Chapter 5 Capitulum 5 That it is a lesser evil when a monarchy turns into tyranny than when an aristocracy becomes corrupt Quod minus malum est cum monarchia in tyrannidem convertitur quam cum regimen plurium optimatum corrumpitur When a choice is to be made between two things, from both of which danger impends, surely that one should be chosen from which the lesser evil follows. Now, lesser evil follows from the corruption of a monarchy (which is tyranny) than from the corruption of an aristocracy. Group government (polyarchy) most frequently breeds dissension. This dissension runs counter to the good of peace, which is the principal social good. A tyrant, on the other hand, does not destroy this good: rather, he obstructs one or the other individual interests of his subjects—unless, of course, there be an excess of tyranny, and the tyrant rages against the whole community. Monarchy is therefore to be preferred to polyarchy, although either form of government might become dangerous. Cum autem inter duo ex quorum utroque periculum imminet eligere oportet, illud videtur potissime eligendum ex quo sequitur minus malum. Ex monarchia autem, si in tyrannidem convertatur, minus malum sequitur quam ex regimine plurium optimatum quando corrumpitur. Dissensio enim quae plurimumque sequitur ex regimine plurium contrariatur bono pacis, quod est praecipuum in multitudine sociali; quod quidem bonum per tyrannidem non tollitur, sed aliqua particularium hominum bona impediuntur, nisi fuerit excessus tyrannidis quod in totam communitatem desaeviat. Magis igitur praeoptandum est unius regimen quam multorum, quamvis in utroque sequantur pericula. Further, it seems that from which great dangers may follow is to be avoided more frequently. Now, considerable dangers to the multitude follow more frequently from polyarchy than from monarchy. There is a greater chance that, where there are many rulers, one of them will abandon the intention of the common good than that it will be abandoned when there is but one ruler. When any one among several rulers turns aside from the pursuit of the common good, danger of internal strife threatens the group because, when the chiefs quarrel, dissension will follow in the people. When, on the other hand, one man is in command, he more often keeps to governing for the sake of the common good. Should he not do so, it does not immediately follow that he also proceeds to the total oppression of his subjects. This, of course, would be the excess of tyranny and the worst wickedness in government, as has been shown above. The dangers, then, arising from a polyarchy are more to be guarded against than those arising from a monarchy. Adhuc, illud magis fugiendum videtur ex quo pluries sequi possunt magna pericula; frequentius autem sequuntur maxima pericula multitudinis ex multorum regimine quam ex regimine unius. Plerumque enim contingit ut ex pluribus aliquis ab intentione communis boni deficiat, quam quod unus tantum. Quicumque autem ex pluribus praesidentibus divertat ab intentione boni communis, dissensionis periculum multitudini subditorum imminet, quia dissentientibus principibus consequens est ut in multitudine sequatur dissensio. Si vero unus praesit, plerumque quidem ad bonum commune respicit; aut si a bono communi intentionem avertat, non statim sequitur ut totaliter ad subditorum oppressionem intendat, quod est excessus tyrannidis et in malitia regiminis maximum gradum tenens, ut supra ostensum est. Magis igitur sunt fugienda pericula quae proveniunt ex regimine plurium quam ea quae proveniunt ex gubernatione unius. Moreover, in point of fact, a polyarchy deviates into tyranny not less but perhaps more frequently than a monarchy. When dissensions arise in such a government on account of there being many rulers, it often happens that the power of one preponderates and he then usurps the government of the multitude for himself. This indeed may be clearly seen from history. There has hardly ever been a polyarchy that did not end in tyranny. The best illustration of this fact is the history of the Roman Republic. It was for a long time administered by the magistrates but then animosities, dissensions, and civil wars arose, and it fell into the power of the most cruel tyrants. Amplius, non minus contingit in tyrannidem verti regimen multorum quam unius, sed forte frequentius. Exorta namque dissensione per regimen plurium, contingit saepe unum alios superare et sibi soli multitudinis dominium usurpare: quod quidem ex his quae pro tempore fiunt manifeste inspici potest. Nam fere omne multorum regimen est in tyrannidem terminatum, ut in Romana republica manifeste apparet. Quae cum diu per plures magistratus administrata fuisset, exortis simultatibus, dissensionibus et bellis civilibus, in crudelissimos tyrannos inciderunt. In general, if one carefully considers what has happened in the past and what is happening in the present, he will discover that more men have held tyrannical sway in lands previously ruled by many rulers than in those ruled by one. The strongest objection why monarchy, although it is the best form of government, is not agreeable to the people is that, in fact, it may deviate into tyranny. Yet tyranny tends to occur not less but more frequently on the basis of a polyarchy than on the basis of a monarchy. It follows that it is, in any case, more expedient to live under one king than under the rule of several men. Et universaliter si quis praeterita facta et quae nunc fiunt diligenter consideret, plures inveniet exercuisse tyrannidem in terris quae per multos reguntur, quam in illis quae gubernantur ab uno. Si igitur regium, quod