Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa sequitur in causis agentibus de necessitate naturae et quantum ad effectus immediatos; sed in causis voluntariis non sequitur, quia ex voluntate sequitur aliquid eo modo quo voluntas disponit et non eo modo quo voluntas habet esse, sicut accidit in causis naturalibus, in quibus attenditur assimilatio quantum ad eandem conditionem causae et causati; cum tamen in causis voluntariis attendatur assimilatio secundum quod in effectu impletur voluntas agentis, ut dictum est. Nec etiam in causis naturalibus sequitur quantum ad effectus mediatos. Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that that argument follows for agent causes by a necessity of nature and with regard to immediate effects; but it does not follow for voluntary causes, for something follows from the will in the way that the will disposes and not in the way that the will has existence, as happens among natural causes, among which likeness is considered with respect to the same condition of the cause and the thing caused; whereas among voluntary causes the likeness is considered inasmuch as the agent's will is fulfilled in the effect, as mentioned in the article. Also, the argument does not follow among natural causes with respect to mediated effects. Ad secundum dicendum quod quamvis Deus possit removere omne impedimentum causae secundae cum voluerit, non tamen semper removere vult, et sic remanet contingentia in causa secunda et per consequens in effectu. Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that although God can remove every impediment of a secondary cause when he wants, yet he does not always want to remove them, and so contingency remains within the secondary cause, and in the effect as a consequence. Ad tertium dicendum quod quamvis non esse effectus divinae voluntatis non possit simul stare cum divina voluntate, tamen potentia deficiendi effectum simul stat cum divina voluntate; non enim sunt ista incompossibilia "Deus vult istum salvari" et "iste potest damnari"; sed ista sunt incompossibilia "Deus vult istum salvari" et "iste damnatur". Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that although the non existence of an effect of the divine will could not exist together with the divine will, yet the ability for the effect to fall short does exist together with the divine will; for these things are not incompatible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man can be damned; but these are incompattible: God wants this man to be saved, and this man is damned. Et similiter dicendum est ad quartum de defectu causae mediae. Reply Obj. 4: And one should respond similarly to the fourth with regard to the defect of the middle cause. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum iustitia in rebus creatis dependeat ex simplici divina voluntate Whether justice in created things depends on the simple divine will Sexto quaeritur utrum iustitia in rebus creatis dependeat ex simplici divina voluntate. Sixth, it is asked whether justice in created things depends on the simple divine will. Et videtur quod sic: Anselmus enim dicit in Monologion id solum iustum est quod vis; ergo iustitia dependet solum ex Dei voluntate. Obj. 1: It seems that it does: for Anselm says in the Monologue,that alone is just which you will. Therefore, justice only depends upon God's will. Praeterea, secundum hoc aliquid est iustum quod concordat legi; sed lex non videtur esse aliud quam explicatio voluntatis principis quia quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem ut dicit legislator; cum igitur princeps rerum omnium sit divina voluntas, videtur quod ex ipsa sola dependeat omnis ratio iustitiae. Obj. 2: Furthermore, something is just inasmuch as it agrees with the law; but the law does not seem to be anything else than the explication of the prince's will, for whatever pleases the prince has the force of law, as the legislator says; therefore, since the divine will is the prince of all things, it seems that every notion of justice depends upon it alone. Praeterea, iustitia politica quae est in rebus humanis, exemplatur a iustitia naturali quae consistit in hoc quod quaelibet res suam implet naturam; sed unaquaeque res participat ordinem suae naturae propter divinam voluntatem: dicit enim Hilarius in libro De symbolo quod omnibus creaturis essentiam Dei voluntas attulit; ergo omnis iustitia dependet solummodo ex Dei voluntate. Obj. 3: Furthermore, political justice, which concerns human things, is exemplified by natural justice, which consists in the fact that any thing fulfills its own nature; but each thing participates in the order of its own nature because of the divine will: for Hilary says in the book On Symbols that God's will conveys essence