Circa primum tria facit. In regard to the first he does three things: Primo proponit documentum; first, he proposes his teaching; secundo rationem assignat, ibi non enim est potestas, etc.; second, he assigns a reason, at for there is no power but from God; tertio infert conclusionem intentam, ibi ideoque, et cetera. third, he draws the conclusion, at therefore. 1017. Circa primum considerandum est quod quidam fideles in primitiva Ecclesia dicebant terrenis potestatibus se subiici non debere propter libertatem, quam consecuti erant a Christo, secundum illud Io. VIII, v. 36: si Filius vos liberaverit, vere liberi eritis. Sed libertas per Christum concessa, est libertas spiritus qua liberamur a peccato et morte, sicut supra VIII, 2 dictum est: lex Spiritus in Christo Iesu liberavit me a lege peccati et mortis. Caro autem adhuc remanet servituti obnoxia, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo tunc nulli subiectioni homo, per Christum liberatus, erit obnoxius, nec spirituali scilicet, nec carnali. Unde dicitur I Cor. XV, 24: Cum tradiderit Christus regnum Deo Patri, et evacuaverit omnem principatum et potestatem. 1017. In regard to the first it should be noted that in the early Church some believers said that they should not be subject to earthly powers on account of the freedom they received from Christ, since it says in John: if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed (John 8:36). But the freedom granted by Christ is a freedom of the spirit, by which we are set free of sin and death, as was said above: the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death (Rom 8:2). The flesh, however, remains subject to slavery, as was stated above (Rom 7:14). Therefore, the time when a man freed by Christ will not be liable to any subjection, either spiritual or carnal, will be when Christ delivers the kingdom to God the Father after destroying every rule and every authority and power (1 Cor 15:24). Interim autem dum corruptibilem carnem gerimus, oportet nos dominis carnalibus subiacere. Unde dicitur Eph. VI, 5: servi, obedite dominis carnalibus. Et hoc est etiam quod hic Apostolus dicit omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit. In the meantime, as long as we live in the flesh, we are subject to temporal rulers; hence it says in Ephesians: servants, obey your masters in the flesh (Eph 6:5). And that is what the Apostle says here: let every soul be subject to the higher powers. Potestates autem sublimiores hic dicuntur homines in potestatibus constituti, quibus secundum iustitiae ordinem subiici debemus. I Petr. II, 23: subditi estote omni humanae creaturae propter Deum, sive regi quasi praecellenti, sive ducibus, tamquam ab eo missis, et cetera. What he calls higher powers are men established in power, to whom we owe subjection according to the order of justice: be subject for the Lord’s sake to every human institution, whether it be to the emperor as supreme or to governors as sent by him (1 Pet 2:13). 1018. Dicit autem indefinite potestatibus sublimioribus, ut ratione sublimitatis officii eis subiiciamur, etiam si sint mali. Unde I Petr. II, 18 subditur: subiecti estote non tantum bonis et modestis, sed etiam dyscolis. 1018. And he says indefinitely higher powers so that we may subject ourselves to them by reason of the sublimity of their office, even if they are wicked: be submissive to your masters, not only to the kind and gentle, but also to the overbearing (1 Pet 2:18). 1019. Quod autem dicitur omnis anima, per synecdochen intelligitur omnis homo, sicut et Gen. XVII, 14: delebitur anima illa de populo suo. 1019. The words every soul are to be taken as a synecdoche for every man, as we find in Genesis, that soul shall be destroyed from among his people (Gen 17:14). Utitur autem hoc modo loquendi, quia subiectionem superioribus debemus ex animo, id est ex pura voluntate, secundum illud Eph. c. VI, 6 s.: non ad oculum servientes, quasi hominibus placentes, sed ex animo cum bona voluntate. And he uses this figure of speech because we owe subjection to the authorities from the soul, i.e., from a pure will: not serving to the eye, as though pleasing men, but from the soul with a good will (Eph 6:6). 1020. Deinde cum dicit non est enim potestas, etc., ponit rationem admonitionis praemissae. 1020. Then when he says, for there is no power, he presents the reason for this admonition: Primo quidem ex parte honesti; first, because subjection is honorable; secundo ex parte necessarii, ibi qui autem resistunt, et cetera. second, because it is necessary, at he who resists. Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first he does two things: Primo praemittit duo principia; first, he presents two principles; secundo ex eis concludit, ibi itaque qui resistit, et cetera. second, he concludes from them, at therefore, he who resists. 