Sed contra. Nonne Dominus dedit legem per Moysen? But against this: did not the Lord give the law through Moses? Videte, sicut dicit Apostolus I ad Cor. VII, 25: de virginibus praeceptum Domini non habeo, consilium autem do. Unde aliquando dicebat quod a Domino acceperat, aliquando ex industria sibi inspirata: sic et Moyses. Istud autem permisit, non quod audisset a Domino, sed ab inspiratione divina, non tamen auctoritate firmata. See, as the Apostle says, now concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord; but I give counsel (1 Cor 7:25). Hence sometimes he spoke what he had received from the Lord, and sometimes, out of diligence, what was inspired in him: so also Moses. And he permitted this, not because he had heard from the Lord, but by divine inspiration, yet not with firm authority. 1557. Ad duritiam cordis vestri permisit vobis dimittere uxores vestras. Ipsi dixerant quod Moyses mandavit; sed non mandavit, sed permisit. De duritia eorum habetur Act. VII, 51: dura cervice, et incircumcisis cordibus et auribus, vos semper Spiritui Sancto restitistis. 1557. Because Moses by reason of the hardness of your heart permitted you to put away your wives. These men had said that Moses commanded it; but he did not command it, but rather permitted it. About their hardness it says, you stiffnecked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, you always resist the Holy Spirit (Acts 7:51). Hic solet esse quaestio, utrum illi peccent mortaliter, qui uxores dimittunt. Here there is usually a question, whether those who send away their wives sin mortally. Quidam dixerunt quod dimittentes peccabant mortaliter. Permissio enim quatuor modis accipitur. Dicitur permitti aliquid, quando contrarium non praecipitur, ut minus bonum permittitur, quia maius bonum non praecipitur, ut Apostolus dicit I Cor. VII, 6: secundum indulgentiam dico vobis. Item quandoque per privationem prohibitionis; et sic peccata venialia sunt permissa. Quandoque autem per privationem impedimenti: et sic omnia mala, quae fiunt in praesenti, dicuntur aliquando etiam ‘permissa,’ quia poena non adhibetur. Ideo Iudaeis quaedam permissa fuerunt, quae erant mortalia peccata, quia poena non fuit eis inflicta. Some have said that those who sent them away sinned mortally. Something is said to be permitted when the contrary is not commanded, as a lesser good is permitted because the greater good is not commanded, as the Apostle says, but I speak this by indulgence, not by commandment (1 Cor 7:6). Sometimes also through lack of a prohibition; and in this way, venial sins are permitted. But sometimes through lack of an impediment, and in this way all the evil things which happen in the present are also sometimes called ‘permitted,’ because no punishment is applied. Therefore, certain things had been permitted to the Jews which were mortal sins, because no punishment was inflicted on them. Sed istud habet locum in mundanis rebus: sic enim videmus, quod secundum leges humanas non punitur fornicatio simplex; unde si lex vetus solum inspiciat ad vitam praesentem, sic solutio est bona. Sed quia quamvis secundum corticem ad vitam pertineat praesentem, tamen secundum medullam pertinet etiam ad vitam aeternam Ex. XV, 25: dedi eis praecepta mea; et Dominus dicit iuveni, infra eodem: si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata ideo dicunt alii quod male provisum esset populo illi, si quod esset peccatum ignoraret, cum tamen scriptum sit, Is. LVIII, 1: nuntia populo peccata eorum. Ideo dicit Chrysostomus, quod a peccato abstulit peccati culpam. Et licet inordinatum quid esset, noluit tamen quod eis imputaretur ad culpam, ut Dominus Osee praecepit, ut faceret filios fornicationis: unde permissio non fuit ex praecepto, sed ad vitandum maius malum. But this holds true only in earthly affairs. For in this way we see that simple fornication is not punished according to human laws; hence if the old law looked only to the present life, then the solution is good. But since, although according to its outer shell it pertains to the present life, yet according to its inner kernel it pertains also to eternal life: and I gave them my statutes (Ezek 20:11); and the Lord says the same thing to the young man, below: but if you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. For this reason, others say that this people would be badly provided for if it did not know what was a sin, while yet it is written, cry, cease not, lift up your voice like a trumpet, and show my people their wicked doings (Isa 58:1). So Chrysostom says that he took from the sin the guilt of sin. And although it was something disordered, yet he did not will that it be reckoned to them as guilt, just as the Lord commanded Hosea to have children of fornication (Hos 1:2). Hence the permission was not by commandment, but for avoiding a greater evil. Ab initio autem non fuit sic. Unde actuale fuit, non ab initio institutum: unde post multos annos nullus dimisit uxorem. But from the beginning it was not so. Hence it was practical, not established from the beginning. Hence for many years, no one sent his wife away. 1558. Dico autem vobis et cetera. Hic inducit legem. 