Article 4 Articulus 4 Whether the angels differ in species? Utrum angeli differant specie Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species. For since the difference is nobler than the ‘genus,’ all things which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according to species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them—that is to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one species. Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli non differant specie. Cum enim differentia sit nobilior genere, quaecumque conveniunt secundum id quod est nobilissimum in eis, conveniunt in ultima differentia constitutiva; et ita sunt eadem secundum speciem. Sed omnes angeli conveniunt in eo quod est nobilissimum in eis, scilicet in intellectualitate. Ergo omnes angeli sunt unius speciei. Obj. 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and less—namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically. Praeterea, magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed angeli non videntur differre ad invicem nisi secundum magis et minus; prout scilicet unus alio est simplicior, et perspicacioris intellectus. Ergo angeli non differunt specie. Obj. 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore are the angels. Praeterea, anima et angelus ex opposito dividuntur. Sed omnes animae sunt unius speciei. Ergo et angeli. Obj. 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of one species. Praeterea, quanto aliquid est perfectius in natura, tanto magis debet multiplicari. Hoc autem non esset, si in una specie esset unum tantum individuum. Ergo multi angeli sunt unius speciei. On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as first and second, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iii, 2). But in the angels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x). Therefore the angels are not of the same species. Sed contra est quod in his quae sunt unius speciei, non est invenire prius et posterius, ut dicitur in III Metaphys. Sed in angelis, etiam unius ordinis, sunt primi et medii et ultimi, ut dicit Dionysius, X cap. Ang. Hier. Ergo angeli non sunt eiusdem speciei. I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual substances, even souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt omnes substantias spirituales esse unius speciei, etiam animas. Alii vero quod omnes angeli sunt unius speciei, sed non animae. Quidam vero quod omnes angeli unius hierarchiae, aut etiam unius ordinis. But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said above (A. 2), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances. Sed hoc est impossibile. Ea enim quae conveniunt specie et differunt numero, conveniunt in forma, et distinguuntur materialiter. Si ergo angeli non sunt compositi ex materia et forma, ut dictum est supra, sequitur quod impossibile sit esse duos angelos unius speciei. Sicut etiam impossibile esset dicere quod essent plures albedines separatae, aut plures humanitates; cum albedines non sint plures nisi secundum quod sunt in pluribus substantiis. And if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes diversity not merely of species, but of genus. Si tamen angeli haberent materiam, nec sic possent esse plures angeli unius speciei. Sic enim oporteret quod principium distinctionis unius ab alio esset materia, non quidem secundum divisionem quantitatis, cum sint incorporei, sed secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Quae quidem diversitas materiae causat diversitatem non solum speciei, sed generis. Reply Obj. 1: Difference is nobler than genus, as the determined is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common, but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species; or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod differentia est nobilior genere, sicut determinatum indeterminato et proprium communi; non autem sicut alia et alia natura. Alioquin oporteret quod omnia animalia irrationalia essent unius speciei; vel quod esset in eis aliqua alia perfectior forma quam anima sensibilis. Differunt ergo specie animalia irrationalia secundum diversos gradus determinatos naturae sensitivae. Et similiter omnes angeli differunt specie secundum diversos gradus naturae intellectivae. Reply Obj. 2: More and less change the species, not according as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels are diversified according to more or less. Ad secundum dicendum quod magis et minus, secundum quod causantur ex intensione et remissione unius formae, non diversificant speciem. Sed secundum quod causantur ex formis diversorum graduum, sic diversificant speciem, sicut si dicamus quod ignis est perfectior aere. Et hoc modo angeli diversificantur secundum magis et minus. Reply Obj. 3: The good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species. Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum speciei praeponderat bono individui. Unde multo melius est quod multiplicentur species in angelis, quam quod multiplicentur individua in una specie. Reply Obj. 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific multiplication, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 3). Hence the perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species. Ad quartum dicendum quod multiplicatio secundum numerum, cum in infinitum protendi possit, non intenditur ab agente, sed sola multiplicatio secundum speciem, ut supra dictum est. Unde perfectio naturae angelicae requirit multiplicationem specierum, non autem multiplicationem individuorum in una specie. Article 5 Articulus 5 Whether the angels are incorruptible? Utrum angeli sint incorruptibiles Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not by nature. Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli non sint incorruptibiles. Dicit enim Damascenus de angelo, quod est substantia intellectualis, gratia et non natura immortalitatem suscipiens. Obj. 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: O gods of gods, whose maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble because I so will it. But gods such as these can only be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible by their nature Praeterea, Plato dicit, in Timaeo, O dii deorum, quorum opifex idem paterque ego, opera siquidem vos mea, dissolubilia natura, me tamen ita volente indissolubilia. Hos autem deos non aliud quam angelos intelligere potest. Ergo angeli natura sua sunt corruptibiles. Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), all things would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved them. But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are corruptible of their own nature. Praeterea, secundum Gregorium, omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis conservaret. Sed quod in nihilum redigi potest, est corruptibile. Ergo, cum angeli sint a Deo facti, videtur quod sint corruptibiles secundum suam naturam. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the intellectual substances have unfailing life, being free from all corruption, death, matter, and generation. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod intellectuales substantiae vitam habent indeficientem, ab universa corruptione, morte et materia et generatione mundae existentes. I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above (A. 2), it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere angelos secundum suam naturam esse incorruptibiles. Cuius ratio est, quia nihil corrumpitur nisi per hoc, quod forma eius a materia separatur, unde, cum angelus sit ipsa forma subsistens, ut ex dictis patet, impossibile est quod eius substantia sit corruptibilis. Quod enim convenit alicui secundum se, nunquam ab eo separari potest, ab eo autem cui convenit per aliud, potest separari, separato eo secundum quod ei conveniebat. Rotunditas enim a circulo separari non potest, quia convenit ei secundum seipsum, sed aeneus circulus potest amittere rotunditatem per hoc, quod circularis figura separatur ab aere. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the angels, as was said above (A. 2), it cannot lose its being. Therefore, the angel’s immateriality is the cause why it is incorruptible by its own nature. Esse autem secundum se competit formae, unumquodque enim est ens actu secundum quod habet formam. Materia vero est ens actu per formam. Compositum igitur ex materia et forma desinit esse actu per hoc, quod forma separatur a materia. Sed si ipsa forma subsistat in suo esse, sicut est in angelis, ut dictum est, non potest amittere esse. Ipsa igitur immaterialitas angeli est ratio quare angelus est incorruptibilis secundum suam naturam. A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature. Et huius incorruptibilitatis signum accipi potest ex eius intellectuali operatione, quia enim unumquodque operatur secundum quod est actu, operatio rei indicat modum esse ipsius. Species autem et ratio operationis ex obiecto comprehenditur. Obiectum autem intelligibile, cum sit supra tempus, est sempiternum. Unde omnis substantia intellectualis est incorruptibilis secundum suam naturam. Reply Obj. 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which includes complete immutability; since every change is a kind of death, as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later (Q. 62). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Damascenus accipit immortalitatem perfectam, quae includit omnimodam immutabilitatem, quia omnis mutatio est quaedam mors, ut Augustinus dicit. Perfectam autem immutabilitatem angeli non nisi per gratiam assequuntur, ut infra patebit. Reply Obj. 2: By the expression ‘gods’ Plato understands the heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are forever preserved in existence by the Divine will. Ad secundum dicendum quod Plato per deos intelligit corpora caelestia, quae existimabat esse ex elementis composita, et ideo secundum suam naturam dissolubilia, sed voluntate divina semper conservantur in esse. Reply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 44, A. 1) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quoddam necessarium est quod habet causam suae necessitatis. Unde non repugnat necessario nec incorruptibili, quod esse eius dependeat ab alio sicut a causa. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur quod omnia deciderent in nihilum nisi continerentur a Deo, et etiam angeli, non datur intelligi quod in angelis sit aliquod corruptionis principium, sed quod esse angeli dependeat a Deo sicut a causa. Non autem dicitur aliquid esse corruptibile, per hoc quod Deus possit illud in non esse redigere, subtrahendo suam conservationem, sed per hoc quod in seipso aliquod principium corruptionis habet, vel contrarietatem vel saltem potentiam materiae. Question 51 Quaestio 51 Angels in Comparison with Bodies De angelis per comparationem ad corporalia We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things; and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; second, of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, third, of their comparison with local movement. Deinde quaeritur de angelis per comparationem ad corporalia. Et primo, de comparatione angelorum ad corpora; secundo, de comparatione angelorum ad loca corporalia; tertio, de comparatione angelorum ad motum localem. Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: Circa primum quaeruntur tria. (1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them? Primo, utrum angeli habeant corpora naturaliter sibi unita. (2) Whether they assume bodies? Secundo, utrum assumant corpora. (3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed? Tertio, utrum in corporibus assumptis exerceant opera vitae. Article 1 Articulus 1 Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them? Utrum angeli habeant corpora naturaliter sibi unita Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): It is God’s attribute alone—that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal addition. Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.): Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal substance. Augustine also says (Gen ad lit. iii): The demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies. But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them. Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli habeant corpora naturaliter sibi unita. Dicit enim Origenes, in libro Peri Archon, solius Dei, idest patris et filii et spiritus sancti, naturae illud proprium est, ut sine materiali substantia et absque ulla corporeae adiectionis societate, intelligatur existere. Bernardus etiam dicit, in VI Homilia super Cant., demus Deo soli, sicut immortalitatem sic incorporeitatem, cuius natura sola, neque propter se neque propter alium, solatio indiget instrumenti corporei. Liquet autem omnem spiritum creatum corporeo indigere solatio. Augustinus etiam dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., Daemones aerea dicuntur animalia, quia corporum aereorum natura vigent. Eadem autem est natura daemonis et angeli. Ergo angeli habent corpora naturaliter sibi unita.