141. Dicit ergo: dico quod per legem maledictio inducta est, nec tamen ab illa maledictione lex eripit, quia manifestum est quod nemo in lege iustificatur apud Deum, id est per opera legis.
141. Therefore he says: I say that by the law a curse was introduced, and yet the law cannot extricate one from that curse, because it is obvious that in the law no man is justified with God, i.e., through the works of the law.
Circa quod intelligendum, quod illi qui negaverunt Vetus Testamentum, ex hoc verbo occasionem sumpserunt. Et ideo dicendum est quod nemo iustificatur in lege, id est per legem. Nam per eam cognitio quidem peccati habebatur, ut dicitur Rom. V, sed non habebatur per eam iustificatio. Rom. III, 20: ex operibus legis nullus iustificabitur.
On this point it should be noted that those who rejected the Old Testament took occasion to do so from this word. Hence it must be said that no one is justified in the law, i.e., through the law. For through it came the knowledge of sin (Rom 3:20); but justification did not come through it: by the works of the law no flesh shall be justified (Rom 3:20).
Sed contra Iac. II, 21 dicitur: nonne Abraham ex operibus iustificatus est?
But against this, it is said: was not Abraham our father justified by works? (Jas 2:21).
Respondeo. Dicendum est, quod iustificare potest accipi dupliciter: vel quantum ad executionem iustitiae et manifestationem, et hoc modo iustificatur homo, id est, iustus ostenditur, ex operibus operatis. Vel quantum ad habitum iustitiae infusum, et hoc modo non iustificatur quis ex operibus, cum habitus iustitiae qua homo iustificatur apud Deum, non sit acquisitus, sed per gratiam fidei infusus. Et ideo signanter Apostolus dicit apud Deum, quia iustitia quae est apud Deum, in interiori corde est: iustitia autem quae est ex operibus, id est, quae manifestat iustum, est apud homines. Et hoc modo Apostolus accepit apud Deum. Rom. II, 13: non enim auditores, sed factores, et cetera. Rom. IV, 2: si ex operibus Abraham iustificatus est, habet gloriam, sed non apud Deum, et cetera.
I answer that ‘to be justified’ can be taken in two senses: either as referring to the execution and manifestation of justice, and in this way a man is justified, i.e., proved just, by the works performed; or as referring to the infused habit of justice, and in this way one is not justified by works, since the habit of justice by which a man is justified before God is not acquired but infused by the grace of faith. Therefore the Apostle says significantly, with God, because the justice which is before God is interior in the heart, whereas the justice which is by works, i.e., which manifests that one is just, is before men. And it is in this sense that the Apostle says, with God: for not the hearers of the law, but the doers are just before God (Rom 2:13); for if Abraham were justified by works, he has glory, but not before God (Rom 4:2).
Sic ergo patet conclusio rationis, scilicet quod lex iustificare non potest.
Thus, therefore, the conclusion of his reasoning is obvious, namely, that the law can not justify.
142. Consequenter cum dicit quia iustus, etc., ponit maiorem, quae est ex auctoritate Scripturae, Hab. II, 4 et introducitur etiam Rom. I, 17 et ad Hebr. X, 38.
142. Then when he says, because the just man lives by faith, he presents the major premise, which is based on Scriptural authority, i.e., Habakkuk (Hab 2:4), and restated in Romans (Rom 1:17) and Hebrews (Heb 10:38).
Circa quod notandum est, quod in homine est duplex vita, scilicet vita naturae et vita iustitiae. Vita quidem naturae est per animam; unde anima a corpore recedente, corpus remanet mortuum. Vita vero iustitiae est per Deum habitantem in nobis per fidem. Et ideo primum quo Deus est in anima hominis, est fides. Hebr. XI, 6: accedentem ad Deum oportet credere. Eph. III, 17: habitare Christum per fidem, et cetera.
Concerning this point it should be noted that in man there is a twofold life; namely, the life of nature and the life of justice. Now the life of nature is from the soul; hence when the soul is separated from the body, the body continues but is dead. But the life of justice is through God dwelling in us by faith. Therefore the first way in which God is in the soul of man is by faith: he who comes to God must believe (Heb 11:6); that Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts (Eph 3:17).
Et sic dicimus, quod in anima prima indicia vitae apparent in operibus animae vegetabilis: quia anima vegetabilis est, quae primo advenit animali generato, ut Philosophus dicit. Ita quia primum principium quo Deus est in nobis, est fides, ideo fides dicitur principium vivendi. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur iustus meus ex fide vivit. Et intelligendum est de fide per dilectionem operante.
Accordingly, we say that in the soul the first signs of life appear in the works of the vegetative soul, because the vegetative soul is the first to be present in a generated animal, as the Philosopher says. Similarly, because the first principle whereby God exists in us is faith, faith is called the principle of living. And this is what he means when he says, the just man lives by faith. Furthermore, this is to be understood of faith acting through love.
143. Minor autem ponitur ibi lex autem non est, et cetera.
143. The minor premise is set down at, but the law is not of faith.
Et primo ponitur ipsa minor;
First, the minor is set down;
secundo probatur, ibi sed qui fecerit, et cetera.
second, it is proved, at but he who does those things.
144. Dicit ergo lex non est ex fide. Sed contra, lex mandat credere quod sit unus Deus, et hoc pertinet ad fidem; ergo lex habebat fidem. Quod autem sit unus Deus, mandatur Deut. VI, audi, Israel, Dominus Deus tuus, et cetera.
144. He says therefore that the law is not of faith. But this seems to conflict with the truth that the law commands one to believe that there is one God, which pertains to faith. Therefore the law had faith. And that there is one God is stated in Deuteronomy: hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord (Deut 6:4).
Respondeo. Dicendum est, quod hic loquitur de observationibus mandatorum legis, secundum quod lex consistit in mandatis et praeceptis caeremonialibus, et dicit quod talis lex non est ex fide. Fides enim, ut dicitur Hebr. XI, 1, est substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium. Et ideo proprie implet mandatum de fide qui non sperat ex hoc aliqua praesentia et visibilia consequi, sed bona invisibilia et aeterna. Lex ergo quia promittebat terrena et praesentia, ut dicitur Is. I, 19: si volueritis et audieritis me, bona terrae comedetis, ideo non est ex fide, sed ex cupiditate potius, vel ex timore, secundum illos praecipue, qui carnaliter legem servabant. Aliqui tamen spiritualiter vivebant in lege, sed hoc non erat ex ea, sed ex fide mediatoris.
I answer that he is speaking here about keeping the commandments of the law insofar as the law consists of ceremonial precepts and moral precepts. This is the law that is not of faith. For faith, as is said, is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that do not appear (Heb 11:1). Therefore, strictly speaking, he fulfills the command of faith who does not hope to obtain from it anything present and visible, but things invisible and eternal. Therefore, because the law promised earthly and present things, as it is said: if you be willing and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land (Isa 1:19), it is not of faith but rather of cupidity or fear, especially in regard to those who kept the law in a carnal manner. Nevertheless, some did live spiritually in the law; but this was not because of the law but because of faith in a mediator.
145. Et quod lex non sit ex fide, probat cum dicit sed qui fecerit ea, id est, opera legis, vivet in illis, scilicet vita praesenti, id est, immunis erit a morte temporali, et conservabitur in vita praesenti.
145. And that the law is not of faith he proves when he says, but he who does those things, i.e., the works of the law, shall live in them, namely, in the present life, i.e., will be immune from temporal death and will be preserved in the present life.
Vel aliter: dico quod lex non est ex fide, et hoc patet, quia qui fecerit, etc.; quasi dicat: praecepta legis non sunt de credendis, sed de faciendis, licet aliquid credendum annuntiet. Et ideo virtus eius non est ex fide, sed ex operibus; et hoc probat, quia Dominus quando voluit eam confirmare, non dixit: qui crediderit sed: qui fecerit ea, vivet in illis. Sed nova lex ex fide est. Mc. ult.: qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, et cetera.
Or again: I say that the law is not of faith, and this is obvious, because he who does those things, shall live in them. As if to say: the precepts of the law are not concerned with what is to be believed, but with what is to be done, even though it proclaims something that must be believed. Therefore its power is not from faith but from works. He proves this on the ground that when the Lord willed to confirm it he did not say, he that believes, but he who does those things, shall live in them. But the new law is from faith: he that believes and is baptized shall be saved (Mark 16:16).
Lex tamen est quoddam effigiatum et effectum ex fide, et ideo comparatur lex vetus ad legem novam, sicut opera naturae ad opera intellectus. Nam in ipsis operibus naturae apparent quaedam opera intellectus, non quod res naturales intelligant, sed quia aguntur et ordinantur ab intellectu ut finem consequantur. Sic et in veteri lege aliqua continentur, quae fidei sunt, non quod Iudaei ea prout erant fidei haberent, sed habebant ea in figura tantum fidei Christi, et protestatione, ex cuius fidei virtute salvabantur iusti.
Nevertheless, the law is something fashioned and produced by faith. That is why the old law is compared to the new as the works of nature to the works of the intellect. For certain works of the intellect appear in the works of nature, not as though natural things understand, but because they are moved and ordained to reach their end by an intellect. In like manner, in the old law are contained certain things that are of faith: not that the Jews held them precisely as being of faith, but that they held them only as protestations and figures of the faith of Christ, in virtue of whose faith the just were saved.
