Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum veritas sit tantum in intellectu Whether truth resides only in the intellect? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit tantum in intellectu, sed magis in rebus. Augustinus enim, in libro Soliloq., reprobat hanc notificationem veri, verum est id quod videtur, quia secundum hoc, lapides qui sunt in abditissimo terrae sinu, non essent veri lapides, quia non videntur. Reprobat etiam istam, verum est quod ita se habet ut videtur cognitori, si velit et possit cognoscere, quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod nihil esset verum, si nullus posset cognoscere. Et definit sic verum, verum est id quod est. Et sic videtur quod veritas sit in rebus, et non in intellectu. Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, That is true which is seen, since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know, for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: That is true which is. It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect. Praeterea, quidquid est verum, veritate verum est. Si igitur veritas est in intellectu solo, nihil erit verum nisi secundum quod intelligitur, quod est error antiquorum philosophorum, qui dicebant omne quod videtur, esse verum. Ad quod sequitur contradictoria simul esse vera, cum contradictoria simul a diversis vera esse videantur. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time. Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis, ut patet I Poster. Sed ex eo quod res est vel non est, est opinio vel oratio vera vel falsa, secundum Philosophum in Praedicamentis. Ergo veritas magis est in rebus quam in intellectu. Obj. 3: Further, that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so, as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, VI Metaphys., quod verum et falsum non sunt in rebus, sed in intellectu. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam. Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili, sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu. Sicut autem bonum est in re, inquantum habet ordinem ad appetitum; et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni, ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur, secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum. I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite—and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Res autem intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se, vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet secundum suum esse, per accidens autem ad intellectum a quo cognoscibilis est. Sicut si dicamus quod domus comparatur ad intellectum artificis per se, per accidens autem comparatur ad intellectum a quo non dependet. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend. Iudicium autem de re non sumitur secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest ei per se. Unde unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est quod res artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur similitudinem formae quae est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, inquantum est signum intellectus veri. Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt in mente divina, dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam lapidis naturam, secundum praeconceptionem intellectus divini. Sic ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium. Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true as being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect’s mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Et secundum hoc, veritas diversimode notificatur. Nam Augustinus, in libro De Vera Relig., dicit quod veritas est, qua ostenditur id quod est. Et Hilarius dicit quod verum est declarativum aut manifestativum esse. Et hoc pertinet ad veritatem secundum quod est in intellectu. Ad veritatem autem rei secundum ordinem ad intellectum, pertinet definitio Augustini in libro de vera Relig., veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est. Et quaedam definitio Anselmi, veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis; nam rectum est, quod principio concordat. Et quaedam definitio Avicennae, veritas uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei. Quod autem dicitur quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus potest ad utrumque pertinere. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is; and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that Truth makes being clear and evident and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine’s definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle: also Anselm’s definition (De Verit. xii), Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone; for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna’s definition (Metaph. viii, 6), The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it. The definition that Truth is the equation of thought and thing is applicable to it under either aspect. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei; et excludit a ratione huius veritatis, comparationem ad intellectum nostrum. Nam id quod est per accidens, ab unaquaque definitione excluditur. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition. Ad secundum dicendum quod antiqui philosophi species rerum naturalium non dicebant procedere ab aliquo intellectu, sed eas provenire a casu, et quia considerabant quod verum importat comparationem ad intellectum, cogebantur veritatem rerum constituere in ordine ad intellectum nostrum. Ex quo inconvenientia sequebantur quae Philosophus prosequitur in IV Metaphys. Quae quidem inconvenientia non accidunt, si ponamus veritatem rerum consistere in comparatione ad intellectum divinum. Reply Obj. 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis, sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in animali; virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas eius, causat sanitatem, cum non sit agens univocum. Et similiter esse rei, non veritas eius, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde Philosophus dicit quod opinio et oratio vera est ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res vera est. Reply Obj. 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or a word is true from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum veritas sit solum in intellectu componente et dividente Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit solum in intellectu componente et dividente. Dicit enim Philosophus, in III de anima, quod sicut sensus propriorum sensibilium semper veri sunt, ita et intellectus eius quod quid est. Sed compositio et divisio non est neque in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est. Ergo veritas non solum est in compositione et divisione intellectus. Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards what a thing is. Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. Praeterea, Isaac dicit, in libro de definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. Sed sicut intellectus complexorum potest adaequari rebus, ita intellectus incomplexorum, et etiam sensus sentiens rem ut est. Ergo veritas non est solum in compositione et divisione intellectus. Obj. 2: Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. Sed contra est quod dicit Philosophus, in VI Metaphys., quod circa simplicia et quod quid est non est veritas, nec in intellectu neque in rebus. On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and what a thing is, truth is found neither in the intellect nor in things. Respondeo dicendum quod verum, sicut dictum est, secundum sui primam rationem est in intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens. Et propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit, licet enim visus habeat similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscit comparationem quae est inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest, sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo quod quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, in so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing what a thing is. When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo, nam in omni propositione aliquam formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea. Et ideo bene invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus cognoscendo quod quid est, sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum. Et similiter est de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis. Veritas quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows what a thing is; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing what a thing is, as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word truth; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta. And thus the Objections given are solved. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum verum et ens convertantur Whether the true and being are convertible terms? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in rebus. Ergo non convertuntur. Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated (A. 1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible. Praeterea, id quod se extendit ad ens et non ens, non convertitur cum ente. Sed verum se extendit ad ens et non ens, nam verum est quod est esse, et quod non est non esse. Ergo verum et ens non convertuntur. Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible. Praeterea, quae se habent secundum prius et posterius, non videntur converti. Sed verum videtur prius esse quam ens, nam ens non intelligitur nisi sub ratione veri. Ergo videtur quod non sint convertibilia. Obj. 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible. Sed contra est quod dicit Philosophus, II Metaphys., quod eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate. On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse, intantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III De Anima, quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen, sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum comparationem ad intellectum. I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that the soul is in some manner all things, through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est. Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato. Hoc enim est de ratione veri, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione. Reply Obj. 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before (A. 1). But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (A. 1). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in the intellect, while being is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea. Ad secundum dicendum quod non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed cognoscitur inquantum intellectus facit illud cognoscibile. Unde verum fundatur in ente , inquantum non ens est quoddam ens rationis, apprehensum scilicet a ratione. Reply Obj. 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason. Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem entis. Et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur ratio veri. Et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi, nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens, intelligitur verum. Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also, since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam verum Whether good is logically prior to the true? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est secundum rationem quam verum. Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true. Praeterea, bonum est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam verum. Obj. 2: Further, good is in things, but the true is in the intellect composing and dividing as said above (A. 2). But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true. Praeterea, veritas est quaedam species virtutis, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed virtus continetur sub bono, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut dicit Augustinus. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum. Obj. 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.