Lecture 6 Lectio 6 The father of lies Pater mendaciorum ^8:44 You are of your father the devil, and you will do the desires of your father. He was a murderer from the beginning, and he did not stand in the truth, because the truth is not in him. When he speaks a lie, he speaks of his own: for he is a liar and the father of lies. [n. 1239] ^8:44 Vos ex patre diabolo estis, et desideria patris vestri vultis facere. Ille homicida erat ab initio, et in veritate non stetit, quia non est veritas in eo: cum loquitur mendacium, ex propriis loquitur, quia mendax est, et pater eius. [n. 1239] 1239. After showing that the Jews had a certain spiritual origin, and after rejecting the origin they presumed they had, our Lord here gives their true origin, ascribing their fatherhood to the devil. 1239. Postquam Dominus Iudaeos ostendit originem aliquam spiritualem habere et exclusit ab eis originem praesumptam, hic astruit veram, ascribens eis paternitatem diaboli, et First, he makes his statement; primo proponit intentum; second, he gives its reason; at and you will do the desires of your father; secundo rationem eis assignat, ibi et desideria patris vestri vultis facere; third, he explains this reason, at he was a murderer from the beginning. tertio positam rationem manifestat, ibi ille homicida erat ab initio. 1240. He says: you are of your father the devil, and you will do the desires of your father, that is, by imitating him: your father was an Amorite, and your mother a Hittite (Ezek 16:3). 1240. Dicit ergo vos facitis opera diaboli, ergo vos ex patre diabolo estis, scilicet per imitationem; Ez. XVI, 3: pater tuus Amorrhaeus, et mater tua Cethaea. Here one must guard against the heresy of the Manicheans who claim that there is a definite nature called ‘evil,’ and a certain race of darkness with its own princes, from which all corruptible things derive their origin. According to this opinion, all men, as to their flesh, have come from the devil. Further, they say that certain souls belong to that creation which is good, and others to that which is evil. Thus they said that our Lord said, you are of your father the devil, because they came from the devil according to the flesh, and their souls were part of that creation which was evil. Cavenda est hic haeresis Manichaeorum, qui dicunt esse quamdam naturam ‘mali,’ et gentem quamdam tenebrarum cum principibus suis, a qua corruptibilia omnia originem trahunt; et secundum hoc omnes homines secundum carnem ex diabolo processisse. Ponebant autem quasdam animas ad bonam creationem pertinere, et quasdam ad malam; unde dicebant hoc dictum a Domino vos ex patre diabolo estis, quia ab eo secundum carnem processistis, et animae vestrae sunt de mala creatione. But as Origen says, to suppose that there are two natures because of the difference between good and evil seems to be like saying that the substance of an eye which sees is different from that of an eye that is clouded or crossed. For just as a healthy and bleary eye do not differ in substance, but the bleariness is from some deficient cause, so the substance and nature of a thing is the same whether it is good or has a defect in itself, which is a sin of the will. And so the Jews, as evil, are not called the children of the devil by nature, but by reason of their imitating him. Sed, ut Origenes dicit, introducere duas naturas propter differentiam boni et mali, simile videtur ei qui diceret alteram esse oculi videntis substantiam, alteram caligantis vel se avertentis. Quemadmodum enim oculi sani et lippi non differunt substantia, sed quaedam contingit causa deficiens, scilicet quae facit eum caligare; ita eadem est substantia et natura rei, sive sit bona, seu habeat in se defectum, quod est peccatum voluntatis. Non ergo Iudaei ut mali, dicuntur filii diaboli natura, sed imitatione. 1241. Then when he says, and you will do the desires of your father, he gives the reason for this, for their being of the devil. It is like saying: you are not the children of the devil as though created and brought into existence by him, but because by imitating him you will do the desires of your father. And these desires are evil, for as he envied and killed man—through the devil’s envy death entered the world (Wis 2:24)—so you too envy me and but now you seek to kill me, a man who has spoken the truth to you (John 8:40). 1241. Consequenter cum dicit et desideria patris vestri vultis facere, rationem assignatam exponit; quasi dicat: non estis filii diaboli tamquam ab eo creati, et in esse producti sed quia eum imitantes, desideria patris vestri vultis facere, quae quidem mala sunt: nam sicut ille invidit homini, et occidit, Sap. II, 24: invidia diaboli mors intravit in orbem terrarum, ita et vos mihi invidentes, quaeritis me interficere hominem, qui veritatem locutus sum vobis. 