1021. Primo enim praemittit originem potestatis, dicens non est enim potestas nisi a Deo. 1021. First, therefore, he speaks about the source of power, saying: there is no power except from God. Quicquid enim communiter de Deo et creaturis dicitur, a Deo in creaturas derivatur, sicut patet de sapientia, Eccli. I, 1: omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est. Potestas autem de Deo et de hominibus dicitur. Iob c. XXXVI, 5: Deus potestates non abiicit, cum ipse sit potens. Unde consequens est, quod omnis humana potestas sit a Deo. Dan. c. IV, 14: dominabitur excelsus in regno hominum, et cuicumque voluerit, dabit illud. Io. XIX, 11: non haberes potestatem adversum me ullam, nisi tibi datum esset desuper. For whatever is said in common of God and creatures, comes to creatures from God, as in the case of wisdom: all wisdom comes from God (Sir 1:1). But power is said of God and of men: God does not abandon the powers, since he is powerful (Job 35:5). Hence, it follows that all human power is from God: the most high rules the kingdom of men, and gives it to whom he will (Dan 4:17); you would have no power over me, unless it had been given you from above (John 19:11). 1022. Sed contra hoc esse videtur, quod dicitur Osee VIII, 4: ipsi regnaverunt, et non ex me: principes extiterunt, et non cognovi. 1022. But a passage in Hosea seems to be against this: they made kings, but not through me. They set up princes, but without my knowledge (Hos 8:4). Ad hoc dicendum est, quod regia potestas, vel cuiuscumque alterius dignitatis potest considerari quantum ad tria. Uno quidem modo quantum ad ipsam potestatem, et sic est a Deo, per quem reges regnant, ut dicitur Prov. VIII, 15. The answer is that royal power or the power associated with any other dignity can be considered from three aspects. First, in regard to the power itself, which is from God through whom kings reign (Prov 8:15). Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad modum adipiscendi potestatem, et sic quandoque potestas est a Deo: quando scilicet aliquis ordinate potestatem adipiscitur, secundum illud Hebr. V, 4: nemo sibi honorem assumit, sed qui vocatur a Deo tamquam Aaron. Quandoque vero non est a Deo sed ex perverso hominis appetitu, qui per ambitionem, vel quocumque alio illicito modo potestatem adipiscitur. Amos VI, 14: numquid non in fortitudine nostra assumpsimus nobis cornua? Second, in regard to the way in which power is obtained: from this aspect, power is from God sometimes, namely, when a person obtains it rightfully, as it says in Hebrews: one does not take the honor upon himself, but he is called by God, as Aaron was (Heb 5:4). But sometimes it is not from God but from a perverse desire of a man, who obtains power through ambition or some other unlawful manner: have we not by our own strength taken horns for ourselves? (Amos 6:13). Tertio modo potest considerari quantum ad usum ipsius: et sic quandoque est a Deo, puta cum aliquis secundum praecepta divinae iustitiae utitur concessa sibi potestate, secundum illud Prov. VIII, 15: per me reges regnant, et cetera. Quandoque autem non est a Deo, puta cum aliqui potestate sibi data utuntur contra divinam iustitiam, secundum illud Ps. II, 2: astiterunt reges terrae, et principes convenerunt in unum adversus Dominum, et cetera. Third, it can be considered in regard to its use, and then it is from God sometimes, as when a person observes the precepts of divine justice in using the power granted him: by me kings rule (Prov 8:15). But sometimes it is not from God, as when a person uses power given to him to act against divine justice: the kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord and his anointed (Ps 2:2). 1023. Dubitatur etiam de potestate peccandi, utrum sit a Deo. 1023. The question arises whether the power to sin is from God. Ad quod dicendum est quod ipsa potentia qua peccatur, a Deo est. Eadem enim potentia est qua peccatur et qua recte agitur: sed quod in bonum ordinetur, a Deo est; quod autem ordinetur ad peccandum, est ex defectu creaturae, inquantum est ex nihilo. The answer is that the power by which one sins is from God. For it is the same power that is employed in sinning and in doing right: but that it is directed to good is from God; that it is directed to sin is due to a defect of the creature, inasmuch as it springs from nothingness. 1024. Secundo ponit, quod ea quae sunt, a Deo ordinata sunt, cuius ratio est quia Deus omnia per suam sapientiam fecit, secundum illud Ps. CIII, 24: omnia in sapientia fecisti. Est autem proprium sapientiae ordinate omnia disponere. Sap. VIII, 1: attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter. Et ideo oportet effectus divinos ordinatos esse. Iob XXXVIII, 33: numquid nosti ordinem caeli, et pones rationem eius in terra? 