23. John the Evangelist, as already indicated, makes it his principal object to show the divinity of the incarnate Word. Accordingly, his Gospel is divided into two parts. 23. Evangelista Ioannes, sicut dictum est, intendit principaliter ostendere divinitatem Verbi incarnati; et ideo dividitur istud Evangelium in partes duas. In the first he states the divinity of Christ; Primo enim insinuat Christi divinitatem; in the second he shows it by the things Christ did in the flesh, at and on the third day (John 2:1). secundo manifestat eam per ea quae Christus in carne fecit, et hoc II cap. et die tertia. In regard to the first, he does two things. Circa primum duo facit. First he shows the divinity of Christ; Primo proponit Christi divinitatem; second he sets forth the manner in which Christ’s divinity is made known to us, at and we saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten (John 1:14). secundo ponit modum, quo Christi divinitas nobis innotuit, ibi et vidimus gloriam eius etc. Concerning the first he does two things. Circa primum duo facit. First he treats of the divinity of Christ; Primo agit de divinitate Christi; second of the incarnation of the Word of God, at there was a man sent from God, whose name was John (John 1:6). secundo de Verbi Dei incarnatione, ibi fuit homo missus a Deo. Because there are two items to be considered in each thing, namely, its existence and its operation or power, Quia vero in unaquaque re sunt consideranda duo, scilicet esse et operatio, sive virtus ipsius, ideo first he treats the existence of the Word as to his divine nature; primo agit de esse Verbi quantum ad naturam divinam; second of his power or operation, at all things were made through him (John 1:3). secundo de virtute, seu operatione ipsius, ibi omnia per ipsum facta sunt. In regard to the first he does four things. Circa primum quatuor facit. First he shows when the Word was: in the beginning was the Word; Primo ostendit quando erat Verbum, quia in principio erat Verbum; second where he was: and the Word was with God; secundo ubi erat, quia apud Deum; unde dicit et Verbum erat apud Deum; third what he was: and the Word was God; tertio quid erat, quia Deus; unde subiungit et Deus erat Verbum; fourth, in what way he was: he was in the beginning with God. quarto quomodo erat, quia hoc erat in principio apud Deum. The first two pertain to the inquiry of whether something exists; the second two pertain to the inquiry of what something is. Prima duo pertinent ad quaestionem, an est: secunda vero duo pertinent ad quaestionem quid est. 24. With respect to the first of these four we must examine the meaning of the statement, in the beginning was the Word. And here three things present themselves for careful study according to the three parts of this statement. First it is necessary to investigate the name Word; second the phrase in the beginning; third the meaning of the Word was in the beginning. 24. Circa primum autem videndum est quid sit hoc quod dicitur in principio erat Verbum. Ubi tria diligenter inquirenda concurrunt, secundum tres dictiones huius orationis. Et primo quid sit hoc quod dicitur Verbum; secundo quid sit hoc quod dicitur in principio; tertio quid sit hoc quod dicitur Verbum erat in principio. 25. To understand the name Word we should note that according to the Philosopher, vocal sounds are signs of the affections that exist in our soul (De interpretatione 1, 16a3–4). It is customary in Scripture for the things signified to be themselves called by the names of their signs, as in the statement, and the rock was Christ (1 Cor 10:4). It is fitting that what is within our soul, and what is signified by our external word, be called a word. But whether the name ‘word’ belongs first to the exterior vocal sound or to the conception in our mind, is not our concern at present. However, it is obvious that what is signified by the vocal sound, as existing interiorly in the soul, exists prior to the vocal expression inasmuch as it is its actual cause. 