Question 111 Quaestio 111 The Action of the Angels on Man De actione angelorum in homines We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power; (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men. Deinde considerandum est de actione angelorum in homines. Et primo, quantum possint eos immutare sua virtute naturali; secundo, quomodo mittantur a Deo ad ministerium hominum; tertio, quomodo custodiant homines. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect? Primo, utrum angelus possit illuminare intellectum hominis. (2) Whether he can change man’s will? Secundo, utrum possit immutare affectum eius. (3) Whether he can change man’s imagination? Tertio, utrum possit immutare imaginationem eius. (4) Whether he can change man’s senses? Quarto, utrum possit immutare sensum eius. Article 1 Articulus 1 Whether an angel can enlighten man? Utrum angelus possit illuminare hominem Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes enlightenment to baptism, as the sacrament of faith. But faith is immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God. Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but immediately by God. Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non possit illuminare hominem. Homo enim illuminatur per fidem, unde Dionysius, in Eccles. Hier., illuminationem attribuit Baptismo, qui est fidei sacramentum. Sed fides immediate est a Deo; secundum illud ad Ephes. II, gratia estis salvati per fidem, et non ex vobis; Dei enim donum est. Ergo homo non illuminatur ab angelo, sed immediate a Deo. Obj. 2: Further, on the words, God hath manifested it to them (Rom 1:19), the gloss observes that not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them by His work, that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God—that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God enlightens man immediately. Praeterea, super illud Rom. I, Deus illis manifestavit, dicit Glossa quod non solum ratio naturalis ad hoc profuit ut divina hominibus manifestarentur, sed etiam Deus illis revelavit per opus suum, scilicet per creaturam. Sed utrumque est a Deo immediate, scilicet ratio naturalis, et creatura. Ergo Deus immediate illuminat hominem. Obj. 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. Therefore he is not enlightened by them. Praeterea, quicumque illuminatur, cognoscit suam illuminationem. Sed homines non percipiunt se ab angelis illuminari. Ergo non illuminantur ab eis. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated (Q. 106, A. 1; Q. 107, A. 2). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels. Sed contra est quod Dionysius probat, in IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod revelationes divinorum perveniunt ad homines mediantibus angelis. Huiusmodi autem revelationes sunt illuminationes, ut supra dictum est. Ergo homines illuminantur per angelos. I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above (Q. 109, A. 2); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum divinae providentiae ordo habeat ut actionibus superiorum inferiora subdantur, ut supra dictum est; sicut inferiores angeli illuminantur per superiores, ita homines qui sunt angelis inferiores, per eos illuminantur. The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above (Q. 106, A. 1), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained above (Q. 106, A. 1). Sed modus utriusque illuminationis quodammodo est similis, et quodammodo diversus. Dictum est enim supra quod illuminatio, quae est manifestatio divinae veritatis, secundum duo attenditur, scilicet secundum quod intellectus inferior confortatur per actionem intellectus superioris; et secundum quod proponuntur intellectui inferiori species intelligibiles quae sunt in superiori, ut capi possint ab inferiori. Et hoc quidem in angelis fit, secundum quod superior angelus veritatem universalem conceptam dividit secundum capacitatem inferioris angeli, ut supra dictum est. The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (Q. 84, A. 7). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils. On the other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel. Sed intellectus humanus non potest ipsam intelligibilem veritatem nudam capere, quia connaturale est ei ut intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo intelligibilem veritatem proponunt angeli hominibus sub similitudinibus sensibilium; secundum illud quod dicit Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod impossibile est aliter nobis lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum. Ex alia vero parte, intellectus humanus, tanquam inferior, fortificatur per actionem intellectus angelici. Et secundum haec duo attenditur illuminatio qua homo illuminatur ab angelo. Reply Obj. 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will; hence Augustine says, No one believes except willingly. In this respect faith comes from God alone. Second, faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is accomplished by man, according to Rom. 10:17, Faith cometh by hearing; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards what is to be done. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad fidem duo concurrunt. Primo quidem habitus intellectus, quo disponitur ad obediendum voluntati tendenti in divinam veritatem, intellectus enim assentit veritati fidei, non quasi convictus ratione, sed quasi imperatus a voluntate; nullus enim credit nisi volens, ut Augustinus dicit. Et quantum ad hoc, fides est a solo Deo. Secundo requiritur ad fidem, quod credibilia proponantur credenti. Et hoc quidem fit per hominem, secundum quod fides est ex auditu, ut dicitur Rom. X; sed per angelos principaliter, per quos hominibus revelantur divina. Unde angeli operantur aliquid ad illuminationem fidei. Et tamen homines illuminantur ab angelis non solum de credendis, sed etiam de agendis. Reply Obj. 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio naturalis, quae est immediate a Deo, potest per angelum confortari, ut dictum est. Et similiter ex speciebus a creaturis acceptis, tanto altior elicitur intelligibilis veritas, quanto intellectus humanus fuerit fortior. Et sic per angelum adiuvatur homo, ut ex creaturis perfectius in divinam cognitionem deveniat. Reply Obj. 