est optimum regimen, maxime vitandum videatur propter tyrannidem, tyrannis autem non minus, sed magis contingere solet in regimine plurium quam unius: relinquitur simpliciter magis esse expediens sub rege uno vivere quam sub regimine plurium. Chapter 6 Capitulum 6 How to make provision lest the king fall into tyranny Qualiter providendum est ne rex incidat in tyrannum Therefore, since the rule of one man (which is the best) is to be preferred, and since it may happen to be changed into a tyranny (which is the worst), as is clear from what has been said, a scheme should be carefully worked out which would prevent the multitude ruled by a king from falling into the hands of a tyrant. Quia ergo unius regimen praeeligendum est, quod est optimum, et contingit ipsum in tyrannidem converti, quod est pessimum, ut ex dictis patet, diligenti studio laborandum est ut sic multitudini provideatur de rege ut non incidant in tyrannum. First, it is necessary that the man who is raised up to be king by those whom it concerns should be of such condition that it is improbable that he should become a tyrant. Thus Samuel, commending the providence of God with respect to the institution of the king, says: The Lord sought a man according to his own heart, and the Lord appointed him to be prince over his people (1 Sam 13:14). Then, once the king is established, the government of the kingdom must be so arranged that opportunity to tyrannize is removed. At the same time his power should be so tempered that he cannot easily fall into tyranny. How these things may be done we must consider in what follows. Finally, provision must be made for facing the situation should the king stray into tyranny. Primum autem est necessarium ut talis conditionis homo, ab illis ad quos hoc spectat officium, promoveatur in regem, quem non sit probabile in tyrannidem declinare; unde Samuel Dei providentiam erga institutionem regis commendans ait Quaesivit sibi Dominus virum secundum cor suum, et praecepit ei Dominus ut esset dux super populum suum. Deinde sic disponenda est regni gubernatio ut regi iam instituto tyrannidis subtrahatur occasio. Simul etiam sic eius temperetur potestas ut in tyrannidem de facili declinare non possit; quae quidem quomodo fiant, in sequentibus considerandum erit. Demum vero curandum est, si rex in tyrannidem diverteret, qualiter posset occurri. Indeed, if there be not an excess of tyranny, it is more expedient to tolerate the milder tyranny for a while than to become involved in many perils more grievous than the tyranny itself by acting against the tyrant. For it may happen that those who act against the tyrant are unable to prevail and the tyrant then will rage the more. Yet if one can prevail against the tyrant, the gravest dissensions frequently ensue among the people from this very fact: the multitude may be broken up into factions either during their revolt against the tyrant, or in process of the organization of the government, after the tyrant has been overthrown. Moreover, it sometimes happens that while the multitude is driving out the tyrant by the help of some man, the latter, having received the power, thereupon seizes the tyranny. Then, fearing to suffer from another what he did to his predecessor, he oppresses his subjects with an even more grievous slavery. Et quidem si non fuerit excessus tyrannidis, utilius est remissam tyrannidem tolerare ad tempus, quam contra tyrannum agendo multis implicari periculis quae sunt graviora ipsa tyrannide. Potest enim contingere ut qui contra tyrannum agunt praevalere non possint, et sic provocatus tyrannus magis desaeviat. Quod si praevalere quis possit adversus tyrannum, ex hoc multotiens proveniunt gravissimae dissensiones in populo, sive dum in tyrannum insurgitur, sive post deiectionem tyranni dum erga ordinationem regiminis multitudo separatur in partes. Contingit etiam interdum ut, dum alicuius auxilio multitudo expellit tyrannum, ille potestate accepta tyrannidem arripit, et timens pati ab alio quod ipse in alium fecit, graviori servitute subditos opprimat. This tends to happen in tyranny: the second becomes more grievous than the one preceding, inasmuch as, without abandoning the previous oppressions, he himself thinks up fresh ones from the malice of his heart. Thus, in Syracuse, when everyone desired the death of Dionysius, a certain old woman kept constantly praying that he might be unharmed and that he might survive her. When the tyrant learned this he asked why she did it. Then she said: When I was a girl we had a harsh tyrant and I wished for his death; when he was killed, there succeeded him one who was a little harsher. I was very eager to see the end of his dominion also, and we began to have a third ruler still more harsh—that was you. So if you should be taken away, a worse would succeed in your place. Sic enim in tyrannide solet contingere ut posterior gravior fiat quam praecedens, dum praecedentia gravamina non deserit et etiam ipse ex sui cordis malitia nova excogitat. Unde Syracusis quondam Dionysii mortem omnibus desiderantibus, anus quaedam ut incolumis et sibi superstes esset continue orabat; quod ut tyrannus cognovit, cur hoc faceret interrogavit. Tum illa Puella, inquit, existens cum gravem tyrannum haberemus, alium cupiebam; quo interfecto aliquantulum durior successit, eius quoque finiri dominationem magnum existimabam. Tertium te importuniorem habere coepimus rectorem; itaque si tu fueris absumptus, deterior in locum tuum succedet. If the excess of tyranny is unbearable, some have been of the opinion that it would be an act of virtue for strong men to slay the tyrant and to