25. Ad intellectum autem huius nominis Verbum, sciendum est quod, secundum Philosophum ea quae sunt in voce, sunt signa earum, quae sunt in anima, passionum. Consuetum est autem in Scriptura quod significata nominantur nominibus signorum, sicut illud I Cor. X, 4: petra autem erat Christus. De necessitate autem oportet quod illud intrinsecum animae nostrae, quod significatur exteriori verbo nostro, verbum vocetur. Utrum autem per prius conveniat nomen ‘verbi’ rei exteriori voce prolatae, vel ipsi conceptioni mentis, nihil refert ad praesens. Planum est tamen quod illud quod voce significatur, interius existens in anima, prius est quam ipsum verbum exteriori voce prolatum, utpote causa eius existens. Therefore if we wish to grasp the meaning of the interior word, we must first look at the meaning of that which is exteriorly expressed in words. Si ergo volumus scire quid est interius verbum mentis, videamus quid significat quod exteriori voce profertur. Now there are three things in our intellect: the intellectual power itself, the species of the thing understood, which is its form, and this form being to the intellect what the species of a color is to the eye; and third, the very activity of the intellect, which is to understand. But none of these is what is signified by the exterior vocal word. In intellectu autem nostro sunt tria: scilicet ipsa potentia intellectus; species rei intellectae, quae est forma eius, se habens ad ipsum intellectum, sicut species coloris ad pupillam; et, tertio, ipsa operatio intellectus quae est intelligere. Nullum autem istorum significatur verbo exteriori voce prolato. For, the name ‘stone’ does not signify the substance of the intellect because this is not what the one naming intends; nor does it signify the species, which is that by which the intellect understands, since this also is not the intention of the one naming; nor does it signify the act itself of understanding since to understand is not an action proceeding to the exterior from the one understanding, but an action remaining within. Therefore, that is properly called an interior word which the one understanding forms when understanding. Nam hoc nomen ‘lapis’ non significat substantiam intellectus, quia hoc non intendit dicere nominans; nec significat speciem, quae est qua intellectus intelligit, cum etiam hoc non sit intentio nominantis; non significat etiam ipsum intelligere, cum intelligere non sit actio exterius progrediens ab intelligente, sed in ipso manens. Illud ergo proprie dicitur verbum interius, quod intelligens intelligendo format. Now the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations. According to its operation which is called the understanding of indivisibles, it forms a definition; while according to its operation by which it unites and separates, it forms an enunciation or something of that sort. Hence, what is thus formed and expressed by the operation of the intellect, whether by defining or enunciating, is what the exterior vocal sound signifies. So the Philosopher says that the notion that a name signifies is a definition (De interpretatatione 16a20–b5). Hence, what is thus expressed, i.e., formed in the soul, is called an interior word. Consequently it is compared to the intellect, not as that by which the intellect understands, but as that in which it understands, because it is in what is thus expressed and formed that it sees the nature of the thing understood. Thus we have the meaning of the name ‘word.’ Intellectus autem duo format, secundum duas eius operationes. Nam secundum operationem suam, quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, format definitionem; secundum vero operationem suam, qua componit et dividit, format enunciationem, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Et ideo, illud sic formatum et expressum per operationem intellectus, vel definientis vel enunciantis, exteriori voce significatur. Unde dicit Philosophus quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est definitio. Istud ergo sic expressum, scilicet formatum in anima, dicitur verbum interius; et ideo comparatur ad intellectum, non sicut quo intellectus intelligit, sed sicut in quo intelligit; quia in ipso expresso et formato videt naturam rei intellectae. Sic ergo habemus significationem huius nominis ‘verbum.’ Second, from what has been said we are able to understand that a word is always something that proceeds from an intellect existing in act; and furthermore, that a word is always a notion and likeness of the thing understood. So if the one understanding and the thing understood are the same, then the word is a notion and likeness of the intellect from which it proceeds. On the other hand, if the one understanding is other than the thing understood, then the word is not a likeness and notion of the one understanding but of the thing understood, as the conception which one has of a stone is a likeness of only the stone. But when the intellect understands itself, its word is a likeness and notion of the intellect. And so Augustine sees a likeness of the Trinity in the soul insofar as the mind understands itself, but not insofar as it understands other things (De Trin. 9.5.8). Secundo, ex his quae dicta sunt, concipere