1242. Then when he says, he was a murderer from the beginning, he explains the reason he gave. 1242. Consequenter cum dicit ille homicida erat ab initio, positam rationem manifestat, et First, he mentions the characteristic of the devil that they imitate; primo ponit diaboli quam imitantur conditionem; second, he shows that they are truly imitators of that, at but if I say the truth, you do not believe me (John 8:45). secundo ostendit eos esse imitatores conditionis illius, ibi ego autem si veritatem dico, non creditis mihi. With respect to the first it should be noted that two sins stand out in the devil: the sin of pride towards God, and of envy towards man, whom he destroys. And from the sin of envy towards man, because of which he injures him, we can know his sin of pride. And so Sciendum est circa primum, quod in diabolo duplex peccatum maxime pollet: scilicet peccatum superbiae ad Deum, et invidiae ad hominem, quem occidit. Sed ex peccato invidiae ad hominem quo infert nocumenta hominibus, cognoscitur a nobis peccatum superbiae et ideo first, he mentions the devil’s sin against man; primo ponit peccatum Daemonis contra hominem; second, his sin against God, he did not stand in the truth. secundo peccatum eius contra Deum, ibi et in veritate non stetit. 1243. His sin of envy against man lies in the fact that he kills him. So he says, he, that is, the devil, was a murderer from the beginning. 1243. Peccatum autem invidiae contra hominem est quod occidit eum; unde dicit: ille, scilicet diabolus, homicida erat ab initio. Here it should be noted that the devil kills man not with the sword, but by persuading him to do evil. Through the devil’s envy death entered the world (Wis 2:24). First, the death of sin entered: the death of the wicked is very evil (Ps 33:22); then came bodily death: sin came into the world through one man and death through sin (Rom 5:12). As Augustine says: do not think that you are not a murderer when you lead your brother into evil. Ubi sciendum est quod non ferro accinctus diabolus occidit hominem, sed mala persuasione; Sap. II, 24: invidia diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum. Et primo quidem introivit mors peccati, Ps. XXXIII, 22: mors peccatorum pessima, deinde vero mors corporalis, Rom. V, 12: per unum hominem peccatum intravit, et per peccatum mors. Et, ut dicit Augustinus, noli putare te non esse homicidam, quando fratri tuo mala persuades. However, it should be noted with Origen, that the devil is not called a murderer with respect to only some particular person, but with respect to the whole race, which he destroyed in Adam, in whom all die (1 Cor 15:22). Thus he is called a murderer because that is a chief characteristic, and he is so indeed from the beginning, that is, from the time that a man existed who could be killed, who could be murdered; for one cannot be murdered unless he first exists. Attendendum est autem, secundum Origenem, quod ille homicida dicitur non propter aliquem singulariter tantum, sed pro toto genere, quod peremit in Adam, in quo cuncti moriuntur, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV, 22. Unde antonomastice homicida dicitur; et hoc ab initio, ex quo scilicet fuit homo, qui occidi poterat, ex quo potuit fieri homicidium: non enim posset occidi homo, nisi prius homo fieret. 1244. Then when he says, he did not stand in the truth, he mentions the devil’s sin against God, which consists in the fact that he turned away from the truth, which is God. 1244. Consequenter cum dicit et in veritate non stetit, ponit peccatum Daemonis contra Deum, quod consistit in hoc quod avertit se a veritate, quae Deus est, et First, he shows that he is turned from the truth; primo ostendit eum a veritate aversum; second, he shows that he is contrary to the truth, at when he speaks a lie, he speaks of his own. secundo ostendit eum veritati contrarium, ibi dum loquitur mendacium, ex propriis loquitur. As to the first he does two things: Circa primum duo facit. first, he shows that the devil is turned from the truth; Primo ostendit eum a veritate aversum; second, he explains what he has said, because there is no truth in him, at because the truth is not in him. secundo manifestat quod dixit, ibi quia veritas in eo non est. 1245. He says, he did not stand in the truth. 