expose themselves to the danger of death in order to set the multitude free. An example of this even occurs in the Old Testament, for a certain Aioth slew Eglon, King of Moab, who was oppressing the people of God under harsh slavery, thrusting a dagger into his thigh; and he was made a judge of the people. But this opinion is not in accord with apostolic teaching. For Peter admonishes us to be submissive to your masters with all respect, not only to the kind and gentle but also to the overbearing. For one is approved if, mindful of God, he endures pain while suffering unjustly (1 Pet 2:18–19). Wherefore, when many emperors of the Romans tyrannically persecuted the faith of Christ, a great number both of the nobility and the common people were converted to the faith and were praised for patiently bearing death for Christ. They did not resist although they were armed, and this is plainly manifested in the case of the holy Theban legion. Aioth, then, must be considered rather as having slain a foe than assassinated a ruler, however tyrannical, of the people. Hence in the Old Testament we also read that they who killed Joas, the king of Judah, who had fallen away from the worship of God, were slain and their children spared according to the precept of the law. Et si sit intolerabilis excessus tyrannidis, quibusdam visum fuit ut ad fortium virorum virtutem pertineat tyrannum interimere, seque pro liberatione multitudinis exponere periculis mortis; cuius rei exemplum etiam in Veteri testamento habetur. Nam Aioth quidam Eglon regem Moab, qui gravi servitute populum Dei premebat, sica infixa in eius femore interemit, et factus est populi iudex. Sed hoc apostolicae doctrinae non congruit. Docet enim nos Petrus non solum bonis et modestis, verum etiam dyscolis dominis reverenter subditos esse: haec est enim gratia, si propter conscientiam Dei sustineat quis tristitias patiens iniuste. Unde cum multi Romanorum imperatores fidem Christi persequerentur tyrannice, magnaque multitudo tam nobilium quam populi esset ad fidem conversa, non resistendo sed mortem patienter et armati sustinentes pro Christo laudantur, ut in sacra Thebaeorum legione manifeste apparet. Magisque Aioth iudicandus est hostem interemisse quam populi rectorem, licet tyrannum; unde et in Veteri testamento leguntur occisi fuisse hi qui occiderunt Ioas regem Iuda, quamvis a cultu Dei recedentem, eorumque filiis reservatis secundum legis praeceptum. Should private persons attempt on their own private presumption to kill the rulers, even though tyrants, this would be dangerous for the multitude as well as for their rulers. This is because the wicked usually expose themselves to dangers of this kind more than the good, for the rule of a king, no less than that of a tyrant, is burdensome to them since, according to the words of Solomon: A wise king winnows the wicked (Prov 20:26). Consequently, by presumption of this kind, danger to the people from the loss of a good king would be more probable than relief through the removal of a tyrant. Esset autem hoc multitudini periculosum et eius rectoribus, si privata praesumptione aliqui attentarent praesidentium necem, etiam tyrannorum: plerumque enim huiusmodi periculis magis exponunt se mali quam boni; malis autem solet esse grave dominium non minus regum quam tyrannorum, quia, secundum sententiam Salomonis, dissipat impios rex sapiens. Magis igitur ex huiusmodi praesumptione immineret periculum multitudini de amissione boni regis, quam remedium de subtractione tyranni. Furthermore, it seems that to proceed against the cruelty of tyrants is an action to be undertaken not through the private presumption of a few, but rather by public authority. If to provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, becoming a tyrant, he abuses the royal power. It must not be thought that such a multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously subjected itself to him in perpetuity, because he himself has deserved that the covenant with his subjects should not be kept, since, in ruling the multitude, he did not act faithfully as the office of a king demands. Thus did the Romans, who had accepted Tarquin the Proud as their king, cast him out from the kingship on account of his tyranny and the tyranny of his sons; and they set up in their place a lesser power: namely, the consular power. Similarly Domitian, who had succeeded those most moderate emperors, Vespasian, his father, and Titus, his brother, was slain by the Roman senate when he exercised tyranny, and all his wicked deeds were justly, and profitably, declared null and void by a decree of the senate. Thus it came about that Blessed John the Evangelist, the beloved disciple of God, who had been exiled to the island of Patmos by that very Domitian, was sent back to Ephesus by a decree of the senate. Videtur autem magis contra tyrannorum saevitiam non privata praesumptione aliquorum, sed auctoritate publica procedendum. Primo quidem, si ad ius alicuius multitudinis pertineat sibi providere de rege, non iniuste ab eadem rex institutus potest destitui, vel refrenari eius potestas, si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur. Nec putanda est talis multitudo infideliter agere tyrannum destituens, etiam si ei se in perpetuum ante subiecerat; quia hoc ipse meruit in multitudinis regimine se non fideliter gerens ut exigit regis officium, quod ei pactum a subditis non servetur. Sic Romani Tarquinium Superbum, quem in regem susceperant, propter eius et filiorum tyrannidem a regno eiecerunt, substituta minori, scilicet consulari, potestate. Sic etiam Domitianus, qui modestissimis imperatoribus