Articulus 15 Article 15 Utrum prudentia insit nobis a natura Whether prudence is in us by nature? Ad decimumquintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia insit nobis a natura. Dicit enim Philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod ea quae pertinent ad prudentiam naturalia videntur esse, scilicet synesis, gnome et huiusmodi, non autem ea quae pertinent ad sapientiam speculativam. Sed eorum quae sunt unius generis eadem est originis ratio. Ergo etiam prudentia inest nobis a natura. Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The Philosopher says that things connected with prudence seem to be natural, namely synesis, gnome and the like, but not those which are connected with speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature. Praeterea, aetatum variatio est secundum naturam. Sed prudentia consequitur aetates, secundum illud Iob XII, in antiquis est sapientia, et in multo tempore prudentia. Ergo prudentia est naturalis. Obj. 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days prudence. Therefore prudence is natural. Praeterea, prudentia magis convenit naturae humanae quam naturae brutorum animalium. Sed bruta animalia habent quasdam naturales prudentias; ut patet per Philosophum, in VIII de Historiis animal. Ergo prudentia est naturalis. Obj. 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus intellectualis plurimum ex doctrina habet et generationem et augmentum, ideo experimento indiget et tempore. Sed prudentia est virtus intellectualis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo prudentia non inest nobis a natura, sed ex doctrina et experimento. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands experience and time. Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praemissis patet, prudentia includit cognitionem et universalium et singularium operabilium, ad quae prudens universalia principia applicat. Quantum igitur ad universalem cognitionem, eadem ratio est de prudentia et de scientia speculativa. Quia utriusque prima principia universalia sunt naturaliter nota, ut ex supradictis patet, nisi quod principia communia prudentiae sunt magis connaturalia homini; ut enim philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., vita quae est secundum speculationem est melior quam quae est secundum hominem. Sed alia principia universalia posteriora, sive sint rationis speculativae sive practicae, non habentur per naturam, sed per inventionem secundum viam experimenti, vel per disciplinam. I answer that, As shown above (A. 3), prudence includes knowledge both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of speculative science, because the primary universal principles of either are known naturally, as shown above (A. 6): except that the common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) the life which is according to the speculative reason is better than that which is according to man: whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the speculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through teaching. Quantum autem ad particularem cognitionem eorum circa quae operatio consistit est iterum distinguendum. Quia operatio consistit circa aliquid vel sicut circa finem; vel sicut circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Fines autem recti humanae vitae sunt determinati. Et ideo potest esse naturalis inclinatio respectu horum finium, sicut supra dictum est quod quidam habent ex naturali dispositione quasdam virtutes quibus inclinantur ad rectos fines, et per consequens etiam habent naturaliter rectum iudicium de huiusmodi finibus. On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 51, A. 1; Q. 63, A. 1) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment about such like ends. Sed ea quae sunt ad finem in rebus humanis non sunt determinata, sed multipliciter diversificantur secundum diversitatem personarum et negotiorum. Unde quia inclinatio naturae semper est ad aliquid determinatum, talis cognitio non potest homini inesse naturaliter, licet ex naturali dispositione unus sit aptior ad huiusmodi discernenda quam alius; sicut etiam accidit circa conclusiones speculativarum scientiarum. Quia igitur prudentia non est circa fines, sed circa ea quae sunt ad finem, ut supra habitum est; ideo prudentia non est naturalis. But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man has a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated above (A. 6; I-II, Q. 57, A. 5), it follows that prudence is not from nature. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de pertinentibus ad prudentiam secundum quod ordinantur ad fines, unde supra praemiserat quod principia sunt eius quod est cuius gratia, idest finis. Et propter hoc non facit mentionem de eubulia, quae est consiliativa eorum quae sunt ad finem. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to prudence, insofar as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had said before (Ethic. vi, 5, 11) that they are the principles of the ‘ou heneka’, namely, the end; and so he does not mention euboulia among them, because it takes counsel about the means. Ad secundum dicendum quod prudentia magis est in senibus non solum propter naturalem dispositionem, quietatis motibus passionum sensibilium, sed etiam propter experientiam longi temporis. Reply Obj. 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but also because of their long experience. Ad tertium dicendum quod in brutis animalibus sunt determinatae viae perveniendi ad finem, unde videmus quod omnia animalia eiusdem speciei similiter operantur. Sed hoc non potest esse in homine, propter rationem eius, quae, cum sit cognoscitiva universalium, ad infinita singularia se extendit. Reply Obj. 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently extends to an infinity of singulars. Articulus 16 Article 16 Utrum prudentia possit amitti per oblivionem Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness? Ad decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia possit amitti per oblivionem. Scientia enim, cum sit necessariorum, est certior quam prudentia, quae est contingentium operabilium. Sed scientia amittitur per oblivionem. Ergo multo magis prudentia. Objection 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of action. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence. Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., virtus ex eisdem generatur et corrumpitur contrario modo factis. Sed ad generationem prudentiae necessarium est experimentum, quod fit ex multis memoriis, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Ergo, cum oblivio memoriae opponatur, videtur quod prudentia per oblivionem possit amitti. Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) the same things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue. Now the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up of many memories, as he states at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. Praeterea, prudentia non est sine cognitione universalium. Sed universalium cognitio potest per oblivionem amitti. Ergo et prudentia. Obj. 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod oblivio est artis, et non prudentiae. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence. Respondeo dicendum quod oblivio respicit cognitionem tantum. Et ideo per oblivionem potest aliquis artem totaliter perdere, et similiter scientiam, quae in ratione consistunt. Sed prudentia non consistit in sola cognitione, sed etiam in appetitu, quia ut dictum est, principalis eius actus est praecipere, quod est applicare cognitionem habitam ad appetendum et operandum. Et ideo prudentia non directe tollitur per oblivionem, sed magis corrumpitur per passiones, dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod delectabile et triste pervertit existimationem prudentiae. Unde Dan. XIII dicitur, species decepit te, et concupiscentia subvertit cor tuum; et Exod. XXIII dicitur, ne accipias munera, quae excaecant etiam prudentes. I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above (A. 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence: wherefore it is written (Dan 13:56): Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted thy heart, and (Exod 23:8): Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the prudent. Oblivio tamen potest impedire prudentiam, inquantum procedit ad praecipiendum ex aliqua cognitione, quae per oblivionem tolli potest. Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, insofar as the latter’s command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod scientia est in sola ratione. Unde de ea est alia ratio, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison fails, as stated above. Ad secundum dicendum quod experimentum prudentiae non acquiritur ex sola memoria, sed ex exercitio recte praecipiendi. Reply Obj. 2: The experience required by prudence results not from memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright. Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia principaliter consistit non in cognitione universalium, sed in applicatione ad opera, ut dictum est. Et ideo oblivio universalis cognitionis non corrumpit id quod est principale in prudentia, sed aliquid impedimentum ei affert, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (A. 3). Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above. Quaestio 48 Question 48 De partibus prudentiae The Parts of Prudence Deinde considerandum est de partibus prudentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor, primo, quae sint partes prudentiae; secundo, de partibus quasi integralibus eius; tertio, de partibus subiectivis eius; quarto, de partibus potentialibus. We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Which are the parts of prudence? (2) Of its integral parts; (3) Of its subjective parts; (4) Of its potential parts. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum convenienter assignentur partes prudentiae Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur partes prudentiae. Tullius enim, in II Rhet., ponit tres partes prudentiae, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et providentiam. Macrobius autem, secundum sententiam Plotini, attribuit prudentiae sex, scilicet rationem, intellectum, circumspectionem, providentiam, docilitatem et cautionem. Aristoteles autem, in VI Ethic., dicit ad prudentiam pertinere eubuliam, synesim et gnomen. Facit etiam mentionem circa prudentiam de eustochia et solertia, sensu et intellectu. Quidam autem alius philosophus Graecus dicit quod ad prudentiam decem pertinent, scilicet eubulia, solertia, providentia, regnativa, militaris, politica, oeconomica, dialectica, rhetorica, physica. Ergo videtur quod vel una assignatio sit superflua, vel alia diminuta. Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of prudence, namely, memory, understanding and foresight. Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, reasoning, understanding, circumspection, foresight, docility and caution. Aristotle says (Ethic. vi, 9, 10, 11) that good counsel, synesis and gnome belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he mentions conjecture, shrewdness, sense and understanding. And another Greek philosopher says that ten things are connected with prudence, namely, good counsel, shrewdness, foresight, regnative, military, political and domestic prudence, dialectics, rhetoric and physics. Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is either excessive or deficient. Praeterea, prudentia dividitur contra scientiam. Sed politica, oeconomica, dialectica, rhetorica, physica sunt quaedam scientiae. Non ergo sunt partes prudentiae. Obj. 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. Therefore they are not parts of prudence. Praeterea, partes non excedunt totum. Sed memoria intellectiva, vel intelligentia, ratio, sensus et docilitas non solum pertinent ad prudentiam, sed etiam ad omnes habitus cognoscitivos. Ergo non debent poni partes prudentiae. Obj. 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility, belong not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits. Therefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence. Praeterea, sicut consiliari et iudicare et praecipere sunt actus rationis practicae, ita etiam et uti, sicut supra habitum est. Sicut ergo eubulia adiungitur prudentiae, quae pertinet ad consilium, et synesis et gnome, quae pertinent ad iudicium; ita etiam debuit poni aliquid pertinens ad usum. Obj. 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above (I-II, Q. 16, A. 1). Therefore, just as eubulia which refers to counsel, is connected with prudence, and synesis and gnome which refer to judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned corresponding to use. Praeterea, sollicitudo ad prudentiam pertinet, sicut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam inter partes prudentiae sollicitudo poni debuit. Obj. 