Differt autem ab amicitia, quoniam sine passione est et sine eo quod est diligere quibus colloquitur. Non enim in amando vel inimicando recipit singula ut oportet, sed in eo quod talis est. Similiter enim ad ignotos et notos et consuetos et inconsuetos id faciet. [821] However, since this virtue is without passion or affection for people with whom we associate, it differs from friendship. A man does not take particular things as becoming because he is influenced by love or hatred, but because he is disposed in this way. He will act similarly with strangers, intimates, and outsiders. [821] Verum tamen et in singulis ut congruit; non enim similiter convenit consuetos et extraneos curare neque rursus contristare. [822] Nevertheless, in particular cases, he does the proper thing; it is not becoming to treat intimates and strangers in the same way, nor similarly to show displeasure toward them. [822] Universaliter quidem igitur dictum est quoniam ut oportet colloquitur. [823] Therefore, as has been pointed out, he always communicates with others in an amiable manner. [823] Referens autem ad bonum et conferens, coniciet non contristare vel condelectare; videtur quidem enim circa delectationes et tristitias esse in colloquiis factas. [824] Considering it honorable and useful, he aims to cause no offense, and even to give pleasure, for he is concerned with pleasure and sadness, which occur in social intercourse. [824] Horum autem quaecumque quidem ipsi est non bonum vel nocivum condelectare aspernabitur et eliget contristare; et si facienti autem deformitatem ferat et hanc non parvam vel nocumentum, contrarietas autem parvam tristitiam, non recipiet, sed aspernabitur. [825] Any virtuous man of this type will refuse to give pleasure and will choose to cause pain over what is dishonorable and harmful to himself or to the person doing an injury or a great wrong. Although his opposition brings not a little offense, he will disregard it. [825] Differenter autem colloquitur his qui in dignitatibus et quibuscumque et magis vel minus notis, similiter autem et secundum alias differentias, singulis tribuens quod decet. [826] He converses differently with persons in high places and with others, with friends, and with acquaintances. Likewise, according to other differences, he attributes what is becoming to each. [826] Et per se quidem desiderans condelectare, contristare autem renuens, considerans eventura autem si sint maiora, dico autem bona et conferente et delectationis autem gratia eius quae est in posterum magnae, parum contristabit. Medius quidem igitur talis est, non nominatus est autem. [827] He primarily strives to give pleasure and declines to inflict pain, considering that future events may be of greater importance. (I speak of what is honorable and useful.) But he will cause grief especially in a slight degree for the sake of a pleasure in a good that is to come. The mean, then, is of this nature, but is nameless. [827] Condelectantis autem qui quidem eius quod est delectabilem esse coniectativus non propter aliquid aliud placidus, qui autem ut utilitas aliqua ipsi fiat in pecunias et quaecumque per pecunias, blanditor. [828] Of those who are agreeable, the man who aims at being pleasant without personal profit is called affable, but he who does so for money and things valued in terms of money is called a flatterer. [828] Qui autem omnes contristat dictum est quoniam litigiosus et discolus. [829] But the individual who is a trial to everyone is called quarrelsome and perverse, as has been stated. [829] Opponi autem videntur extrema sibi ipsis propter innominatum esse medium. [830] However, the extremes seem to be mutually opposed, because the mean is nameless. [830] 816. In colloquiis autem et convivere etc. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtutibus quae respiciunt res exteriores, hic determinat de virtutibus quae respiciunt actus humanos. 816. Some men seem to be obsequious. After the Philosopher has considered virtues relating to external things, now he considers the virtues that relate to human actions. Et primo in seriis; First, he treats the serious actions; secundo in ludicris, ibi: existente autem requie etc. second, the humorous actions, at since recreation should have a place (1127b33; [850]). In actibus autem seriosis est duo considerare, scilicet delectationem et veritatem. In the investigation of the serious actions, he examines pleasantness and veracity. Primo ergo determinat de virtute quae est circa delectationes et tristitias in seriosis actibus hominum; First, he investigates the virtue concerned with pleasantness and sadness arising from the serious actions of men; secundo de virtute quae est circa veritatem, ibi: circa eadem autem fere est etc. second, the virtue concerned with veracity, at likewise, the mean opposed to boasting (1127a13; [831]). Circa primum duo facit: He develops the first point in a twofold fashion. primo ostendit circa delectationes et tristitias humanorum actuum esse medium et extrema; First, he shows that a mean and extremes are found in regard to pleasantness and sadness in human acts; secundo determinat de eis, ibi: nomen autem non redditur etc. second, he examines these, at this mean habit has not (1126b19; [819]). Circa primum tria facit. He