On Kingship De Regno To the King of Cyprus Ad Regem Cypri Prologue Prologus As I was turning over in my mind what I might present to your majesty as a gift, at once worthy of your royal highness and befitting my profession and office, it seemed to me a highly appropriate offering that, for a king, I should write a book on kingship, in which, so far as my ability permits, I should carefully expound, according to the authority of Scripture and the teachings of the philosophers, as well as the practice of worthy princes, both the origin of kingly government and the things which pertain to the office of a king, relying for the beginning, progress and accomplishment of this work on the help of him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, through whom kings rule, God the mighty Lord, the great king above all gods. Cogitanti mihi quid offerrem regiae celsitudini dignum meaeque professioni et officio congruum, id occurrit potissime offerendum ut regi librum de regno conscriberem, in quo et regni originem et ea quae ad regis officium pertinent secundum Scripturae divinae auctoritatem, philosophorum dogmata et exempla laudatorum principum, diligenter depromerem iuxta ingenii proprii facultatem, principium, progressum et consummationem operis ex illius expectans auxilio qui est Rex regum et Dominus dominantium, per quem reges regnant, Deus magnus Dominus, et rex magnus super omnes deos. Book I Liber I Kingship De Regno Chapter 1 Capitulum 1 What is signified by the name of king Quid significetur nomine regis The first step in our undertaking must be to set forth what the name ‘king’ means. In all things which are ordered towards an end, in which this or that course may be adopted, some directive principle is needed through which the due end may be reached by the most direct route. A ship, for example, which moves in different directions according to the impulse of the changing winds, would never reach its destination were it not brought to port by the skill of the pilot. Now, man has an end to which his whole life and all his actions are ordered; for man is an intelligent agent, and it is clearly the part of an intelligent agent to act in view of an end. Men also adopt different methods in proceeding towards their proposed end, as the diversity of men’s pursuits and actions clearly indicates. Consequently, man needs some directive principle to guide him towards his end. Principium autem intentionis nostrae hinc sumere oportet ut quid nomine regis intelligendum sit, exponatur. In omnibus autem quae ad finem aliquem ordinantur, in quibus contingit sic et aliter procedere, opus est aliquo dirigente per quod directe debitum perveniatur ad finem. Non enim navis, quam secundum diversorum ventorum impulsum in diversa moveri contingit, ad destinatum finem perveniret nisi per gubernatoris industriam dirigeretur ad portum. Hominis autem est aliquis finis ad quem tota eius vita et actio ordinatur, cum sit agens per intellectum cuius est manifeste propter finem operari. Contingit autem diversimode homines ad finem intentum procedere, quod ipsa diversitas humanorum studiorum et actionum declarat; indiget igitur homo aliquo dirigente ad finem. Now the light of reason is placed by nature in every man to guide him in his acts towards his end. And if man were intended to live alone, as many animals do, he would require no other guide to his end. Each man would be a king unto himself, under God the highest king, inasmuch as he would direct himself in his acts by the light of reason given him from on high. Yet it is natural for man, more than for any other animal, to be a social and political animal living in a group. This is clearly a necessity of man’s nature. For all other animals, nature has prepared food, a covering of hair, and means of defense such as teeth, horns, claws, or at least speed in flight. Man alone was made without any natural provisions for these things, yet in their place he was given reason, through which he could procure all these things for himself by the work of his hands. Now, one man alone is not able to procure them all for himself, for one man could not sufficiently provide for life, unassisted. It is therefore natural that man should live in the society of many. Est autem unicuique hominum naturaliter insitum rationis lumen, quo in suis actibus dirigatur ad finem. Et si quidem homini conveniret singulariter vivere sicut multis animalium, nullo alio dirigente indigeret ad finem, sed ipse sibi unusquisque esset rex sub Deo summo rege, inquantum per lumen rationis divinitus sibi datum in suis actibus se ipsum dirigeret. Naturale autem est homini ut sit animal sociale et politicum, in multitudine vivens, magis etiam quam omnia alia animalia; quod quidem naturalis necessitas declarat. Aliis enim animalibus