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among the parts of prudence. Respondeo dicendum quod triplex est pars, scilicet integralis, ut paries, tectum et fundamentum sunt partes domus; subiectiva, sicut bos et leo sunt partes animalis; et potentialis, sicut nutritivum et sensitivum sunt partes animae. Tribus ergo modis possunt assignari partes alicui virtuti. Uno modo, ad similitudinem partium integralium, ut scilicet illa dicantur esse partes virtutis alicuius quae necesse est concurrere ad perfectum actum virtutis illius. Et sic ex omnibus enumeratis possunt accipi octo partes prudentiae, scilicet sex quas enumerat Macrobius; quibus addenda est septima, scilicet memoria, quam ponit Tullius; et eustochia sive solertia, quam ponit Aristoteles (nam sensus prudentiae etiam intellectus dicitur, unde Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., horum igitur oportet habere sensum, hic autem est intellectus). Quorum octo quinque pertinent ad prudentiam secundum id quod est cognoscitiva, scilicet memoria, ratio, intellectus, docilitas et solertia, tria vero alia pertinent ad eam secundum quod est praeceptiva, applicando cognitionem ad opus, scilicet providentia, circumspectio et cautio. Quorum diversitatis ratio patet ex hoc quod circa cognitionem tria sunt consideranda. Primo quidem, ipsa cognitio. Quae si sit praeteritorum, est memoria, si autem praesentium, sive contingentium sive necessariorum, vocatur intellectus sive intelligentia. Secundo, ipsa cognitionis acquisitio. Quae fit vel per disciplinam, et ad hoc pertinet docilitas, vel per inventionem, et ad hoc pertinet eustochia, quae est bona coniecturatio. Huius autem pars, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., est solertia, quae est velox coniecturatio medii, ut dicitur in I Poster. Tertio considerandus est usus cognitionis, secundum scilicet quod ex cognitis aliquis procedit ad alia cognoscenda vel iudicanda. Et hoc pertinet ad rationem. Ratio autem, ad hoc quod recte praecipiat, tria debet habere. Primo quidem, ut ordinet aliquid accommodum ad finem, et hoc pertinet ad providentiam. Secundo, ut attendat circumstantias negotii, quod pertinet ad circumspectionem. Tertio, ut vitet impedimenta, quod pertinet ad cautionem. I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, integral, as wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; subjective, as ox and lion are parts of animal; and potential, as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of a virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of prudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition of a seventh, viz. memory mentioned by Tully; and eustochia or shrewdness mentioned by Aristotle. For the sense of prudence is also called understanding: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is understanding. Of these eight, five belong to prudence as a cognitive virtue, namely, memory, reasoning, understanding, docility and shrewdness: while the three others belong thereto, as commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely, foresight, circumspection and caution. The reason of their difference is seen from the fact that three things may be observed in reference to knowledge. In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of the past, is called memory, if of the present, whether contingent or necessary, is called understanding or intelligence. Second, the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to which pertains docility, or by discovery, and to this belongs to eustochia, i.e., a happy conjecture, of which shrewdness is a part, which is a quick conjecture of the middle term, as stated in Poster. i, 9. Third, the use of knowledge, inasmuch as we proceed from things known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this belongs to reasoning. And the reason, in order to command aright, requires to have three conditions. First, to order that which is befitting the end, and this belongs to foresight; second, to attend to the circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs to circumspection; third, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to caution. Partes autem subiectivae virtutis dicuntur species eius diversae. Et hoc modo partes prudentiae, secundum quod proprie sumuntur, sunt prudentia per quam aliquis regit seipsum, et prudentia per quam aliquis regit multitudinem, quae differunt specie, ut dictum est, et iterum prudentia quae est multitudinis regitiva dividitur in diversas species secundum diversas species multitudinis. Est autem quaedam multitudo adunata ad aliquod speciale negotium, sicut exercitus congregatur ad pugnandum, cuius regitiva est prudentia militaris. Quaedam vero multitudo est adunata ad totam vitam, sicut multitudo unius domus vel familiae, cuius regitiva est prudentia oeconomica; et multitudo unius civitatis vel regni, cuius quidem directiva est in principe regnativa, in subditis autem politica simpliciter dicta. The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a multitude, which differ specifically as stated above (Q. 47, A. 11). Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There is the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called military. There is also the multitude that is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home or family, and this is ruled by domestic prudence: and such again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is regnative prudence in the ruler, and political prudence, simply so called, in the subjects. Si vero prudentia sumatur large, secundum quod includit etiam scientiam speculativam, ut supra dictum est; tunc etiam partes eius ponuntur dialectica, rhetorica et physica, secundum tres modos procedendi in scientiis. Quorum unus est per demonstrationem ad scientiam causandam, quod pertinet ad physicam; ut sub physica intelligantur omnes scientiae demonstrativae. Alius modus est ex probabilibus ad opinionem faciendam, quod pertinet ad dialecticam. Tertius modus est ex quibusdam coniecturis ad suspicionem inducendam, vel ad aliqualiter persuadendum, quod pertinet ad rhetoricam. Potest tamen dici quod haec tria pertinent ad prudentiam etiam proprie dictam, quae ratiocinatur interdum quidem ex necessariis, interdum ex probabilibus, interdum autem ex quibusdam coniecturis. If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also speculative knowledge, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 2) then its parts include dialectics, rhetoric and physics, according to three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to physics (if physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises, and this belongs to dialectics. The third method is to employ conjectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and this belongs to rhetoric. It may be said, however, that these three belong also to prudence properly so called, since it argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.