Vespasiano patri et Tito fratri eius successerat, dum tyrannidem exercet a senatu Romano interemptus est, omnibus quae idem perverse fecerat per senatusconsultum iuste et salubriter in irritum revocatis. Quo factum est ut beatus Ioannes evangelista, dilectus Dei discipulus, qui per ipsum Domitianum in Patmos insulam fuerat exilio relegatus, ad Ephesum per senatusconsultum remitteretur. If, on the other hand, it pertains to the right of a higher authority to provide a king for a certain multitude, a remedy against the wickedness of a tyrant is to be looked for from him. Thus when Archelaus, who had already begun to reign in Judaea in the place of Herod his father, was imitating his father’s wickedness, a complaint against him having been laid before Caesar Augustus by the Jews, his power was at first diminished by depriving him of his title of king and by dividing one-half of his kingdom between his two brothers. Later, since he was not restrained from tyranny even by this means, Tiberius Caesar sent him into exile to Lugdunum, a city in Gaul. Si vero ad ius alicuius superioris pertineat multitudini providere de rege, expectandum est ab eo remedium contra tyranni nequitiam. Sic Archelai, qui in Iudaea pro Herode patre suo regnare iam coeperat, paternam malitiam imitantis, Iudaeis contra eum querimoniam ad Caesarem Augustum deferentibus, primo quidem potestas diminuitur, ablato sibi regio nomine et medietate regni sui inter duos fratres eius divisa; demum cum nec sic a tyrannide compesceretur, a Tiberio Caesare relegatus est in exilium apud Lugdunum Galliae civitatem. Should no human aid whatsoever against a tyrant be forthcoming, recourse must be had to God, the King of all, who is a helper in due time in tribulation (Ps 9:10). For it lies in his power to turn the cruel heart of the tyrant to mildness. According to Solomon: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; he turns it wherever he will (Prov 21:1). It was he who turned into mildness the cruelty of King Assuerus, who was preparing death for the Jews. It was he who so filled the cruel king Nebuchadnezzar with piety that he became a proclaimer of the divine power. Therefore, he said, I, Nabuchodonosor do now praise and magnify and glorify the King of Heaven; because all his works are true and his ways judgments, and they that walk in pride he is able to abase (Dan 4:34). Quod si omnino contra tyrannum auxilium humanum haberi non possit, recurrendum est ad regem omnium Deum qui est adiutor in opportunitatibus, in tribulatione. Eius enim potentiae subest ut cor tyranni crudele convertat in mansuetudinem, secundum Salomonem Cor regis in manu Dei, quocumque voluerit inclinabit illud; ipse enim regis Assueri crudelitatem, qui Iudaeis mortem parabat, in mansuetudinem vertit; ipse est qui ita Nabuchodonosor crudelem regem in tantam devotionem convertit, quod factus est divinae potentiae praedicator: Nunc igitur, inquit, ego Nabuchodonosor laudo et magnifico et glorifico regem caeli, quia opera eius vera et viae eius iudicia, et gradientes in superbia potest humiliare. Those tyrants, however, whom he deems unworthy of conversion, he is able to put out of the way or to degrade, according to the words of the wise man: The Lord has cast down the thrones of rulers, and has seated the lowly in their place (Sir 10:14). He it was who, seeing the affliction of his people in Egypt and hearing their cry, hurled Pharaoh, a tyrant over God’s people, with all his army into the sea. He it was who not only banished from his kingly throne the above-mentioned Nabuchodonosor because of his former pride, but also cast him from the fellowship of men and changed him into the likeness of a beast. Indeed, his hand is not shortened so that he cannot free his people from tyrants. For by Isaiah he promised to give his people rest from pain and turmoil and hard service (Isa 14:3) in which they had formerly served; and by Ezekiel he says: I will rescue my sheep from their mouths (Ezek 34:10), that is, from the mouth of shepherds who feed themselves. But to deserve to secure this benefit from God, the people must desist from sin, for it is by divine permission that wicked men receive power to rule as a punishment for sin, as the Lord says by the Prophet Hosea: I will give you a king in my wrath (Hos 13:11) and it is said in Job that he makes a man who is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people (Job 34:30). Sin must therefore be done away with in order that the scourge of tyrants may cease. Tyrannos vero quos reputat conversione indignos, potest auferre de medio vel ad infimum statum reducere, secundum illud Sapientis Sedes ducum superborum destruxit Deus et sedere fecit mites pro eis. Ipse est qui videns afflictionem populi sui in Aegypto et audiens eorum clamorem, Pharaonem tyrannum deiecit cum exercitu suo in mare. Ipse est qui memoratum Nabuchodonosor prius superbientem, eiectum non solum de regni solio sed etiam de hominum consortio, in similitudinem bestiae commutavit. Nec est abbreviata manus eius, ut populum suum a tyrannis liberare non possit: promittit enim per Isaiam populo suo requiem se daturum a labore et concussione et servitute dura qua ante servierat; et per Ezechielem dicit Liberabo meum gregem de ore eorum, scilicet pastorum qui pascunt se ipsos. Sed ut hoc beneficium populus a Deo consequi mereatur, debet a peccatis cessare, quia in ultionem peccati divina permissione impii accipiunt principatum, dicente Domino per Oseam Dabo tibi regem in furore meo; et in Iob dicitur quod regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi. Tollenda est igitur culpa ut cesset tyrannorum