Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum anima hominis corrumpatur ad corruptionem corporis Whether the soul of man is corrupted at the corruption of the body Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima hominis corrupto corpore corrumpatur. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the soul of man is corrupted when the body is corrupted. Primo per hoc quod habetur Eccle. 3:19: unus interitus est hominis et jumentorum. Sed jumenta simul in corpore et in anima intereunt. Ergo videtur quod etiam homo. Obj. 1: This is first because Ecclesiastes 3:19 says, the fate of the sons of men and the fate of beasts is the same; as one dies, so dies the other. They all have the same breath, and man has no advantage over the beasts. But beasts die in body and soul at the same time. Therefore, it seems that man does as well. Praeterea, differentiae superiores participantur uniformiter ab his quae conveniunt in aliquo inferiori; sicut omne animal aequaliter se habet ut dicatur corporeum. Sed incorruptibile et corruptibile sunt differentiae entis. Ergo eodem modo conveniunt omnibus quae sunt in aliquo determinato genere. Sed in omnibus animalibus accidit corruptio per hoc quod forma eorum in non ens secedit. Ergo videtur quod similiter in hominibus. Obj. 2: Furthermore, higher differences are participated in uniformly by things that agree in something lower, just as every animal has equal standing to be called “corporeal.” But “incorruptible” and “corruptible” are differences of beings. Therefore, they befit everything in a given genus in the same way. But in all animals corruption occurs through the fact that their form withdraws into non-being. Therefore, it seems that the case is similar in men. Praeterea, quorumcumque est unum esse, non potest corrumpi unum sine corruptione alterius, cum corruptio sit mutatio de esse in non esse. Sed formae et materiae est unum esse, cum esse debeatur composito, quod ex utroque resultat. Ergo non potest esse corruptio materiae sine corruptione formae. Sed anima est forma corporis, ut in 2 De anima habetur. Ergo corrupto corpore etiam anima corrumpitur. Obj. 3: Furthermore, whenever things possess a single being, one cannot be corrupted without the corruption of the other, since corruption is the change from being to non-being. But form and matter have a single being, since being belongs to the composite, which results from both. Therefore, there cannot be a corruption of matter without corruption of form. But the soul is the form of the body, as is related in On the Soul 2. Therefore, when the body is corrupted, the soul too is corrupted. Si dicatur, quod anima etiam est forma et substantia, et post mortem non manet inquantum est forma, sed inquantum est substantia; Obj. 4: One might say that the soul is both a form and a substance, and that after death it does not remain inasmuch as it is a form, but rather inasmuch as it is a substance. contra. Aut anima est forma per essentiam suam, aut per aliquod accidens suum. Si primo modo, ergo cum unius rei non sint plures essentiae, si anima post mortem non manet inquantum est forma, essentia sua penitus annihilabitur. Si autem secundo modo, cum ex anima et corpore non constituatur unum quod est homo nisi inquantum anima est forma corporis, sequeretur quod homo sit ens per accidens, et non significet aliquid in praedicamento substantiae, quod est valde absurdum. Ergo videtur quod post mortem nullo modo anima remaneat. On the contrary, either the soul is a form through its essence or through some accident in it. If in the first way, then since nothing has more than one essence, and if the soul does not remain after death inasmuch as it is a form, then its essence will be thoroughly annihilated. But if in the second way, then since from the soul and the body a single thing, that is, man, is only constituted inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it would follow that “man” is a being incidentally and does not signify something in the category of substance, which is quite absurd. Therefore, it seems that after death the soul in no way remains. Praeterea, ut in 1 Caeli et mundi, cap. 12, probat Philosophus, impossibile est quod aliquid habeat virtutem ad essendum semper, quod non semper fuit: quia virtus quae est ad hoc ut sit semper, determinatur ad tempus infinitum; et quod in tempore infinito potest esse, non habet virtutem determinatam ad hoc ut quandoque sit et quandoque non sit, quod invenitur in omni eo quod esse coepit. Sed anima rationalis non semper fuit, quinimmo cum corpore incepit. Ergo nec semper erit, sed cum corpore finietur. Obj. 5: Furthermore, as the Philosopher proves in On the Heavens 1, it is impossible for something to have the power to exist always that has not always been. For the power for it to exist is always determined to infinite time. Because it can exist for an infinite time, it does not have a power determined to sometimes being and sometimes not being, which is found in everything