Praeterea, finis ultimus hominis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed obiectum voluntatis est bonum universale, quod est finis omnium. Ergo necesse est quod in ultimo fine hominis omnia conveniant.
Obj. 3: Further, man’s last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all. Therefore all must needs concur in man’s last end.
Sed contra est quod ultimus finis hominum est beatitudo; quam omnes appetunt, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed non cadit in animalia rationis expertia ut beata sint, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Non ergo in ultimo fine hominis alia conveniunt.
On the contrary, man’s last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason, as Augustine says (83 Questions, Q5). Therefore other things do not concur in man’s last end.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Physic. et in V Metaphys., finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cuius, et quo, idest ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur, et usus sive adeptio illius rei. Sicut si dicamus quod motus corporis gravis finis est vel locus inferior ut res, vel hoc quod est esse in loco inferiori, ut usus, et finis avari est vel pecunia ut res, vel possessio pecuniae ut usus.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold—the end for which and the end by which; viz., the thing itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty body is either a lower place as thing, or to be in a lower place, as use; and the end of the miser is money as thing, or possession of money as use.
Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quae est finis, sic in ultimo fine hominis omnia alia conveniunt, quia Deus est ultimus finis hominis et omnium aliarum rerum. Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad consecutionem finis, sic in hoc fine hominis non communicant creaturae irrationales. Nam homo et aliae rationales creaturae consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum, quod non competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt.
If, therefore, we speak of man’s last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man’s last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man’s last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, insofar as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Hence it is evident how the objections are solved.
In quibus sit beatitudo hominis
What Man’s Happiness Consists In
Deinde considerandum est de beatitudine, nam beatitudo nominat adeptionem ultimi finis. Primo quidem, in quibus sit; secundo, quid sit; tertio, qualiter eam consequi possimus.
We have now to consider happiness, because happiness is attaining the last end: (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.
Circa primum quaeruntur octo.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum beatitudo consistat in divitiis.
(1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?
Secundo, utrum in honoribus.
(2) Whether in honor?
Tertio, utrum in fama, sive in gloria.
(3) Whether in fame or glory?
Quarto, utrum in potestate.
(4) Whether in power?
Quinto, utrum in aliquo corporis bono.
(5) Whether in any good of the body?
Sexto, utrum in voluptate.
(6) Whether in pleasure?
Septimo, utrum in aliquo bono animae.
(7) Whether in any good of the soul?
Octavo, utrum in aliquo bono creato.
(8) Whether in any created good?
Utrum beatitudo hominis in divitiis consistat
Whether man’s happiness consists in wealth?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in divitiis consistat. Cum enim beatitudo sit ultimus finis hominis, in eo consistit quod maxime in hominis affectu dominatur. Huiusmodi autem sunt divitiae, dicitur enim Eccle. X, pecuniae obediunt omnia. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo hominis consistit.
Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man’s last end, it must consist in that which has the greatest hold on man’s affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (Eccl 10:19): All things obey money. Therefore man’s happiness consists in wealth.
Praeterea, secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Sed in pecuniis omnia possideri videntur, quia, ut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., ad hoc nummus est inventus, ut sit quasi fideiussor habendi pro eo quodcumque homo voluerit. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistit.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things. Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
Praeterea, desiderium summi boni, cum nunquam deficiat, videtur esse infinitum. Sed hoc maxime in divitiis invenitur, quia avarus non implebitur pecunia, ut dicitur Eccle. V. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistit.
Obj. 3: Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than anything else; since a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches (Eccl 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
Sed contra, bonum hominis in retinendo beatitudinem magis consistit quam in emittendo ipsam. Sed sicut Boetius in II de Consol. dicit, divitiae effundendo, magis quam coacervando, melius nitent, siquidem avaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo non consistit.
On the contrary, Man’s good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), wealth shines in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in wealth.
Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in divitiis consistere. Sunt enim duplices divitiae, ut philosophus dicit in I Polit., scilicet naturales, et artificiales. Naturales quidem divitiae sunt, quibus homini subvenitur ad defectus naturales tollendos, sicut cibus, potus, vestimenta, vehicula et habitacula, et alia huiusmodi. Divitiae autem artificiales sunt, quibus secundum se natura non iuvatur, ut denarii; sed ars humana eos adinvenit propter facilitatem commutationis, ut sint quasi mensura quaedam rerum venalium.