possumus, quod verbum semper est aliquid procedens ab intellectu in actu existente. Iterum quod verbum semper est ratio et similitudo rei intellectae. Et si quidem eadem res sit intelligens et intellecta, tunc verbum est ratio et similitudo intellectus, a quo procedit; si autem sit aliud intelligens et intellectum, tunc verbum non est similitudo et ratio intelligentis, sed rei intellectae: sicut conceptio quam aliquis habet de lapide, est similitudo lapidis tantum, sed quando intellectus intelligit se, tunc huiusmodi verbum est similitudo et ratio intellectus. Et ideo Augustinus ponit similitudinem Trinitatis in anima, secundum quod mens intelligit seipsam, non autem secundum quod intelligit alia. It is clear then that it is necessary to have a word in any intellectual nature, for it is of the very nature of understanding that the intellect in understanding should form something. Now what is formed is called a word, and so it follows that in every being which understands there must be a word. Patet ergo quod in qualibet natura intellectuali necesse est ponere verbum: quia de ratione intelligendi est quod intellectus intelligendo aliquid formet; huius autem formatio dicitur verbum; et ideo in omni intelligente oportet ponere verbum. However, intellectual natures are of three kinds: human, angelic and divine; and so there are three kinds of words. The human word, about which it is said: the fool said in his heart: there is no God (Ps 13:1). The angelic word, about which it is said in Zechariah, and in many places in Sacred Scripture, and the angel said to me: I will show you what these are (Zech 1:9). The third is the divine word, of which it is said, and God said: let there be light (Gen 1:3). Natura autem intellectualis est triplex, scilicet humana, angelica et divina: et ideo triplex est verbum. Scilicet humanum, de quo in Ps. XIII, 1: dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus. Est et angelicum, de quo Zac. I, 9 et in multis locis Sacrae Scripturae dicitur: dixit angelus etc. Tertium est verbum divinum, de quo Gen. I, 5: dixit Deus: fiat lux etc. So when the Evangelist says, in the beginning was the Word, we cannot understand this as a human or angelic word, because both these words have been made since man and angel have a cause and principle of their existence and operation, and the word of a man or an angel cannot exist before they do. The word the Evangelist had in mind he shows by saying that this word was not made, since all things were made by it. Therefore, the word about which John speaks here is the Word of God. Cum ergo Evangelista dicit in principio erat Verbum, non intelligi potest de humano vel angelico verbo: quia utrumque istorum verborum est factum, cum homo et angelus habeant sui esse et operationis principium et causam; verbum autem hominis vel angeli non potest praeexistere eis. De quo autem verbo intellexerit Evangelista, declarat per hoc quod dicit, hoc verbum non esse factum, cum omnia sint facta per ipsum; hoc autem est Verbum Dei, de quo Ioannes hic loquitur. 26. We should note that this Word differs from our own word in three ways. 26. Sciendum est autem, quod hoc Verbum differt a nostro verbo in tribus. The first difference, according to Augustine, is that our word is formable before being formed, for when I wish to conceive the notion of a stone, I must arrive at it by reasoning (De Trin 15.4.25). And so it is in all other things that are understood by us, with the sole possible exception of the first principles, which, since they are known in a simple manner, are known at once without any discourse of reason. Prima differentia est, secundum Augustinum, quia verbum nostrum prius est formabile, quam formatum: nam cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam; et sic est in omnibus aliis, quae a nobis intelliguntur, nisi forte in primis principiis, quae cum sint simpliciter nota, absque discursu rationis statim sciuntur. So as long as the intellect, in so reasoning, casts about this way and that, the formation is not yet complete. It is only when it has conceived the notion of the thing perfectly that for the first time it has the notion of the complete thing and a word. Thus in our mind there is both a cogitation, meaning the discourse involved in an investigation, and a word, which is formed according to a perfect contemplation of the truth. So our word is first in potency before it is in act. But the Word of God is always in act. In consequence, the term cogitation does not properly speaking apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says: the Word of God is spoken of in such a way that cogitation is not included, lest anything changeable be supposed in God (De Trin. 15.4.25). Anselm was speaking improperly when he said: for the supreme Spirit to speak is for him to look at something while cogitating (Monolog. 