plaga. Chapter 7 Capitulum 7 That worldly honor and glory are not an adequate reward for a king Quod mundanus honor seu gloria non sunt sufficiens premium regis Since, according to what has been said thus far, it is the king’s duty to seek the good of the multitude, the task of a king may seem too burdensome unless some advantage to himself should result from it. Therefore, we must consider what a suitable reward for a good king is. Quoniam autem secundum praedicta regis est bonum multitudinis quaerere, nimis videretur onerosum regis officium nisi ei aliquod proprium bonum ex hoc proveniret. Oportet igitur considerare quale sit boni regis conveniens praemium. Some men considered this reward to be nothing other than honor and glory. Hence Cicero says in the book On the Republic: The prince of the city should be nourished by glory, and Aristotle seems to assign the reason for this in the Ethics: Because the prince for whom honor and glory is not sufficient consequently turns into a tyrant. For it is in the hearts of all men to seek their proper good. Therefore, if the prince is not content with glory and honor, he will seek pleasures and riches, and so will resort to plundering and injuring his subjects. Quibusdam igitur visum est regis praemium non esse aliud quam honorem et gloriam, unde et Tullius in libro de Republica definit principem civitatis esse alendum gloria; cuius rationem Aristoteles in libro Ethicorum assignare videtur, quia princeps cui non sufficit honor et gloria consequenter tyrannus efficitur. Inest enim animis omnium ut proprium bonum quaerant; si ergo contentus non sit princeps gloria et honore, quaeret voluptates et divitias, et sic ad rapinas et subditorum iniurias convertitur. However, if we accept this opinion, a great many incongruous results follow. In the first place, it would be costly to kings if so many labors and anxieties were to be endured for a reward so perishable: for nothing, it seems, is more perishable among human things than the glory and honor of men’s favor, since it depends upon the report of men and their opinions, which nothing in human life is more fickle than. And this is why the Prophet Isaiah calls such glory the flower of grass (Isa 40:6). Moreover, the desire for human glory takes away greatness of soul. For he who seeks the favor of men must serve their will in all he says and does, and thus, while striving to please all, he becomes a slave to each one. Therefore, the same Cicero says in his book On Duties that the inordinate desire for glory is to be guarded against: It takes away freedom of soul, for the sake of which high-minded men should put forth all their efforts. Indeed, there is nothing more becoming to a prince who has been set up for the doing of good works than greatness of soul. Thus, the reward of human glory is not enough for the services of a king. Sed si hanc sententiam receperimus, plurima sequuntur inconvenientia. Primo namque hoc esset regibus dispendiosum, si tot labores et sollicitudines paterentur pro mercede tam fragili: nihil enim videtur in rebus humanis fragilius gloria et honore favoris hominum, cum dependeat ex opinionibus hominum et verbis eorum, quibus nihil mutabilius in vita hominibus; et inde est quod Isaias propheta huiusmodi gloriam nominat florem foeni. Deinde humanae gloriae cupido animi magnitudinem aufert: qui enim favorem hominum quaerit, necesse est ut in omni quod dicit aut facit eorum voluntati deserviat; et sic dum placere omnibus studet, fit servus singulorum. Propter quod et idem Tullius, in libro de Officiis, cavendam dicit esse gloriae cupidinem: Eripit enim animi libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nihil autem principem qui ad magna peragenda instituitur, magis decet quam animi magnitudo; est igitur incompetens regis officio humanae gloriae praemium. At the same time it also hurts the multitude if such a reward be set up for princes, for it is the duty of a good man to take no account of glory, just as he should take no account of other temporal goods. It is the mark of a virtuous and brave soul to despise glory as he despises life, for justice’s sake. From this comes a wonder: glory ensues from virtuous acts, and out of virtue glory itself is despised. And therefore, through his very contempt for glory, a man is made glorious—according to the sentence of Fabius: He who scorns glory shall have true glory, and as Sallust says of Cato: The less he sought glory the more he achieved it. Even the disciples of Christ exhibited themselves as the ministers of God in honor and dishonor, in ill repute and good repute (2 Cor 6:8). Therefore, it is not fitting for glory, spurned by good men, to be the reward of a good man. And, if it alone be set up as the reward for princes, it will follow that good men will not take upon themselves the chief office of the city, or if they take it, they will go unrewarded. Simul etiam est multitudini noxium si tale praemium statuatur principibus. Pertinet enim ad boni viri officium ut contemnat gloriam sicut et alia temporalia bona: virtuosi enim et fortis animi est pro iustitia contemnere gloriam sicut et vitam. Unde fit quiddam mirabile, ut quia virtuosos actus consequitur gloria ipsaque gloria virtuose contemnatur, ex contemptu gloriae homo gloriosus reddatur, secundum sententiam Fabii dicentis Gloriam qui spreverit, veram habuit. Et de Catone dixit Salustius Quo minus petebat gloriam, tanto magis assequebatur illam; ipsique Christi discipuli se sicut Dei ministros exhibebant per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam. Non est igitur boni viri conveniens praemium gloria quam contemnunt boni. Si