I answer that, It is impossible for man’s happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3), viz., natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable.
Manifestum est autem quod in divitiis naturalibus beatitudo hominis esse non potest. Quaeruntur enim huiusmodi divitiae propter aliud, scilicet ad sustentandam naturam hominis, et ideo non possunt esse ultimus finis hominis, sed magis ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem. Unde in ordine naturae omnia huiusmodi sunt infra hominem, et propter hominem facta; secundum illud Psalmi VIII, omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius.
Now it is evident that man’s happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something else, viz., as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man’s last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to Psalm 8: Thou hast subjected all things under his feet (8).
Divitiae autem artificiales non quaeruntur nisi propter naturales, non enim quaererentur, nisi quia per eas emuntur res ad usum vitae necessariae. Unde multo minus habent rationem ultimi finis. Impossibile est igitur beatitudinem, quae est ultimus finis hominis, in divitiis esse.
And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia corporalia obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad multitudinem stultorum, qui sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae pecunia acquiri possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus, sicut et iudicium de saporibus ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.
Reply Obj. 1: All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.
Ad secundum dicendum quod pecunia possunt haberi omnia venalia, non autem spiritualia, quae vendi non possunt. Unde dicitur Proverb. XVII, quid prodest stulto divitias habere, cum sapientiam emere non possit?
Reply Obj. 2: All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Prov 17:16): What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom.
Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus naturalium divitiarum non est infinitus, quia secundum certam mensuram naturae sufficiunt. Sed appetitus divitiarum artificialium est infinitus, quia deservit concupiscentiae inordinatae, quae non modificatur, ut patet per philosophum in I Polit. Aliter tamen est infinitum desiderium divitiarum, et desiderium summi boni. Nam summum bonum quanto perfectius possidetur, tanto ipsummet magis amatur, et alia contemnuntur, quia quanto magis habetur, magis cognoscitur. Et ideo dicitur Eccli. XXIV, qui edunt me, adhuc esurient. Sed in appetitu divitiarum, et quorumcumque temporalium bonorum, est e converso, nam quando iam habentur, ipsa contemnuntur, et alia appetuntur; secundum quod significatur Ioan. IV, cum dominus dicit, qui bibit ex hac aqua, per quam temporalia significantur, sitiet iterum. Et hoc ideo, quia eorum insufficientia magis cognoscitur cum habentur. Et ideo hoc ipsum ostendit eorum imperfectionem, et quod in eis summum bonum non consistit.
Reply Obj. 3: The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (Sir 24:29): They that eat me shall yet hunger. Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord’s words (John 4:13): Whosoever drinketh of this water, by which temporal goods are signified, shall thirst again. The reason of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and that the sovereign good does not consist therein.
Utrum beatitudo hominis in honoribus consistat
Whether man’s happiness consists in honors?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in honoribus consistat. Beatitudo enim, sive felicitas, est praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Sed honor maxime videtur esse id quod est virtutis praemium, ut philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Ergo in honore maxime consistit beatitudo.
Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.
Praeterea, illud quod convenit Deo et excellentissimis, maxime videtur esse beatitudo, quae est bonum perfectum. Sed huiusmodi est honor, ut philosophus dicit in IV Ethic. Et etiam I Tim. I, dicit apostolus, soli Deo honor et gloria. Ergo in honore consistit beatitudo.
Obj. 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says (1 Tim 1:17): To . . . the only God be honor and glory. Therefore happiness consists in honor.
Praeterea, illud quod est maxime desideratum ab hominibus, est beatitudo. Sed nihil videtur esse magis desiderabile ab hominibus quam honor, quia homines patiuntur iacturam in omnibus aliis rebus ne patiantur aliquod detrimentum sui honoris. Ergo in honore beatitudo consistit.
Obj. 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor.
Sed contra, beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non est in eo qui honoratur, sed magis in honorante, qui reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Ergo in honore beatitudo non consistit.
On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor.
Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem consistere in honore. Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam; et ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae quae est in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum beatitudinem, quae est hominis bonum perfectum; et secundum partes eius, idest secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem, sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.
I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man’s excellence is in proportion, especially, to his happiness, which is man’s perfect good; and to its parts, i.e., those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein.