Question 26 Quaestio 26 Of Love De amore We have now to consider the soul’s passions in particular, and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the irascible faculty. Consequenter considerandum est de passionibus animae in speciali. Et primo, de passionibus concupiscibilis; secundo, de passionibus irascibilis. The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and sadness. Prima consideratio erit tripartita, nam primo considerabimus de amore et odio; secundo, de concupiscentia et fuga tertio, de delectatione et tristitia. Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Circa amorem consideranda sunt tria, primo, de ipso amore; secundo, de causa amoris; tertio, de effectibus eius. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. (1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power? Primo, utrum amor sit in concupiscibili. (2) Whether love is a passion? Secundo, utrum amor sit passio. (3) Whether love is the same as dilection? Tertio, utrum amor sit idem quod dilectio. (4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence? Quarto, utrum amor convenienter dividatur in amorem amicitiae et amorem concupiscentiae. Article 1 Articulus 1 Whether love is in the concupiscible power? Utrum amor sit in concupiscibili Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written (Wis 8:2): Her, namely wisdom, have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth. But the concupiscible power, being a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible power. Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in concupiscibili. Dicitur enim Sap. VIII, hanc, scilicet sapientiam, amavi et exquisivi a iuventute mea. Sed concupiscibilis, cum sit pars appetitus sensitivi, non potest tendere in sapientiam, quae non comprehenditur sensu. Ergo amor non est in concupiscibili. Obj. 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): Love, yearning for the object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is sadness. But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible power. Praeterea, amor videtur esse idem cuilibet passioni, dicit enim Augustinus, in XIV de Civ. Dei, amor inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia; fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est; idque si acciderit sentiens, tristitia est. Sed non omnis passio est in concupiscibili; sed timor, etiam hic enumeratus, est in irascibili. Ergo non est simpliciter dicendum quod amor sit in concupiscibili. Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a natural love. But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power. Praeterea, Dionysius, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., ponit quendam amorem naturalem. Sed amor naturalis magis videtur pertinere ad vires naturales, quae sunt animae vegetabilis. Ergo amor non simpliciter est in concupiscibili. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that love is in the concupiscible power. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Topic., quod amor est in concupiscibili. I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in some other: and this is called the natural appetite. Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of their nature, as stated in the First Part (Q6, A1, ad 2; FP, Q103, A1, ad 1,3). And there is another appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the sensitive appetite, which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, insofar as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Respondeo dicendum quod amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens, cum utriusque obiectum sit bonum. Unde secundum differentiam appetitus est differentia amoris. Est enim quidam appetitus non consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius, et huiusmodi dicitur appetitus naturalis. Res enim naturales appetunt quod eis convenit secundum suam naturam, non per apprehensionem propriam, sed per apprehensionem instituentis naturam, ut in I libro dictum est. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero. Et talis est appetitus sensitivus in brutis, qui tamen in hominibus aliquid libertatis participat, inquantum obedit rationi. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem appetentis secundum liberum iudicium. Et talis est appetitus rationalis sive intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas. Now in each of these appetites, the name love is given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject’s connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called natural love: thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the center, is by reason of its weight and may be called natural love. In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called sensitive love, or intellectual or rational love. So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty. In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis, sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis. Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu intellectivo. Et pertinet ad concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum, quod est obiectum irascibilis. Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de amore intellectivo vel rationali. Reply Obj. 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally. Ad secundum dicendum quod amor dicitur esse timor, gaudium, cupiditas et tristitia, non quidem essentialiter, sed causaliter. Reply Obj. 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul’s powers, and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things; since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it. Ad tertium dicendum quod amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae vegetativae, sed in omnibus potentiis animae, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile; cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam. Article 2 Articulus 2 Whether love is a passion? Utrum amor sit passio Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore love is not a passion. Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit passio. Nulla enim virtus passio est. Sed omnis amor est virtus quaedam, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo amor non est passio. Obj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion. Praeterea, amor est unio quaedam vel nexus, secundum Augustinum, in libro de Trin. Sed unio vel nexus non est passio, sed magis relatio. Ergo amor non est passio. Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite; for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not a passion. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod passio est motus quidam. Amor autem non importat motum appetitus, qui est desiderium; sed principium huiusmodi motus. Ergo amor non est passio. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that love is a passion. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est passio. I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the first place it gives it the form; and second it gives it the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called natural love. In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For the appetitive movement is circular, as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called love, and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is desire; and lastly, there is rest which is joy. Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will. Respondeo dicendum quod passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam. Et ipsa gravitas, quae est principium motus ad locum connaturalem propter gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis. Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile. Nam appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in III de anima, appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione; et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium. Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium. Sic ergo, cum amor consistat in quadam immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor et passio, proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate. Reply Obj. 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, insofar as it is a principle of movement in the appetite. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia virtus significat principium motus vel actionis, ideo amor, inquantum est principium appetitivi motus, a Dionysio vocatur virtus. Reply Obj. 2: Union belongs to love insofar as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that love is a unitive force (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love. Ad secundum dicendum quod unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod amor est virtus unitiva, et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio est opus amoris. Reply Obj. 3: Although love does not denote the movement of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have complacency therein. Ad tertium dicendum quod amor, etsi non nominet motum appetitus tendentem in appetibile, nominat tamen motum appetitus quo immutatur ab appetibili, ut ei appetibile complaceat. Article 3 Articulus 3 Whether love is the same as dilection? Utrum amor sit idem quod dilectio Objection 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, as four is to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines. But these have the same meaning. Therefore love and dilection denote the same thing. Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit idem quod dilectio. Dionysius enim, IV cap. de Div. Nom., dicit quod hoc modo se habent amor et dilectio, sicut quatuor et bis duo, rectilineum et habens rectas lineas. Sed ista significant idem. Ergo amor et dilectio significant idem. Obj. 2: Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same. Therefore these are the same. Praeterea, appetitivi motus secundum obiecta differunt. Sed idem est obiectum dilectionis et amoris. Ergo sunt idem. Obj. 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is chiefly in the fact that dilection refers to good things, love to evil things, as some have maintained, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection. Praeterea, si dilectio et amor in aliquo differunt, maxime in hoc differre videntur, quod dilectio sit in bono accipienda, amor autem in malo, ut quidam dixerunt, secundum quod Augustinus narrat, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Sed hoc modo non differunt, quia, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit, in sacris Scripturis utrumque accipitur in bono et in malo. Ergo amor et dilectio non differunt; sicut ipse Augustinus ibidem concludit quod non est aliud amorem dicere, et aliud dilectionem dicere. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that some holy men have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod quibusdam sanctorum visum est divinius esse nomen amoris quam nomen dilectionis.