that begins to be. But the rational soul has not always been, but rather began with the body. Therefore, neither will it always exist, but will instead be ended with the body. Praeterea, cum nulla sit substantia sine propria operatione, ut Damascenus dicit, De fide orth., lib. 2, cap. 23, impossibile est animam separari a corpore, si in omni operatione sua indiget corpore. Sed in intelligendo corpore indiget: quia non est intelligere sine phantasmate, ut in 1 et 3 De anima dicitur, et hujusmodi intelligere corrumpitur corrupto corpore, ut in 1 De anima dicitur; de aliis etiam operationibus ejus planum est quod sine corpore non exercentur. Ergo animam corpore separatam remanere est impossibile. Obj. 6: Furthermore, since no substance lacks a proper activity, as Damascene says, it is impossible for the soul to be separated from the body if it needs the body in each of its activities. But in understanding it needs the body, since it cannot understand without a phantasm, as is said in On the Soul 3, and understanding of this sort is corrupted when the body is corrupted, as is said in On the Soul 1. With respect to its other activities, too, it is plain that they are not carried out without the body. Therefore, it is impossible for the soul to remain separate from the body. Praeterea, omne quod est ex nihilo, ut Damascenus dicit, De fide orth., lib. 2, cap. 3, vertibile est in nihil. Sed anima, cum sit creatura, ex nihilo est. Ergo videtur quod in nihil vertibilis sit; et ita est corruptibilis. Obj. 7: Furthermore, everything that comes from nothing, as Damascene says, can turn back to nothing. But the soul, since it is a thing created, comes from nothing. Therefore, it seems that it can turn back to nothing. And thus, it is corruptible. In contrarium est quod dicit Philosophus in 2 De anima, quod reliquum genus animae, scilicet intellectus, separatur ab aliis partibus animae, sicut perpetuum a corruptibili; et in 1 De anima, quod intellectus videtur substantia quaedam esse, et non corrumpi: non enim corrumpitur per se, cum etiam inferiores vires, ut sensitivae, de quibus minus videtur, debilitentur tantum ex indispositione organorum: nec etiam per accidens, cum non sit forma super aliud delata, sed substantia quaedam per se subsistens. On the contrary, the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2 that the remaining kind of soul, namely, the intellect, is separated from the other parts of the soul as perpetual from corruptible. And in On the Soul 1, he says that the intellect seems to be a kind of substance and is not corrupted. For it is not corrupted through itself, since even lower powers such as the sensitive powers, where the point is less evident, are weakened only due to indisposition of organs. Nor is it corrupted incidentally, since it is not a form superimposed on another, but rather a kind of substance subsisting through itself. Praeterea, in 10 Ethic., cap. 7, Philosophus probat felicitatem contemplativam activa digniorem esse, quia est diuturnior. Sed felicitas activa extenditur usque ad terminum hujus corporalis vitae. Ergo contemplativa remanet etiam post hanc vitam. Non autem in corpore. Ergo in anima. Furthermore, in the Ethics 10, the Philosopher proves that contemplative happiness is more worthy than active happiness, since it is more prolonged. But active happiness extends up to the limit of this bodily life. Therefore, contemplative happiness remains even after this life. But it does not remain in the body. Therefore, it is in the soul. Praeterea, ad Deum pertinet habere curam et providentiam de omnibus quae in mundo fiunt, et praecipue de his quae circa homines geruntur, et praecipue circa bonos, et qui sunt Deo simillimi, ut habetur ex verbis Philosophi, 10 Ethicorum, cap. 7, quod homo sapiens est Deo simillimus, et sibi amantissimus. Sed non potest esse sine injustitia provisoris et gubernantis, ut mali non puniantur et boni non praemientur. Cum ergo injustitia in Deum cadere non possit, oportet omne malum puniri, et omne bonum praemiari. Hoc autem in vita ista non contingit, cum frequenter bona malis eveniant, et e converso. Ergo videtur quod hoc erit post hanc vitam. Furthermore, it pertains to God to have care and providence for everything that happens in the world, and especially for what happens concerning men, especially concerning the good and those who are most like God, as can be gathered from the words of the Philosopher in the Ethics 10, that a wise man is most like God and most loving to him. But without injustice on the part of the one who provides and governs, it cannot be that the wicked are not punished and the good not rewarded. Therefore, since injustice cannot have any place in God, every wicked person must be punished and every good person rewarded. But this does not occur in this life, since good things frequently happen to the wicked, and vice versa. Therefore, it seems that this will take place after this life. Praeterea, ut in 3 De anima Philosophus dicit, anima est locus specierum. Sed locus conservat locatum. Ergo si similitudo bona est, oportet quod in anima intellectiva, de qua loquitur, species intelligibiles conserventur. Sed intellectus potest intelligere praesentibus intelligibilibus, sicut sensus sentire praesentibus sensibilibus. Ergo anima potest per se in actum intelligendi, sine hoc quod aliquid a corpore accipiat; et ita videtur quod sine corpore esse possit, ex regula quam Aristoteles in principio De anima proponit, quod si anima habet operationem propriam sine corpore, est separabilis. Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3, the soul is the “place” where species reside. But a place preserves what is placed there. So if the likeness is a good one, then in the intellective soul—which is what he is speaking about—intelligible species must be preserved. But the intellect can understand present intelligible things, just as the senses sense present sensible things. Therefore, the soul has the capability by itself for the act of understanding without receiving something from the body. Thus, it seems that it can exist without the body, on the basis of the rule that Aristotle posits in the beginning of On the Soul, that if the soul has a proper activity without the body then it is separable. Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc quattuor sunt positiones. I answer that concerning this there are four positions. Prima fuit antiquorum naturalium, qui intellectum a sensu non discernebant; unde sicut operatio sensus dependet a corpore, ita etiam ponebant intellectus operationem ex corpore dependere et animam intellectivam consequi naturam corporalem: unde quidam ponebant animam esse ignem, quidam vaporem, quidam harmoniam, et sic de aliis, secundum quod tantum sensus et motus animalium considerabant; et ideo secundum eos necessarium fuit ponere animam post corpus non remanere. The first is that of the ancient natural philosophers, who did not distinguish the intellect from the senses. Hence just as the activity of the senses depends on the body, so also they held that the activity of the intellect depends on the body, and that the intellective soul follows on a bodily nature. Hence some posited that the soul is fire, some vapor, others harmony, and so forth, insofar as they considered only the senses and motions of animals. Thus, according to them, it was necessary to hold that the soul does not remain after the body. Hanc autem opinionem Aristoteles, 1 De anima, sufficienter infringit, ostendens intellectum habere esse absolutum, non dependens a corpore; propter quod dicitur non esse actus corporis; et ab Avicenna, De anima, part. 5, cap. 1, dicitur non esse forma submersa in materia; et in libro De causis dicitur non esse super corpus delata. Now, Aristotle sufficiently demolishes this opinion, showing that the intellect has absolute being independent of the body. This is the reason why it is not called an “act of the body,” why Avicenna says it is not a form submerged in matter, and why the Book of Causes says it is not superimposed on the body. Hujus autem probationis medium sumitur ex parte operationis ejus. Cum enim operatio non possit esse nisi rei per se existentis, oportet illud quod per se habet operationem absolutam etiam esse absolutum per se habere. The middle premise for a proof of this is drawn from its activity. For since an activity can only belong to a thing existing through itself, that which has absolute activity through itself must also have absolute existence through itself. Operatio autem intellectus est ipsius absolute, sine hoc quod in hac operatione aliquod organum corporale communicet; quod patet praecipue ex tribus. But the activity of the intellect belongs to it absolutely, without a bodily organ’s sharing in this activity, which is clear especially from three reasons. Primo, quia haec operatio est omnium formarum corporalium sicut objectorum; unde oportet illud principium cujus est haec operatio ab omni forma corporali absolutum esse. The first is because this activity has all bodily forms as its objects. Hence the principle of this activity must not be entangled with any bodily form. Secundo, quia intelligere est universalium; in organo autem corporali recipi non possunt nisi intentiones individuatae. The second is because what is understood are universals, but a bodily organ can only receive individuated intentions. Tertio, quia intellectus intelligit se; quod non contingit in aliqua virtute cujus operatio sit per organum corporale; cujus ratio est, quia, secundum Avicennam, De anima, part. 2, cap. 2, cujuslibet virtutis operantis per organum corporale, oportet ut organum sit medium inter ipsam et objectum ejus. Visus enim nihil cognoscit nisi illud cujus species potest fieri in pupilla. Unde cum non sit possibile ut organum corporale cadat medium inter virtutem aliquam et ipsam essentiam virtutis, non erit possibile ut aliqua virtus operans mediante organo corporali cognoscat seipsam. Et haec probatio tangitur in libro De causis, in illa propositione 15: omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam, est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa. Et dicitur redire complete ad essentiam, ut ibi Commentator exponit, cujus essentia est fixa stans, non super aliud delata. Ex quibus omnibus patet quod anima intellectiva habet esse absolutum, non dependens ad corpus; unde corrupto corpore non corrumpitur. The third is because the intellect understands itself, which does not occur in a power whose activity is through a bodily organ. The reason for this is that, in keeping with Avicenna, for any power that operates through a bodily organ, the organ must stand as a medium between it and its object. For sight knows nothing except that whose species can be made present in the pupil. Hence, since it is not possible for a bodily organ to stand as a medium between a power and the very essence of the power, it will not be possible for a power that operates by the mediation of a bodily organ to know itself. This proof is touched on in the Book of Causes: every knower who knows his essence returns to his essence by a complete returning. As the Commentator explains, that one is said to return completely to his essence whose essence is fixed and stable, not superimposed on another. From all these arguments it is clear that the intellective soul has absolute being independent of the body. Hence, when the body is corrupted, the soul is not corrupted. Secunda fuit Pythagorae et Platonis, qui, videntes incorruptionem animae, erraverunt in hoc quod posuerunt animas de corpore in corpus transire. Et hanc positionem improbat Philosophus in 1 De anima, ostendens quod anima est forma corporis et motor ejus. Oportet autem ut determinatae formae determinata materia debeatur, et determinato motori determinatum organum, sicut quaelibet ars in agente utitur propriis instrumentis: unde haec anima non potest esse forma et motor nisi hujus corporis. The second position was that of Pythagoras and Plato, who, perceiving the incorruption of the soul, erred in holding that souls pass from body to body. The Philosopher disproves this position in On the Soul 1, showing that the soul is the form of the body and its mover. But a determinate form must have determinate matter and a determinate mover must have a determinate organ, just as any art in an agent uses its proper instruments. Hence this soul can only be the form and mover of this body. Tertia positio est eorum qui dicunt, animam intellectivam secundum quid corruptibilem esse, et secundum quid incorruptibilem; quia secundum hoc quod de anima est huic corpori proprium, corrumpitur corrupto corpore; secundum autem id quod omnibus est commune, incorruptibilis est. Ponunt enim intellectum esse unum in substantia omnium; quidam agentem et quidam possibilem, ut supra dictum est: et hunc esse substantiam incorruptibilem, et in nobis non esse nisi phantasmata illustrata, lumine intellectus agentis, et moventia intellectum possibilem, quibus intelligentes sumus, secundum quod per ea continuamur intellectui separato. Ex quo sequitur quod si id quod est proprium destruitur, tantum communi remanente, ex omnibus animabus humanis una tantum substantia remaneat, dissolutis corporibus. The third position is that of those who say that the intellective soul is corruptible in one qualified sense and incorruptible in another qualified sense. For as regards what in the soul is proper to this body, it is corrupted when the body is corrupted. But as regards what is common to all, it is incorruptible. For they posit that there is a single intellect in the substance of all: some say it is the agent intellect and others the potential intellect, as has been said above. They hold that this is an incorruptible substance, and that in us there are only the phantasms enlightened by the light of the agent intellect, which move the potential intellect, by which we have understanding insofar as through them we are connected to that separated intellect. From this it follows that if that which is proper is destroyed, with only what is common remaining, then, at the dissolution of bodies, only one single substance remains from all human souls. Haec autem positio quibus rationibus innitatur, et quomodo improbari possit, supra dictum est, dist. 17. The arguments supporting this position and how it can be disproved have been explained above. Quarta positio est quam fides nostra tenet, quod anima intellectiva sit substantia non dependens ex corpore, et quod sint plures intellectivae substantiae secundum corporum multitudinem, et quod, destructis corporibus, remanent separatae, non in alia corpora transeuntes; sed in resurrectione idem corpus numero quod deposuerat unaquaeque assumat. The fourth position is that which our faith holds: that the intellective soul is a substance that does not depend on the body, that there is more than one intellective substance corresponding to the multitude of bodies, and that they remain separate when bodies are destroyed, not passing into other bodies. Rather, in the resurrection each soul assumes the same body numerically that it had laid aside. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Salomon ibi loquitur more concionatoris, assumens in se diversorum hominum sententias, et sapientum, et stultorum; ut in fine omnibus appareat quae sit verior sententia; unde concludit quasi sententiam proferens, dicens, cap. 12:13: finem loquendi omnes pariter audiamus: Deum time, et mandata ejus observa. Et hoc est unum ex illis quae ab eo in persona stultorum inducuntur. Reply Obj. 1: In that passage Solomon is speaking in the customary manner of an orator, appropriating the opinions of different men, both the wise and the foolish, so that in the end it may be apparent to all which is the truer opinion. Hence he concludes as though pronouncing his own opinion: let us all hear together the conclusion of the discourse: fear God, and keep his commandments (Eccl 12:13). This is one of those things that are cited by him in the person of the foolish. Ad secundum dicendum, quod corruptio invenitur in omnibus corruptibilibus secundum unam rationem communem, quantum ad id quod per se corruptioni convenit, sed non quantum ad id quod accidit ei. Cum enim corruptio sit proprie compositi transmutatio de esse in non esse, hoc per se ad corruptionem pertinet ut compositum esse desistat; et quia compositum habet esse ex conjunctione formae ad materiam, ideo divisio formae a tali materia invenitur in qualibet corruptione; sed quod forma in nihil cadat, vel non, hoc corruptioni accidit ex ratione propria hujus formae vel illius. Si enim sit forma talis cujus esse sit absolutum et non dependens, in cujus esse participationem materia adducitur ex hoc quod perficitur tali forma, contingit ut ex defectu materiae compositum hujusmodi esse amittat, secundum hoc quod improportionata ad ipsum efficitur: et tamen ipsa forma remanet in suo esse, et sic destructio est compositi, forma remanente. Si vero forma non habeat esse absolutum in quo subsistat, sed sit per esse compositi, tunc ex quo compositum desinit esse, oportet quod forma etiam esse amittat, et per accidens corrumpatur. Reply Obj. 2: The same account of corruption is found in all corruptible things as regards what belongs to corruption through itself, but not as regards what is incidental to it. For since corruption is properly the transmutation from being into non-being of the composite, it pertains to corruption through itself that the composite cease to be. Because the composite has being from the union of form with matter, the separation of form from such matter is found in any corruption. But whether the form falls into nothing or not happens to accompany corruption due to the proper account of this or that form. For if it is the sort of form whose being is absolute and independent, into whose being matter is brought to participate due to the fact that it is perfected by such a form, it happens that due to a defect in the matter this sort of composite loses being, inasmuch as the matter is rendered disproportionate to it. Yet the form itself remains in its own being, and so the destruction is of the composite while the form remains. However, if the form does not have an absolute being in which to subsist, but rather exists through the being of the composite, then from the fact that the composite ceases to be, the form also must lose being and is corrupted incidentally. Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Commentator in 3 De anima, intellectus non eodem modo dicitur forma cum aliis formis materialibus; quod quantum ad hoc dico verum esse, licet ipse aliud intendat, quod anima cum habeat esse absolutum, ut ejus operatio ostendit, non habet esse per esse compositi, quin potius compositum per esse ejus; et ideo corrupto corpore non corrumpitur per accidens anima sicut aliae formae, quae non sunt nisi per esse compositi, nec aliquam operationem habent nisi mediante materia. Reply Obj. 3: As the Commentator says on On the Soul 3, the intellect is not called a “form” in the same way as other material forms. And I say that this is true in the following respect (granted that he himself intends something else): namely, that the soul, since it has absolute existence, as its activity shows, does not have existence through the existence of the composite, but rather it is the composite that has its existence through the soul’s existence. Thus, when the body is corrupted, the soul is not incidentally corrupted, like other forms that only exist through the existence of the composite and only have an activity by the mediation of matter. Ad quartum dicendum, quod anima rationalis praeter alias formas dicitur esse substantia, et hoc aliquid, secundum quod habet esse absolutum, et quod distinguitur; quia anima potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet secundum quod est substantia, et secundum quod est forma, non est intelligendum quantum ad diversa quae in ipsa