discusses the first from three aspects. Primo proponit vitium pertinens ad superabundantiam delectationis. Et dicit quod circa colloquia humana per quae maxime homines ad invicem convivunt secundum proprietatem suae naturae et universaliter circa totum convictum hominum qui fit per hoc quod homines sibi invicem communicant in sermonibus et in rebus, quidam videntur esse placidi quasi hominibus placere intendentes; unde omnia laudant quae ab aliis dicuntur et fiunt, ad hoc quod delectabiles se eis exhibeant, et in nullo contradicunt eis quibus convivunt ne eos contristent, aestimantes quod oportet omnibus convivere sine tristitia. First, he presents the vice pertaining to the excess of pleasantness. He says that, in human conversation (by which men especially associate with one another according to a natural tendency) and generally in all human companionships (made possible by the fact that men communicate with one another in words and deeds), some seem to be obsequious, straining, as it were, to please men. Therefore, they praise everything that others say and do for the purpose of making themselves agreeable. They never contradict people for fear of giving offense, thinking they must live without causing pain to anyone. 817. Secundo ibi: qui autem contrario his etc., ponit vitium quod pertinet ad defectum in talibus. Et dicit quod illi qui contrario modo se habent ad placidos, volunt contrariari omnibus quae dicuntur vel fiunt, quasi intendentes alios contristare et nihil curantes praetermittere ne alios contristent: et isti vocantur discoli et litigiosi. 817. Second, at others, on the contrary (1126b14), he introduces the vice that pertains to the defect in such matters. He states that people who are cross-grained wish to be contrary to everything said or done, as if trying to make others sad and taking care to emphasize anything that will make life unpleasant for others. These persons are called perverse or quarrelsome. 818. Tertio ibi: quoniam quidem igitur etc., concludit esse quendam medium habitum laudabilem. Et dicit quod, quia praedicti habitus qui sunt in extremo sunt vituperabiles, manifestum est quod medius habitus est laudabilis, secundum quem aliquis acceptat ea quae ab aliis dicuntur vel fiunt, vel etiam despicit et contradicit secundum quod oportet. 818. Third, at these habits (1126b16), he draws the conclusion that the mean is praiseworthy, saying that these habits, which consist in an extreme, are unworthy of praise. Obviously, then, the mean habit is worthy of praise—that habit by which a man accepts what others say or do or rightly rejects and contradicts it. 819. Deinde cum dicit: nomen autem non redditur etc., determinat de praedictis. 819. Next, at this mean habit (1126b19), he defines the previous matter. Et primo de medio; And first, the mean; secundo de extremis, ibi: condelectantis autem etc. second, the extremes, at of those who are (1127a7; [828]). Circa primum duo facit: He handles the initial point in a twofold manner. primo determinat de nomine medii habitus; First, he treats the name of the mean habit; secundo de eius proprietatibus, ibi: universaliter quidem igitur etc. second, its properties, at therefore, as has been pointed out (1126b28; [823]). Circa primum tria facit. He considers the name under three headings. Primo proponit medium habitum esse innominatum. First, he states that the mean habit has no name. 820. Secundo ibi: assimulatur autem etc., nominat ipsum per similitudinem amicitiae. Et dicit quod ista virtus maxime assimilatur amicitiae, quia communicat cum ea in actu exteriori maxime proprio ei, qui est delectabiliter convivere ad amicos. Ille enim qui est dispositus secundum medium habitum huius virtutis taliter se habet in delectabili convictu ad alios sicut dicimus competere amico, cuius scilicet amicitia moderatur ratione, quod pertinet ad amicitiam honesti (non enim omnis amicitia est secundum virtutem, ut infra dicetur), et si ita esset quod ille qui habet istam virtutem, assumeret affectum dilectionis ad eos quibus convivit, esset omnino talis qualis est omnino virtuosus. 820. Second, at but it has (1126b20), he gives the habit a name from a resemblance to friendship. This virtue, he says, is very much like friendship, because there is an agreement in the external act that is especially proper to friendship, namely, to live amicably with friends. That person who is disposed according to the mean habit of this virtue conducts himself in agreeable association with others in a manner becoming to a friend whose friendship is moderated by reason—a thing that pertains to honorable friendship. Not every friendship is virtuous, as will be pointed out later [1574–7]. If the man who has this virtue should love those with whom he lives, his friendship will be entirely virtuous. 821. Tertio ibi: differt autem ab amicitia etc., ostendit differentiam huius virtutis ad veram amicitiam. 821. Third, at however, since (1126b22), he shows how this virtue differs from friendship. Et circa hoc duo facit: He treats this point in a twofold manner. primo ponit differentiam; First, he presents the difference; secundo excludit falsum intellectum, ibi: verum tamen et in singulis etc. second, rejects a false understanding of it, at nevertheless, in particular cases (1126b26; [822]).