Lectio 5
Lecture 5
Christus de maledictio legis redemit
Christ redeems from the law’s curse
3:13 Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis, factus pro nobis maledictum: quia scriptum est: maledictus omnis qui pendet in ligno: [n. 146]
3:13 Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us (for it is written: cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree). [n. 146]
3:14 ut in gentibus benedictio Abrahae fieret in Christo Jesu, ut pollicitationem Spiritus accipiamus per fidem. [n. 151]
3:14 That the blessing of Abraham might come on the gentiles through Christ Jesus: that we may receive the promise of the Spirit by faith. [n. 151]
146. Posito damno a lege illato, et defectu legis ab illo eripere non valentis, hic consequenter ostendit virtutem Christi ab ipso damno liberantis. Et
146. Having explained the curse brought on by the law, as well as the law’s incapacity to deliver from sin, he now shows forth Christ’s power to set one free from this curse.
primo ostendit quomodo per Christum ab ipso damno liberamur;
First, he shows how through Christ we are set free of that curse;
secundo quomodo etiam super hoc auxilium a Christo acquirimus, ibi ut in gentibus, et cetera.
second, how in addition we receive help from Christ, at that the blessing of Abraham.
Circa primum tria facit.
As to the first, he does three things.
Primo enim ponit liberationis auctoritatem;
First, he presents the author of the liberation;
secundo liberationis modum, ibi factus pro nobis, etc.;
second, the manner of liberation, at being made a curse for us;
tertio testimonium propheticum, ibi quia scriptum est, et cetera.
third, the testimony of the prophets, at for it is written.
147. Dicit ergo primo: quicumque servabant opera legis erant sub maledicto sicut dictum est, nec per legem liberari poterant. Ideo necesse fuit aliquem habere, qui nos liberaret, et iste fuit Christus. Et ideo dicit Christus redemit nos de maledicto legis, et cetera. Rom. VIII, 3: quod impossibile erat legi, etc., Deus mittens Filium suum, scilicet Christum, et cetera. Redemit, inquam, nos, scilicet Iudaeos, pretioso sanguine suo, Apoc. V, 9: redemisti nos in sanguine, et cetera. Is. XLIII, 1: noli timere, quia redemi te, et cetera. De maledicto legis, id est, de culpa et poena. Infra IV, v. 5: ut eos qui sub lege erant redimeret; Os. XIII, 14: de morte redimam eos.
147. Therefore, he says first: all who observed the works of the law were under a curse, as has been said, and they could not be delivered by the law. Hence it was necessary to have someone who should set us free, and that someone was Christ. Hence he says, Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law: for what the law could not do . . . God, sending his own Son (Rom 8:3), i.e., Christ. He has redeemed, I say, us, namely, the Jews, with his own precious blood: you have redeemed us in your blood (Rev 5:9); fear not, for I have redeemed you (Isa 43:1), from the curse of the law, i.e., from guilt and penalty: that he might redeem those who were under the law (Gal 4:5); I will redeem them from death (Hos 13:14).
148. Modum liberationis ponit cum dicit factus pro nobis maledictum. Ubi notandum quod maledictum est quod dicitur malum. Et secundum duplex malum potest dici duplex maledictum, scilicet maledictum culpae et maledictum poenae. Et utroque modo potest hoc legi dupliciter factus est pro nobis maledictum.
148. Then when he says, being made a curse for us, he sets forth the manner of the deliverance. Here it should be noted that a curse is that which is said as an evil. Now it is according to two kinds of evil that there can be two kinds of curse, namely, the curse of guilt and the curse of punishment. And with respect to each this passage can be read, namely, he was made a curse for us.
Et primo quidem de malo culpae. Nam Christus redemit nos de malo culpae. Unde sicut redemit nos de morte mortuus, ita redemit nos de maledicto culpae factus maledictum, scilicet culpae; non quidem quod in eo peccatum esset aliquod, qui peccatum non fecit, nec dolus, etc., ut dicitur I Petr. II, v. 22, sed secundum opinionem hominum, et praecipue Iudaeorum qui reputabant eum peccatorem. Io. XVIII, 30: si non esset hic malefactor, non tibi tradidissemus eum. Et ideo de hoc dicitur II Cor. V, 21: eum qui non noverat peccatum, fecit pro nobis peccatum.
First of all with respect to the evil of guilt, for Christ redeemed us from the evil of guilt. Hence, just as in dying he redeemed us from death, so he redeemed us from the evil of guilt by being made a curse, i.e., of guilt; not that there was really any sin in him, for he did not sin, neither was guile found in his mouth (1 Pet 2:22), but only according to the opinion of men and particularly the Jews who regarded him as a sinner: if he were not a malefactor, we would not have delivered him up to you (John 18:30). Hence it is said of him, him who knew no sin he has made sin for us (2 Cor 5:21).