natura praeparavit cibum, tegumenta pilorum, defensionem, ut dentes, cornua, ungues, vel saltem velocitatem ad fugam; homo autem institutus est nullo horum sibi a natura praeparato, sed loco omnium data est ei ratio per quam sibi haec omnia officio manuum posset praeparare. Ad quae omnia praeparanda unus homo non sufficit, nam unus homo per se sufficienter vitam transigere non posset; est igitur homini naturale quod in societate multorum vivat. Moreover, all other animals are able to discern, by inborn skill, what is useful and what is injurious (as the sheep naturally regards the wolf as his enemy). Some animals also recognize by natural skill certain medicinal herbs and other things necessary for their life. Man, on the contrary, has a natural knowledge of the things which are essential for his life only in a general fashion, inasmuch as he is able to attain knowledge of the particular things necessary for human life by reasoning from natural principles. But it is not possible for one man to arrive at a knowledge of all these things by his own individual reason. It is therefore necessary for man to live in a multitude so that each one may assist his fellows, and different men may be occupied in seeking to make different discoveries by reason—one, for example, in medicine, one in this and another in that. Amplius, aliis animalibus insita est naturalis industria ad omnia ea quae sunt eis utilia vel nociva, sicut ovis naturaliter existimat lupum inimicum; quaedam etiam animalia ex naturali industria cognoscunt aliquas herbas medicinales et alia eorum vitae necessaria. Homo autem horum quae sunt suae vitae necessaria naturalem cognitionem habet solum in communi, quasi eo per rationem valente ex naturalibus principiis ad cognitionem singulorum quae necessaria sunt humanae vitae pervenire. Non est autem possibile quod unus homo ad omnia huiusmodi per suam rationem pertingat; est igitur necessarium homini quod in multitudine vivat, ut unus ab alio adiuvetur, ut diversi in diversis inveniendis per rationem occupentur, puta unus in medicina, alius in hoc alius in alio. This point is further and most plainly evidenced by the fact that the use of speech is proper to man, through which one man is able to fully express his conceptions to others. Other animals, it is true, express their feelings to one another in a general way, as a dog may express anger by barking and other animals give vent to other feelings in various fashions. But man communicates with his kind more completely than any other animal known to be gregarious, such as the crane, the ant or the bee. Considering this, Solomon says: It is better that there be two than one; for they have the advantage of their company (Eccl 4:9). Hoc etiam evidentissime declaratur per hoc quod est proprium hominis locutione uti, per quam unus homo aliis suum conceptum totaliter exprimere potest. Alia quidem animalia exprimunt mutuo suas passiones in communi, ut canis iram per latratum, et alia animalia passiones alias diversis modis; magis igitur homo est communicativus alteri quam quodcumque aliud animal quod gregale videtur, ut grus et formica et apis. Hoc ergo considerans Salomon ait Melius est duos esse quam unum; habent enim emolumentum mutuae societatis. If, then, it is natural for man to live in the society of many, there must exist among men some means by which the group may be governed. For where there are many men together and each one is looking after his own interest, the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless there were also an agency to take care of what appertains to the commonweal. In like manner, the body of a man or any other animal would disintegrate unless there were a general ruling force within the body which watches over the common good of all members. With this in mind, Solomon says: Where there is no governor, the people shall fall (Prov 11:14). Si igitur naturale est homini quod in societate multorum vivat, necesse est in omnibus esse aliquid per quod multitudo regatur. Multis enim existentibus hominibus et unoquoque id quod est sibi congruum providente, multitudo in diversa dispergeretur nisi etiam esset aliquid de eo quod ad bonum multitudinis pertinet curam habens, sicut et corpus hominis et cuiuslibet animalis deflueret nisi esset aliqua vis regitiva communis in corpore, quae ad bonum commune omnium membrorum intenderet. Quod considerans Salomon dixit Ubi non est gubernator, dissipabitur populus. Indeed, it is reasonable that this should happen, for what is proper and what is common are not identical. Things differ by what is proper to each: they are united by what they have in common. But diversity of effects is due to diversity of causes. Consequently, beyond that which moves toward the proper good of each individual, there