igitur hoc solum praemium statuatur principibus, sequetur bonos viros non assumere principatum, aut si assumpserint impraemiatos esse. Furthermore, dangerous evils come from the desire for glory. Many have been led unrestrainedly to seek glory in warfare, and have sent their armies and themselves to destruction, while the freedom of their country was turned into servitude under an enemy. Consider Torquatus, the Roman chief: in order to impress upon the people how imperative it is to avoid such danger, he slew his own son who had acted against his orders (he had been challenged by an enemy whom he had fought and vanquished). Torquatus acted thus lest more harm should accrue from the example of his son’s presumption than advantage from the glory of slaying the enemy. Amplius, ex cupidine gloriae periculosa mala proveniunt. Multi enim dum immoderate gloriam in rebus bellicis quaerunt, se ac suos exercitus perdiderunt, libertate patriae sub hostium servitute redacta: unde Torquatus Romanus princeps, in exemplo huius vitandi discriminis, filium, qui contra imperium suum ab hoste provocatus iuvenili ardore pugnavit, licet vicisset occidit, ne plus mali esset in praesumptionis exemplo quam utilitatis in gloria hostis occisi. Moreover, the desire for glory has another vice akin to it: namely, hypocrisy. Since it is difficult to acquire true virtues, to which alone honor and glory are due, and it is therefore the lot of but a few to attain them, many who desire glory become simulators of virtue. On this account, as Sallust says: Ambition drives many mortals to become false. They keep one thing shut up in their heart, another ready on the tongue, and they have more countenance than character. But our Savior also calls those persons ‘hypocrites,’ or simulators, who do good works to be seen by men. Therefore, just as there is danger for the multitude that the prince may become abusive and a plunderer if he seeks pleasures and riches as his reward, so there is danger that he may become presumptuous and a hypocrite if glory is assigned to him as reward. Habet etiam cupido gloriae aliud sibi familiare vitium, simulationem videlicet. Quia enim difficile est paucisque contingit veras virtutes assequi, quibus solis honor debetur et gloria, multi gloriam cupientes virtutum simulatores fiunt; propter quod, sicut Salustius dicit, ambitio multos mortales falsos fieri coegit: aliud clausum in pectore, aliud promptum habere in lingua, magisque vultum quam ingenium bonum habere. Sed et Salvator noster eos qui bona opera faciunt ut ab hominibus videantur, hypocritas, id est simulatores, vocat. Sicut igitur periculosum est multitudini si princeps voluptates et divitias quaerat pro praemio, ne raptor contumeliosus fiat, ita periculosum est si ei determinetur gloriae praemium, ne praesumptuosus et simulator existat. Looking at what the above-mentioned wise men intended to say, they do not seem to have decided upon honor and glory as the reward of a prince because they judged that the king’s intention should be principally directed to that object, but because it is more tolerable for him to seek glory than to desire money or pursue pleasure. For this vice is akin to virtue inasmuch as the glory which men desire, as Augustine says, is nothing else than the judgment of men who think well of men. So the desire for glory has some trace of virtue in it, at least so long as it seeks the approval of good men and is reluctant to displease them. Therefore, since few men reach true virtue, it seems more tolerable if one be set up to rule who, fearing the judgment of men, is restrained from manifest evils. For the man who desires glory either endeavors to win the approval of men in the true way, by deeds of virtue, or at least strives for this by fraud and deceit. But if the one who desires to domineer lacks the desire for glory, he will have no fear of offending men of good judgment and will commonly strive to obtain what he chooses by the most open crimes. Thus he will surpass the beasts in the vices of cruelty and lust, as is evidenced in the case of the Emperor Nero, of whom Augustine says: He was so lustful that he despised everything virile, and yet so cruel that nobody would have thought him to be effeminate. Indeed all this is quite clearly contained in what Aristotle says in his Ethics regarding the magnanimous man: true, he does seek honor and glory, but not as something great which could be a sufficient reward of virtue. And beyond this he demands nothing more of men, for among all earthly goods the chief good, it seems, is this, that men bear testimony to the virtue of a man. Sed quantum ex dictorum sapientium intentione apparet, non ea ratione honorem et gloriam pro praemio principi decreverunt tanquam ad hoc principaliter ferri debeat boni regis intentio, sed quia tolerabilius est si gloriam quaerat quam si pecuniam cupiat aut voluptatem sequatur. Hoc enim vitium virtuti propinquius est, cum gloria quam homines cupiunt nihil aliud sit, ut Augustinus definit, quam iudicium hominum bene de hominibus opinantium. Cupido enim gloriae aliquod habet virtutis vestigium, dum saltem bonorum approbationem quaerit et eis displicere recusat. Paucis igitur ad veram virtutem pervenientibus, tolerabilius videtur si praeferatur ad regimen qui, vel iudicium hominum metuens, saltem a malis manifestis retrahitur. Qui enim gloriam cupit, aut vera via, id est per virtutis opera, nititur ut ab hominibus approbetur, vel saltem dolis ad hoc contendit atque fallaciis. Qui vero dominari desiderat, si cupiditate gloriae carens non timeat bene iudicantibus displicere, etiam per apertissima scelera