1024. Second, he states that those that exist have been instituted by God, the reason being that God made all things through his wisdom, for it says in a psalm: in wisdom have you made all (Ps 104:24). But it is the function of wisdom to dispose of things in order: she reaches mightily from one end of the earth to the other, and she orders all things well (Wis 8:1). Therefore, divine effects must be orderly: do you know the ordinances of the heavens? (Job 38:33). Duplicem autem ordinem Deus in suis effectibus instituit: unum quidem quo omnia ordinantur in ipsum, Prov. XVI, 4: universa propter semetipsum operatus est Deus, alium vero quo effectus divini ordinantur ad invicem, sicut dicitur Deut. IV, 19 de sole et luna et stellis, quod fecit ea in ministerium cunctis gentibus. But God has established a twofold order in his effects: one, whereby all things are ordained to him: the Lord has made everything for himself (Prov 16:4); the other is that whereby divine effects are ordained one to another, as Deuteronomy says of the sun and the moon and the stars, that he made them to serve all nations (Deut 4:19). 1025. Deinde cum dicit itaque qui resistit, etc., ex duabus praemissis concludit propositum. 1025. Then when he says, therefore, he who resists, he draws the conclusion. Si enim potestas principum, inquantum talis est, a Deo est, et nihil est a Deo sine ordine, consequens est, quod etiam ordo, quo inferiores potestatibus superioribus subiiciuntur, sit a Deo. Itaque qui contra hunc ordinem resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit. I Reg. VIII, 7: non te abiecerunt, sed me, ne regnem super eos. Lc. X, 16: qui vos spernit, me spernit. For if the power of rulers is from God and nothing is from God without order, it follows that the order whereby the lower are subjected to the higher powers is from God. Therefore, he who acts against the order and resists the power, resists the ordinance of God: they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me (1 Sam 8:7); he who rejects you rejects me (Luke 10:16). Resistere autem divinae ordinationi contrariatur honestati virtutis. Unde contra virtutem agit quicumque potestati resistit, in eo quod pertinet ad ordinem suae potestatis. But to resist the divine order is contrary to the good of virtue. Hence, whoever resists power in anything that pertains to the order of this power acts against virtue. 1026. Deinde cum dicit qui autem resistunt, etc., ostendit huiusmodi subiectionem non solum esse honestam, sed necessariam. 1026. Then when he says, those who resist, he shows that this subjection is not only virtuous but necessary. Et primo proponit quod intendit; First, he states his proposition; secundo probat propositum, ibi nam principes, et cetera. second, he proves it, at for rulers. 1027. Dicit ergo primo: dictum est, quod qui resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit, quod quidem secundum se est vitandum, tamquam contrarium virtuti. Multi tamen sunt, qui amorem virtutis non habentes, ea quae sunt contraria virtuti non detestantur. Unde tales cogendi sunt ad vitationem malorum per poenas, et quantum ad hoc subdit qui autem resistunt, scilicet divinae ordinationi, sibi damnationem acquirunt, contra potestatis ordinem agendo. 1027. He says, therefore: it has been stated that he who resists the power resists the ordinance of God, and this should be avoided as contrary to virtue. Yet there are many who have no love for virtue and who do not detest things contrary to virtue. Such persons must be compelled to avoid evil by punishments. In regard to this he says: they who resist the divine ordinance incur to themselves damnation for acting against the order of authority. Quod quidem potest intelligi, uno modo, de damnatione aeterna, quam merentur qui potestatibus subiici nolunt in eo quod debent. In cuius exemplum Dathan et Abiron, qui Moysi et Aaron restiterunt, sunt a terra absorpti, ut habetur Num. XVI, 20 ss. This can be understood in one way as referring to eternal damnation, which is incurred by those who refuse to be subject to authority in matters in which they should be subject. As an example of this, Dathan and Abiron, who resisted Moses and Aaron, were swallowed up by the earth, as it says in Numbers (Num 16:20). Alio modo potest intelligi de damnatione poenae, quae per ipsos principes infertur. Prov. XX, 2: sicut rugitus leonis, ita et terror regis: qui provocant eum, peccant in animam suam. In another way it can be understood as referring to the punishments imposed by the authorities themselves: the dread wrath of a king is like the growling of a lion; he who provokes him to anger forfeits his life (Prov 20:2). 1028. Sed contra hoc videtur esse quod apostoli et martyres principibus et potestatibus restiterunt et ex hoc non damnationem a Deo sed praemium acquisiverunt. 1028. But against this is the fact that the apostles and martyrs seem to have resisted rulers and authorities and did not receive damnation from God as a result but rather a reward.