must exist something which moves toward the common good of the many. Also on account of this, in all things that are ordained towards one end, one thing is found to rule the rest. Thus, in the corporeal universe, corporeal things are regulated according to the order of Divine Providence by the first body (namely, the celestial body); and all physical creation is ruled by a rational creature. Likewise, in the individual man the soul rules the body, and, among the parts of the soul, the irascible and the concupiscible parts are ruled by reason. Likewise, among the members of a body, one (such as the heart or the head) is the principal and moves all the others. Therefore, in every multitude there must be some governing power. Hoc autem rationabiliter accidit. Non enim idem est quod proprium et quod commune est; secundum propria quidem differunt, secundum commune autem uniuntur. Diversorum autem diversae sunt causae; oportet igitur, praeter id quod movet ad proprium bonum uniuscuiusque, esse aliquid quod movet ad bonum commune multorum. Propter quod et in omnibus quae in unum ordinantur, aliquid invenitur alterius regitivum: in universitate enim corporum per primum corpus, scilicet caeleste, alia corpora ordine quodam divinae providentiae reguntur, omniaque corpora per creaturam rationalem. In uno etiam homine anima regit corpus, atque inter animae partes irascibilis et concupiscibilis ratione reguntur. Itemque inter membra corporis unum est principale quod omnia movet, aut cor aut caput. Oportet igitur esse in omni multitudine aliquod regitivum. Now, it happens in certain things which are ordained towards an end that there is both a right and a wrong way to proceed: and for this reason, in the government of a multitude there is a distinction between right and wrong. A thing is rightly directed when it is led towards a fitting end; wrongly, when it is led towards an unfitting end. Now the end which befits a multitude of free men is different from that which befits a multitude of slaves, for the free man is one who exists for his own sake, while the slave, as such, exists for the sake of another. If, therefore, a multitude of free men is ordered by the ruler towards the common good of the multitude, that rulership will be right and just, as is suitable to free men. If, on the other hand, a rulership aims not at the common good of the multitude, but at the private good of the ruler, it will be an unjust and perverted rulership. And hence the Lord threatens such rulers, saying by the mouth of Ezekiel: Woe to the shepherds that feed themselves, as seeking their own interest, should not the flocks be fed by the shepherd? (Ezek 34:2). Shepherds indeed should seek the good of their flocks, and every ruler the good of the multitude subject to him. Contingit autem in quibusdam quae ordinantur ad finem et recte et non recte procedere; quare et in regimine multitudinis et rectum et non rectum invenitur. Recte autem dirigitur unumquodque quando ad finem convenientem deducitur, non recte autem quando ad finem non convenientem. Alius autem est finis conveniens multitudini liberorum et servorum; nam liber est qui sui causa est, servus autem est qui id quod est alterius est. Si igitur liberorum multitudo a regente ad bonum commune multitudinis ordinetur, erit regimen rectum et iustum quale convenit liberis. Si vero non ad bonum commune multitudinis sed ad bonum privatum regentis regimen ordinetur, erit regimen iniustum atque perversum; unde et Dominus talibus rectoribus comminatur per Ezechielem dicens Vae pastoribus qui pascebant se ipsos, quasi sua propria commoda quaerentes, nonne greges pascuntur a pastoribus? Bonum siquidem gregis pastores quaerere debent, et rectores quique bonum multitudinis sibi subiectae. If an unjust government is carried on by one man alone, who seeks his own benefit from his rule and not the good of the multitude subject to him, such a ruler is called a ‘tyrant’—a word derived from strength—because he oppresses by might instead of ruling by justice. Thus, among the ancients, all powerful men were called tyrants. If an unjust government is carried on not by one but by several, and if they be few, it is called an ‘oligarchy’—that is, the rule of a few. This occurs when a few, who differ from the tyrant only by the fact that they are more than one, oppress the people by means of their wealth. If the bad government is carried on by the multitude, it is called a ‘democracy’—that is, control by the populace—which comes about when the plebeian people by force of numbers oppress the rich. In this way the whole people will be as one tyrant. Si igitur regimen iniustum per unum tantum fiat qui sua commoda ex regimine quaerat, non autem bonum multitudinis sibi subiectae, talis rector tyrannus vocatur nomine a