quaerit plerumque obtinere quod diligit, unde bestias superat sive crudelitatis sive luxuriae vitiis, sicut in Nerone Caesare patet, cuius, ut Augustinus dicit, fuit tanta luxuria ut nihil putaretur ab eo virile metuendum, tanta crudelitas ut nihil molle habere putaretur. Hoc autem satis exprimitur per id quod Aristoteles de magnanimo in Ethicis dicit, quod non quaerit honorem et gloriam quasi aliquid magnum quod sit virtutis sufficiens praemium, sed nihil ultra hoc ab hominibus exigit. Hoc enim inter omnia terrena videtur esse praecipuum, ut homini ab hominibus testimonium de virtute reddatur. Chapter 8 Capitulum 8 That the king should look to God for adequate reward Quod sufficiens premium regis est a Deo expectandum Therefore, since worldly honor and human glory are not a sufficient reward for royal cares, it remains to inquire what sort of reward is sufficient. Quoniam ergo mundanus honor et hominum gloria regiae sollicitudini non est sufficiens praemium, inquirendum restat quale sit eius sufficiens praemium. It is proper that a king look to God for his reward, for a servant looks to his master for the reward of his service. The king is indeed the minister of God in governing the people, as the Apostle says: There is no authority except from God (Rom 13:1) and God’s minister is the servant of God to execute his wrath on the wrongdoer (Rom 13:4). And in the Book of Wisdom, kings are described as being ministers of God (Wis 6:5). Consequently, kings ought to look to God for the reward of their ruling. Est autem conveniens ut rex praemium expectet a Deo. Minister enim pro suo ministerio praemium expectat a domino; rex autem populum gubernando minister Dei est, dicente Apostolo quod omnis potestas a Domino Deo est, et quod est Dei minister vindex in iram ei qui male agit; et in libro Sapientiae reges regni Dei esse ministri describuntur. Debent igitur reges pro suo regimine praemium expectare a Deo. Now God sometimes rewards kings for their service by temporal goods, but such rewards are common to both the good and the wicked. Hence the Lord says to Ezechiel: Nabuchodonosor king of Babylon made his army labor hard against Tyre; every head was made bald and every shoulder was rubbed bare; yet neither he nor his army got anything from Tyre to pay for the labor that he had performed for me against it (Ezek 29:18), namely, for that service by which power is the minister of God and the avenger to execute wrath upon him who does evil (Rom 13:4). Afterwards he adds, regarding the reward: Therefore, thus says the Lord God: Behold, I will give the land of Egypt to Nabuchodonosor king of Babylon; and he shall carry off its wealth and despoil it and plunder it; and it shall be the wages for his army (Ezek 29:19). Remunerat autem Deus pro suo ministerio interdum temporalibus bonis, sed talia praemia sunt bonis malisque communia; unde Dominus ad Ezechielem dicit Nabuchodonosor rex Babylonis servire fecit exercitum suum servitute magna adversus Tyrum, et merces non est reddita ei neque exercitui eius de Tyro pro servitute qua servivit mihi adversus eam, ea scilicet servitute qua potestas, secundum Apostolum, Dei minister est, vindex in iram ei qui male agit. Et postea de praemio subdidit Propterea haec dicit Dominus Deus: Ecce ego dabo Nabuchodonosor regem Babylonis in terra Aegypti, et diripiet spolia eius et erit merces exercitui eius. Therefore, if God recompenses wicked kings who fight against the enemies of God, though not with the intention of serving him but to execute their own hatred and cupidity, by giving them such great rewards as to yield them victory over their foes, subject kingdoms to their sway, and grant them spoils to rifle, what will he do for kings who rule the people of God and assail his enemies from a holy motive? Indeed, he promises them not an earthly reward, but an everlasting one, and in none other than in himself. As Peter says to the shepherds of the people: Tend the flock of God that is your charge . . . and when the chief Shepherd is manifested, that is, Christ the King of kings, you will obtain the unfading crown of glory (1 Pet 5:2, 4). Concerning this, Isaiah says: The Lord of hosts will be a crown of glory and a diadem of beauty to his people (Isa 28:5). Si ergo reges iniquos contra Dei hostes pugnantes, licet non intentione serviendi Deo sed sua odia et cupiditates exequendi, tanta mercede Dominus remunerat ut eis de hostibus victoriam tribuat, regna subiiciat et spolia diripienda proponat, quid faciet bonis regibus qui pia intentione populum Dei regunt et hostes impugnant? Non quidem terrenam sed aeternam eis mercedem promittit, nec in alio quam in se ipso, dicente Petro pastoribus populi Dei Pascite qui in vobis est gregem Domini, ut cum venerit Princeps pastorum, id est Rex regum Christus, percipiatis immarcescibilem gloriae coronam; de qua dicit Isaias Erit Dominus sertum exultationis et diadema gloriae populo suo. This is also clearly shown by reason. It is implanted in the minds of all who have the use of reason that the reward of virtue is happiness. The virtue of anything whatsoever is explained to be that which makes its possessor good and renders his deed good. Moreover, everyone strives by working well to attain what is most deeply implanted in desire: namely, to be happy. No one is able not to wish this. It is therefore fitting to expect as a reward for virtue that which makes man happy. Now, if to work well is a virtuous deed, and the king’s work is to rule his people well, then that which makes him happy will be the king’s reward. What this is has now to be considered. Hoc autem ratione manifestatur. Est enim