to all creatures; thus, all justice depends on God's will alone. Praeterea, iustitia cum sit rectitudo quaedam, dependet ex imitatione alicuius regulae; regula autem effectus est debita causa eius; cum igitur prima omnium rerum causa sit divina voluntas, videtur quod ipsa sit prima regula, ex qua unumquodque iustum iudicetur. Obj. 4: Furthermore, since justice is a certain rectitude, it depends on the imitation of some rule; however, the rule of an effect is its appropriate cause; thus, since the first cause of all things is the divine will, it seems that it is the first rule, by which each thing is judged to be just. Praeterea, voluntas Dei non potest esse nisi iusta; si ergo ex aliquo alio dependeret ratio iustitiae quam ex divina voluntate, illud restringeret et quodam modo ligaret divinam voluntatem, quod est impossibile. Obj. 5: Furthermore, God's will can only be just; thus, if the reason for justice should depend on something other than the divine will, it would restrict and in some way bind the divine will, which is impossible. Praeterea, omnis voluntas, quae est iusta aliqua alia ratione quam se ipsa, ita se habet quod eius ratio quaeri debet; sed voluntatis Dei causa quaerenda non est, ut Augustinus dicit in libro 83 quaestionum; ergo ex nullo alio dependet ratio iustitiae nisi ex divina voluntate. Obj. 6: Furthermore, every will, which is just for some other reason than itself, is such that its reason should be sought; but the cause for the divine will ought not to be sought, as Augustine says in the book Eighty-Three Questions; therefore, the reason for justice depends on no other than the divine will. Sed contra, opera iustitiae ab operibus misericordiae distinguuntur; sed opera divinae misericordiae dependent ab eius voluntate; ergo aliquid aliud exigitur ad rationem iustitiae quam sola Dei voluntas. On the contrary (1), the works of justice are distinguished from the works of mercy; but the works of divine mercy depend on his will; thus, something else is needed to account for justice than God's will alone. Praeterea, secundum Anselmum in libro De veritate, iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis; sed rectitudo voluntatis est aliud a voluntate: in nobis quidem secundum rem, cum voluntas nostra possit esse recta et non recta, in Deo autem saltem ratione sive secundum modum intelligendi; ergo ratio iustitiae non dependet solum ex divina voluntate. Furthermore, according to Anselm in On Truth, justice is rectitude of the will; but rectitude of the will in us is really different from the will, since our will can be correct or not correct, but in God it is different at least according to reason or the mode of understanding; thus, the reason for justice does not depend on the divine will alone. Respondeo. Dicendum quod cum iustitia rectitudo quaedam sit, ut dicit Anselmus, vel adaequatio secundum Philosophum, oportet quod ex hoc primo dependeat ratio iustitiae ubi primo invenitur ratio regulae, secundum quam aequalitas et rectitudo iustitiae constituitur in rebus. Voluntas autem non habet rationem primae regulae, sed est regula regulata; dirigitur enim per rationem et intellectum non solum in nobis, sed etiam in Deo, quamvis in nobis sit aliud intellectus et voluntas secundum rem, ac per hoc nec idem est voluntas et rectitudo voluntatis; in Deo autem est idem secundum rem intellectus et voluntas et propter hoc idem rectitudo voluntatis et ipsa voluntas. Et ideo primum ex quo pendet ratio omnis iustitiae est sapientia divini intellectus quae res constituit in debita proportione et ad se invicem et ad suam causam, in qua quidem proportione ratio iustitiae creatae consistit. Dicere autem quod ex simplici voluntate dependeat iustitia, est dicere quod divina voluntas non procedat secundum ordinem sapientiae, quod est blasphemum. I answer that: it must be said that since justice is a certain rectitude, as Anselm says, or an adequation according to the Philosopher, it is necessary that the reason for justice depends first of all upon that wherein the notion of a rule is first found, according to which equality and the rectitude of justice is constituted in things. However, the will does not have the notion of a first rule, but it is a regulated rule; for it is directed by reason and intellect not only in us, but also in God, even though in us the intellect is other than the will in reality, and for this reason the will and the will's rectitude are not the same; however, in God the intellect and the will are really the same thing, and for this reason the will and the will's rectitude are the same. Thus, the first thing upon which the notion of justice depends is the wisdom of the divine intellect, which constitutes things in their due proportion both with respect to themselves and in respect to their cause, in which proportion the notion of justice consists. However, to say that justice depends upon the unqualified will is to say that the divine will does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, which is blasphemy. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil potest esse iustum nisi volitum a Deo; tamen id quod est volitum a Deo habet primam causam iustitiae ex ordine sapientiae divinae. Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that nothing can be just unless willed by God; yet, what is willed by God has the first cause of its justice from the order of divine wisdom. Ad secundum dicendum quod voluntas principis, licet habeat vim legis in cogendo ex hoc ipso quod voluntas est, non tamen habet rationem iustitiae nisi ex hoc quod ducitur ratione. Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the will of a prince, although it has the force of law in enforcing from the fact that it is a will, yet it does not have the notion of justice except from the fact that it is led by reason. Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus operatur in rebus naturalibus dupliciter: primo instituens ipsas naturas, secundo providens unicuique rei id quod competit suae naturae. Et quia ratio iustitiae debitum requirit, ideo cum ipsas creaturas institui non sit aliquo modo debitum sed pure voluntarium, prima operatio non habet rationem iustitiae sed dependet ex simplici voluntate divina, nisi forte dicatur iustitiae rationem habere propter ordinem ipsius rei factae ad voluntatem: debitum enim est fieri omne illud quod Deus vult, ex hoc ipso quod Deus illud vult; sed ad hunc ordinem implendum sapientia dirigit quasi prima regula. Sed in secunda operatione invenitur ratio debiti non ex parte agentis, cum Deus nulli sit debitor, sed ex parte recipientis; debitum enim est unicuique rei naturali ut habeat ea quae exigit sua natura tam in essentialibus quam in accidentalibus. Hoc autem debitum ex divina sapientia dependet, in quantum scilicet res naturalis debet esse talis quod imitetur propriam ideam quae est in mente divina; et per hunc modum invenitur ipsa divina sapientia prima regula iustitiae naturalis. In omnibus autem divinis operationibus quibus Deus creaturae aliquid supra debitum naturae impendit utpote in muneribus gratiarum, idem modus iustitiae invenitur qui in prima operatione est assignatus, qua naturas instituit. Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that God works in natural things in two ways: first by establishing the natures themselves, second by providing for each thing what belongs to its nature. And since the notion of justice requires a duty, thus, since that creatures be established is not in any way a duty but solely voluntary, the first action does not have the notion of justice but depends on the unqualified divine will, unless it is perhaps said to have the notion of justice because of the order to the will of the thing made: for it is obligatory that all that God wills be done from the very fact that God wills it; but wisdom, like a first rule, directs so that this order might be fulfilled. But in the second action the notion of duty is found not on the part of the agent, since God is not obliged by any one, but on the part of the recipient; for it is due to any natural thing that it have what its nature requires, both for essential as for accidental things. However, this obligation depends upon divine wisdom, namely, inasmuch as a natural thing ought to be such as to imitate its own idea, which is in the mind of God; and in this way divine wisdom is found to be the first rule of natural justice. However, in all divine actions by which God gives something to the creature beyond the duty of nature, as in gifts of grace, the same kind of justice is found as that which was assigned in the first operation, by which he established natures. Ad quartum dicendum quod voluntas divina secundum modum intelligendi praesupponit sapientiam, quae primo habet regulae rationem. Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the divine will presupposes wisdom with regard to the mode of understanding, which first possesses the notion of a rule. Ad quintum dicendum quod cum in Deo intellectus et voluntas non differant secundum rem, voluntas per hoc quod ab intellectu dirigitur et ad aliquid diffinitur, non ab aliquo alio restringitur; sed movetur secundum suam naturam, cum naturale sit illi voluntati ut semper secundum ordinem sapientiae agat. Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that since intellect and will do not really differ in God, the will is not restricted by another for the reason that it is directed by the intellect, that it is fixed toward something, and is not restrained by another; but it is moved according to its own nature, since it is natural for that will that it always act according to the order of wisdom. Ad sextum dicendum quod voluntatis divinae ex parte volentis non potest esse aliqua causa quae sit aliud ab ipsa voluntate, existens ei ratio volendi, nam voluntas, sapientia et bonitas secundum rem sunt idem in Deo. Sed ex parte voliti divina voluntas habet aliquam rationem, quae scilicet est ratio voliti, non volentis, secundum quod ipsum volitum ordinatur ex debito vel ex congruo ad aliquid; qui quidem ordo ad divinam sapientiam pertinet: unde ipsa est prima radix iustitiae. Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that on the part of the one willing there cannot be any cause of the divine will other than the will itself, being for itself the reason for willing: for will, wisdom, and goodness are really the same thing in God. But the divine will has a reason on the part of the thing willed, which is the reason for the thing willed and for of the one willing, inasmuch as what is willed is ordered to something either by obligation or by suitability; which order pertains to divine wisdom: hence, it is the first root of justice. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum teneamur voluntatem nostram conformare voluntati divinae Whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will Septimo quaeritur utrum teneamur voluntatem nostram conformare voluntati divinae. Seventh, it is asked whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will. Et videtur quod non: nullus enim tenetur ad impossibile; sed impossibile est nobis nostram voluntatem conformare divinae, cum divina voluntas sit nobis ignota; ergo non tenemur ad conformitatem praedictam. Obj. 1: It seems not: for no one is bound to the impossible; but it is impossible for us to conform our will to the divine, since the divine will is unknown to us; thus, we are not bound to the previously mentioned conformity. Praeterea, quicumque non facit hoc ad quod tenetur peccat; si ergo tenemur ad conformandam voluntatem nostram divinae, non conformando ipsam peccamus; sed quicumque peccat mortaliter, in hoc in quo peccat non conformat voluntatem suam divinae; ergo ex hoc ipso peccat: peccat autem aliquo alio speciali peccato, utpote quod furatur vel fornicatur; ergo quicumque peccat, duo peccata committit, quod videtur esse absurdum. Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever does not do what he is bound to do sins. Thus, if we are bound to conform our will to the divine, we sin by not conforming it. But whoever sins mortally does not conform his own will to the divine in the matter in which he sins; thus, he sins in this matter. However, he also sins in some other particular sin, such as that he robs or fornicates. Thus, whoever sins, commits two sins, which seems to be absurd. Sed dicebat quod praeceptum de conformitate voluntatis nostrae ad divinam, cum sit affirmativum, quamvis semper obliget, non tamen obligat ad semper, et sic non oportet quod quandocumque non conformat peccet. Obj. 3: But one might say that the command of conformity of our will to the divine, since it is affirmative, does not oblige forever, even though it always obliges, and so it is not necessary that one sins whenever one does not conform. Sed contra, quamvis aliquis non servans praeceptum affirmativum non peccet quolibet instanti quo non servat, peccat tamen quandocumque contrarium agit; sicut peccat aliquis quandocumque inhonorat parentes, licet non semper peccet quando non actu honorat; sed ille qui peccat mortaliter agit contrarium conformitati praedictae; ergo ex hoc ipso peccat. On the contrary, even though someone not observing the affirmative precept does not sin in any instant whatsoever that one does not observe it, nevertheless, one sins whenever one does the contrary; as when one sins whenever one dishonors one's parents, even though one does not always sin when one does not honor them in act; but the one who sins mortally does what is contrary to the previously mentioned conformity; thus, one sins in this. Praeterea, quicumque non servat hoc ad quod tenetur, est transgressor; sed ille qui peccat venialiter non conformat voluntatem suam voluntati divinae; si ergo ad conformandum tenetur erit transgressor, et ita peccabit mortaliter. Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever does not observe what one is bound to is a transgressor; but one who sins venially does not conform one's own will to the divine will; thus, if one is bound to conform, then one would be a transgressor, and so one would sin mortally. Sed dicebat quod non tenetur pro illo instanti conformare quo venialiter peccat, quia praecepta affirmativa non obligant ad semper. Obj. 5: But one might say that one is not bound to conform for that instant in which one sins venially, since affirmative precepts do not always bind. Sed contra, quicumque non servat praeceptum affirmativum loco et tempore pro quo obligat, transgressor iudicatur; sed tempus conformandi voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae non videtur posse aliud determinari nisi hoc quando voluntas exit in actum; ergo quandocumque voluntas in actum exit, nisi conformetur divinae voluntati videtur esse peccatum; et ita quando aliquis venialiter peccat, videtur esse peccatum mortale. On the contrary, whoever does not observe an affirmative precept in the place and time for which one is obliged is judged as a transgressor; but the time that our will is to be conformed to the divine will does not seem to be able to be determined in any other way except when the will goes forth in act; thus, whenever the will goes forth in act, it seems to sin, unless it be conformed to the divine will; and thus, when someone sins venially, it seems to be a mortal sin. Praeterea, nullus ad impossibile tenetur; sed obstinati non possunt suam voluntatem conformare divinae; ergo ad hanc conformitatem non tenentur, et ita nec alii; alias obstinati de sua obstinatione commodum reportarent. Obj. 6: Furthermore, no one is bound to what is impossible; but the obstinate are unable to conform their own will to the divine will; thus, they are not bound to this conformity, and so neither is anyone else; otherwise the obstinate would gain an advantage by their obstinacy. Praeterea, cum Deus quicquid vult ex caritate velit, ipse enim est caritas, si tenemur nostram voluntatem conformare divinae, tenemur caritatem habere; sed non habens caritatem non potest eam consequi, nisi ad eam se praeparet diligenter; ergo non habens caritatem tenetur se continue ad habendam caritatem praeparare; et ita in quolibet instanti quo non habet caritatem peccat, cum hoc ex defectu praeparationis proveniat. Obj. 7: Furthermore, since whatever God wills he wills out of charity, for he himself is charity, if we are bound to conform our will to the divine, we are bound to have charity; but the one not having charity cannot obtain it, unless one prepares oneself for it diligently; thus, one not having charity is bound to continually prepare oneself to have charity; and so one sins in any instant that one does not have charity, for this comes from a defect in the preparation. Praeterea, cum forma actus praecipue in modo agendi consistat, si ad conformitatem divinae voluntatis tenemur, oportet ut eodem modo aliquid velimus quo Deus vult; modum autem divinae voluntatis potest aliquis aliqualiter imitari et dilectione naturali et dilectione gratuita. Non autem potest secundum dilectionem naturalem attendi conformitas de qua loquimur, quia hoc modo conformant voluntatem suam divinae etiam infideles et peccatores dum in eis naturalis dilectio boni viget; similiter non potest attendi quantum ad dilectionem gratuitam quae est caritas, sic enim teneremur velle quicquid volumus ex caritate, quod est contra opinionem multorum, qui dicunt quod modus non cadit in praecepto; ergo videtur quod non teneamur ad conformandum nostram voluntatem divinae. Obj. 8: Furthermore, since the form of an act consists primarily in the mode of acting, if we are bound to conformity to the divine will, we must want something in the same way that God wants it. However, someone can imitate the mode of the divine will to some extent both by natural love and by gratuitous love. However, the conformity about which we are speaking cannot be considered with regard to natural love, for in this way even the unfaithful and sinners conform their will to the divine so long as the natural love of goodness thrives in them; likewise, it cannot be considered with regard to the natural love that is charity, for then we would be bound to will whatever we will from charity, which is contrary to the opinion of many, who say that the mode does not fall under a precept; thus, it seems that we are not bound to conform our will to the divine. Praeterea, quantum distat Deus ab homine, tanto voluntas Dei a voluntate hominis, ut dicit Glossa super illud Psal. "rectos decet collaudatio"; sed Deus tantum distat ab homine quod homo non potest ei conformari: cum enim homo a Deo in infinitum distet, nulla potest esse ipsius ad Deum proportio; ergo nec voluntas hominis divinae voluntati conformari potest. Obj. 9: Furthermore, God's will is as far from man's will as God is from man, as the Gloss says on Ps. 32:1 praise befits the upright; but God is so far from man that man cannot be conformed to him: for since man is infinitely far from God, there cannot be any proportion of him to God; thus, neither can man's will be conformed to the divine will.