779. Then he solves the above problem as it refers to rejection of the wicked, when he says for the Scripture says.
779. Deinde, cum dicit dicit enim Scriptura, etc., solvit quaestionem praemissam quantum ad reprobationem malorum.
First, he quotes an authority;
Et primo inducit auctoritatem;
second, he draws the conclusion, at therefore he has mercy on whom he wills.
secundo infert conclusionem, ibi ergo cui vult miseretur, et cetera.
780. He says, therefore: it has been shown that there is no injustice, when God loves the just from all eternity. But neither is there injustice in rejecting the wicked from all eternity. For out of God’s mouth the Scripture says: to this purpose have I raised you, or according to another rendition: I have preserved you for the very purpose of showing my power in you, so that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth. But our letter has: and on that account I stationed you, that I might show my strength in you, that my name my be related in the whole earth.
780. Dicit ergo: ita ostensum est quod non est iniquitas apud Deum, quantum ad hoc quod ab aeterno diligit iustos. Sed etiam nec quantum ad hoc quod ab aeterno reprobat malos. Dicit enim Scriptura ex ore Dei, Ex. IX, 16: quia in hoc ipsum excitavi te, vel servavi te, secundum aliam litteram, ut ostendam in te virtutem meam ut annuntietur nomen meum in universa terra. Nostra autem littera sic habet: et idcirco posui te, ut ostendam in te fortitudinem meam, ut enarretur nomen meum in omni terra.
781. The first point to notice here is what God does in regard to the rejected. He shows this when he says: to this purpose have I raised you, i.e., you had deserved to die for the evils you had done: those who do such things deserve to die (Rom 1:32), but I did not call you to die at once; rather I preserved you in life for this purpose, namely, of showing my power in you.
781. Ubi primo, consideratum est quid Deus circa reprobos faciat, quod ostendit dicens in hoc ipsum servavi te, id est dignus eras mori propter mala quae feceras, supra c. I, 32: qui talia agunt, digni sunt morte, sed tamen non statim tibi mortem induxi sed servavi te in vita eo fine quo sequitur, ut scilicet ostendam, et cetera.
This interpretation can also be obtained from the version which reads: have I raised you, i.e., although before me you deserved to be dead, I granted you life, as if I had raised you up. From this it appears that God works no injustice against the rejected, since they deserved to be destroyed at once for their crimes; rather, the fact that he preserves their life proceeds from his exceeding goodness: correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in your fury, lest you bring me to nothing (Jer 10:24).
Et in hoc etiam sensu potest legi quod dicitur excitavi te, id est, cum apud me pro tuis meritis mortuus esses, concessi tibi vitam, quasi te excitarem. In quo apparet quod Deus iniquitatem reprobis non facit, cum ipsi ex suis meritis essent digni statim consumi, sed hoc ipsum quod eos servat in vita, procedit ex nimia sua bonitate. Ier. X, 24: corripe me, Domine verumtamen in iudicio et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas me.
Another interpretation is this, have I raised you for sin, that you might become worse. This should not be understood as though God causes sin in man; rather, it should be understood in a permissive sense, namely, that from his just judgment he permits some to fall into sin on account of previous sins, as it says above: God gave them up to a base mind (Rom 1:28).
Alio modo potest intelligi excitavi te, in peccatum, ut deterior fias. Quod quidem non est intelligendum hoc modo quod Deus in homine causet malitiam, sed est intelligendum permissive, quia scilicet ex iusto suo iudicio permittit aliquos ruere in peccatum propter praecedentes iniquitates, sicut supra I, 24 dictum est: tradidit eos Deus in reprobum sensum.
But it seems to me that still more must be understood here, namely, that men are moved to good and to evil by God through an inward prompting. Hence, Augustine says in his book On Grace and Free Will that God works in men’s hearts to incline their wills whithersoever he wills, either to good through his mercy or to evil according to their deserts. Thus, God is said very often to stir up men to do good, as it says in Daniel: the Lord raised up the Holy Spirit of a young boy (Dan 13:45). He is also said to raise up others to do evil, as in Isaiah: I will stir up the Medes against them and with their arrows they shall kill the children (Isa 13:1).