fortitudine derivato, quia scilicet per potentiam opprimit, non per iustitiam regit; unde et apud antiquos potentes quique tyranni vocabantur. Si vero iniustum regimen non per unum fiat sed per plures, si quidem per paucos oligarchia vocatur, id est principatus paucorum, quando scilicet pauci propter divitias opprimunt plebem, sola pluralitate a tyranno differentes. Si vero iniquum regimen exerceatur per multos, democratia nominatur, id est potentatus populi, quando scilicet populus plebeiorum per potentiam multitudinis opprimit divites: sic enim populus totus erit quasi unus tyrannus. In like manner we must divide just governments. If the government is administered by many, it is given the name ‘polity,’ common to all forms of government: as, for instance, when a group of warriors exercise dominion over a city or province. If it is administered by a few men of virtue, this kind of government is called an ‘aristocracy,’ that is, the best governance, or governance by the best men, who for this reason are called the ‘Optimates.’ And if a just government is in the hands of one man alone, he is properly called a ‘king’. Wherefore the Lord says by the mouth of Ezekiel: My servant, David, shall be king over them and all of them shall have one shepherd (Ezek 37:24). From this it is clearly shown that the idea of king implies that there be one man who is chief, and that he be a shepherd, seeking the common good of the multitude and not his own. Similiter autem et iustum regimen distingui oportet. Si enim administretur per aliquam multitudinem, communi nomine politia vocatur, utpote cum multitudo bellatorum in civitate vel provincia dominatur. Si vero administretur per paucos, virtuosos autem, huiusmodi regimen aristocratia vocatur, id est potentatus optimus, vel optimorum, qui propterea optimates dicuntur. Si vero iustum regimen ad unum tantum pertineat, ille proprie rex vocatur: unde Dominus per Ezechielem dicit Servus meus David rex super eos erit et pastor unus erit omnium eorum. Ex quo manifeste ostenditur quod de ratione regis est quod sit unus qui praesit, et quod sit pastor bonum commune multitudinis et non suum quaerens. Now, since man must live in a group, because he is not sufficient unto himself to procure the necessities of life if he were to remain solitary, it follows that a society will be the more perfect the more it is sufficient unto itself to procure the necessities of life. There is, to some extent, sufficiency for life in one family of one household: namely, insofar as pertains to the natural acts of nourishment, and the begetting of offspring, and other things of this kind. Self-sufficiency exists, furthermore, in one street with regard to those things which belong to one trade. In a city, which is the perfect community, it exists with regard to all the necessities of life. Still more self-sufficiency is found in a province because of the need of fighting together and of mutual help against enemies. Hence the man ruling a perfect community (which is a city or a province), is antonomastically called the ‘king.’ The ruler of a household is called ‘father,’ not ‘king,’ although he bears a certain resemblance to the king, for which reason kings are sometimes called the fathers of their peoples. Cum autem homini competat in multitudine vivere, quia sibi non sufficit ad necessaria vitae si solitarius maneat, oportet quod tanto sit perfectior multitudinis societas quanto magis per se sufficiens erit ad necessaria vitae. Habetur siquidem aliqua vitae sufficientia in una familia domus unius, quantum scilicet ad naturales actus nutritionis et generandae prolis et aliorum huiusmodi; in uno autem vico, quantum ad ea quae ad unum artificium pertinent; in civitate vero, quae est perfecta communitas, quantum ad omnia necessaria vitae; sed adhuc magis in provincia una, propter necessitatem compugnationis et mutui auxilii contra hostes. Unde qui perfectam communitatem regit, id est civitatem vel provinciam, antonomastice rex vocatur; qui autem domum regit, non rex sed paterfamilias dicitur, habet tamen aliquam similitudinem regis, propter quam aliquando reges patres populorum nominantur. It is plain, therefore, from what has been said, that a king is one who rules the people of one city or province, and rules them for the common good. Hence Solomon says: The king rules over all the land subject to him (Eccl 5:8). Ex dictis igitur patet quod rex est qui unus multitudinem civitatis vel provinciae et propter bonum commune regit: unde Salomon dicit Universae terrae rex imperat servienti. Chapter 2 Capitulum 2 Whether it is more expedient for a city or province to be ruled by one man or by many Quid plus expediat civitati vel provinciae pluribus aut uno regi rectore Having set forth these preliminary points we must now