Ut ergo unitatem Dei et hominis confiterentur quidam haeretici in partem contrariam diverterunt, dicentes Dei et hominis esse unam non solum personam, sed etiam naturam. Cuius quidem erroris primum principium fuit ab Arrio, qui ut ea quae in Scripturis dicuntur de Christo quibus ostenditur minor Patre, non nisi ad ipsum Dei Filium possent referri secundum assumentem naturam, posuit in Christo aliam animam non esse quam Dei Verbum, quod dixit corpori Christi fuisse pro anima: et sic cum dicit Pater maior me est, vel cum orasse legitur aut tristatus, ad ipsam naturam Filii Dei sit referendum. Hoc autem posito, sequitur quod unio Filii Dei ad hominem facta sit non solum in persona sed etiam in natura; manifestum est enim quod ex anima et corpore constituitur unitas naturae humanae.
Therefore, in order to proclaim the unity of God and man in Christ, some heretics went to the opposite extreme and taught that not only was there one person, but also a single nature, in God and man. This error took its first origin from Arius. To ensure that those scriptural passages where Christ is represented as being inferior to the Father must refer to the Son of God himself, regarded in his assuming nature, Arius taught that in Christ there is no other soul than the Word of God who, he maintained, took the place of the soul in Christ’s body. Thus when Christ says, in John 14:28, The Father is greater than I, or when he is read to pray or be sad, such matters are to be referred to the very nature of the Son of God. If this were so, the union of God’s Son with man would be effected not only in the person, but also in the nature. For, as we know, the unity of human nature arises from the union of soul and body.
Et huius quidem positionis falsitas quantum ad id quod Filium minorem Patre asserit esse, supra declarata est cum ostendimus Filium Patri aequalem. Quantum vero ad hoc quod dicit Verbum Dei Christo fuisse pro anima, huius erroris ex praemissis falsitas ostendi potest. Ostensum est enim supra animam corpori uniri ut formam; Deum autem impossibile est formam corporis esse, sicut supra ostensum est. Et ne forte Arrius diceret hoc de summo Deo Patre intelligendum, idem et de angelis ostendi potest, quod secundum suam naturam corpori non possunt uniri per modum formae, cum sint secundum suam naturam a corporibus separati. Multo igitur minus Filius Dei per quem facti sunt angeli, ut etiam Arrius confitetur, corporis forma esse non potest.
The falsity of this position, so far as regards the assertion that the Son is less than the Father, was brought out above, when we showed that the Son is equal to the Father. And with respect to the theory that the Word of God took the place of the soul in Christ, the absurdity of this error can be shown by reverting to a point previously set forth. For, as we demonstrated above, the soul is united to the body as the latter’s form. But God cannot be the form of a body, as we also demonstrated above. Arius could not counter by maintaining that this is to be understood of God the Father on high, since the same can be proved even of the angels: namely, that they cannot, of their very nature, be united to a body in the manner of a form, seeing that by nature they are separated from bodies. Much less, then, can the Son of God be the form of a body, by whom the angels were made, as even Arius admits.
Praeterea, Filius Dei etiam si sit creatura, ut Arrius mentitur, tamen secundum ipsum beatitudine praecedit omnes spiritus creatos. Est autem tanta angelorum beatitudo quod tristitiam habere non possunt; non enim esset vera et plena felicitas, si aliquid eorum votis deficeret, est enim de ratione beatitudinis ut sit finale et perfectum bonum totaliter appetitum quietans. Multo igitur minus Dei Filius tristari potest aut timere secundum suam naturam. Legitur autem tristatus, cum dicitur cepit Iesus pavere et taedere, et mestus esse; et ipse etiam suam tristitiam profitetur dicens, Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem. Manifestum est autem tristitiam corporis non esse, sed alicuius apprehensivae substantiae; oportet igitur praeter Verbum et corpus in Christo aliam fuisse substantiam quae tristitiam pati posset, et hanc dicimus animam.
Besides, even if the Son of God were a creature, as Arius falsely teaches, he nevertheless excels all created spirits in beatitude, according to Arius himself. But the beatitude of the angels is so great that they can suffer no sadness. Their happiness would not be true and complete if anything were wanting to their desires, since the very notion of beatitude requires that it be the ultimate and perfect good wholly satisfying all desire. Much less can the Son of God be subject to sadness or fear in his own nature. Yet we read that he was sad: Jesus began to be greatly distressed and troubled, and to be sorrowful (Mark 14:33; Matt 26:37). And he himself gave witness of his sorrow, saying, My soul is sorrowful even unto death (Mark 14:34). Sadness, assuredly, pertains not to the body, but to some substance capable of apprehension. Therefore, besides the Word and the body, there must have been in Christ another substance that could suffer sadness; and this we call the soul.