Sed aliquid amplius videtur mihi in hoc esse intelligendum, quia, videlicet, instinctu quodam interiori moventur homines a Deo ad bonum et ad malum. Unde Augustinus dicit in libro de Gratia et libero arbitrio, quod Deus operatur in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocumque voluerit, sive ad bona pro sua misericordia, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum. Unde et Deus dicitur saepius suscitare aliquos ad bonum, secundum illud Dan. XIII, 45: suscitavit Deus spiritum pueri iunioris. Dicitur etiam suscitare aliquos ad malum faciendum, secundum illud Is. XIII, 17: suscitabo Medos qui sagittis parvulos interficiant.
However, he stirs them to good and to evil in different ways: for he inclines men’s wills to good directly as the author of these good deeds; but he is said to incline or stir up men to evil as an occasional cause, namely, inasmuch as God puts before a person, either in him or outside of him something which of itself is conducive to good but which through his own malice he uses for evil: do you not know that God’s kindness is meant to lead you to repentance? But by your hard and impenitent heart you are storing up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath (Rom 2:4–5) and God gave his place for penance: and he abused it unto pride (Job 24:23).
Aliter tamen ad bona, aliter ad mala: nam ad bona inclinat hominum voluntates directe et per se, tamquam actor bonorum; ad malum autem dicitur inclinare vel suscitare homines occasionaliter, inquantum scilicet Deus homini aliquid proponit vel interius, vel exterius, quod, quantum est de se, est inductivum ad bonum; sed homo propter suam malitiam perverse utitur ad malum. Supra II, 4: ignoras quoniam benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam te adducit: secundum autem duritiam tuam et cor impoenitens thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae. Et Iob XXIV, 23: dedit ei Deus locum poenitentiae, et ille abutitur eo in superbia.
Similarly, as far as in him lies, God enlightens a man inwardly to good, say a king to defend the rights of his kingdom or to punish rebels. But he abuses this good impulse according to the malice of his heart. This is plain in Isaiah where it is said of Assyria: against a godless nation I send him and against the people of my wrath I command him to take spoil and seize plunder (Isa 10:6), and further on: but he does not so intend, and his mind does not so think, but it is in his mind to destroy. That is the way it happened with Pharaoh, who, when he was prompted by God to defend his kingdom, abused this suggestion and practiced cruelty.
Et similiter Deus quantum est de se, interius instigat hominem ad bonum, puta regem ad defendendum iura regni sui, vel ad puniendum rebelles. Sed hoc instinctu bono malus homo abutitur secundum malitiam cordis sui. Et hoc patet Is. X, 6, ubi dicitur de Assur: ad gentem fallacem mittam eum, contra populum furoris mei mandabo illi ut auferat spolia, et cetera. Et post: ipse autem non sic arbitrabitur, et cor eius non ita aestimabit, sed ad conterendum erit cor eius. Et hoc modo circa Pharaonem accidit, qui cum a Deo excitaretur ad regni sui tutelam, abusus est hac excitatione in crudelitatem.
782. Second, there is need to consider the purpose behind God’s doing certain things and permitting certain things.
782. Secundo, oportet considerare quo fine Deus ista partim faciat et partim permittat.
For one must remember that God works in creatures to manifest himself, as it says in Romans: his invisible nature has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made (Rom 1:20); hence these promptings are ordained to this manifestation both for those present, for the very purpose of showing my power in you, and Israel saw the great work which the Lord did against the Egyptians (Exod 14:3), and for those absent, so that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth. Declare his glory among the gentiles (Ps 95:3).
Est enim considerandum, quod Deus operatur in creaturis ad suam manifestationem, secundum illud supra I, 20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Unde et huiusmodi excitatio in hoc ipsum ordinatur, et quantum ad praesentes, ut ostendam in te virtutem meam, Ex. XIV, 31: viderunt filii Israel manum magnam, quam exercuerat Dominus contra Aegyptios, et quantum ad absentes, ut annuntietur nomen meum in universa terra. Ps. XCV, 3: annuntiate inter gentes gloriam eius.
Thus, it is clear that in this matter there in no injustice in God, because he uses his creature according to its merits for his glory. And it can be interpreted in the same sense if it be said have I raised you, i.e., I have ordered your malice to my glory; for God orders the malice, but does not cause it.