1245. Dicit ergo et in veritate non stetit. Here it should be noted that truth is of two kinds, namely, the truth of word and the truth of deed. The truth of word consists in a person saying what he feels in his heart and what is in reality: therefore, putting away falsehood, let every one speak the truth with his neighbor (Eph 4:25); he who speaks truth from his heart, who does not slander with his tongue (Ps 15:3). The truth of deed, on the other hand, is the truth of righteousness, i.e., when a person does what befits him according to the order of his nature. Concerning this it says above: but he who practices truth comes to the light, so that his works may be made manifest, because they are done in God (John 3:21). Speaking of this truth our Lord says, in the truth, namely, the truth of righteousness, he did not stand, because he abandoned the order of his nature, which was that he be subject to God, and through him acquire his happiness and the fulfillment of his natural desire. And so, because he wanted to obtain this through himself, he fell from the truth. Unde sciendum est, quod duplex est veritas: scilicet vocis et operis. Veritas quidem vocis est qua quis profert ore quod gerit corde, et est in rerum natura; Eph. IV, 25: deponentes mendacium, loquimini veritatem unusquisque cum proximo suo; Ps. XIV, 3: qui loquitur veritatem cum proximo suo, qui non egit dolum in lingua sua. Veritas iustitiae, quando scilicet quis agit quod convenit sibi secundum ordinem suae naturae: de qua supra III, 21, dicit: qui fecerit veritatem, veniet ad lucem, ut manifestentur opera eius, quia in Deo sunt facta. De hac ergo veritate Dominus loquens dicit et in veritate, scilicet iustitiae, non stetit, quia deseruit ordinem suae naturae, qui erat ut Deo subiiceretur, et per eumdem beatitudinem suam et naturalis desiderii complementum consequeretur. Unde dum hoc per se consequi voluit, a veritate cecidit. 1246. The statement, he did not stand in the truth, can be understood in two ways. Either he never had anything to do with the truth, or that he once did, but did not continue in it. 1246. Hoc autem quod dicit in veritate non stetit, potest dupliciter intelligi: vel quod numquam in veritate steterit; vel quod aliquando steterit, sed in ea non permansit. Now never to have anything to do with the truth of righteousness has two meanings. One is according to the Manicheans, who say that the devil is evil by nature. From this it follows that he was always evil, because whatever is present by nature is always present. But this is heretical, for we read: God made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that is in them (Ps 146:6). Therefore, every being is from God; but everything which is from God, insofar as it is, is good. Sed hoc quod numquam fuerit in veritate iustitiae, potest habere duplicem sensum. Unum quidem secundum Manichaeos, qui dicunt diabolum naturaliter malum esse: ex quo sequitur quod semper malus fuerit. Nam quod inest naturaliter, semper inest. Sed hoc est haereticum, quia in Ps. CXLV, 6, dicitur, quod Deus fecit caelum et terram, mare et omnia quae in eis sunt. Ergo omne ens est a Deo; omne autem quod est a Deo, inquantum est, bonum est. Consequently, others have said that the devil was created good in his nature by God, but became evil in the first instant by his own free choice. And this opinion differs from that of the Manicheans who say that the devils were always and by nature evil, whereas this opinion claims that they were always evil by free choice. Et ideo alii dixerunt, quod Daemon ex sui natura bonus est a Deo creatus, sed in primo instanti factus est malus per liberum arbitrium. Et differunt isti a Manichaeis: quia illi dicunt Daemones semper fuisse malos, et naturaliter; isti vero semper malos, sed per liberum arbitrium. Someone might suppose that since an angel is not evil by nature but by a sin of his own will—and sin is an act—it is possible that at the beginning of the act the angel was good, and at the end of the evil act he became evil. For it is plain that the act of sin in the devil is subsequent to his creation, and that the terminus of creation is the existence of an angel; but the terminus of the act of sin is that he is evil. Consequently, according to this explanation, they conclude that it is impossible that an angel be evil in the first instant in which the angel came to exist. Sed posset alicui videri quod quia angelus non est malus per naturam, sed per peccatum propriae voluntatis, peccatum autem est actus quidam, potuit fieri ut angelus in principio actus fuerit bonus, sed in termino actus mali fuerit malus effectus. Manifestum est autem quod actus peccati in Daemone est creatione posterior, terminus autem creationis est ipsum esse angeli: terminus vero operationis peccati est quod sint mali. Et sic ex hac ratione volunt quod impossibile sit quod in primo instanti quo angelus esse coepit, fuerit malus. But this