inquire whether it is better for a province or a city to be ruled by one man or by many. His autem praemissis inquirere oportet quid provinciae vel civitati magis expedit, utrum pluribus regi vel uno. This question may be considered first from the viewpoint of the purpose of government. The aim of any ruler should be directed towards securing the welfare of that which he undertakes to rule. The duty of the pilot, for instance, is to preserve his ship amidst the perils of the sea, and to bring it unharmed to the port of safety. Now the welfare and safety of a multitude formed into a society lies in the preservation of its unity, which is called peace. If this is removed, the benefit of social life is lost; moreover, a dissenting multitude becomes a burden to itself. Hoc autem considerari potest ex ipso fine regiminis. Ad hoc cuiuslibet regentis ferri debet intentio ut eius quod regendum suscepit salutem procuret: gubernatoris enim est navem contra maris pericula servando illaesam perducere ad portum salutis. Bonum autem et salus consociatae multitudinis est ut eius unitas conservetur, quae dicitur pax; qua remota socialis vitae perit utilitas, quinimmo multitudo dissentiens sibi ipsi fit onerosa. The chief concern of the ruler of a multitude, therefore, is to procure the unity of peace. It is not even legitimate for him to deliberate whether he shall establish peace in the multitude subject to him, just as a physician does not deliberate whether he shall heal the sick man encharged to him, for no one should deliberate about an end which he is obliged to seek, but only about the means to attain that end. Therefore, the Apostle, having commended the unity of the faithful people, says: Be eager to maintain the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace (Eph 4:3). Thus, the more efficacious a government is in keeping the unity of peace, the more useful it will be. For we call that more useful which leads more directly to the end. Now it is manifest that what is itself one can more efficaciously bring about unity than several—just as the most efficacious cause of heat is that which is by its nature hot. Therefore, the rule of one man is more useful than the rule of many. Hoc igitur est ad quod maxime rector multitudinis intendere debet, ut pacis unitatem procuret; nec recte consiliatur an pacem faciat in multitudine sibi subiecta, sicut nec medicus an sanet infirmum sibi commissum: nullus enim consiliari debet de fine quem intendere debet, sed de his quae sunt ad finem. Propterea quod Apostolus, commendata fidelis populi unitate, Solliciti, inquit, sitis servare unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis. Quanto igitur regimen efficacius fuerit ad unitatem pacis servandam, tanto erit utilius; hoc enim utilius dicimus quod magis perducit ad finem. Manifestum est autem quod unitatem magis efficere potest quod est per se unum quam plures, sicut efficacissima causa calefactionis est quod est per se calidum. Utilius igitur est regimen unius quam plurium. Furthermore, it is evident that several persons could by no means preserve the stability of the community if they totally disagreed. For union is necessary among them if they are to rule at all: several men, for instance, could not pull a ship in one direction unless joined together in some fashion. Now, several are said to be ‘united’ according as they come closer to being one. So one man rules better than several who come near being one. Amplius, manifestum est quod plures multitudinem nullo modo regerent si omnino dissentirent; requiritur igitur in pluribus quaedam unio ad hoc quod quoquo modo regere possint, quia nec multi navem in unam partem traherent nisi aliquo modo coniuncti. Uniri autem dicuntur plura per appropinquationem ad unum; melius igitur regit unus quam plures ex eo quod appropinquant ad unum. Again, whatever is in accord with nature is best, for nature does what is best in each thing. Now, every natural governance is governance by one. In the multitude of bodily members there is one which is the principal mover (namely, the heart); and among the powers of the soul one power presides as chief (namely, the reason). Among bees there is one king bee, and in the whole universe there is one God, Maker and Ruler of all. And this is reasonable, for every multitude is derived from unity. Therefore, if artificial things are an imitation of natural things, and a work of art is better according as it attains a closer likeness to what is in nature, it follows that it is best for a human multitude to be ruled by one person. Adhuc, ea quae sunt ad naturam sunt optime se habent, in singulis enim operatur natura quod optimum est. Omne autem naturale regimen ab uno est: in membrorum enim multitudine est unum quod principaliter movet, scilicet