Sic igitur patet quod quantum ad hoc, non est iniquitas apud Deum, quia utitur creatura sua secundum eius merita ad gloriam suam. Et in hoc eodem sensu potest exponi si dicatur, posui te, id est ordinavi malitiam tuam ad gloriam meam; Deus enim malitiam ordinat, sed non causat.
783. Then when he says, therefore, he has mercy on whom he wills, he draws a conclusion from the two texts cited. From the statement I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy, he concludes: therefore he has mercy upon whom he wills: the Lord has mercy on them that fear him (Ps 103:11); from the text, have I raised you, he concludes, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills: you have hardened our heart, so that we fear you not (Isa 3:17); some of them he blessed and exalted, and some of them has he cursed and brought low (Sir 33:12).
783. Deinde cum dicit ergo cui vult miseretur, etc.; infert conclusionem quamdam ex utraque auctoritate supra inducta. Nam ex eo quod dictum est miserebor cui misereor, concludit ergo cui vult miseretur. Ps. CII, 13: misertus est Dominus timentibus se. Ex eo vero quod dictum est: in hoc ipsum excitavit te, concludit et quem vult indurat. Is. LXIII, 17: indurasti cor nostrum, ne timeremus te. Eccli. XXXIII, 12: ex ipsis benedixit et exaltavit, et ex ipsis maledixit et humiliavit.
There seems to be no difficulty about God’s mercy, once we grant what has been said above.
Et quidem quod dicitur de Dei misericordia, dubitationem non habet, suppositis his quae praemissa sunt.
784. But two difficulties seem to exist in regard to hardening.
784. Sed circa indurationem videtur esse duplex dubitatio.
First, hardening of heart seems allied to sin, as it says in Sirach: a hard heart shall fear evil at the last (Sir 3:27). Consequently, if God hardens the heart, he is the author of a sin—contrary to what is said in James: God is no tempter to evil (Jas 1:13).
Primo quidem quia duritia cordis ad culpam pertinere videtur, secundum illud Eccli. c. III, 27: cor durum male habebit in novissimo. Si ergo Deus indurat, sequitur quod sit auctor culpae. Contra quod dicitur Iac. I, 13: Deus intentator malorum est.
The answer is that God is not said to harden anyone directly, as though he causes their malice, but indirectly, inasmuch as man makes an occasion of sin out of things God does within or outside the man; and this God himself permits. Hence, he is not said to harden as though by inserting malice, but by not affording grace.
Ad quod dicendum quod Deus non dicitur indurare aliquos directe, quasi in eis causet malitiam, sed indirecte, inquantum scilicet ex his quae facit in homine intus vel extra, homo sumit occasionem peccati, et hoc ipse Deus permittit. Unde non dicitur indurare quasi immittendo malitiam, sed non apponendo gratiam.
785. The second difficulty is that this hardening does not seem ascribable to the divine will, since it is written: this is the will of God, your sanctification (1 Thess 4:3) and he desires all men to be saved (1 Tim 2:4).
785. Secunda dubitatio est, quia ipsa obduratio non videtur divinae voluntati posse adscribi, cum scriptum sit I Thess. IV, 3: haec est voluntas Dei sanctificatio vestra. Et I Tim. II, 4: qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri.
The answer is that both mercy and justice imply a disposition of the will. Hence, just as mercy is attributed to the divine will, so also that which is just.
Ad quod dicendum est, quod tam misericordia quam iustitia dispositionem voluntatis important. Unde sicut miseratio attribuitur divinae voluntati, ita et id quod est iustitiae.
Therefore, the interpretation is that he has mercy on whom he wills through his mercy and he hardens whom he wills through his justice, because those whom he hardens deserve to be hardened by him, as was stated above (Rom 1).
Sic ergo intelligendum est cui vult miseretur, scilicet per suam misericordiam, et quem vult indurat, per suam iustitiam; quia illi, quos indurat, hoc merentur ut indurentur ab ipso, ut supra cap. 1 dictum est.
Lecture 4
Lectio 4
Vessels of wrath and of mercy
Vasa irae et misericordiae
9:19 You will say therefore to me: why does he still find fault? For who resists his will?
9:19 Dicis itaque mihi: Quid adhuc queritur? voluntati enim ejus quis resistit?
