De Mixtione Elementorum On the Blend of the Elements ad Magistram Philippum de Castro Caeli to Master Philip of Castro Caeli On the Blend of the Elements Dubium apud multos esse solet quomodo elementa sint in mixto. There tends to be a doubt among many in what way the elements are present in a blend. Videtur autem quibusdam quod, qualitatibus activis et passivis elementorum ad medium aliqualiter reductis per alterationem, formae substantiales elementorum manent: si enim formae substantiales non maneant, corruptio quaedam elementorum esse videbitur et non mixtio. Now it seems to certain men that, with the active and passive qualities of the elements having been reduced somehow to a mean through alteration, the substantial forms of the elements remain. For if the substantial forms do not remain, there will seem to be a certain corruption of the elements, and not a blend. Rursus, si forma substantialis corporis mixti sit actus materie, non presuppositis formis simplicium corporum, simplicia corpora elementorum rationem amittent. Est enim elementum ex quo componitur aliquid primo, et est in eo, et est indivisibile secundum speciem; sublatis enim formis substantialibus, non sic ex simplicibus corporibus corpus mixtum componetur quod in eo remaneant. On the other hand, if the substantial form of the blended body be the act of matter, with the forms of the simple bodies not having been presupposed, the simple bodies would lose the notion of elements. For an element is that from which something is primarily composed, and it is in that something, and it is indivisible according to species. For with the substantial forms having been withdrawn, accordingly the blended body is not composed from the simple bodies such that they would remain in it. Est autem impossibile sic se habere. Impossibile est enim materiam secundum idem diversas formas elementorum suscipere; si igitur in corpore mixto formae substantiales elementorum salventur, oportebit diversis partibus materiae eas inesse. Materiae autem diversas partes accipere est impossibile nisi praeintellecta quantitate in materia, sublata enim quantitate substantia indivisibilis permanet, ut patet in I Physicorum; ex materia autem sub quantitate existente et forma substantiali adveniente corpus physicum constituitur: diversae igitur partes materiae formis elementorum subsistentes plurium corporum rationem suscipiunt. Multa autem corpora impossibile est esse simul; non igitur in qualibet parte corporis mixti erunt quatuor elementa: et sic non erit vera mixtio sed secundum sensum, sicut accidit in aggregatione corporum insensibilium propter parvitatem. But it is impossible that they possess themselves in this manner. For it is impossible for matter to sustain the diverse forms of the elements in the same respect. Therefore, if in a blended body the substantial forms of the elements be preserved, it will be necessary that they be present in diverse parts of the matter. However, for the diverse parts of matter to receive these forms is impossible except through the quantity in matter having been presupposed. For when the quantity has been withdrawn, the substance remains indivisible, as is clear in I Physics (185b16). Now a physical body is constituted out of matter under existing quantity and through the arriving substantial form. Therefore, the diverse parts of matter subsisting by means of the forms of the elements admits the notion of many bodies. But it is impossible for it to be many bodies at once. Therefore, the four elements will not be in any part of the blended body whatever; and thus there will not be a blend in truth, but according to sense, just as happens in the aggregation of bodies imperceptible because of their smallness. Amplius, omnis forma substantialis propriam dispositionem in materia requirit, sine qua esse non potest: unde alteratio est via ad generationem et corruptionem. Impossibile est autem in idem convenire propriam dispositionem quae requiritur ad formam ignis, et propriam dispositionem quae requiritur ad formam aquae, quia secundum huiusmodi dispositiones ignis et aqua sunt contraria; contraria autem impossibile est esse in eodem: impossibile est igitur quod in eadem parte mixti sint formae substantiales ignis et aquae. Si igitur mixtum fiat remanentibus formis substantialibus simplicium corporum, sequitur quod non sit vera mixtio sed solum ad sensum, quasi iuxta se positis partibus insensibilibus propter parvitatem. Furthermore, every substantial form requires a proper disposition in matter, without which it is not able to be; whence the way towards generation and corruption is alteration. But it is impossible in the same thing for the proper disposition which is required for the form of fire, and the proper disposition which is required for the form of water to come together, because according to such dispositions fire and water are contraries. Now it is impossible for contraries to be in the same place. Therefore, it is impossible because the substantial forms of fire and of water would be in the same part of the blend. Therefore, if the blend be made through