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to him. Second, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him. Ad tertium dicendum quod operatio intellectualis, et illuminatio, dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo, ex parte rei intellectae, et sic quicumque intelligit vel illuminatur, cognoscit se intelligere vel illuminari; quia cognoscit rem sibi esse manifestam. Alio modo, ex parte principii, et sic non quicumque intelligit aliquam veritatem, cognoscit quid sit intellectus, qui est principium intellectualis operationis. Et similiter non quicumque illuminatur ab angelo, cognoscit se ab angelo illuminari. Article 2 Articulus 2 Whether the angels can change the will of man? Utrum angeli possint immutare voluntatem hominis Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers a flame of fire (Heb 1:7), the gloss notes that they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices. This could not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will. Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli possint immutare voluntatem hominis. Quia super illud Heb. I, qui facit angelos suos spiritus, et ministros suos flammam ignis, dicit Glossa quod ignis sunt, dum spiritu fervent, et vitia nostra urunt. Sed hoc non esset, nisi voluntatem immutarent. Ergo angeli possunt immutare voluntatem. Obj. 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them. Damascene, however, says that he also sends them; for he remarks that every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them. Praeterea, Beda dicit quod Diabolus non est immissor malarum cogitationum, sed incensor. Damascenus autem ulterius dicit quod etiam est immissor, dicit enim in II libro, quod omnis malitia et immundae passiones ex daemonibus excogitatae sunt, et immittere homini sunt concessi. Et pari ratione, angeli boni immittunt et incendunt bonas cogitationes. Sed hoc non possent facere, nisi immutarent voluntatem. Ergo immutant voluntatem. Obj. 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will. Praeterea, angelus, sicut est dictum, illuminat intellectum hominis mediantibus phantasmatibus. Sed sicut phantasia, quae deservit intellectui, potest immutari ab angelo; ita et appetitus sensitivus qui deservit voluntati, quia et ipse etiam est vis utens organo corporali. Ergo sicut illuminat intellectum, ita potest immutare voluntatem. On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God alone, according to Prov. 21:1: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it. Sed contra est quod immutare voluntatem est proprium Dei; secundum illud Prov. XXI, cor regis in manu domini; quocumque voluerit, vertet illud. I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone, Who causes the will. Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas potest immutari dupliciter. Uno modo, ab interiori. Et sic cum motus voluntatis non sit aliud quam inclinatio voluntatis in rem volitam, solius Dei est sic immutare voluntatem, qui dat naturae intellectuali virtutem talis inclinationis. Sicut enim inclinatio naturalis non est nisi a Deo qui dat naturam; ita inclinatio voluntaria non est nisi a Deo, qui causat voluntatem. Second, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way—by the good apprehended by the intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion, as above explained (Q. 106, A. 2). Alio modo movetur voluntas ab exteriori. Et hoc in angelo est quidem uno modo tantum, scilicet a bono apprehenso per intellectum. Unde secundum quod aliquis est causa quod aliquid apprehendatur ut bonum ad appetendum, secundum hoc movet voluntatem. Et sic etiam solus Deus efficaciter potest movere voluntatem; angelus autem et homo per modum suadentis, ut supra dictum est. In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion. Sed praeter hunc modum, etiam aliter movetur in hominibus voluntas ab exteriori, scilicet ex passione existente circa appetitum sensitivum; sicut ex concupiscentia vel ira inclinatur voluntas ad aliquid volendum. Et sic etiam angeli, inquantum possunt concitare huiusmodi passiones, possunt voluntatem movere. Non tamen ex necessitate, quia voluntas semper remanet libera ad consentiendum vel resistendum passioni. Reply Obj. 1: Those who act as God’s ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ministri Dei, vel homines vel angeli, dicuntur urere vitia, et inflammare ad virtutes, per modum persuasionis. Reply Obj. 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling a putting in because such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels. Ad secundum dicendum quod daemones non possunt immittere cogitationes, interius eas causando, cum usus cogitativae virtutis subiaceat voluntati. Dicitur tamen Diabolus incensor cogitationum, inquantum incitat ad cogitandum, vel ad appetendum cogitata, per modum persuadentis, vel passionem concitantis. Et hoc ipsum incendere Damascenus vocat immittere, quia talis operatio interius fit. Sed bonae cogitationes attribuuntur altiori principio, scilicet Deo; licet angelorum ministerio procurentur. Reply Obj. 3: The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold. Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus humanus, secundum praesentem statum, non potest intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata; sed voluntas humana potest aliquid velle ex iudicio rationis, non sequendo passionem appetitus sensitivi. Unde non est simile. Article 3 Articulus 3 Whether an angel can change man’s imagination? Utrum angelus possit immutare imaginationem hominis Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man’s imagination. For the phantasy, as is said in De Anima iii, is a motion caused by the sense in act. But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel. Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non possit immutare imaginationem hominis. Phantasia enim, ut dicitur in libro de Anima, est motus factus a sensu secundum actum. Sed si fieret per immutationem angeli, non fieret a sensu secundum actum. Ergo est contra rationem phantasiae, quae est actus imaginativae virtutis, ut sit per immutationem angeli. Obj. 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (Q. 110, A. 2). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it. Praeterea, formae quae sunt in imaginatione, cum sint spirituales, sunt nobiliores formis quae sunt in materia sensibili. Sed angelus non potest imprimere formas in materia sensibili, ut dictum est. Ergo non potest imprimere formas in imaginatione. Et ita non potest eam immutare.