1558. And I say to you, that whoever puts away his wife. Here he brings in the law. Primo pro viro; First, for a man; secundo pro muliere. second, for a woman. 1559. Dicit ergo quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam et cetera. Sed excipitur fornicatio. 1559. He says then, whoever puts away his wife. But fornication is excepted. Sed videte quod duplex est fornicatio, scilicet corporalis et spiritualis. Unde propter utrumque potest dimittere, ut habetur I ad Cor. VII, 11: si unus infidelis, alter fidelis, potest dimittere fidelis infidelem. But see that there are two kinds of fornication, i.e., bodily and spiritual. Hence one can put away one’s wife on account of either: if one is an unbeliever, the other a believer, the believer can put away the unbeliever (1 Cor 7:11). Notandum, quod per nullum impedimentum sequens potest dissolvi vinculum matrimonii, quia significat unionem Christi et Ecclesiae: unde cum unio Christi et Ecclesiae dissolvi non possit, nec unio matrimonii. Sed propter fornicationem potest a consortio separari, et non debet eam secum retinere, ne videatur esse conscius turpitudinis; sed pro aliis turpitudinibus non potest, ut pro ebrietate. Item si vult hominem inducere ad infidelitatem, potest dimittere eam. One should note that the bond of matrimony cannot be dissolved by any impediment coming afterward, because it signifies the union of Christ and the Church; hence because the union of Christ and the Church cannot be dissolved, neither can the union of matrimony. But a partnership can be divided on account of fornication, and a man should not retain her with him, lest he seem to be an accomplice in her baseness; but the partnership cannot be divided for other basenesses, as for drunkenness. Likewise, if she wishes to lead a man into unbelief, he can put her away. Sed quare fit mentio magis de fornicatione corporali, quam de spirituali? Quia est contra fidem matrimonii: et fidem frangenti fides non est servanda. Alia ratio est quam ponit Origenes, quia supra V, 32 dixit Dominus qui dimiserit uxorem, excepta causa fornicationis, facit eam moechari, et ideo dat ei occasionem moechandi; sed postquam ipsa peccavit, non dat ei occasionem moechandi, ideo post potest dimittere, non ante. But why is bodily fornication mentioned more than spiritual? Because it is against the faith of matrimony, and the faith of one who breaks faith is not to be preserved. Another reason is what Origen sets down, for above, the Lord said, whoever will put away his wife, except for the cause of fornication, makes her commit adultery (Matt 5:32), and so gives her an occasion of committing adultery; but after she herself has sinned, he does not give her an occasion of committing adultery. Therefore he can put her away afterward, but not before. 1560. Et qui aliam duxerit, moechatur. Sed quare non, nisi aliam ducat? Quia eadem res per ea quae solvitur, ligatur. Unde quando homo habet uxorem separatam, et non aliam, adhuc spes remanet quod uniri possint, vel per consimile peccatum, vel per animorum consensum; sed quando aliam duxit, tunc cor totaliter separavit, et assensum ab ea. 1560. And marries another, commits adultery. But why does he not commit adultery unless he marries another? Because the same is bound by the things through which it is dissolved. Hence when a man is separated from his wife, and does not have another, there still remains hope that they can be united, either through a similar sin, or through the consent of souls; but when he marries another, then the heart entirely separates, and sets itself away from her. Alia ratio, quia si praeter fornicationem posset dimittere uxorem suam, aliquando accideret quod homo imponeret uxori suae crimen, ut ab ea separaretur, et alii coniungeretur; ideo Dominus voluit quod non haberet aliam. Unde expresse prohibet, quod non habeat homo diversas uxores, quia, una dimissa, et alia accepta, moechatur. Another reason is that if in addition to fornication one could put away his wife, it would sometimes happen that a man would bring a charge against his wife in order to be separated from her, and joined to another. For this reason, the Lord willed that he not have another. Hence he expressly forbids that a man should have different wives, because, having put one away and taken another, he commits adultery. 1561. Et qui dimissam duxerit, moechatur. Hic ponit legem quantum ad mulierem: unde non vult quod uxor dimissa habeat virum. 