explanation does not seem to be sufficient, because it is true only in motions that occur in time and that are accomplished in a successive manner, not in instantaneous motions. For in every successive motion the instant in which an act begins is not the one in which the action is terminated; thus, if a local motion follows upon an alteration, the local motion cannot be terminated in the same instant as the alteration. But in changes that are instantaneous, the terminus of a first and of a second change can occur together and in the same instant. Thus, in the same instant that the moon is illumined by the sun, the air is illumined by the moon. Now it is clear that creation is instantaneous, and likewise the act of free choice in the angels, since they do not go through the weighings and discoursings of reason. Thus, in the case of an angel there is nothing to prevent the same instant from being the terminus of creation, in which he was good, and the terminus of a free decision in which he was evil. Sed haec ratio non videtur sufficiens, habet enim locum in motibus temporalibus tantum, qui successive aguntur, non autem in motibus instantaneis. Nam in motibus successivis aliud est instans in quo incipit actio, et aliud in quo terminatur: sicut si motus localis sequitur ad alterationem, non potest in eodem instanti terminari motus localis et alteratio. Sed in mutationibus instantaneis, simul et in eodem instanti potest esse terminus primae et secundae mutationis; sicut in eodem instanti quo illuminatur luna a sole, illuminatur aer a luna. Manifestum est autem quod creatio est instantanea, et similiter motus liberi arbitrii in angelis, cum non indigerent collatione et discursu rationis; unde nihil prohibet simul et in eodem instanti esse terminum creationis, in quo fuit bonus, et iterum terminum liberi arbitrii, in quo fuit malus. Some admit this, although they do not say that it so happened, but that it could have so happened. And they base themselves on the authority of Scripture, for under the figure of the king of Babylon it is said of the devil: how have you fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who did rise in the morning? (Isa 14:12); and under the person of the king of Tyre it says: you were in the pleasures of the paradise of God (Ezek 28:13). Accordingly, they say that he was not evil at the first instant of his creation, but that he was once good, and fell through his free choice. Et hoc aliqui concedunt; sed dicunt hoc non fuisse, licet esse potuerit: et hoc propter auctoritatem Scripturae. Dicitur enim sub figura regis Babylonis de diabolo, Is. XIV, 12: quomodo cecidisti, Lucifer, qui mane oriebaris? Ez. XXVIII, 13, dicitur sub persona regis Tyri: in deliciis Paradisi Dei fuisti. Et ideo dicunt, quod non fuit in principio suae creationis malus, sed quandoque bonus fuit, et per liberum arbitrium cecidit. But it must be said that he could not be evil at the first instant of his creation. The reason for this is that no act is sinful except insofar as it is outside the nature of the voluntary agent. But in order of acts, the natural act is first: thus in understanding, first principles are understood first, and through them other things are understood; and in willing, we likewise first will the ultimate perfection and ultimate end, the desire for which is naturally in us, and on account of this we seek other things. Now that which is done according to nature is not sin. Therefore, it is impossible that the first act of the devil was evil; consequently, at some instant the devil was good. But he did not stand in the truth, i.e., he did not remain in it. Sed dicendum est, quod in primo instanti suae creationis non potuit esse malus. Cuius ratio est, quia nullus actus habet rationem peccati, nisi inquantum est praeter rationem naturae agentis voluntarii. In quolibet autem ordine actuum prius est actus naturalis; sicut in intelligendo, primo intelliguntur prima principia, et per ipsa intelliguntur alia, et, in volendo similiter, primo volumus ultimam perfectionem et ultimum finem, cuius appetitus naturaliter nobis inest, et propter ipsum appetimus alia. Quod autem secundum naturam fit, non est peccatum. Impossibile est ergo quod primus actus diaboli fuerit malus. Fuit ergo diabolus in aliquo instanti bonus, sed in veritate non stetit, idest, non permansit. Concerning the statement, the devil has sinned from the beginning (1 John 3:8), one may say that he did indeed sin from the beginning in the sense that once he began to sin he never stopped. Ad illud autem quod dicitur I Io. III, 8: diabolus ab initio peccavit, dicendum, quod ab initio quidem peccavit; quia ex quo incepit peccare, numquam desiit.