Summa Theologiae
Prima Secundae Summa Theologiae
First Part of the Second Part De vitiis Vices Quaestio 71 Question 71 De vitiis et peccatis secundum se Of Vice and Sin Considered in Themselves Consequenter considerandum est de vitiis et peccatis. Circa quae sex consideranda occurrunt, primo quidem, de ipsis vitiis et peccatis secundum se; secundo, de distinctione eorum; tertio, de comparatione eorum ad invicem; quarto, de subiecto peccati; quinto, de causa eius; sexto, de effectu ipsius. We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect of sin. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum vitium contrarietur virtuti. (1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue? Secundo, utrum vitium sit contra naturam. (2) Whether vice is contrary to nature? Tertio, quid sit peius, utrum vitium vel actus vitiosus. (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act? Quarto, utrum actus vitiosus possit esse simul cum virtute. (4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue? Quinto, utrum in omni peccato sit aliquis actus. (5) Whether every sin includes action? Sexto, de definitione peccati quam Augustinus ponit, XXII contra Faustum, peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem aeternam. (6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii): Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum vitium contrarietur virtuti Whether vice is contrary to virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non contrarietur virtuti. Uni enim unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaphys. Sed virtuti contrariantur peccatum et malitia. Non ergo contrariatur ei vitium, quia vitium dicitur etiam si sit indebita dispositio membrorum corporalium, vel quarumcumque rerum. Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of any things whatever. Praeterea, virtus nominat quandam perfectionem potentiae. Sed vitium nihil nominat ad potentiam pertinens. Ergo vitium non contrariatur virtuti. Obj. 2: Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod virtus est quaedam sanitas animae. Sanitati autem opponitur aegritudo vel morbus, magis quam vitium. Ergo virtuti non contrariatur vitium. Obj. 3: Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that virtue is the soul’s health. Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, quod vitium est qualitas secundum quam malus est animus. Virtus autem est qualitas quae facit bonum habentem, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo vitium contrariatur virtuti. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil. But virtue is a quality which makes its subject good, as was shown above (Q55, AA3,4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue. Respondeo dicendum quod circa virtutem duo possumus considerare, scilicet ipsam essentiam virtutis; et id ad quod est virtus. In essentia quidem virtutis aliquid considerari potest directe; et aliquid ex consequenti. Directe quidem virtus importat dispositionem quandam alicuius convenienter se habentis secundum modum suae naturae, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Physic. quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Ex consequenti autem sequitur quod virtus sit bonitas quaedam, in hoc enim consistit uniuscuiusque rei bonitas, quod convenienter se habeat secundum modum suae naturae. Id autem ad quod virtus ordinatur, est actus bonus, ut ex supradictis patet. I answer that, Two things may be considered in virtue—the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies directly a disposition whereby the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to its nature. That which virtue implies consequently is that it is a kind of goodness: because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue is directed is a good act, as was shown above (Q56, A3). Secundum hoc igitur tria inveniuntur opponi virtuti. Quorum unum est peccatum, quod opponitur sibi ex parte eius ad quod virtus ordinatur, nam peccatum proprie nominat actum inordinatum, sicut actus virtutis est actus ordinatus et debitus. Secundum autem quod ad rationem virtutis consequitur quod sit bonitas quaedam, opponitur virtuti malitia. Sed secundum id quod directe est de ratione virtutis, opponitur virtuti vitium, vitium enim uniuscuiusque rei esse videtur quod non sit disposita secundum quod convenit suae naturae. Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., quod perfectioni naturae deesse perspexeris, id voca vitium. Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is sin, which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz., that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is malice: while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is vice: because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): Whatever is lacking for a thing’s natural perfection may be called a vice. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa tria non contrariantur virtuti secundum idem, sed peccatum quidem contrariatur secundum quod virtus est operativa boni; malitia autem secundum quod est bonitas quaedam; vitium autem proprie secundum quod est virtus. Reply Obj. 1: These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus non solum importat perfectionem potentiae quae est principium agendi, sed etiam importat debitam dispositionem eius cuius est virtus, et hoc ideo quia unumquodque operatur secundum quod actu est. Requiritur ergo quod aliquid sit in se bene dispositum, quod debet esse boni operativum. Et secundum hoc virtuti vitium opponitur. Reply Obj. 2: Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., morbi et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis, in corporibus enim morbum appellant totius corporis corruptionem, puta febrem vel aliquid huiusmodi; aegrotationem vero, morbum cum imbecillitate; vitium autem, cum partes corporis inter se dissident. Et quamvis in corpore quandoque sit morbus sine aegrotatione, puta cum aliquis est interius male dispositus, non tamen exterius praepeditur a solitis operationibus; in animo tamen, ut ipse dicit, haec duo non possunt nisi cogitatione secerni. Necesse est enim quod quandocumque aliquis interius est male dispositus, habens inordinatum affectum, quod ex hoc imbecillis reddatur ad debitas operationes exercendas, quia unaquaeque arbor ex suo fructu cognoscitur, idest homo ex opere, ut dicitur Matth. XII. Sed vitium animi, ut Tullius ibidem dicit, est habitus aut affectio animi in tota vita inconstans, et a seipsa dissentiens. Quod quidem invenitur etiam absque morbo vel aegrotatione, ut puta cum aliquis ex infirmitate vel ex passione peccat. Unde in plus se habet vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus, sicut etiam virtus in plus se habet quam sanitas, nam sanitas etiam quaedam virtus ponitur in VII Physic. Et ideo virtuti convenientius opponitur vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus. Reply Obj. 3: As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), disease and sickness are vicious qualities, for in speaking of the body he calls it disease when the whole body is infected, for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness when the disease is attended with weakness; and vice when the parts of the body are not well compacted together. And although at times there may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; yet, in the soul, as he says, these two things are indistinguishable, except in thought. For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since a tree is known by its fruit, i.e., man by his works, according to Mt. 12:33. But vice of the soul, as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), is a habit or affection of the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life: and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, e.g., when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum vitium sit contra naturam Whether vice is contrary to nature? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non sit contra naturam. Vitium enim contrariatur virtuti, ut dictum est. Sed virtutes non sunt in nobis a natura, sed causantur in nobis per infusionem aut ab assuetudine, ut dictum est. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam. Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above (A1). Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q63, AA1,2,3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. Praeterea, ea quae sunt contra naturam, non possunt assuefieri, sicut lapis nunquam assuescit ferri sursum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed aliqui assuefiunt ad vitia. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam. Obj. 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus a stone never becomes habituated to upward movement (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. Praeterea, nihil quod est contra naturam, invenitur in habentibus illam naturam ut in pluribus. Sed vitia inveniuntur in hominibus ut in pluribus, quia, sicut dicitur Matth. VII, lata est via quae ducit ad perditionem, et multi vadunt per eam. Ergo vitium non est contra naturam. Obj. 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Matt 7:13): Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. Praeterea, peccatum comparatur ad vitium sicut actus ad habitum, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed peccatum definitur esse dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei; ut patet per Augustinum, XXII contra Faustum. Lex autem Dei est supra naturam. Magis ergo dicendum est quod vitium sit contra legem, quam sit contra naturam. Obj. 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above (A1). Now sin is defined as a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God, as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., omne vitium, eo ipso quod vitium est, contra naturam est. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitium virtuti contrariatur. Virtus autem uniuscuiusque rei consistit in hoc quod sit bene disposita secundum convenientiam suae naturae, ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod in qualibet re vitium dicatur ex hoc quod est disposita contra id quod convenit naturae. Unde et de hoc unaquaeque res vituperatur, a vitio autem nomen vituperationis tractum creditur, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb. I answer that, As stated above (A1), vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above (A1). Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing vituperated, which word is derived from vice according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14). Sed considerandum est quod natura uniuscuiusque rei potissime est forma secundum quam res speciem sortitur. Homo autem in specie constituitur per animam rationalem. Et ideo id quod est contra ordinem rationis, proprie est contra naturam hominis inquantum est homo; quod autem est secundum rationem, est secundum naturam hominis inquantum est homo. Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse, et malum hominis est praeter rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde virtus humana, quae hominem facit bonum, et opus ipsius bonum reddit, intantum est secundum naturam hominis, inquantum convenit rationi, vitium autem intantum est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est contra ordinem rationis. But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. Now man’s good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man’s nature, for as much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man’s nature, insofar as it is contrary to the order of reason. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes, etsi non causentur a natura secundum suum esse perfectum, tamen inclinant ad id quod est secundum naturam, idest secundum ordinem rationis, dicit enim Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod virtus est habitus in modum naturae rationi consentaneus. Et hoc modo virtus dicitur esse secundum naturam, et per contrarium intelligitur quod vitium sit contra naturam. Reply Obj. 1: Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords with reason, i.e., with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a second nature: and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary to nature. Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de his quae sunt contra naturam, secundum quod esse contra naturam opponitur ei quod est esse a natura, non autem secundum quod esse contra naturam opponitur ei quod est esse secundum naturam, eo modo quo virtutes dicuntur esse secundum naturam, inquantum inclinant ad id quod naturae convenit. Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, insofar as being against nature is contrary to being from nature: and not insofar as being against nature is contrary to being in accord with nature, in which latter sense virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature. Ad tertium dicendum quod in homine est duplex natura, scilicet rationalis et sensitiva. Et quia per operationem sensus homo pervenit ad actus rationis, ideo plures sequuntur inclinationes naturae sensitivae quam ordinem rationis, plures enim sunt qui assequuntur principium rei, quam qui ad consummationem perveniunt. Ex hoc autem vitia et peccata in hominibus proveniunt, quod sequuntur inclinationem naturae sensitivae contra ordinem rationis. Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason. Ad quartum dicendum quod quidquid est contra rationem artificiati, est etiam contra naturam artis, qua artificiatum producitur. Lex autem aeterna comparatur ad ordinem rationis humanae sicut ars ad artificiatum. Unde eiusdem rationis est quod vitium et peccatum sit contra ordinem rationis humanae, et quod sit contra legem aeternam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., quod a Deo habent omnes naturae quod naturae sunt, et intantum sunt vitiosae, inquantum ab eius, qua factae sunt, arte discedunt. Reply Obj. 4: Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that every nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, insofar as it fails from the Divine art whereby it was made.