Dicit autem maledictum, non maledictus, ut ostendat quod Iudaei eum sceleratissimum reputabant. Unde dicitur Io. IX, 16: non est hic homo a Deo, etc.; et Io. X, 33: de bono opere non lapidamus te, sed de peccato et de blasphemia.
But he says, a curse, and not accursed, to show that the Jews regarded him as the worst type of criminal. Hence it is said, this man is not of God who does not keep the sabbath (John 9:16) and not for a good work do we stone you, but for sin and for blasphemy (John 10:33).
Et ideo dicit factus est pro nobis maledictum, in abstracto; quasi dicat: factus est ipsa maledictio.
Therefore he says, being made for us a curse in the abstract. As though to say: he was made curse itself.
149. Secundo exponitur de malo poenae. Nam Christus liberavit nos a poena, sustinendo poenam et mortem nostram: quae quidem in nos provenit ex ipsa maledictione peccati. In quantum ergo hanc maledictionem peccati suscepit, pro nobis moriendo, dicitur esse factus pro nobis maledictum. Et est simile ei quod dicitur Rom. VIII, 3: misit Deus Filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati, id est, mortalis. Eum qui non noverat peccatum, scilicet Christum, qui peccatum non fecit, Deus scilicet Pater, pro nobis fecit peccatum, II Cor. V, 21, id est fecit pati peccati poenam, quando scilicet oblatus est propter peccata nostra.
149. Second, it is explained with respect to the evil of punishment. For Christ freed us from punishment by enduring our punishment and our death which came upon us from the very curse of sin. Therefore, inasmuch as he endured this curse of sin by dying for us, he is said to have been made a curse for us. This is similar to what is said in Romans: God sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and of sin (Rom 8:3), i.e., of mortal sin. Him who knew no sin, namely, Christ, who committed no sin, God (namely, the Father) has made sin for us (2 Cor 5:21), i.e., made him suffer the punishment of sin, namely, when he was offered for our sins.
150. Consequenter ponit Scripturae testimonium cum dicit quia scriptum est: maledictus omnis, et cetera. Et hoc Deut. XXVII.
150. Then he gives the testimony of Scripture when he says, for it is written: ‘cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree’ (Deut 21:23).
Ubi sciendum, secundum Glossam, quod in Deuteronomio, unde accipitur hoc verbum, tam in nostris, quam in Hebraeis codicibus habetur: maledictus a Deo omnis, etc., quod quidem, scilicet a Deo, in antiquis Hebraeorum voluminibus non habetur, unde creditur quod a Iudaeis post passionem domini appositum sit ad infamiam Christi.
Here it should be noted, according to a Gloss, that in Deuteronomy, from which this passage is taken, our version as well as the Hebrew version has: cursed by God is everyone who hangs on a tree. However, the phrase by God is not found in the ancient Hebrew volumes. Hence it is believed to have been added by the Jews after the passion of Christ in order to defame him.
Potest autem exponi auctoritas de malo poenae et de malo culpae. De malo quidem culpae sic maledictus omnis qui pendet in ligno, non propter hoc quod pendet in ligno, sed pro culpa pro qua pendet. Et hoc modo Christus aestimatus maledictus in cruce pendens, propter hoc quod maxime tali poena punitus fuit. Et secundum hoc continuatur ad praecedentia. Dominus enim praecepit in Deuteronomio, ut qui suspensus fuerit, in vespera deponatur; et ratio huius est, quia haec poena erat caeteris abiectior et ignominiosior. Dicit ergo: vere factus est pro nobis maledictum, quia ipsa mors crucis, quam sustinuit, sufficit ad maledictionem, hoc modo exponendo de malo culpae, sed solum aestimatione Iudaeorum, quia scriptum est maledictus omnis, et cetera.
But it is possible to expound this authority both with respect to the evil of punishment and the evil of guilt. Of the evil of punishment thus: cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree, not precisely because he hangs on a tree, but because of the guilt for which he hangs. And in this way Christ was thought to be cursed, when he hung on the cross, because he was being punished with an extraordinary punishment. And according to this explanation, there is a continuity with the preceding. For the Lord commanded in Deuteronomy that anyone who had hung on a tree should be taken down in the evening; the reason being that this punishment was more disgraceful and ignominious than any other. He is saying, therefore: truly was he made a curse for us, because the death of the cross which he endured is tantamount to a curse—thus explaining the evil of guilt, although it was only in the minds of the Jews—because it is written: ‘cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree’.