1561. And he who marries her who is put away, commits adultery. Here he sets out the law as regards the woman: hence he does not will that a wife who has been put away should have a husband. Sed quare prohibet viro ne contrahat cum ea, et non mulieri? Respondeo, quod mulieres magis ad malum praecipites sunt. Ier. III, 3: frons mulieris meretricis facta est tibi. Ideo per istam prohibitionem praecipitaretur ad mala maiora. Ideo praecipit viro, quod non contrahat, non autem prohibet mulieri. But why does he forbid a man to marry her, and not forbid the woman to marry? I respond that women are more prone toward evil. You had a harlot’s forehead (Jer 3:3). Therefore she would be hastened on toward greater evil by this prohibition. So he commands the man that he not marry, but does not forbid the woman. Sed quid? Nonne licebat ei, quae repudiata erat, accipere alium? Dicunt quidam quod non, quia adhuc manebat vinculum: et inducunt illud quod habetur Deut. XXIV, quod non poterit reverti ad priorem, quia polluta est; sed nisi peccasset, redire posset. Alii dicunt quod poterat alteri nubere, sed non isti, quia si posset ad eum redire, facilius repudiaret eam. But why? Was it not lawful for her who had been rejected to take another? Some say that it was not, because the bond still remained. And they bring in that which is written: that she could not return to her prior husband, because she was defiled; but if she had not sinned, she could go back (Deut 24). Others say that she was able to marry another, but not this man, because if she could return to him, he would reject her more easily. Quid ergo dicis, quod polluta est? Dico quod est polluta isti, quia ad eum redire non potest. Vel potest intelligi de immunditia legis, quia sacerdos non poterat eam habere. So why do you say that she was defiled? I say that she is defiled for this man, because she cannot go back to him. Or it can be understood as about the uncleanness of the law, because the priest could not have her. 1562. Dixerunt ei discipuli: si ita est causa hominis cum uxore, non expedit nubere. Postquam Dominus egit de insolutione matrimonii, hic tractat de perfectione continentium: 1562. His disciples say to him: if the case of a man with his wife is so, it is not expedient to marry. After the Lord treated of the indissolubility of matrimony, here he treats of the perfection of abstinence. et circa hoc duo facit. And concerning this he does two things: Primo ponit sententiam discipulorum; first, he sets out the disciples’ thought; secundo sententiam Christi, ibi qui dixit illis et cetera. second, Christ’s thought, at he said to them: all men do not take this word. 1563. Dicit ergo dixerunt discipuli: si ita est causa hominis cum uxore, non expedit nubere. Moti sunt ad hoc dicendum, quia audierant quod non poterat uxor dimitti nisi ob unam causam, cum tamen multae aliae causae reddant matrimonium onerosum, ut aliqua immunditia, ut lepra et huiusmodi; ita quod impleatur illud quod in Eccli. XXV, v. 23 dicitur: commorari leoni et urso melius est quam cum muliere nequam. Item multam affert sollicitudinem; I Cor. VII, 34: si virgo nubat, cogitat quae sunt mundi. Ideo ex hoc arguunt quod expedit cuilibet homini non nubere; ideo Dominus temperat, quia contingit esse aliquid melius dupliciter: vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid; sic continere aliquibus competit, aliquibus non: quia, ut dicit Apostolus I ad Cor. VII, 9, melius est nubere, quam uri. 1563. His disciples say to him: if the case of a man with his wife is so, it is not expedient to marry. They were moved to say this because they had heard that a man could not put away a wife except for one cause, while yet many other causes render matrimony burdensome, such as some uncleanness, like leprosy and suchlike; so that it is fulfilled which is said: it will be more agreeable to abide with a lion and a dragon, than to dwell with a wicked woman (Sir 25:23). Likewise, it introduces anxiety; but she who is married thinks on the things of the world (1 Cor 7:34). Therefore, they argued from this that it is expedient for any man not to marry. So the Lord tempers this conclusion, because something can be better in two ways: either simply, or in a certain respect. Thus to abstain belongs to some and not to others; for, as the Apostle says, for it is better to marry than to be burnt (1 Cor 7:9). 1564. Qui dixit illis approbat sententiam discipulorum. Et 1564. He said to them. He approves the disciples’ thought. And primo dictis; first, in words; secundo factis, ibi tunc oblati sunt ei parvuli. Et second, in deeds, at then little children were presented to him. primo approbat continentiam; And first, he approves abstinence; secundo assignat differentias continentium ibi sunt enim eunuchi etc.; second, he gives the differences of abstinence, at for there are eunuchs; tertio difficultatem, ibi qui potest capere capiat. third, the difficulty, at he who can take, let him take it. 1565. Dicit ergo qui dixit illis: non omnes capiunt istud verbum. Ita dicitis quod non expedit nubere: verum est aliquibus, sed non est verum quoad omnes, quia non omnes, habent tantam virtutem, quod abstineant; sed quibus datum