Rursus, si Christus propterea assumpsit quae nostra sunt ut nos a peccatis mundaret, magis autem necessarium erat nobis mundari secundum animam, a qua origo peccati processerat et quae est subiectum peccati: non igitur corpus assumpsit sine anima, sed principalius animam, et corpus cum anima.
Moreover, if Christ assumed what is ours for the purpose of cleansing us of sin, and if our greater need was to be cleansed in soul, from which sin arises and which is the subject of sin, we must conclude that he did not assume a body without a soul, but most principally the soul, and the body with the soul.
De errore Apollinaris circa Incarnationem et improbatio eius
Apollinaris’ error about the Incarnation and his refutation
Ex quo etiam excluditur error Apollinaris, qui primo quidem Arrium secutus in Christo aliam animam esse non posuit quam ipsum Dei Verbum. Sed quia non sequebatur in hoc Arrium quod Filium Dei diceret creaturam, multa autem dicuntur de Christo quae nec corpori attribui possunt nec Creatori convenire, ut tristitia, timor et huiusmodi, coactus tandem fuit ponere quidem aliquam animam in Christo quae corpus sensificaret et harum passionum posset esse subiectum; quae tamen ratione et intellectu careret, ipsum autem Verbum homini Christo pro intellectu et ratione fuisse.
These considerations also refute the error of Apollinaris, who at first followed Arius in refusing to admit any soul in Christ other than the Word of God. But since he did not follow Arius in teaching that the Son of God was a creature, and many things are narrated of Christ which cannot be ascribed to the body, and which are inadmissible in the Creator, such as sadness, fear, and the like, he was eventually driven to acknowledge the existence in Christ of some soul which gave sense life to the body and could be the subject of such emotions. Yet this soul was without reason and intellect, and the Word himself took the place of intellect and reason in the man Christ.
Hoc autem multipliciter falsum esse ostenditur. Primo quidem quia hoc est contra naturae rationem ut anima non rationalis cum formam corporis habeat; nihil autem monstruosum et innaturale in Christi Incarnatione fuisse putandum est. Secundo quia hoc fuisset contra Incarnationis finem qui est reparatio humanae naturae, quae quidem principalius incipit reparari quantum ad intellectivam partem, quae particeps peccati esse potest: unde praecipue conveniens fuit ut intellectivam hominis partem assumeret. Legitur etiam Christus ammiratus fuisse; ammirari autem non est nisi animae rationalis, Deo vero omnino convenire non potest. Sic igitur, sicut tristitia cogit in Christo ponere partem animae sensitivam, sic ammiratio cogit ponere in ipso partem animae intellectivam.
This theory is shown to be false on many grounds. In the first place, the very concept of nature is incompatible with the opinion that a non-rational soul is the form of man, whose body nevertheless must have some form. But nothing monstrous or unnatural can be thought of in connection with Christ’s Incarnation. Second, this hypothesis would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation, which is the reparation of human nature. Above all, human nature needs to be restored in the intellectual sphere, for that which can have part in sin is precisely the rational soul. Hence it chiefly befitted God’s Son to assume man’s intellectual nature. Besides, Christ is said to have marveled. But wonder cannot be experienced without a rational soul, and of course is wholly inadmissible in God. Therefore, as the sorrow Christ experienced forces us to admit that he had a sensitive soul, so the wonder he expressed compels us to acknowledge the existence of a rational soul in him.
De errore Eutychetis ponentis unionem in natura
Eutyches’ error of placing union in the nature
Hos autem quantum ad aliquid secutus est Eutices: posuit enim unam naturam fuisse Dei et hominis post Incarnationem, non tamen posuit quod Christo deesset vel anima vel intellectus, vel aliquid eorum quae ad integritatem spectant naturae.
In a certain respect, Eutyches embraced the error of these men. He taught that there was one nature common to both God and man after the Incarnation. However, he did not hold that Christ was lacking in soul or in intellect or in anything pertaining to the integrity of nature.