cor; et in partibus animae una vis principaliter praesidet, scilicet ratio; et in apibus unus rex, et in toto universo unus Deus omnium factor et rector. Et hoc rationabiliter: omnis enim multitudo derivatur ab uno. Quare, si ea quae sunt secundum artem imitantur ea quae sunt secundum naturam, et tanto magis opus artis melius est quanto magis assequitur similitudinem eius quod est in natura, necesse est quod in humana multitudine optimum sit quod per unum regatur. This is also evident from experience. For provinces or cities which are not ruled by one person are torn with dissensions and tossed about without peace, so that the complaint seems to be fulfilled which the Lord uttered through the prophet: Many pastors have destroyed my vineyard (Jer 12:10). On the other hand, provinces and cities which are ruled under one king enjoy peace, flourish in justice, and delight in prosperity. Hence, the Lord by his prophets promises to his people as a great reward that he will give them one head and that one prince will be in the midst of them (Ezek 34:24; Jer 30:21). Hoc etiam experimentis apparet. Nam provinciae vel civitates quae non reguntur ab uno dissensionibus laborant et absque pace fluctuant, ut videatur impleri quod Dominus per prophetam conqueritur dicens Pastores multi demoliti sunt vineam. E contrario vero provinciae et civitates quae sub rege uno reguntur pace gaudent, iustitia florent et affluentia rerum laetantur: unde Dominus pro magno munere per prophetas populo suo promittit quod ponet sibi caput unum et quod princeps unus erit in medio eorum. Chapter 3 Capitulum 3 That the dominion of a tyrant is the worst Quod regimen tyranni est pessimum Just as the government of a king is the best, so the government of a tyrant is the worst. For democracy is the opposite of polity, since both are governments carried on by many persons, as is clear from what has already been said; while oligarchy is the opposite of aristocracy, since both are governments carried on by a few persons; and kingship is the opposite of tyranny, since both are carried on by one person. Now, as has been shown above, monarchy is the best government. If, therefore, the best is the opposite of the worst, it follows that tyranny is the worst kind of government. Sicut autem regimen regis est optimum, ita regimen tyranni est pessimum. Opponitur enim politiae quidem democratia, utrumque enim, sicut ex dictis apparet, est regimen quod per plures exercetur; aristocratiae vero oligarchia, utrumque enim exercetur per paucos; regnum autem tyranno, utrumque enim per unum exercetur. Quod autem regnum sit optimum regimen, ostensum est prius; si igitur optimo opponitur pessimum, necesse est quod tyrannis sit pessimum. Further, a united force is more efficacious in producing its effect than a force which is scattered or divided. Many persons together can pull a load which could not be pulled by each one taking his part separately and acting individually. Therefore, just as it is more useful for a force operating for a good to be more united, in order that it may work good more effectively, so a force operating for evil is more harmful when it is one than when it is divided. Now, the power of one who rules unjustly works to the detriment of the multitude in that he diverts the common good of the multitude to his own benefit. Therefore, for the same reason that, in a just government, the government is better in proportion as the ruling power is one—thus monarchy is better than aristocracy, and aristocracy better than polity—so the contrary will be true of an unjust government: namely, the ruling power will be more harmful in proportion as it is more one. Consequently, tyranny is more harmful than oligarchy, and oligarchy more harmful than democracy. Adhuc, virtus unita magis est efficax ad effectum inducendum quam dispersa vel divisa: multi enim congregati simul trahunt illud quod divisim per partes singulariter a singulis trahi non posset. Sicut igitur utilius est virtutem operantem ad bonum esse magis unam, ut sit virtuosior ad operandum bonum, ita magis est noxium si virtus operans malum sit una quam divisa. Virtus autem iniuste praesidentis operatur ad malum multitudinis, dum commune bonum multitudinis in sui ipsius bonum tantum retorquet. Sicut igitur in regimine iusto quanto regens est magis unum, tanto est utilius regimen, ut regnum utilius est quam aristocratia, aristocratia vero quam politia: ita e converso erit et in iniusto regimine, ut videlicet quanto regens est magis unum, tanto magis sit noxium. Magis igitur est noxia tyrannis quam oligarchia, oligarchia autem quam democratia. Moreover, a government becomes unjust by the fact that the ruler, paying no heed to the common good, seeks his own private good. Therefore, the further he departs