Article 2 Articulus 2 Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart? Utrum purificatio cordis sit effectus fidei Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith is in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying the heart. Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod purificatio cordis non sit effectus fidei. Puritas enim cordis praecipue in affectu consistit. Sed fides in intellectu est. Ergo fides non causat cordis purificationem. Obj. 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may be seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not purify the heart. Praeterea, illud quod causat cordis purificationem non potest simul esse cum impuritate. Sed fides simul potest esse cum impuritate peccati, sicut patet in illis qui habent fidem informem. Ergo fides non purificat cor. Obj. 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way, it would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not purify the intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge. Therefore faith nowise purifies the heart. Praeterea, si fides aliquo modo purificaret cor humanum, maxime purificaret hominis intellectum. Sed intellectum non purificat ab obscuritate, cum sit cognitio aenigmatica. Ergo fides nullo modo purificat cor. On the contrary, Peter said (Acts 15:9): Purifying their hearts by faith. Sed contra est quod dicit Petrus, Act. XV, fide purificans corda eorum. I answer that, A thing is impure through being mixed with baser things: for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which betters it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that the rational creature is more excellent than all transient and corporeal creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting itself to transient things by loving them. From this impurity the rational creature is purified by means of a contrary movement, namely, by tending to that which is above it, viz. God. The first beginning of this movement is faith: since he that cometh to God must believe that He is, according to Heb. 11:6. Hence the first beginning of the heart’s purifying is faith; and if this be perfected through being quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly purified thereby. Respondeo dicendum quod impuritas uniuscuiusque rei consistit in hoc quod rebus vilioribus immiscetur, non enim dicitur argentum esse impurum ex permixtione auri, per quam melius redditur, sed ex permixtione plumbi vel stanni. Manifestum est autem quod rationalis creatura dignior est omnibus temporalibus et corporalibus creaturis. Et ideo impura redditur ex hoc quod temporalibus se subiicit per amorem. A qua quidem impuritate purificatur per contrarium motum, dum scilicet tendit in id quod est supra se, scilicet in Deum. In quo quidem motu primum principium est fides, accedentem enim ad Deum oportet credere, ut dicitur Heb. XI. Et ideo primum principium purificationis cordis est fides, quae si perficiatur per caritatem formatam, perfectam purificationem causat. Reply Obj. 1: Things that are in the intellect are the principles of those which are in the appetite, insofar as the apprehended good moves the appetite. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt in intellectu sunt principia eorum quae sunt in affectu, inquantum scilicet bonum intellectum movet affectum. Reply Obj. 2: Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which is contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the human intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself, through wishing to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible objects. But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible with any kind of impurity, because charity covereth all sins (Prov 10:12). Ad secundum dicendum quod fides etiam informis excludit quandam impuritatem sibi oppositam, scilicet impuritatem erroris, quae contingit ex hoc quod intellectus humanus inordinate inhaeret rebus se inferioribus, dum scilicet vult secundum rationes rerum sensibilium metiri divina. Sed quando per caritatem formatur, tunc nullam impuritatem secum compatitur, quia universa delicta operit caritas, ut dicitur Prov. X. Reply Obj. 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity of sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect, according to the present state of life. Ad tertium dicendum quod obscuritas fidei non pertinet ad impuritatem culpae, sed magis ad naturalem defectum intellectus humani, secundum statum praesentis vitae. Question 8 Quaestio 8 The Gift of Understanding De dono intellectus We must now consider the gifts of understanding and knowledge, which respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of understanding there are eight points of inquiry: Deinde considerandum est de dono intellectus et scientiae, quae respondent virtuti fidei. Et circa donum intellectus quaeruntur octo. (1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Spirit? Primo, utrum intellectus sit donum spiritus sancti. (2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person? Secundo, utrum possit simul esse in eodem cum fide. (3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Spirit is only speculative, or practical also? Tertio, utrum intellectus qui est donum sit speculativus tantum, vel etiam practicus. (4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of understanding? Quarto, utrum omnes qui sunt in gratia habeant donum intellectus. (5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace? Quinto, utrum hoc donum inveniatur in aliquibus absque gratia. (6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other gifts. Sexto, quomodo se habeat donum intellectus ad alia dona. (7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift? Septimo, de eo quod respondet huic dono in beatitudinibus. (8) Which of the fruits? Octavo, de eo quod respondet ei in fructibus. Article 1 Articulus 1 Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Spirit? Utrum intellectus sit donum Spiritus Sancti Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the Holy Spirit. For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of nature, since they are given in addition to the latter. Now understanding is a natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident principles are known, as stated in Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit donum spiritus sancti. Dona enim gratuita distinguuntur a donis naturalibus, superadduntur enim eis. Sed intellectus est quidam habitus naturalis in anima, quo cognoscuntur principia naturaliter nota, ut patet in VI Ethic. Ergo non debet poni donum spiritus sancti. Obj. 