the persisting substantial forms of the simple bodies, it follows that it is not a blend in truth, but only to sense, as it were, by the parts placed beside each other being imperceptible because of their smallness. Quidam autem utrasque rationes vitare volentes, in maius inconveniens inciderunt: ut enim mixtionem ab elementorum corruptione distinguerent, dixerunt formas substantiales elementorum aliqualiter remanere in mixto. Sed rursus, ne cogerentur dicere esse mixtionem ad sensum et non secundum veritatem, posuerunt quod formae elementorum non manent in mixto secundum suum complementum sed in quoddam medium reducuntur; dicunt enim quod formae elementorum suscipiunt magis et minus et habent contrarietatem ad invicem. Sed quia hoc manifeste repugnat communi opinioni, et dictis Aristotelis dicentis in Praedicamentis quod substantiae nihil est contrarium et quod non recipit magis et minus, ulterius procedunt, dicentes quod formae elementorum sunt imperfectissimae, utpote materiae primae propinquiores; unde sunt mediae inter formas substantiales et accidentales, et sic, in quantum accedunt ad naturam formarum accidentalium, magis et minus suscipere possunt. Some, however, wishing to avoid both accounts, have fallen into more unfitting reasons. For in order that they might distinguish the blending from the corruption of the elements, they said that the substantial forms of the elements somehow remain in the blend. But on the other hand, lest they should be compelled to say that it is only a blend to sense, and not according to truth, they maintained that the forms of the elements do not remain in the blend according to their entirety but are reduced into some mean. For they say that the forms of the elements admit of more and less, and they have contrariety to one another. But because this is manifestly repugnant to common opinion and to the statement of Aristotle saying in the Categories 5 (3b24) that nothing is contrary to substance, and that substance does not admit of more and less, they go on further, saying that the forms of the elements are most imperfect, as being nearer to prime matter. Hence they are middles between substantial and accidental forms. And thus, insofar as they approach to the nature of accidental forms, they are able to admit of more and less. Haec autem positio multipliciter improbabilis est. Primo quidem quia esse aliquid medium inter substantiam et accidens est omnino impossibile: esset enim aliquid medium inter affirmationem et negationem. Proprium enim accidentis est in subiecto esse, substantiae vero in subiecto non esse; formae autem substantiales sunt quidem in materia, non autem in subiecto: nam subiectum est hoc aliquid, forma autem substantialis est quae facit hoc aliquid, non autem praesupponit ipsum. This position, however, is improbable in manifold ways. First, indeed, because to be a certain mean between substance and accident is entirely impossible; for there would be some mean between affirmation and negation. For it is proper to an accident to be in a subject, but to a substance not to be in a subject. Substantial forms, however, are in fact in matter, but not in a subject; for a subject is a ‘this something’, but a substantial form is what makes a ‘this something’—it does not, however, presuppose it. Item, ridiculum est dicere medium esse inter ea quae non sunt unius generis, ut probatur in X Metaphysicae, medium enim et extrema ex eodem genere esse oportet; nihil igitur medium esse potest inter substantiam et accidens. Likewise, it is ridiculous to say that a mean is something between those which are not of one genus, as is proved in X Metaphysics 7 (1057a20). For the mean and extremes must be from the same genus. Nothing, therefore, is able to be a mean between substance and accident. Deinde, impossibile est formas substantiales elementorum suscipere magis et minus. Omnis enim forma suscipiens magis et minus est divisibilis per accidens, in quantum scilicet subiectum eam potest participare vel magis vel minus. Secundum autem id quod est divisibile per se vel per accidens, contingit esse motum continuum, ut patet in VI Physicorum: est enim loci mutatio et augmentum et decrementum secundum quantitatem et locum, quae sunt per se divisibilia; alteratio autem secundum qualitates, quae suscipiunt magis et minus, ut calidum et album. Si igitur formae elementorum suscipiunt magis et minus, tam generatio quam corruptio elementorum erit motus continuus: quod est impossibile, nam motus continuus non est nisi in tribus generibus, scilicet in quantitate et qualitate et ubi, ut probatur in V Physicorum. Furthermore, it is impossible for the substantial forms of the elements to admit of more and less. For every form admitting of more and less is divisible per accidens, inasmuch as, namely, the subject can partake of it either more or less. However, motion happens to be continuous according as something is divisible per se or per accidens, as is clear in VI Physics 1 (231b15). For there is change of place, and augmentation and diminution, according to quantity and place, which are divisible per se; but