from the common good, the more unjust will his government be. But there is a greater departure from the common good in an oligarchy, in which the advantage of a few is sought, than in a democracy, in which the advantage of many is sought; and there is a still greater departure from the common good in a tyranny, where the advantage of only one man is sought. For a large number is closer to the totality than a small number, and a small number than only one. Thus, the government of a tyrant is the most unjust. Amplius, per hoc regimen fit iniustum quod, spreto bono communi multitudinis, quaeritur bonum privatum regentis; quanto igitur magis receditur a bono communi, tanto est regimen magis iniustum. Plus autem receditur a bono communi in oligarchia, in qua quaeritur bonum paucorum, quam in democratia in qua quaeritur bonum multorum; et adhuc plus receditur a bono communi in tyrannide, in qua quaeritur bonum unius tantum: omni enim universitati propinquius est multum quam paucum, et paucum quam unum solum; regimen igitur tyranni est iniustissimum. The same conclusion is made clear to those who consider the order of divine providence, which disposes everything in the best way. In all things, good ensues from one perfect cause (as from the totality of the conditions favorable to the production of the effect), while evil results from any one partial defect. There is beauty in a body when all its members are fittingly disposed; ugliness, on the other hand, arises when any one member is not fittingly disposed. Thus ugliness results in different ways from many causes; beauty in one way from one perfect cause. It is thus with all good and evil things, as if God so provided that good, arising from one cause, be stronger, and evil, arising from many causes, be weaker. It is expedient, therefore, that a just government be that of one man only in order that it may be stronger. However, if the government should turn away from justice, it is more expedient that it be a government by many, so that it may be weaker, and the many may mutually hinder one another. Among unjust governments, therefore, democracy is the most tolerable, but the worst is tyranny. Simul autem hoc manifestum fit considerantibus divinae providentiae ordinem, quae optime universa disponit. Nam bonum provenit in rebus ex una causa perfecta, quasi omnibus adunatis quae ad bonum iuvare possunt, malum autem singillatim ex singularibus defectibus. Non enim est pulchritudo in corpore nisi omnia membra fuerint decenter disposita; turpitudo autem contingit quodcumque membrum inconvenienter se habeat. Et sic turpitudo ex pluribus causis diversimode provenit, pulchritudo autem uno modo ex una causa perfecta; et sic est in omnibus bonis et malis, tanquam hoc Deo providente ut bonum ex una causa sit fortius, malum autem ex pluribus causis sit debilius. Expedit igitur ut regimen iustum sit unius tantum ad hoc quod sit fortius; quod si a iustitia declinat regimen, expedit magis quod sit multorum, ut sit debilius et se invicem impediant. Inter iniusta igitur regimina tolerabilius est democratia, pessimum vero tyrannis. This same conclusion is also apparent if one considers the evils which come from tyrants. Since a tyrant, despising the common good, seeks his private interest, it follows that he will oppress his subjects in different ways according as he is dominated by different passions to acquire certain goods. The one who is enthralled by the passion of cupidity seizes the goods of his subjects; hence Solomon says: A just king sets up the land; a covetous man shall destroy it (Prov 29:4). If he is dominated by the passion of anger, he sheds blood for nothing; whence it is said by Ezekiel: Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves tearing the prey, shedding blood (Ezek 22:27). Therefore, this kind of government is to be avoided, as the wise man admonishes: Keep far from a man who has the power to kill (Sir 9:13), because he kills not for justice’s sake but by his power, for the lust of his will. Thus there can be no safety. Everything is uncertain when there is a departure from justice. Nobody will be able firmly to state, this thing is such and such, when it depends upon the will of another, not to say upon his caprice. Idem etiam maxime apparet si quis consideret mala quae ex tyrannis proveniunt; quia cum tyrannus contempto communi bono quaerit privatum, consequens est ut subditos diversimode gravet secundum quod diversis passionibus subiacet ad bona aliqua affectanda. Qui enim passione cupiditatis detinetur, bona subditorum rapit; unde Salomon Rex iustus erigit terram, vir avarus destruet eam. Si vero iracundiae passioni subiaceat, pro nihilo sanguinem fundit, unde dicitur per Ezechielem Principes eius in medio eius quasi lupi rapientes praedam ad effundendum