9:20 O man, who are you who replies against God? Shall the thing formed say to him who formed it: why have you made me thus? [n. 788]
9:20 O homo, tu quis es, qui respondeas Deo? numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Quid me fecisti sic? [n. 788]
9:21 Or has not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor? [n. 791]
9:21 an non habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam? [n. 791]
9:22 What if God, willing to show his wrath and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, [n. 793]
9:22 Quod si Deus volens ostendere iram, et notum facere potentiam suam, sustinuit in multa patientia vasa irae, apta in interitum, [n. 793]
9:23 That he might show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy which he has prepared unto glory?
9:23 ut ostenderet divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae, quae praeparavit in gloriam.
786. Having solved the question proposed, the Apostle objects to the solution, particularly to the last part, which states that God has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills (Rom 9:18).
786. Posita solutione praemissae quaestionis, hic Apostolus contra ipsam solutionem obiicit, et praecipue contra ultimam conclusionem qua dictum est: Cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat.
First, he places the objection;
Primo ergo ponit obiectionem;
second, the solution, at O man, who are you.
secundo solutionem, ibi O homo, tu quis es, et cetera.
787. First, therefore, he says: we have said that God has mercy on whomever he wills and hardens whomever he wills. You will say therefore to me: why does he still find fault? i.e., what need is there to inquire any further into the cause of the good and evil done here, since all things are attributed to the divine will, which is a sufficient cause, since no one can resist him? Hence he continues: for who resists his will? I applied my mind to seek and to search out by wisdom all that is done under heaven (Eccl 1:13).
787. Dicit ergo primo: dictum est quod Deus cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat, dicis itaque mihi: quid adhuc quaeritur? Id est, quid oportet ulterius quaerere de causa bonorum et malorum quae hic aguntur, cum omnia voluntati divinae attribuantur, quae est causa sufficiens, eo quod nullus potest ei resistere? Unde sequitur voluntati eius quis resistit? Eccle. I, 13: proposui in animo meo quaerere et investigare sapienter de omnibus quae fiunt sub sole.
Or in another way: why does he still find fault? i.e., why does God complain about men when they sin, as in Isaiah: some have I reared and brought up, but they have rebelled against me (Isa 1:2). Therefore, he does not seem to have a just complaint, because it all proceeds from his will, which no one can resist. Hence he adds: who resists his will?
Vel aliter quid adhuc quaeritur, id est conqueritur Deus de hominibus quando peccant, sicut Is. I, 2: filios enutrivi et exaltavi, ipsi autem spreverunt me, et cetera. Ideo autem videtur iustam querimoniam non habere, quia ex voluntate eius totum procedit, cui nullus potest resistere. Unde subdit voluntati eius quis resistit?
Or still another way: why does he still find fault, i.e., why is man still required to do good and avoid evil: he has showed you, O man, what is good and what does the Lord require of you but to do justice, and love mercy and walk with your God? (Mic 6:8). For it is useless to require of someone that which is not in his power. But nothing seems to lie in man’s power, according to the above, in which all things seem ascribed to the divine will, which cannot be resisted. He adds: for who resists his will? As if to say: no one. There is none that can resist your will (Esth 13:11). And this seems to be the Apostle’s meaning.
Vel aliter quid adhuc quaeritur, scilicet ab homine ut faciat bonum vel vitet malum. Mich. VI, 8: indicabo tibi, o homo, quid sit bonum, et quid Deus requirat a te, et cetera. Frustra autem requiritur ab aliquo quod non est in eius potestate. Nihil autem in hominis potestate esse videtur secundum praedicta, quibus omnia divinae voluntati videntur adscribi, cui resisti non potest. Sequitur voluntati enim eius quis resistit? Quasi diceret: nullus. Esth. XIII, 9: non est qui tuae possit resistere voluntati. Et haec videtur esse intentio Apostoli.
788. Then he answers the question, at O man, who are you.
788. Deinde cum dicit O homo, tu quis es, etc. respondet praemissae quaestioni.
To understand his answer it should be noted that with regard to the election of the good and the rejection of the wicked two questions can arise. One is general, namely, why does God will to harden some and be merciful to some; the other is particular, namely, why does he will to be merciful to this one and harden this or that one?
Ad cuius responsionis intellectum considerandum est, quod circa electionem bonorum et reprobationem malorum duplex quaestio potest moveri. Una quidem in generali, quare Deus velit quosdam indurare, et quorumdam misereri. Alia vero in speciali, quare velit huius misereri et hunc vel illum indurare.