Sed et huius opinionis falsitas manifeste apparet. Divina enim natura in se perfecta est et incommutabilis. Natura autem quae in se perfecta est, cum altera non potest in unam naturam convenire, nisi vel ipsa convertatur in alteram sicut cibus in cibatum, vel alterum convertatur in ipsum sicut in ignem ligna, vel utrumque transmutetur in tertium sicut elementa in corpus mixtum. Haec autem omnia removet divina immutabilitas: non enim immutabile est neque quod in alterum convertitur, neque in quod alterum converti potest. Cum igitur natura divina in se sit perfecta, nullo modo potest esse quod simul cum alia natura in unam naturam conveniat.
But the falsity of this theory is plainly apparent. The divine nature is perfect in itself, and is incapable of change. But a nature that is perfect in itself cannot combine with another nature to form a single nature unless it is changed into that other nature (as food is changed into the eater), or unless the other nature is changed into it (as wood is changed into fire), or unless both natures are transformed into a third nature (as elements are when they combine to form a mixed body). The divine immutability excludes all these alternatives. For neither that which is changed into another thing, nor that into which another thing can be changed, is immutable. Since, therefore, the divine nature is perfect in itself, it can in no way combine with some other nature to form one nature.
Rursus, si quis rerum ordinem consideret, additio maioris perfectionis variat naturae speciem. Alterius enim speciei est quod est et vivit quam quod est tantum; quod autem est et vivit et sentit, ut animal, est alterius speciei quam quod est et vivit tantum, ut planta; itemque quod est, vivit, sentit et intelligit, ut homo, est alterius speciei quam quod est, vivit et sentit tantum, ut animal brutum.
Moreover, as we see if we reflect on the order of things, the addition of a greater perfection causes variation in the species of a nature. Thus a thing that not only exists but lives differs in species from a thing that merely exists. And that which exists and lives and senses, for instance, an animal, differs in species from the plant, which merely exists and lives. Likewise a being that exists, lives, senses, and understands, namely, a man, differs in species from that which merely exists, lives, and feels, such as a brute animal.
Si igitur illa una natura quae ponitur esse Christi, supra haec omnia habuit quod divinum est, consequens est quod illa natura fuerit alterius speciei a natura humana, sicut natura humana a natura bruti animalis; neque igitur Christus fuit homo eiusdem speciei. Quod falsum esse ostenditur ex hoc quod ab hominibus secundum carnem progenitus fuit, sicut Matthaeus ostendit in principio Euangelii sui dicens liber generationis Iesu Christi, filii David, filii Abraham.
Accordingly, if the single nature which the Eutychean theory ascribes to Christ has the perfection of divinity in addition to all these other perfections, that nature necessarily differs in species from human nature, in the way that human nature differs specifically from the nature of a brute animal. On this supposition, consequently, Christ would not be a man of the same species as other men, a conclusion shown to be false by Christ’s descent from men according to the flesh. This is brought out by Matthew in the beginning of his Gospel, saying, The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham.
Contra errorem Manichaei dicentis, Christum non habuisse verum corpus sed phantasticum
Against the error of the Manichaeans, who said that Christ did not have a true body but a phantastical one
Sicut autem Photinus evacuavit Incarnationis mysterium divinam naturam Christo auferendo, ita Manichaeus auferendo humanam. Quia enim ponebat totam creaturam corpoream a diabolo fuisse creatam, nec erat conveniens ut boni Dei Filius assumeret diaboli creaturam, posuit Christum non habuisse veram carnem sed phantasticam tantum; et omnia quae in Euangelio de Christo narrantur ad humanam naturam pertinentia, in phantasia et non in veritate facta fuisse asserebat.
Just as Photinus emptied the mystery of the Incarnation by denying Christ’s divine nature, so the Manichaean did the same by denying Christ’s human nature. He held that the whole of material creation was the work of the devil and that the Son of the good God could not becomingly take to himself a creature of the devil. Therefore, he taught that Christ did not have real flesh but only phantom flesh. Consequently, he asserted that everything narrated in the Gospel as pertaining to the human nature of Christ was done in appearance only and not in very truth.
Haec autem positio manifeste sacrae Scripturae contradicit, quae Christum asserit de Virgine natum, circumcisum, esurisse, comedisse et alia pertulisse quae pertinent ad humanae carnis naturam; falsa igitur esset Euangeliorum scriptura haec narrans de Christo.
