Quaestio 123 Question 123 De fortitudine Fortitude Consequenter, post iustitiam, considerandum est de fortitudine. Et primo, de ipsa virtute fortitudinis; secundo, de partibus eius; tertio, de dono ei correspondente; quarto, de praeceptis ad ipsam pertinentibus. After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude. We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts; (3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it. Circa fortitudinem autem consideranda sunt tria, primo quidem, de ipsa fortitudine; secundo, de actu praecipuo eius, scilicet de martyrio; tertio, de vitiis oppositis. Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3) the vices opposed to fortitude. Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: Primo, utrum fortitudo sit virtus. (1) Whether fortitude is a virtue? Secundo, utrum sit virtus specialis. (2) Whether it is a special virtue? Tertio, utrum sit circa timores et audacias. (3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring? Quarto, utrum sit solum circa timorem mortis. (4) Whether it is only about fear of death? Quinto, utrum sit solum in rebus bellicis. (5) Whether it is only in warlike matters? Sexto, utrum sustinere sit praecipuus actus eius. (6) Whether endurance is its chief act? Septimo, utrum operetur propter proprium bonum. (7) Whether its action is directed to its own good? Octavo, utrum habeat delectationem in suo actu. (8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action? Nono, utrum fortitudo maxime consistat in repentinis. (9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences? Decimo, utrum utatur ira in sua operatione. (10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action? Undecimo, utrum sit virtus cardinalis. (11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue? Duodecimo, de comparatione eius ad alias virtutes cardinales. (12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum fortitudo sit virtus Whether fortitude is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non sit virtus. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. XII, virtus in infirmitate perficitur. Sed fortitudo infirmitati opponitur. Ergo fortitudo non est virtus. Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (2 Cor 12:9): Virtue is perfected in infirmity. But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue. Praeterea, si est virtus, aut est theologica, aut intellectualis, aut moralis. Sed fortitudo neque continetur inter virtutes theologicas, neque inter intellectuales, ut ex supra dictis patet. Neque etiam videtur esse virtus moralis. Quia, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., videntur aliqui esse fortes propter ignorantiam, aut etiam propter experientiam, sicut milites, quae magis pertinent ad artem quam ad virtutem moralem, quidam etiam dicuntur esse fortes propter aliquas passiones, puta propter timorem comminationum vel dehonorationis, aut etiam propter tristitiam vel iram, seu spem; virtus autem moralis non operatur ex passione, sed ex electione, ut supra habitum est. Ergo fortitudo non est virtus. Obj. 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological, intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be gathered from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 2; Q. 62, A. 3). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7, 8): Some seem to be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers, both of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue, and some are called brave on account of certain passions; for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from passion but from choice, as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue. Praeterea, virtus humana maxime consistit in anima, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut supra iam dictum est. Sed fortitudo videtur consistere in corpore, vel saltem corporis complexionem sequi. Ergo videtur quod fortitudo non sit virtus. Obj. 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it is a good quality of the mind, as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7, 8). But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not a virtue. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., fortitudinem inter virtutes numerat. On the contrary, Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers fortitude among the virtues. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in II Ethic., virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit, unde virtus hominis, de qua loquimur, est quae bonum facit hominem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Et ideo ad virtutem humanam pertinet ut faciat hominem et opus eius secundum rationem esse. Quod quidem tripliciter contingit. Uno modo, secundum quod ipsa ratio rectificatur, quod fit per virtutes intellectuales. Alio modo, secundum quod ipsa rectitudo rationis in rebus humanis instituitur, quod pertinet ad iustitiam. Tertio, secundum quod tolluntur impedimenta huius rectitudinis in rebus humanis ponendae. Dupliciter autem impeditur voluntas humana ne rectitudinem rationis sequatur. Uno modo, per hoc quod attrahitur ab aliquo delectabili ad aliud quam rectitudo rationis requirat, et hoc impedimentum tollit virtus temperantiae. Alio modo, per hoc quod voluntatem repellit ab eo quod est secundum rationem, propter aliquid difficile quod incumbit. Et ad hoc impedimentum tollendum requiritur fortitudo mentis, qua scilicet huiusmodi difficultatibus resistat, sicut et homo per fortitudinem corporalem impedimenta corporalia superat et repellit. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good. Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes a man good, and renders his work good. Now man’s good is to be in accordance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual virtues; second, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice; third, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs. Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some object of pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance. Second, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles. Unde manifestum est quod fortitudo est virtus, inquantum facit hominem secundum rationem esse. Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, insofar as it conforms man to reason. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus animae non perficitur in infirmitate animae, sed in infirmitate carnis, de qua apostolus loquebatur. Hoc autem ad fortitudinem mentis pertinet, quod infirmitatem carnis fortiter ferat, quod pertinet ad virtutem patientiae vel fortitudinis. Et quod homo propriam infirmitatem recognoscat, pertinet ad perfectionem quae dicitur humilitas. Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one’s own infirmity, and this belongs to the perfection that is called humility. Ad secundum dicendum quod exteriorem virtutis actum quandoque aliqui efficiunt non habentes virtutem, ex aliqua alia causa quam ex virtute. Et ideo philosophus, in III Ethic., ponit quinque modos eorum qui similitudinarie dicuntur fortes, quasi exercentes actum fortitudinis praeter virtutem. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Primo quidem, quia feruntur in id quod est difficile ac si non esset difficile. Quod in tres modos dividitur. Quandoque enim hoc accidit propter ignorantiam, quia scilicet homo non percipit magnitudinem periculi. Quandoque autem hoc accidit propter hoc quod homo est bonae spei ad pericula vincenda, puta cum expertus est se saepe pericula evasisse. Quandoque autem hoc accidit propter scientiam et artem quandam, sicut contingit in militibus, qui propter peritiam armorum et exercitium non reputant gravia pericula belli, aestimantes se per suam artem posse contra ea defendi; sicut Vegetius dicit, in libro de re militari, nemo facere metuit quod se bene didicisse confidit. Alio modo agit aliquis actum fortitudinis sine virtute, propter impulsum passionis, vel tristitiae, quam vult repellere; vel etiam irae. Tertio modo, propter electionem, non quidem finis debiti, sed alicuius temporalis commodi acquirendi, puta honoris, voluptatis vel lucri; vel alicuius incommodi vitandi, puta vituperii, afflictionis vel damni. Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than virtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be done in three ways. First, because they tend to that which is difficult as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers—when, for instance, one has often experienced escape from danger; and sometimes this is owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, through skill and practice in the use of arms, think little of the dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending themselves against them; thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), No man fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well. Second, a man performs an act of fortitude without having the virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Third, through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad similitudinem corporalis fortitudinis dicitur fortitudo animae, quae ponitur virtus, ut dictum est. Nec tamen est contra rationem virtutis quod ex naturali complexione aliquis habeat naturalem inclinationem ad virtutem, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (I-II, Q. 63, A. 1). Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum fortitudo sit specialis virtus Whether fortitude is a special virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non sit specialis virtus. Dicitur enim Sap. VIII, quod sapientia sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, et ponitur ibi virtus pro fortitudine. Cum ergo nomen virtutis sit commune omnibus virtutibus, videtur quod fortitudo sit generalis virtus. Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it is written (Wis 7:7): She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, where the text has virtue for fortitude. Since then the term virtue is common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general virtue. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., non mediocris animi est fortitudo, quae sola defendit ornamenta virtutum omnium, et iudicia custodit; et quae inexpiabili praelio adversus omnia vitia decertat. Invicta ad labores, fortis ad pericula, rigidior adversus voluptates, avaritiam fugat tanquam labem quandam quae virtutem effeminet. Et idem postea subdit de aliis vitiis. Hoc autem non potest convenire alicui speciali virtuti. Ergo fortitudo non est specialis virtus. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): Fortitude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue; and he says the same further on in connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue. Praeterea, nomen fortitudinis a firmitate sumptum esse videtur. Sed firmiter se habere pertinet ad omnem virtutem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo fortitudo est generalis virtus. Obj. 3: Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue. Sed contra est quod in XXII Moral., Gregorius connumerat eam aliis virtutibus. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other virtues. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, nomen fortitudinis dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum quod absolute importat quandam animi firmitatem. Et secundum hoc est generalis virtus, vel potius conditio cuiuslibet virtutis, quia sicut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., ad virtutem requiritur firmiter et immobiliter operari. Alio modo potest accipi fortitudo secundum quod importat firmitatem animi in sustinendis et repellendis his in quibus maxime difficile est firmitatem habere, scilicet in aliquibus periculis gravibus. Unde Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpessio. Et sic fortitudo ponitur specialis virtus, utpote materiam determinatam habens. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the term fortitude can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Second, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore Tully says (Rhet. ii), that fortitude is deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils. In this sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum philosophum, in I de caelo, nomen virtutis refertur ad ultimum potentiae. Dicitur autem uno modo potentia naturalis secundum quam aliquis potest resistere corrumpentibus, alio modo secundum quod est principium agendi, ut patet in V Metaphys. Et ideo, quia haec acceptio est communior, nomen virtutis secundum quod importat ultimum talis potentiae, est commune, nam virtus communiter sumpta nihil est aliud quam habitus quo quis potest bene operari. Secundum autem quod importat ultimum potentiae primo modo dictae, qui quidem est modus magis specialis, attribuitur speciali virtuti scilicet fortitudini, ad quam pertinet firmiter stare contra quaecumque impugnantia. Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (De Caelo i, 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action, as stated in Metaph. v, 17. And since this latter meaning is the more common, the term virtue, as denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds of assaults.