Ad tertium dicendum quod illae quatuor generales virtutum conditiones quas ponit philosophus, non sunt propriae praedictis virtutibus. Sed possunt eis appropriari, secundum modum iam dictum. Reply Obj. 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum convenienter huiusmodi quatuor virtutes dividantur in virtutes exemplares, purgati animi, purgatorias, et politicas Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar Virtues? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter huiusmodi quatuor virtutes dividantur in virtutes exemplares, purgati animi, purgatorias, et politicas. Ut enim Macrobius dicit, in I super somnium Scipionis, virtutes exemplares sunt quae in ipsa divina mente consistunt. Sed philosophus, in X Ethic., dicit quod ridiculum est Deo iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et prudentiam attribuere. Ergo virtutes huiusmodi non possunt esse exemplares. Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God. Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar. Praeterea, virtutes purgati animi dicuntur quae sunt absque passionibus, dicit enim ibidem Macrobius quod temperantiae purgati animi est terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci; fortitudinis autem passiones ignorare, non vincere. Dictum est autem supra quod huiusmodi virtutes sine passionibus esse non possunt. Ergo huiusmodi virtutes purgati animi esse non possunt. Obj. 2: Further, the perfect virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that in a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them. Now it was stated above (Q59, A5) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as perfect virtue. Praeterea, virtutes purgatorias dicit esse eorum qui quadam humanorum fuga solis se inserunt divinis. Sed hoc videtur esse vitiosum, dicit enim Tullius, in I de Offic., quod qui despicere se dicunt ea quae plerique mirantur imperia et magistratus, his non modo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto. Ergo non sunt aliquae virtutes purgatoriae. Obj. 3: Further, he says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the perfecting virtues are those of the man who flies from human affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God. But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz., power and office. Therefore there are no perfecting virtues. Praeterea, virtutes politicas esse dicit quibus boni viri reipublicae consulunt, urbesque tuentur. Sed ad bonum commune sola iustitia legalis ordinatur; ut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Ergo aliae virtutes non debent dici politicae. Obj. 4: Further, he says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the social virtues are those whereby good men work for the good of their country and for the safety of the city. But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called social. Sed contra est quod Macrobius ibidem dicit, Plotinus, inter philosophiae professores cum Platone princeps, quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum genera virtutum. Ex his primae politicae vocantur; secundae, purgatoriae; tertiae autem, iam purgati animi; quartae, exemplares. On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: ‘The four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social virtues; second, there are perfecting virtues; third, there are perfect virtues; and fourth, there are exemplar virtues.’ Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de moribus Eccles., oportet quod anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possit virtus innasci, et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene vivimus. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright. Oportet igitur quod exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo praeexistat, sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes. Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Sic igitur virtus potest considerari vel prout est exemplariter in Deo, et sic dicuntur virtutes exemplares. Ita scilicet quod ipsa divina mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero, conversio divinae intentionis ad seipsum, sicut in nobis temperantia dicitur per hoc quod concupiscibilis conformatur rationi; fortitudo autem Dei est eius immutabilitas; iustitia vero Dei est observatio legis aeternae in suis operibus, sicut Plotinus dixit. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we speak of exemplar virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God’s gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God’s fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states. Et quia homo secundum suam naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur, prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modum hactenus de his virtutibus locuti sumus. Again, since man by his nature is a social animal, these virtues, insofar as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called social virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now. Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se trahat quantum potest, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in X Ethic.; et hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est illud Matth. V, estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus est, necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt virtutes divinae. Quae quidem virtutes distinguuntur secundum diversitatem motus et termini. Ita scilicet quod quaedam sunt virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium, et hae vocantur virtutes purgatoriae. Ita scilicet quod prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat, inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam. Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium divinam similitudinem, quae vocantur virtutes iam purgati animi. Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones ignoret; iustitia cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando. Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac vita perfectissimorum. But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us—for instance: Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect (Matt 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called perfecting virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the perfect virtues. Thus prudence sees naught else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such are the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de his virtutibus secundum quod sunt circa res humanas, puta iustitia circa emptiones et venditiones, fortitudo circa timores, temperantia circa concupiscentias. Sic enim ridiculum est eas Deo attribuere. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtutes humanae sunt circa passiones, scilicet virtutes hominum in hoc mundo conversantium. Sed virtutes eorum qui plenam beatitudinem assequuntur, sunt absque passionibus. Unde Plotinus dicit quod passiones politicae virtutes molliunt, idest ad medium reducunt; secundae, scilicet purgatoriae, auferunt; tertiae, quae sunt purgati animi, obliviscuntur; in quartis, scilicet exemplaribus, nefas est nominari. Quamvis dici possit quod loquitur hic de passionibus secundum quod significant aliquos inordinatos motus. Reply Obj. 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says that the social virtues check the passions, i.e., they bring them to the relative mean; the second kind, viz., the perfecting virtues, uproot them; the third kind, viz., the perfect virtues, forget them; while it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind, viz., the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions. Ad tertium dicendum quod deserere res humanas ubi necessitas imponitur, vitiosum est, alias est virtuosum. Unde parum supra Tullius praemittit, his forsitan concedendum est rempublicam non capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae se dederunt; et his qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate, aut aliqua graviori causa impediti, a republica recesserunt; cum eius administrandae potestatem aliis laudemque concederent. Quod consonat ei quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, otium sanctum quaerit caritas veritatis; negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiendae atque intuendae vacandum est veritati, si autem imponitur, suscipienda est, propter caritatis necessitatem. Reply Obj. 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity presses is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority. This agrees with what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): The love of truth demands a hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity. Ad quartum dicendum quod sola iustitia legalis directe respicit bonum commune, sed per imperium omnes alias virtutes ad bonum commune trahit, ut in V Ethic. dicit philosophus. Est enim considerandum quod ad politicas virtutes, secundum quod hic dicuntur, pertinet non solum bene operari ad commune, sed etiam bene operari ad partes communis, scilicet ad domum, vel aliquam singularem personam. Reply Obj. 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz., towards the household, or even towards one individual. Quaestio 62 Question 62 De virtutibus theologicis Of the Theological Virtues Deinde considerandum est de virtutibus theologicis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. (1) Whether there are any theological virtues? Secundo, utrum virtutes theologicae distinguantur ab intellectualibus et moralibus. (2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues? Tertio, quot, et quae sint. (3) How many, and which are they? Quarto, de ordine earum. (4) Of their order. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum sint aliquae virtutes theologicae Whether there are any theological virtues? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. Ut enim dicitur in VII Physic., virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, dico autem perfectum, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Sed id quod est divinum, est supra naturam hominis. Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis. Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature. But that which is Divine is above man’s nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man. Praeterea, virtutes theologicae dicuntur quasi virtutes divinae. Sed virtutes divinae sunt exemplares, ut dictum est, quae quidem non sunt in nobis, sed in Deo. Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis. Obj. 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (Q61, A5), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man. Praeterea, virtutes theologicae dicuntur quibus ordinamur in Deum, qui est primum principium et ultimus finis rerum. Sed homo ex ipsa natura rationis et voluntatis, habet ordinem ad primum principium et ultimum finem. Non ergo requiruntur aliqui habitus virtutum theologicarum, quibus ratio et voluntas ordinetur in Deum. Obj. 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God. Sed contra est quod praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum. Sed de actibus fidei, spei et caritatis dantur praecepta in lege divina, dicitur enim Eccli. II, qui timetis Deum, credite illi; item, sperate in illum; item, diligite illum. Ergo fides, spes et caritas sunt virtutes in Deum ordinantes. Sunt ergo theologicae. On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is written (Sir 2:8, seqq.): Ye that fear the Lord believe Him, and again, hope in Him, and again, love Him. Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues. Respondeo dicendum quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet. Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod dicitur II Petr. I, quod per Christum facti sumus consortes divinae naturae. Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur. I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (Q5, A7). Now man’s happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (Q5, A5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pet 1:4) that by Christ we are made partakers of the Divine nature. And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man’s natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called theological virtues: first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: second, because they are infused in us by God alone: third, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliqua natura potest attribui alicui rei dupliciter. Uno modo, essentialiter, et sic huiusmodi virtutes theologicae excedunt hominis naturam. Alio modo, participative, sicut lignum ignitum participat naturam ignis, et sic quodammodo fit homo particeps divinae naturae, ut dictum est. Et sic istae virtutes conveniunt homini secundum naturam participatam. Reply Obj. 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man. Second, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker. Ad secundum dicendum quod istae virtutes non dicuntur divinae, sicut quibus Deus sit virtuosus, sed sicut quibus nos efficimur virtuosi a Deo, et in ordine ad Deum. Unde non sunt exemplares, sed exemplatae. Reply Obj. 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because by them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur prout est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas secundum suam naturam non ordinantur sufficienter. Reply Obj. 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him insofar as He is the object of supernatural happiness. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum virtutes theologicae distinguantur a moralibus et intellectualibus Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?