mentibus omnium ratione utentium inditum virtutis praemium beatitudinem esse; virtus enim uniuscuiusque rei esse describitur quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit. Ad hoc autem quisque bene operando nititur pervenire quod est maxime desiderio inditum; hoc autem est esse felicem, quod nullus potest non velle: hoc igitur praemium virtutis convenienter expectatur quod hominem facit beatum. Si autem bene operari virtutis est opus, regis autem opus est bene regere subditos, hoc etiam erit praemium regis quod eum faciat beatum. Quid autem hoc sit, hinc considerandum est. Happiness, we say, is the ultimate end of our desires. Now the movement of desire does not go on to infinity, else natural desire would be vain, for infinity cannot be traversed. Since, then, the desire of an intellectual nature is for universal good, that good alone can make it truly happy which, when attained, leaves no further good to be desired. Hence happiness is called the perfect good inasmuch as it comprises in itself all things desirable. But no earthly good is such a good. They who have riches desire to have more, they who enjoy pleasure desire to enjoy more, and the like is clear for the rest: and if they do not seek more, they at least desire that those they have should abide or that others should follow in their stead. For nothing permanent is found in earthly things. Consequently, there is nothing earthly which can calm desire. Thus, nothing earthly can make man happy, so that it may be a fitting reward for a king. Beatitudinem quidem dicimus ultimum desideriorum finem; neque enim desiderii motus usque in infinitum procedit, esset enim inane naturale desiderium, cum infinita pertransiri non possint. Cum autem desiderium intellectualis naturae sit universalis boni, hoc solum bonum vere beatum facere poterit, quo adepto nullum bonum restat quod amplius desiderari possit; unde et beatitudo dicitur bonum perfectum, quasi omnia desiderabilia in se comprehendens. Tale autem non est aliquod bonum terrenum; nam qui divitias habent amplius habere desiderant, qui voluptatibus perfruuntur amplius perfrui desiderant, et simile patet in caeteris. Et si ampliora non quaerunt, desiderant tamen ut ea permaneant, vel alia in locum eorum succedant: nihil enim permanens invenitur in rebus terrenis; nihil igitur terrenum est quod quietare desiderium possit. Neque igitur terrenum aliquod beatum facere potest, ut possit esse regis conveniens praemium. Again, the last perfection and perfect good of anything one chooses depends upon something higher, for even bodily things are made better by the addition of better things and worse by being mixed with baser things. If gold is mingled with silver, the silver is made better, while by an admixture of lead it is rendered impure. Now all earthly things are beneath the human mind; but happiness is the last perfection and the perfect good of man, which all men desire to reach. Therefore, there is no earthly thing which could make man happy, nor is any earthly thing a sufficient reward for a king. For, as Augustine says, We do not call Christian princes happy merely because they have reigned a long time, or because after a peaceful death they have left their sons to rule, or because they subdued the enemies of the state, or because they were able to guard against or to suppress citizens who rose up against them. Rather, we call them happy if they rule justly, if they prefer to rule their passions rather than nations, and if they do all things not for the love of vainglory but for the love of eternal happiness. Such Christian emperors we say are happy, now in hope, afterwards in very fact when that which we await shall come to pass. But neither is there any other created thing which would make a man happy and which could be set up as the reward for a king. For the desire of each thing tends towards its source which causes its being. But the cause of the human soul is none other than God, who made it to his own image. Therefore, it is God alone who can still the desires of man, and make him happy, and be the fitting reward for a king. Adhuc, cuiuslibet rei finalis perfectio et bonum completum ab aliquo superiore dependet, quia et ipsa corporalia meliora redduntur ex adiunctione meliorum, peiora vero si deterioribus misceantur; sicut argento si misceatur aurum, argentum fit melius, quod ex plumbi admixtione impurum efficitur. Constat autem terrena omnia esse infra mentem humanam; beatitudo autem est hominis finalis perfectio et bonum completum ad quod omnes pervenire desiderant: nihil igitur terrenum est quod hominem possit beatum facere, neque igitur terrenum aliquod est praemium regis sufficiens. Non enim, ut Augustinus dicit, christianos principes felices dicimus quia diutius imperarunt, vel imperatores filios morte placida reliquerunt, vel hostes reipublicae domuerunt, vel cives adversum se insurgentes et cavere et opprimere potuerunt; sed felices eos dicimus si iuste imperant, si malunt cupiditatibus potius quam gentibus quibuslibet imperare, si omnia faciunt non propter ardorem inanis gloriae, sed propter caritatem felicitatis aeternae. Tales imperatores christianos dicimus esse felices, interim spe, postea re ipsa futuros cum id quod expectamus advenerit. Sed nec aliud aliquod creatum est quod hominem beatum faciat et possit regi decerni pro praemio. Tendit enim uniuscuiusque rei desiderium in suum principium a quo suum esse causatur; causa vero mentis humanae non est aliud quam Deus qui eam ad suam imaginem facit: solus igitur Deus est qui hominis desiderium quietare potest et facere hominem beatum et esse regi conveniens praemium.