This theory plainly contradicts Sacred Scripture, which relates that Christ was born of the Virgin, that he was circumcised, that he was hungry, that he ate, and that he had other experiences common to the nature of human flesh. Hence in recording such things of Christ, what is written in the Gospels would be false.
Rursus, ipse Christus de se dicit In hoc natus sum et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati; non fuisset autem veritatis testis, sed magis falsitatis, si in se demonstrasset quod non erat: praesertim cum praedixerit se passurum quae sine vera carne pati non potuisset, scilicet quod traderetur in manus hominum, quod conspueretur, flagellaretur et crucifigeretur. Dicere ergo Christum veram carnem non habuisse, nec huiusmodi in veritate sed solum in phantasia eum fuisse perpessum, est Christo imponere falsitatem.
Besides, Christ says of himself: For this I was born, and for this I have come into the world, to bear witness to the truth (John 18:37). If he had displayed in himself what really did not exist, he would have been a witness not of truth but rather of error; especially since he foretold that he would suffer that which he could not suffer without a body: namely, that he would be betrayed into the hands of men, that he would be spat upon, scourged, and crucified. Accordingly, to say that Christ did not have true flesh and that he suffered such indignities not in truth but only in appearance is to accuse him of lying.
Adhuc, veram opinionem a cordibus hominum removere est hominis fallacis; Christus autem hanc opinionem a cordibus discipulorum removit. Cum enim post resurrectionem discipulis appareret qui eum spiritum vel phantasma esse existimabant, ad huiusmodi suspicionem de cordibus eorum tollendam dixit Palpate et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet sicut me videtis habere; et in alio loco, cum supra mare ambularet, aestimantibus discipulis eum esse phantasma et ob hoc eis in timore constitutis, Dominus dixit Ego sum, nolite timere. Si igitur haec opinio vera est, necesse est dicere Christum fuisse fallacem; Christus autem Veritas est, ut ipse de se dicit. Est igitur hec opinio falsa.
Furthermore, to banish true conviction from men’s minds is the act of a liar. Christ did expel the Manichaean view from the minds of his disciples. After his resurrection he appeared to the disciples, who thought that he was a spirit or a specter. To banish suspicion of this kind from their hearts, he said to them: Handle me, and see; for a spirit has not flesh and bones as you see that I have. (Luke 24:39). On another occasion, when he was walking on the sea, and his disciples were terrified because they thought that he was an phantom, our Lord said: It is I; have no fear (Matt 14:27). If, therefore, this opinion were true, it is necessary to say that Christ was deceitful. But Christ is the Truth, as he testified of himself. Therefore, the Manichaean theory is false.
Quod Christus verum corpus habuit, non de caelo, contra Valentinum
That Christ had a true body, not one from heaven, against Valentinus
Valentinus autem etsi verum corpus Christum habuisse confiteretur, dicebat tamen eum non assumpsisse carnem de Virgine, sed attulisse corpus de caelo formatum quod transivit per Virginem, nihil ex ea accipiens, sicut aqua per canalem.
Valentinus admitted that Christ had a real body. However, he insisted that our Lord did not take flesh from the Blessed Virgin, but rather brought down with him a body formed of celestial matter. This body passed through the Virgin without receiving anything from her, like water through a canal.
Hoc etiam veritati Scripturae contradicit. Dicit enim Apostolus ad Romanos de Christo qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem, et ad Galatas dicit quod Misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere; Matthaeus etiam dicit quod Iacob genuit Ioseph virum Mariae, de qua natus est Iesus qui vocatur Christus, et postmodum eam eius matrem nominat subdens Cum esset desponsata mater eius Maria Ioseph. Haec autem vera non essent, si Christus de Virgine carnem non assumpsisset; falsum est igitur quod corpus caeleste attulerit.
This view also contradicts the truth of Scripture. In Romans 1:3 the Apostle says that God’s Son was descended from David according to the flesh. And in Galatians 4:4 St. Paul writes: God sent forth his Son, born of woman. Matthew likewise relates: And Jacob begot Joseph, the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ (Matt 1:16). A little later Matthew refers to her as Christ’s mother, when his mother Mary had been betrothed to Joseph. None of this would be true if Christ had not received his flesh from the Virgin. Accordingly, the doctrine that Christ brought with him a celestial body is false.
Sed quod Apostolus ad Corinthios dicit secundus homo de caelo caelestis, intelligendum est quod de caelo descendit secundum divinitatem, non autem secundum substantiam corporis.