sanguinem. Hoc igitur regimen fugiendum esse sapiens monet dicens Longe esto ab homine potestatem habente occidendi, quasi scilicet non pro iustitia sed per potestatem occidit pro libidine voluntatis. Sic igitur nulla potest esse securitas, sed omnia sunt incerta cum a iure disceditur; nec firmari quidquam potest quale sit quod positum est in alterius voluntate, ne dicam libidine. Nor does the tyrant merely oppress his subjects in corporal things but he also hinders their spiritual good. Those who seek more to use, than to be of use to, their subjects prevent all progress, suspecting all excellence in their subjects to be prejudicial to their own evil domination. For tyrants hold the good in greater suspicion than the wicked, and to them the valour of others is always fraught with danger. So, the above-mentioned tyrants strive to prevent those of their subjects who have become virtuous from acquiring valour and high spirit in order that they may not want to cast off their iniquitous domination. They also see to it that there be no friendly relations among these so that they may not enjoy the benefits resulting from being on good terms with one another, for as long as one has no confidence in the other, no plot will be set up against the tyrant’s domination. Wherefore they sow discords among the people, foster any that have arisen, and forbid anything which furthers society and co-operation among men, such as marriage, banquets, and anything of like character, through which familiarity and confidence are engendered among men. They moreover strive to prevent their subjects from becoming powerful and rich, since, suspecting these to be as wicked as themselves, they fear their power and wealth; for the subjects might become harmful to them even as they are accustomed to use power and wealth to harm others. Hence Job 15:21 says of the tyrant: The sound of dread is always in his ears and when there is peace, that is, when there is no one to harm him, he always suspects treason. Nec solum in corporalibus subditos gravat, sed etiam spiritualia eorum bona impedit. Quia enim plus praeesse appetunt quam prodesse, omnem profectum subditorum impediunt, suspicantes omnem subditorum excellentiam suae iniquae dominationis praeiudicium esse: tyrannis enim magis boni quam mali suspecti sunt, semperque his aliena virtus formidolosa est. Conantur igitur praedicti tyranni ne ipsorum subditi virtuosi effecti magnanimitatis concipiant spiritum et eorum iniquam dominationem non ferant. Conantur etiam ne inter subditos amicitiae foedus firmetur et pacis emolumento ad invicem gaudeant, ut sic, dum unus de altero non confidit, contra eorum dominium aliquid moliri non possint. Propter quod inter ipsos discordias seminant, exortas nutriunt, et ea quae ad confoederationes hominum pertinent ut connubia et convivia prohibent, et caetera huiusmodi per quae inter homines solet familiaritas et fiducia generari. Conantur etiam ne potentes aut divites fiant, quia de subditis secundum suae malitiae conscientiam suspicantes, sicut ipsi potentia et divitiis ad nocendum utuntur, ita timent ne potentia et divitiae subditorum eis nocivae reddantur. Unde in Iob de tyranno dicitur Sonitus terroris semper in auribus illius, et cum pax sit, nullo scilicet ei malum intentante, ille semper insidias suspicatur. It thus results that when rulers, who ought to induce their subjects to virtue, are wickedly jealous of the virtue of their subjects and hinder it as much as they can, few virtuous men are found under the rule of tyrants. For, according to Aristotle’s sentence, brave men are found where brave men are honoured. And as Cicero says: Those who are despised by everybody are disheartened and flourish but little. It is also natural that men, brought up in fear, should become small-spirited and discouraged in the face of any strenuous and manly task. This is shown by experience in provinces that have long been under tyrants. Hence the Apostle says to the Colossians: Fathers, do not provoke your children to indignation, lest they become discouraged (Col 3:21). Ex hoc autem contingit ut, dum praesidentes, qui subditos ad virtutes inducere deberent, virtuti subditorum nequiter invident et eam pro posse impediunt, sub tyrannis pauci virtuosi inveniantur. Nam, iuxta sententiam Aristotelis, apud illos inveniuntur fortes viri apud quos fortissimi quique honorantur; et ut Tullius dicit Iacent semper et parum vigent quae apud quosque improbantur. Naturale etiam est ut homines sub timore nutriti in servilem degenerent animum et pusillanimes fiant ad omne virile opus et strenuum: quod experimento patet in provinciis quae diu sub tyrannis fuerunt; unde Apostolus ad Colossenses dicit Patres, nolite ad indignationem provocare filios vestros ut non pusillo animo fiant.