Septimo quaeritur utrum substantia spiritualis corpori aereo uniatur. Seventh, it is asked whether a spiritual substance is united to an ethereal body. Et videtur quod sic. Dicit enim Augustinus III Super Genesim ad litteram et IV De civitate Dei quod daemones habent corpora aerea; sed daemones sunt substantiae spirituales; ergo substantia spiritualis corpori aereo unitur. Obj. 1: And it would seem that it is. For Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 3 and in City of God 4 that demons have ethereal bodies. But demons are spiritual substances. Therefore, a spiritual substance is united to an ethereal body. Praeterea. Augustinus in libro De divinatione daemonum dicit quod daemones subtilitate aerei corporis sensum humanum transcendunt; hoc autem non esset nisi aereo corpori naturaliter unirentur; ergo substantiae spirituales aereo corpori uniuntur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says in his book On the Divination of Demons that demons are beyond the human senses because of the subtlety of an ethereal body. Now this would not be the case unless they were naturally united to an ethereal body. Therefore, spiritual substances are united to an ethereal body. Praeterea. Medium non discrepat ab extremis; sed in regione caelestium corporum invenitur vita secundum ponentes corpora caelestia animata, in regione autem terrae invenitur vita in animalibus et plantis; ergo et in regione media, quae est aeris, invenitur vita. Nec hoc potest referri ad vitam avium, quia aves ad modicum spatium aeris supra terram elevantur; nec videretur conveniens quod totum aliud spatium aeris vacuum vita remaneret: oportet igitur ponere, ut videtur, ibi esse aliqua aerea animalia. Ex quo sequitur quod aliquae substantiae spirituales aereo corpori uniantur. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the mean does not differ widely from the extremes. But life is found in the region of heavenly bodies, according to those who assert that the heavenly bodies are animate; and in the region of earth, life is found in animals and in plants. Therefore, in the middle region also, that of the air, life is found. Nor can this have reference to bird life, because birds are raised above the earth a little distance in the air, and it would not seem fitting that all the other air space should remain devoid of life. One must then assert, as it seems, that some ethereal living beings exist in it, from which it follows that some spiritual substances are united to an ethereal body. Praeterea. Nobilioris corporis nobilior est forma; sed aer est nobilius corpus quam terra, cum sit formalius et subtilius; si igitur corpori terrestri, scilicet humano, unitur substantia spiritualis quae est anima, multo fortius corpori aereo uniretur. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a body that is more noble has a more noble form. But air is a more noble body than earth, inasmuch as it is more formal and more fine. If then a spiritual substance such as the soul is united to an earthly body, namely, a human body, for all the greater reason would it be united to an ethereal body. Praeterea. Eorum quae magis conveniunt facilior est unio; sed aer magis videtur convenire cum anima quam corpus commixtum, quale est corpus hominis, quia, ut Augustinus dicit Super Genesim ad litteram, anima per aerem administrat corpus; ergo magis nata est uniri anima corpori aereo quam etiam corpori commixto. Obj. 5: Furthermore, in the case of things which agree more closely, union is easier. But “air” seems to agree more with “soul” than does a mixed body, such as man’s body is. For, as Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, the soul manages the body through air. Therefore, the soul is naturally more apt to be united to an ethereal body than even to a mixed body. Praeterea. Dicitur in libro De substantia orbis: motus circularis proprius est animae, et hoc ideo quia anima quantum est de se indifferens est ut moveat in omnem partem; sed hoc etiam videtur aeri convenire, quia est cum levibus levis et cum gravibus gravis; ergo anima maxime videtur aeri uniri. Obj. 6: Furthermore, it is said in the book On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, circular movement is characteristic of the soul, and this for the reason that the soul, so far as it is itself concerned, is disposed to do its moving in all directions without any difference. But this also seems to be characteristic of the air, because it is light in combination with light objects and heavy in combination with heavy objects. Therefore, the soul would seem most of all to be united to air. Sed contra. Anima est actus corporis organici; sed corpus aereum non potest esse organicum quia, cum non sit terminabilis termino proprio sed solum alieno, non est figurabilis; ergo substantia spiritualis quae est anima non potest corpori aereo uniri. On the contrary, the soul is the act of an organic body. But an ethereal body cannot be organic because, since it cannot be bounded by a boundary of its own but only by the boundary of something else, it cannot have any shape. Therefore, a spiritual substance, which the soul is, cannot be united to an ethereal body. Respondeo. Dicendum quod impossibile est substantiam spiritualem corpori aereo uniri. Quod potest manifestari tripliciter. I answer that it is impossible for a spiritual substance to be united to an ethereal body. This can be clearly shown in three ways. Primo quidem quia inter omnia alia corpora corpora simplicia elementorum sunt imperfectiora, cum sint materialia respectu omnium aliorum corporum; unde non est conveniens secundum rationem ordinis rerum quod aliquod simplex corpus elementare spirituali substantiae uniatur ut forma. First, this is because, among all other bodies, the simple bodies of elements are the more imperfect, since they are like matter in relation to all other bodies. Hence, it is not consistent with the scheme of things for some simple elementary body to be united to a spiritual substance as a form. Secunda ratio est quia aer est corpus simile in toto et in omnibus suis partibus: unde si alicui parti aeris unitur aliqua spiritualis substantia, eadem ratione et toti aeri unietur, et similiter cuilibet alteri elemento, quod videtur absurdum. The second reason is that air is a body, which is homogeneous as a whole and in all its parts. Hence, if some spiritual substance is united to any one part of the air, for the same reason it will also be united to the whole air, and likewise to every other element, which seems absurd. Tertia ratio est quia substantia spiritualis dupliciter alicui corpori invenitur uniri: uno modo ad exhibendum corpori motum, sicut dictum est quod corporibus caelestibus spirituales substantiae uniuntur; alio modo ut substantia spiritualis per corpus iuvetur ad propriam suam operationem, quae est intelligere; sicut anima humana unitur corpori, ut per sensus corporeos scientias acquirat. Aeri autem substantia spiritualis non potest uniri neque ratione motus, quia aeri est connaturalis motus quidam qui consequitur formam eius naturalem, nec invenitur aliquis motus aut in toto aere aut in aliqua eius parte, qui non possit reduci in aliquam causam corporalem: unde ex motu eius non apparet quod aliqua substantia spiritualis ei uniatur; neque etiam unitur spiritualis substantia corpori aereo propter perfectionem intellectualis operationis: corpus enim simplex non potest esse instrumentum sensus, ut probatur in libro De anima. The third reason is that a spiritual substance is found to be united to a given body in two ways: in one way, in order to furnish movement to a body, as, for instance, it was said that spiritual substances are united to the heavenly bodies; in another way, in order that a spiritual substance may be helped by a body as regards its own proper activity, which is understanding, as a human soul, for instance, is united to a body in order that it may acquire a store of knowledge through the bodily senses. But a spiritual substance cannot be united to the air. It cannot by reason of movement, because air has a certain connatural movement which is a consequence of its natural form, nor is there to be found any movement in the whole air or in any part thereof which cannot be referred back to some bodily cause; hence, from its movement it does not appear that a spiritual substance is united to it. Nor yet is a spiritual substance united to an ethereal body for the perfection of intellectual activity, for a simple body cannot be an instrument of sense, as is proven in On the Soul. Unde relinquitur quod spiritualis substantia nullo modo corpori aereo uniatur. Hence, the only remaining alternative is that spiritual substance is in no way united to a body. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, ubicumque Augustinus dicit daemones habere aerea corpora, non loquitur asserendo quasi ex sententia propria sed secundum opiniones aliorum; unde ipse dicit in XXI De civitate Dei: sunt quedam sua etiam daemonibus corpora, sicut doctis hominibus visum est, ex isto aere crasso atque humido; si autem nulla quisque habere corpora daemones asserat, non est de hac re aut laborandum operosa inquisitione aut contentiosa disputatione certandum. Reply Obj. 1: Wherever Augustine says that demons have ethereal bodies, he does not say so as an assertion of his own belief, but according to the opinion of others. Hence, he himself says in City of God 21, even demons have a kind of body of their own, as learned men have thought, of that thick and humid air . . . but if anyone should assert that demons have no bodies, there is no need either to work out a laborious investigation of this matter or to quarrel about it in contentious argument. Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. Reply Obj. 2: Through this the solution to the second is clear. Ad tertium dicendum quod in inferiori regione, scilicet circa terram, est locus mixtionis elementorum; corpora autem mixta, quanto magis ad aequalitatem mixtionis perveniunt, tanto magis recedunt ab extremis contrariorum: et sic quamdam similitudinem consequuntur caelestium corporum, quae sunt sine contrarietate. Et sic patet quod vita magis potest esse in suprema et infima regione quam in media, praesertim cum in istis inferioribus tanto paratius est corpus ad vitam quanto propinquius fuerit aequalitati complexionis. Reply Obj. 3: The place for the mixing of the elements is in the lower region, namely, that around the earth. Now, mixed bodies, the closer they come to an equal mixture, the farther do they recede from the extremes of contraries; and thus, they acquire a kind of likeness to the heavenly bodies, which are without contrariety. And so, it is clear that life is more able to exist in the highest and in the lowest region than in the middle one, especially when, in the case of those lower ones, the body is all the more prepared for life the nearer it comes to an equality of constituency. Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus aeris est nobilius quam terra; sed corpus aequalis complexionis est nobilius utroque, quia magis elongatum a contrarietate. Et hoc solum invenitur substantiae spirituali uniri; in quo tamen inferiora elementa plus necesse est abundare materialiter ad aequalitatem constituendam propter excessum activae virtutis in aliis elementis. Reply Obj. 4: The body “air” is more noble than the body “earth.” But a body of equal constituency is more noble than both, because it is more distant from contrariety. This kind of body only is found to be united to a spiritual substance. In it, nevertheless, the lower element must be materially more abundant in order to constitute equality, on account of the excess of active power in the other elements. Ad quintum dicendum quod anima dicitur administrare corpus suum per aerem quantum ad motum, quia est susceptibilior motus aliis corporibus spissis. Reply Obj. 5: A soul is said to manage its own body through air so far as movement is concerned, because air is more susceptible to movement than are other dense bodies. Ad sextum dicendum quod aer non est indifferens ad omnem motum, sed respectu quorundam est levis, respectu aliorum gravis: unde ex hoc non habetur quod sit perfectibile per animam. Reply Obj. 6: Air is not indifferent to every movement, but in combination with certain bodies it is light, in combination with others it is heavy; hence, from this we cannot conclude that air is perfectible through a soul. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum omnes angeli differant specie ab invicem Whether all angels differ in species from one another Octavo quaeritur utrum omnes angeli differant specie ab invicem. Eighth, it is asked whether all angels differ in species from one another. Et videtur quod non. Dicit Augustinus in Enchiridion: creatura rationalis quae in hominibus erat, quantum peccatis atque suppliciis tota perierat, ex parte reparari meruit. Ex quo sic arguitur. Si omnes angeli ad invicem differrent secundum naturam speciei, pluribus angelis irreparabiliter cadentibus, plures naturae irreparabiliter periissent; sed hoc non patitur divina providentia, ut aliqua natura rationalis ex toto pereat, ut patet ex auctoritate inducta; ergo non omnes angeli differunt ab invicem secundum naturam speciei. Obj. 1: And it would seem that they do not. Augustine says in his Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Charity, the rational creaturehood which was in men, since by reason of sins and penalties . . . it had wholly perished deserved in part to be renewed. From this, it is argued as follows. If all angels were different from one another in their specific nature, then, since many angels fell irreparably, many natures would have irreparably perished. But divine providence does not allow any rational nature to perish entirely, as is clear from the passage quoted. Therefore, not all angels differ from one another in specific nature. Praeterea. Quanto sunt aliqua propinquiora Deo, in quo nulla est diversitas, tanto minus sunt diversa; angeli autem secundum ordinem naturae propinquiores sunt Deo quam homines. Magis vero diversa sunt ab invicem quae differunt numero et specie quam quae differunt numero et conveniunt in specie; cum igitur homines non differant specie sed numero solum, videtur quod nec angeli specie differant. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the closer some things are to God, in whom there is no diversity, the less different they are. Now, according to the order of nature, angels are closer to God than men are. But beings which differ numerically and specifically are more different from one another than are those which differ numerically and agree specifically. Since, therefore, men do not differ specifically, but only numerically, it would seem that angels too do not differ specifically. Praeterea. Convenientia aliquorum in formali principio facit aliqua idem esse specie, differentia vero in principio materiali facit differre numero solum; in angelis autem ipsum esse se habet ut formale ad essentiam angeli, ut supra dictum est. Cum igitur omnes angeli conveniant in esse, differant vero secundum essentiam, videtur quod angeli non differant specie sed numero solo. Obj. 3: Furthermore, an agreement of things in their formal principle causes them to be specifically the same, but a difference in their material principle makes them differ only numerically. Now in angels their very existence serves as the formal element with regard to the angel’s essence, as has been said above. Since then all angels agree in existence but differ in essence, it would seem that angels differ, not specifically, but only numerically. Praeterea. Omnis substantia subsistens creata est individuum contentum sub aliqua natura communi speciei, ita quod si individuum sit compositum, natura speciei praedicabitur de eo secundum rationem compositi; si vero