But what the Apostle states in 1 Corinthians 15:47, namely, that the second man was from heaven, heavenly, should be understood in the sense that he came down from heaven in his divinity, not according to the substance of his body.
Adhuc, nulla ratio esset quare corpus de caelo afferens Dei Filius uterum Virginis introisset, si ex eo nihil assumeret; sed magis videretur esse fictio quaedam, dum ex utero matris egrediens demonstraret se ab ea accepisse carnem quam non acceperat. Cum igitur omnis falsitas a Christo sit aliena, simpliciter confitendum est quod Christus sic processit ex utero Virginis quod ex ea carnem accepit.
Moreover, there would be no reason why the Son of God, bringing his body from heaven, should have entered the Virgin’s womb, if he were to receive nothing from her. Such a procedure would seem to be a kind of deceit if, by coming forth from his Mother’s womb, he were to intimate that he had received from her a body which in fact he had not received. Since, therefore, all falsehood is foreign to Christ, we must acknowledge without reservation that he came forth from the Virgin’s womb in such a way that he really took his flesh from her.
Quae sit sententia fidei circa Incarnationem
The teaching of the faith about the Incarnation
Ex praemissis igitur colligere possumus quod in Christo, secundum catholicae fidei veritatem, fuit verum corpus nostrae naturae, vera anima rationalis, et simul cum hoc perfecta deitas. Hae autem tres substantiae in unam personam convenerunt, non autem in unam naturam.
We can gather together the various points established in the foregoing chapters and say that, according to the true teaching of Catholic faith, Christ had a real body of the same nature as ours, a true rational soul, and, together with these, perfect deity. These three substances are united in one person, but do not combine to form one nature.
Ad huius autem veritatis expositionem aliqui per quasdam vias erroneas processerunt. Considerantes enim quidam quod omne quod advenit alicui post esse completum accidentaliter ei adiungitur, ut homini vestis, posuerunt quod humanitas accidentali unione fuerit in persona Filii divinitati coniuncta, ita scilicet quod natura assumpta se haberet ad personam Filii Dei sicut vestis ad hominem; ad cuius confirmationem inducebant quod Apostolus dicit ad Philippenses de Christo, quod habitu est inventus ut homo. Rursus, considerabant quod ex unione animae et corporis efficitur individuum quoddam rationalis naturae, quod nominatur persona; si igitur anima in Christo fuisset corpori unita, videre non poterant quin sequeretur quod ex tali unione constitueretur persona. Sequeretur igitur in Christo duas esse personas, scilicet personam assumentem et personam assumptam; in homine enim induto non sunt duae personae, quia indumentum rationem personae non habet: si autem vestis esset persona, sequeretur in homine vestito duas esse personas. Ad hoc igitur excludendum, posuerunt animam Christi corpori unitam numquam fuisse, sed quod persona Filii Dei animam et corpus separatim assumpsit.
In undertaking to explain this truth, some theologians have taken the wrong path. Persuaded that everything accruing to a being subsequent to its complete existence is joined to it accidentally, as a garment is joined to a man, they taught that humanity was joined to divinity in the person of the Son by an accidental union, in such a way that the assumed nature would be related to the person of God’s Son as clothing is related to a man. To bolster up this view, they brought forward what the Apostle says of Christ in Philippians 2:7, that he was in habit found as a man. Likewise, they reflected that from the union of soul and body an individual possessed of rational nature is formed, and that such an individual is called a person. If, therefore, the soul was united to the body in Christ, they were unable to see how they could escape the conclusion that a person would be constituted by such a union. In this event there would be two persons in Christ, the person who assumes and the person who is assumed. For there are not two persons in a man who is clothed, because clothing does not possess what is required for the notion of a person; but if the clothes were a person, there would be two persons in a clothed man. To avoid this conclusion, therefore, some proposed that Christ’s soul was never united to his body, but that the person of God’s Son assumed soul and body separately.
Sed dum haec opinio unum inconveniens vitare nititur, incidit in maius: sequitur enim ex necessitate quod Christus non fuerit verus homo. Veritas enim humanae naturae requirit animae et corporis unionem, nam homo est quod ex utroque componitur. Sequeretur etiam quod caro Christi non fuerit vera caro, nec aliquod membrum eius habuerit veritatem: remota enim anima, non est oculus aut manus aut caro et os nisi aequivoce, sicut pictus aut lapideus. Sequeretur etiam quod Christus vere mortuus non fuerit: mors enim est privatio vitae; manifestum est autem quod divinitatis vita per mortem privari non potuit, corpus autem vivum esse non potuit si ei anima coniuncta non fuit. Sequeretur etiam ulterius quod Christi corpus sentire non potuit, non enim sentit corpus nisi per animam sibi coniunctam.