alteration according to those qualities which admit of more and less, such as hot and white. Therefore, if the forms of the elements admit of more and less, both the generation and corruption of the elements will be a continuous motion, which is impossible. For motion is not continuous except in three genera, namely, in quantity, and quality, and where, as is proved in V Physics 1 (225b9). Amplius, omnis differentia secundum formam substantialem variat speciem; quod autem recipit magis et minus, differt quod est magis ab eo quod est minus et quodammodo est ei contrarium, ut magis album et minus album. Si igitur forma ignis suscipiat magis et minus, magis facta vel minus facta speciem variabit, et non erit eadem forma sed alia. Et hinc est quod Philosophus dicit in VIII Metaphysicae, quod sicut in numeris variatur species per additionem et subtractionem, ita in substantiis. Furthermore, every difference according to substantial form variegates the species. But that which receives more and less distinguishes what is more from that which is less and in some way is contrary to it, such as the more white and the less white. If, then, the form of fire admits of more and less, the more having been made or the less having been made will variegate the species, and it will not be the same form, but another. And this is what the Philosopher says in VIII Metaphysics 3 (1043b36), that just as in numbers the species is variegated through addition and subtraction, so also in substances. Oportet igitur alium modum invenire, quo et veritas mixtionis salvetur, et tamen elementa non totaliter corrumpantur, sed aliqualiter in mixto remaneant. Therefore, it is needful to find another way by which both the truth of blends is preserved and yet the elements are not totally corrupted but, in some way, remain in the blend. Considerandum est igitur quod qualitates activae et passivae elementorum contrariae sunt ad invicem, et magis et minus recipiunt. Ex contrariis autem qualitatibus quae recipiunt magis et minus, constitui potest media qualitas quae sapiat utriusque extremi naturam, sicut pallidum inter album et nigrum, et tepidum inter calidum et frigidum. Sic igitur remissis excellentiis qualitatum elementorum, constituitur ex his quaedam qualitas media quae est propria qualitas corporis mixti, differens tamen in diversis secundum diversam mixtionis proportionem; et haec quidem qualitas est propria dispositio ad formam corporis mixti, sicut qualitas simplex ad formam corporis simplicis. Sicut igitur extrema inveniuntur in medio quod participat naturam utriusque, sic qualitates simplicium corporum inveniuntur in propria qualitate corporis mixti. Qualitas autem simplicis corporis est quidem aliud a forma substantiali ipsius, agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis; alioquin calor calefaceret tantum, non autem per eius actionem forma substantialis educeretur in actum, cum nihil agat ultra suam speciem. Sic igitur virtutes formarum substantialium simplicium corporum in corporibus mixtis salvantur. It ought to be considered, therefore, that the active and passive qualities of the elements are contraries to each other, and they receive both of more and less. Now, from contrary qualities which receive of more and less can be constituted a medium quality which is flavored with the nature of both extremes, such as gray between white and black, and tepid between hot and cold. So then, with the excellences of the qualities of the elements having been remitted, there is constituted from out of these qualities some medium quality which is the proper quality of the blended body, differing nevertheless in diverse ways according to the diverse proportion of the blend. And this quality is, in fact, the proper disposition for the form of the blended body, just as the simple quality is for the form of the simple body. Therefore, just as the extremes are found within the mean, which partakes of the nature of both, so the qualities of the simple bodies are found within the proper qualities of the blended body. The quality of the simple body, however, is indeed other than its substantial form; nevertheless, it acts in virtue of the substantial form. Otherwise, the hot would only heat, while through the action of heat the substantial form would not be drawn forth into act, since nothing acts beyond its own species. In this manner therefore, the virtues of the substantial forms of the simple bodies are preserved in blended bodies. Sunt igitur formae elementorum in corporibus mixtis, non quidem actu sed virtute. Et hoc est quod Aristoteles dicit in I De generatione: Non manent igitur—elementa scilicet in mixto—actu ut corpus et album, nec corrumpuntur nec alterum nec ambo: salvatur enim virtus eorum. Therefore, the forms of the elements are in blended bodies, certainly not with respect to act, but according to strength: and this is what Aristotle says in I de Generatione 10 (327b30): therefore, the elements manifestly do not remain in the blend actually, as body and white do; nor are they corrupted, neither the other nor both: for their strength is preserved.