63). Quamdiu ergo sic ratiocinando, intellectus iactatur hac atque illac, nec dum formatio perfecta est, nisi quando ipsam rationem rei perfecte conceperit: et tunc primo habet rationem rei perfectae, et tunc primo habet rationem verbi. Et inde est quod in anima nostra est cogitatio, per quam significatur ipse discursus inquisitionis, et verbum, quod est iam formatum secundum perfectam contemplationem veritatis. Sic ergo verbum nostrum primo est in potentia quam in actu; sed Verbum Dei semper est in actu: et ideo nomen cogitationis Verbo Dei proprie non convenit. Dicit enim Augustinus, XV de Trinit., ita dicitur Verbum Dei, ut cogitatio non dicatur, ne quid quasi volubile credatur in Deo. Id autem quod Anselmus dicit, scilicet dicere summo Spiritui nihil aliud est, quam cogitando intueri, improprie dictum est. 27. The second difference is that our word is imperfect, but the divine Word is most perfect. 27. Secunda vero differentia verbi nostri ad Verbum divinum est, quia verbum nostrum est imperfectum, sed Verbum divinum est perfectissimum. For since we cannot express all our conceptions in one word, we must form many imperfect words through which we separately express all that is in our knowledge. But it is not that way with God. For since he understands both himself and everything else through his essence, by one act, the single divine Word is expressive of all that is in God, not only of the persons but also of creatures; otherwise it would be imperfect. So Augustine says: if there were less in the Word than is contained in the knowledge of the one speaking it, the Word would be imperfect; but it is obvious that it is most perfect; therefore, it is only one. God speaks once (Job 33:14). Quia enim nos non possumus omnes nostras conceptiones uno verbo exprimere, ideo oportet quod plura verba imperfecta formemus, per quae divisim exprimamus omnia, quae in scientia nostra sunt. In Deo autem non est sic: cum enim intelligat, et seipsum etiam et quicquid intelligit per essentiam suam, uno actu, unicum Verbum divinum est expressivum totius quod in Deo est, non solum personarum, sed etiam creaturarum: alias esset imperfectum. Unde dicit Augustinus: si quid minus esset in Verbo, quam in dicentis scientia continetur, Verbum imperfectum esset. Sed constat quod est perfectissimum; ergo est tantum unum. Iob XXXIII, 14: semel loquitur Deus. 28. The third difference is that our word is not of the same nature as we; but the divine Word is of the same nature as God. And therefore it is something that subsists in the divine nature. 28. Tertia differentia est, quod verbum nostrum non est eiusdem naturae nobiscum, sed Verbum divinum est eiusdem naturae cum Deo: et ideo aliquid subsistens in natura divina. For the understood notion which the intellect is seen to form about some thing has only an intelligible existence in our soul. Now in our soul, to understand is not the same as the nature of the soul, because our soul is not its own operation. Consequently, the word which our intellect forms is not of the essence of our soul, but is an accident of it. But in God, to understand and to be are the same; and so the Word of the divine intellect is not an accident but belongs to its nature. Thus it must be subsistent, because whatever is in the nature of God is God. Thus Damascene says that God is a substantial word, and a hypostasis, but our words are concepts in our mind (De fide orth. 1.13). Nam ratio intellecta, quam intellectus videtur de aliqua re formare, habet esse intelligibile tantum in anima nostra; intelligere autem in anima nostra non est idem quod est natura animae, quia anima non est sua operatio. Et ideo verbum quod format intellectus noster, non est de essentia animae, sed est accidens ei. In Deo autem idem est intelligere et esse; et ideo Verbum intellectus divini non est aliquid accidens, sed pertinens ad naturam eius: quia quicquid est in natura Dei, est Deus. Unde, dicit Damascenus, quod Deus verbum substantiale est, et in hypostasi ens, reliqua vero, verba nostra scilicet, virtutes sunt animae. 29. From the above it is clear that the Word, properly speaking, is always understood as a person in the divinity, since it implies only something expressed, by the one understanding; 29. Ex praemissis etiam patet quod Verbum, proprie loquendo, semper personaliter accipitur in divinis, cum non importet nisi quid expressum ab intelligente.