This view, while trying to escape one absurdity, falls into a greater, for it entails the necessary consequence that Christ would not be true man. For true human nature requires the union of soul and body; ‘man’ is what is made up of both. A further consequence is that Christ’s flesh would not be true flesh, and that none of his members would be a true member. For if the soul is taken away, there is no eye or hand or flesh and bone, except in an equivocal sense, as when these parts of the body are depicted in paint or fashioned in stone. Further, it would follow that Christ did not really die. For death is the privation of life. But obviously the divinity could not be deprived of life by death, and the body could not be alive if a soul were not united to it. A final consequence would be that Christ’s body could not experience sensation; for the body has no sensation except through the soul united to it.
Adhuc, haec opinio in errorem Nestorii relabitur, quem tamen declinare intendit. In hoc enim erravit Nestorius quod potuit Verbum Dei homini Christo fuisse unitum secundum inhabitationem gratiae, ita quod Verbum Dei fuerit in illo homine sicut in templo suo; nihil autem refert dicere, quantum ad propositum pertinet, quod Verbum est in homine sicut in templo, et quod natura humana Verbo adveniat ut vestimentum vestito: nisi quod in tantum haec opinio est deterior, quia Christum verum hominem confiteri non potest. Est igitur haec opinio non immerito condemnata.
Furthermore, this theory falls back into the heresy of Nestorius, which it set out to overthrow. The error of Nestorius consisted in holding that the Word of God was united to Christ the man by the indwelling of grace, so that the Word of God would reside in that man as in his temple. It makes no difference, with regard to the doctrine at hand, whether we say that the Word is in the man as in a temple, or whether we say that human nature is joined to the Word as a garment to the person wearing it, except that the second opinion is the worse, inasmuch as it cannot admit that Christ was true man. Accordingly, this view is condemned, and deservedly so.
Adhuc, homo vestitus non potest dici esse persona vestis aut indumenti, neque aliquo modo dici potest quod sit in specie indumenti. Si igitur Filius Dei humanam naturam ut vestimentum assumpsit, nullo modo dici poterit persona humanae naturae; nec etiam dici poterit quod Filius Dei sit eiusdem speciei cum aliis hominibus, de quo tamen Apostolus dicit quod est in similitudine hominum factus. Unde patet hanc opinionem esse totaliter evitandam.
Moreover, the man who is clothed cannot be the person of the clothes or garment, nor can he in any way be said to be in the species of clothing. If, therefore, the Son of God took human nature to himself as a garment, he cannot in any sense be called the person of the human nature, nor could the Son of God be said to belong to the same species as the rest of men. Yet the Apostle says of him that he was made in the likeness of men (Phil 2:7). Clearly, therefore, this theory is to be utterly rejected.
Quod in Christo non sunt duo supposita
That in him there are not two supposita
Alii vero praedicta inconvenientia vitare volentes, posuerunt quidem in Christo animam corpori fuisse unitam, et ex tali unione quendam hominem constitutum fuisse quem dicunt a Filio Dei in unitatem personae assumptum; ratione cuius assumptionis illum hominem dicunt esse Filium Dei, et Filium Dei dicunt esse illum hominem. Et quia assumptionem praedictam ad unitatem personae dicunt esse terminatam, confitentur quidem in Christo unam personam Dei et hominis; sed quia hic homo, quem ex anima et corpore constitutum dicunt, est quoddam suppositum vel hypostasis humanae naturae, ponunt in Christo duo supposita et duas hypostases: unum humanae naturae creatum et temporale, aliud divinae naturae increatum et aeternum.
Other theologians, wishing to avoid these absurdities, proposed that in Christ the soul was indeed united to the body, and that this union constituted a certain man who, they maintained, was assumed by the Son of God in unity of person. By reason of this assumption they said that the man in question was the Son of God and that the Son of God was that man. Further, since this assumption had unity of person as its terminus, they admitted that in Christ there was one person of God and man. But since this man who, they maintain, is composed of soul and body, is a certain suppositum or hypostasis of human nature, they place two supposita and two hypostases in Christ: one of human nature, created and temporal; the other of divine nature, uncreated and eternal.