individuum fuerit simplex, natura speciei praedicabitur de eo secundum simplices rationes. Angelus autem est substantia creata subsistens; sive igitur sit compositus ex materia et forma sive simplex, oportet quod contineatur sub aliqua natura speciei. Sed naturae speciei non derogat quod possit habere plura supposita; similiter etiam nec individuo sub ea existenti derogat si habeat aliquod secum compar in eadem specie. Ergo videtur quod possibile sit esse plures angelos unius speciei; in perpetuis autem non differunt esse et posse, ut dicitur in III Physicorum; ergo in angelis sunt plura individua unius speciei. Obj. 4: Furthermore, every subsisting created substance is an individual, included under some nature common to a species in such a way that if the individual be a composite, the specific nature will be predicated of it according to its account as a composite, but if the individual is simple, the specific nature will be predicated of it in consideration of its simple accounts. Now, an angel is a subsisting created substance. Whether, then, it be composed of matter and form or whether it be simple, it must be included under some specific nature. But the fact that it can have many supposits does not detract from a specific nature; so too, the fact of having something like itself in the same species does not detract from an individual existing under such a nature. Therefore, it would seem to be possible that there are many angels belonging to one species. But in the case of eternal beings, there is no difference between “actual” and “possible,” as is said in Physics 3. Therefore, among the angels there are many individuals of a single species. Praeterea. In angelis est perfecta dilectio; nihil igitur eis subtrahendum est quod ad perfectionem dilectionis pertineat. Sed quod sint plures unius speciei pertinet ad perfectionem dilectionis, quia omnia animalia unius speciei naturaliter se invicem diligunt secundum illud Eccli. XIV: omne animal diligit simile sibi. Ergo in angelis sunt plures unius speciei. Obj. 5: Furthermore, among the angels there is perfect love; accordingly, nothing which pertains to the perfection of love must be taken away from them. But the fact that there are many belonging to one species pertains to the perfection of love, because all living beings of one species naturally love one another, according to Ecclesiasticus: every creature loves its like (Sir 13:15). Therefore, in the case of angels, there are many belonging to one species. Praeterea. Cum sola species definiatur secundum Boetium, quaecumque in definitione conveniunt videntur in specie convenire; sed omnes angeli conveniunt in illa definitione quam Damascenus ponit in III libro: angelus est substantia intellectualis, semper mobilis, arbitrio libera, incorporea, Deo ministrans, secundum gratiam, non natura, immortalitatem suscipiens; ergo omnes angeli sunt unius speciei. Obj. 6: Furthermore, since a species alone has a definition, according to Boethius, all things which agree in their definition would seem to agree in their species. But all angels agree in that definition which Damascene lays down: an angel is an intellectual substance, always mobile, free in its will, incorporeal, serving God, receiving immortality in consequence of grace, not by nature. Therefore, all angels belong to one species. Praeterea. Angeli secundum ordinem naturae sunt propinquiores Deo quam homines; sed in Deo sunt tres personae unius naturae secundum numerum; cum igitur in hominibus sint plures personae unius naturae secundum speciem, videtur quod multo fortius in angelis sint plures personae in una natura speciei convenientes. Obj. 7: Furthermore, according to the order of nature, angels are closer to God than men are. But in God there are three persons of numerically one nature. Since then there are, among men, many persons of one specific nature, it would seem that for all the greater reason among the angels there are many persons agreeing in one specific nature. Praeterea. Gregorius dicit quod in illa caelesti patria, ubi plenitudo boni est, si quaedam data sunt excellenter, nihil tamen possidetur singulariter: omnia enim in omnibus sunt, non quidem aequaliter, quia aliqui aliis sublimius possident quae tamen omnes habent. Non est ergo differentia in angelis nisi secundum magis et minus; sed magis et minus non diversificant speciem; ergo angeli non differunt specie. Obj. 8: Furthermore, Gregory says that in that heavenly country where there is a fullness of good, although certain attributes have been bestowed in an outstanding degree, yet none of these is possessed in an individual way; for all attributes are in all, not indeed equally, since some angels possess them in a more sublime degree than others, and yet all have them. There is, therefore, no difference in angels except one of “more and less.” But “more and less” do not constitute a specific difference. Therefore, angels do not differ specifically. Praeterea. Quaecumque conveniunt in nobilissimo conveniunt in specie, quia nobilius est quod ponit sub specie quam quod ponit sub genere: est enim differentia specifica formalis respectu generis; sed omnes angeli conveniunt in nobilissimo quod in eis est, scilicet in natura intellectuali; ergo omnes angeli conveniunt in specie. Obj. 9: Furthermore, things which agree in what is most noble agree in species, because that which puts something in a species is more noble than that which puts a thing in a genus; for a specific difference is something formal in relation to a genus. But all angels agree in the most noble thing that is in them, namely, in intellectual nature. Therefore, all angels agree in species. Praeterea. Si aliquod genus dividatur per duas differentias quarum una altera sit imperfectior, differentia imperfectior magis est multiplicabilis quam perfectior, sicut irrationale per plures species multiplicatur quam rationale. Substantia autem spiritualis dividitur per unibile et non unibile; unibile autem corpori est imperfectius in spiritualibus substantiis. Cum igitur substantia spiritualis unibilis corpori, scilicet anima humana, non distinguatur in multas species, multo fortius substantia spiritualis non unibilis, scilicet angelus, non multiplicatur per multas species. Obj. 10: Furthermore, if a given genus is divided by two differences, one of which is more imperfect than the other, the more imperfect difference is more capable of multiplication than is the more perfect; thus, for instance, “irrational” is multiplied in more species than is “rational.” Now, spiritual substance is divided by “capable of union” and “not capable of union”; but “capable of union with a body” is something more imperfect, in the case of spiritual substances. Since, then, a spiritual substance capable of union with a body, namely, the human soul, is not divided into many species, for all the greater reason a spiritual substance which is not capable of union, namely, an angel, is not multiplied in many species. Praeterea. Bonifatius Papa dicit quod ministrationes in ecclesia militanti sunt ad exemplum caelestis militiae, in qua angeli differunt in ordine et potestate; sed in ecclesia militante differentia ordinis et potestatis non facit homines differre secundum speciem; ergo nec in caelesti militia angelorum angeli specie differunt, etiam qui sunt diversorum ordinum vel hierarchiarum. Obj. 11: Furthermore, Pope Boniface says that ministerial functions in the church militant are modelled after the heavenly host, wherein angels differ in orders and in power. But in the church militant, a difference in orders and in power does not make men differ specifically. Therefore, neither in the heavenly host of angels do angels differ specifically, even those who are of different orders or hierarchies. Praeterea. Sicut inferiora elementa sunt ornata plantis et animalibus et caelum sidereum stellis et sole et luna, ita etiam caelum empyreum ornatum est angelis. Sed in plantis et animalibus inveniuntur multa eiusdem speciei; similiter etiam videtur quod omnes stellae sint unius speciei, quia communicant in una forma nobilissima, quae est lux. Ergo videtur pari ratione quod vel omnes angeli vel aliqui conveniant in una specie. Obj. 12: Furthermore, just as the lower elements are adorned with plants and animals, and the sidereal heaven with stars, sun, and moon, so too the empyrean heaven is adorned with angels. But among plants and animals many of the same species are found; likewise also, it would seem that all the stars belong to the same species, because they share in one most noble form, which is light. Therefore, it would seem by a parallel argument that either all angels or some angels agree in one species. Praeterea. Si plures angeli non ponantur convenire in una specie, hoc non est nisi quia in eis non est materia. Sed remotio materiae non solum tollit pluralitatem individuorum sed etiam unitatem, quia individuum non ponitur sub specie nisi per materiam, quia materia est individuationis principium; si ergo necesse est poni angelos esse individua quaedam, pari etiam ratione poni poterit quod sint plures in una specie. Obj. 13: Furthermore, if many angels are not asserted to agree in one species, this is only because there is no matter in them. But the removal of matter not only takes away plurality of individuals, but also their unity. For an individual is not put into a species except through matter, because matter is the principle of individuation. If, therefore, it must be asserted that angels are individuals in some sense, by a parallel argument it can also be asserted that there are many in one species. Praeterea. In his quae sunt separata a materia idem est intelligens et intellectum secundum Philosophum: si igitur angeli essent sine materia, idem esset angelus intelligens et angelus intellectus. Sed quilibet angelus intelligit alium quemlibet; ergo sequeretur quod non esset nisi unus angelus, quod est falsum. Non est ergo ponendum quod angeli sint sine materia, et ita neque ponendum est quod omnes angeli differant specie. Obj. 14: Furthermore, in those things which are separated from matter, the being which understands and that which is understood are the same, according to the Philosopher. If, then, angels were without matter, the angel which understands and the angel which is understood would be the same. But every angel understands every other angel. Therefore, it would follow that there is but one angel, which is false. One must not, therefore, assert that angels are without matter, and so neither must it be asserted that all the angels differ specifically.