est, quia aliquibus datum est non ex proprio facto, sed dono gratiae. Sap. c. VIII, 21: scivi quod aliter non possum esse continens, nisi Deus det. Quod enim homo in carne vivat praeter carnem, non hominis est, sed Dei; I ad Cor. VII, 7: volo omnes homines esse sicut meipsum, sed unusquisque proprium donum habet ex Deo, alius quidem sic, alius vero sic. 1565. It says then he said to them: all men do not take this word. Thus you say that it is not expedient to marry. This is true for some, but it is not true with regard to all, because not all have such great virtue that they may abstain, but they to whom it is given, because to some it is given not from their own deed, but by the gift of grace. And as I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it (Wis 8:21). For that a man in the flesh should live beyond the flesh is not of man, but of God; for I would that all men were even as myself: but every one has his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that (1 Cor 7:7). 1566. Et quia possent credere quod omnes continere possent, ideo dicit sunt enim eunuchi et cetera. Unde distinguit, quod est continentia in aliquibus ex natura, aliquando ex violentia, aliquando ex voluntate. Ideo tria genera eunuchorum tangit: quia quidam per naturam qui a matris utero sic nati sunt. Sicut aliqui monstruose nascuntur propter defectum manus, sic et aliqui sine genitalibus: et hoc ex Dei providentia, quia si omnia secundum communem cursum naturae acciderent, attribueretur totum naturae, et non divinae providentiae; unde Sap. VIII, 8: signa et monstra scit antequam fiant. 1566. And because they could think that all can abstain, he says, for there are eunuchs. Hence he makes the distinction that there is abstinence in some by nature, sometimes by violence, and sometimes by will. Therefore he touches upon three kinds of eunuchs. For some are eunuchs by nature, who were born so from their mother’s womb. As some are born monstrously, because of a defect of the hand, so also some are born without genitals. And this is from God’s providence, because if all things happened according to the common course of nature, the whole would be attributed to nature, and not to divine providence; hence, she knows signs and monsters before they are done (Wis 8:8). 1567. Item quidam per violentiam, ut illi qui castrantur a tyrannis vel barbaris, vel qui castrantur propter custodiam mulierum. Qui sunt facti ab hominibus, quos scilicet vel crudelitas hominum castravit, vel conservantia mulierum. Et hoc dicit Hieronymus quod scit, quia pueri acciperentur, et castrarentur, et ponerentur in domo Nabuchodonosor. 1567. Likewise, there are some who are eunuchs by violence, such as those who are castrated by tyrants or barbarians, or who are castrated for the sake of guarding women. Who were made so by men, namely those whom either the cruelty of men or the preservation of women has castrated. And Jerome says that he knows this, because boys were taken and castrated, and placed in the house of Nabuchodonosor. 1568. Quidam vero voluntate, ut dicit et sunt eunuchi, qui castraverunt seipsos propter regnum caelorum. Quidam male intellexerunt verbum istud, dicentes scindenda esse genitalia, et leguntur hoc quidam fecisse, de quibus dicitur fuisse Origenes. Sed istud reprobatum est, et separari debent a clero, capit. ex parte, et capitul. significavit, extra de corp. Vit. 1568. But some are eunuchs by will, as he says: and there are eunuchs, who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. Some have understood these words in a bad way, saying that the genitals should be cut off, and it is written that some have done this, of whom one is said to have been Origen. But this should be reproved, and should be kept out of the clergy (Decrees, I, 20, 3). Unde datur occasio errori Manichaeorum, qui creaturam corporalem dixerunt esse causam mali. Item datur occasio errori gentilium, quia quidam in sacrificiis suis eunuchantur. Item hoc factum non est in utilitatem, quia tales, etsi actum non habent, a concupiscentia tamen non sunt immunes. Unde Eccli. XX, v. 2. Concupiscentia spadonis devirginabit iuvenculam. Ideo melius est quod homo sibi fraenum imponat, quam membrum abscindat, ut malas cogitationes et desideria refraenet. Is. I, 16: auferte malas cogitationes a cordibus vestris. From this an occasion is given for the error of the Manichees, who said that the bodily creation is the cause of evil. Likewise, an occasion is given for the error of the gentiles, because some are made eunuchs in their sacrifices. Likewise, this is not useful when done, because such men, even though they do not have the act, still they are not free from concupiscence. Hence, the lust of an eunuch shall devour a young maiden (Sir 20:2). Therefore it is better that a man impose restraint on himself than that he cut off a member to restrain evil thoughts and desires. Remove the evil thoughts from your hearts (Isa 1:16).