sunt, quasi aliud sit essentia sua et aliud ipsam esse formam, ut sic esse formam accidat sibi sicut color corpori: sed distinctio accipitur secundum ejus diversam considerationem; non enim ex hoc quod est forma habet quod post corpus remaneat, sed ex hoc quod habet esse absolutum, ut substantia subsistens: sicut etiam homo non habet quod intelligat ex hoc quod est animal, sed ex hoc quod est rationalis, quamvis utrumque sit sibi essentiale. Reply Obj. 4: More than other forms, the rational soul is said to be a substance and a this-something because it has absolute being. And there is a distinction because the soul can be considered in two ways, namely, as a substance and as a form, and this should not be understood to refer to different things within the soul itself, as if its essence were one thing and the fact that it is a form another, so that being a form would be incidental to it as color is to a body. Rather, the distinction is made with reference to different considerations of the soul. For the fact that it remains after the body is not due to its being a form, but rather to its having absolute being as a subsisting substance, just as man does not have understanding from the fact that he is an animal, but rather from the fact that he is rational, even though both are essential to him. Ad quintum dicendum, quod ex ratione illa non plus probatur quam hoc, scilicet quod id quod habet virtutem ad hoc ut sit semper, dum habet illam virtutem, non terminat esse suum ad aliquod tempus ante vel post, quasi non potuerit per hanc virtutem plus quam certo tempore durasse; et hoc etiam in anima verum est: quia per virtutem quam modo habet, potuisset per mille millia annorum durasse. Sed quia hanc virtutem a se non habet, sed ab alio, tunc ex hac virtute incepit sua duratio quando haec virtus data est sibi. Reply Obj. 5: From this argument nothing more than this is proved: that what has the power to exist always, while it has this power, does not terminate its being at a given time before or after, as if through this power it could not endure for more than a certain time. And this is also true in the soul, since through the power that it now has, it would have been able to endure for a million years. But because it does not have this power from itself, but rather from another, its duration by this power began when the power was given to it. Ad sextum dicendum, quod intelligere cum aliquo vel sine aliquo dicitur dupliciter. Vel hoc modo quod illud etiam intelligatur esse particeps operationis, sicut organum virtutis visivae simul cum virtute visiva videt, quia videre est compositi, et sic intellectus omnino sine corpore intelligit, quia haec operatio non perficitur mediante organo corporali; vel ita quod illud sit objectum operationis, sicut visus non potest videre sine colore, et hoc modo etiam intellectus in statu viae non potest intelligere sine phantasmate, quod se habet ad intellectum sicut color ad visum, ut Philosophus in 3 De anima dicit. Et ex hoc non ostenditur quod anima intellectiva habeat esse dependens ad corpus, cum operatio egrediatur ab ipsa absolute. Sed post mortem alium modum intelligendi habebit, de quo locus erit inquirendi in fine quarti libri. Reply Obj. 6: To understand with or without something is spoken of in two ways. Either it is in such a way that the thing is also understood to be a participant in the work, as the organ of the power of sight sees together with the power of sight, since to see belongs to the composite. In this way, the intellect understands altogether without the body, since this activity is not perfected by the mediation of a bodily organ. Or it is such that the thing is the object of the activity, as sight cannot see without color. In this way, even the intellect in the wayfaring state cannot understand without a phantasm, which is related to the intellect as color is to sight, as the Philosopher says. This does not show that the intellective soul has being that depends on the body, since its activity proceeds from it absolutely. Rather, after death it will have another mode of understanding, about which there will be a place for inquiry at the end of Book IV. Ad septimum dicendum, quod vertibilitas in nihil, nihil aliud ponit in creatura quam dependentiam esse ejus ad principium a quo esse habet; adeo quod si influentia ejus cessaret, quaelibet creatura esse desisteret. Sed ex hoc non potest creatura corruptibilis dici, ut in 1 libro dictum est, dist. 8. Reply Obj. 7: The ability to turn back into nothing posits nothing in the created thing other than that it possesses a dependency on the principle from which it has being; this is to such an extent that anything created would cease to be if that principle’s influence ceased. But a created thing cannot be called “corruptible” on this basis, as has been said in Book I. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum homo in primo statu habuerit necessitatem moriendi Whether man in his first state had the necessity of dying