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a sign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign of reason), as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge which is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason rather than a gift of understanding. Praeterea, dona divina participantur a creaturis secundum earum proportionem et modum, ut patet per Dionysium, in libro de Div. Nom. Sed modus humanae naturae est ut non simpliciter veritatem cognoscat, quod pertinet ad rationem intellectus, sed discursive, quod est proprium rationis, ut patet per Dionysium, in VII cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo cognitio divina quae hominibus datur magis debet dici donum rationis quam intellectus. Obj. 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9, 10). Now no gift of the Holy Spirit is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Spirit should receive the name of understanding. Praeterea, in potentiis animae intellectus contra voluntatem dividitur, ut patet in III de anima. Sed nullum donum spiritus sancti dicitur voluntas. Ergo etiam nullum donum spiritus sancti debet dici intellectus. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 11:2): The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom and of understanding. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XI, requiescet super eum spiritus domini, spiritus sapientiae et intellectus. I answer that, Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for intelligere is the same as intus legere. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned with external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge penetrates into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as stated in De Anima iii, 6. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen intellectus quandam intimam cognitionem importat, dicitur enim intelligere quasi intus legere. Et hoc manifeste patet considerantibus differentiam intellectus et sensus, nam cognitio sensitiva occupatur circa qualitates sensibiles exteriores; cognitio autem intellectiva penetrat usque ad essentiam rei, obiectum enim intellectus est quod quid est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate within, so to speak. Thus, under the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa. Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all these things. Sunt autem multa genera eorum quae interius latent, ad quae oportet cognitionem hominis quasi intrinsecus penetrare. Nam sub accidentibus latet natura rerum substantialis, sub verbis latent significata verborum, sub similitudinibus et figuris latet veritas figurata: res etiam intelligibiles sunt quodammodo interiores respectu rerum sensibilium quae exterius sentiuntur, et in causis latent effectus et e converso. Unde respectu horum omnium potest dici intellectus. Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things, as it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the understanding, the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. Now the natural light of our understanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach to a certain fixed point. Consequently, man needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate further still so as to know what it cannot know by its natural light: and this supernatural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift of understanding. Sed cum cognitio hominis a sensu incipiat, quasi ab exteriori, manifestum est quod quanto lumen intellectus est fortius, tanto potest magis ad intima penetrare. Lumen autem naturale nostri intellectus est finitae virtutis, unde usque ad determinatum aliquid pertingere potest. Indiget igitur homo supernaturali lumine ut ulterius penetret ad cognoscendum quaedam quae per lumen naturale cognoscere non valet. Et illud lumen supernaturale homini datum vocatur donum intellectus. Reply Obj. 1: The natural light instilled within us manifests only certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q. 2, A. 3; I-II, Q. 3, A. 8), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for which he requires the gift of understanding. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per lumen naturale nobis inditum statim cognoscuntur quaedam principia communia quae sunt naturaliter nota. Sed quia homo ordinatur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, ut supra dictum est, necesse est quod homo ulterius pertingat ad quaedam altiora. Et ad hoc requiritur donum intellectus. Reply Obj. 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we ignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something previously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the light of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore this addition is not called reason but understanding, since the additional light is in comparison with what we know supernaturally, what the natural light is in regard to those things which we know from the first. Ad secundum dicendum quod discursus rationis semper incipit ab intellectu et terminatur ad intellectum, ratiocinamur enim procedendo ex quibusdam intellectis, et tunc rationis discursus perficitur quando ad hoc pervenimus ut intelligamus illud quod prius erat ignotum. Quod ergo ratiocinamur ex aliquo praecedenti intellectu procedit. Donum autem gratiae non procedit ex lumine naturae, sed superadditur ei, quasi perficiens ipsum. Et ideo ista superadditio non dicitur ratio, sed magis intellectus, quia ita se habet lumen superadditum ad ea quae nobis supernaturaliter innotescunt sicut se habet lumen naturale ad ea quae primordialiter cognoscimus. Reply Obj. 3: Will denotes simply a movement of the appetite without indicating any excellence; whereas understanding denotes a certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of things. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding rather than after the will. Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas nominat simpliciter appetitivum motum, absque determinatione alicuius excellentiae. Sed intellectus nominat quandam excellentiam cognitionis penetrandi ad intima. Et ideo supernaturale donum magis nominatur nomine intellectus quam nomine voluntatis. Article 2 Articulus 2 Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith? Utrum donum intellectus simul habeatur cum fide Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 15) that the thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension of him who understands it. But the thing which is believed is not comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippians 3:12: Not as though I had already comprehended, or were already perfect. Therefore it seems that faith and understanding are incompatible in the same subject. Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum intellectus non simul habeatur cum fide. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Octogintatrium trium Quaest., id quod intelligitur intelligentis comprehensione finitur. Sed id quod creditur non comprehenditur, secundum illud apostoli, ad Philipp. III, non quod iam comprehenderim aut perfectus sim. Ergo videtur quod fides et intellectus non possint esse in eodem.