167. Secundo poena peccatis eorum debita, cum dicit digni sunt morte. Infra VI, 23: stipendia peccati mors est.
167. Second, the punishment due to their sins, when he says, are worthy of death. The wages of sin is death (Rom 6:23).
Dignum est enim quod anima, quae deserit Deum, a corpore suo deseratur per mortem corporalem, et finaliter deseratur a Deo per mortem aeternam, de qua dicitur in Ps. XXXIII, 22: mors peccatorum pessima, et, Apoc. XX, 6: in his mors secunda non habebit potestatem.
For it is fitting that the soul which deserts God should be deserted by its own body through bodily death and in the end be deserted by God through eternal death: the death of the wicked is very evil (Ps 34:22); over such the second death has no power (Rev 20:6).
168. Tertio considerandum est quibus talis poena debetur. Et, primo, his qui talia agunt, scilicet praedicta peccata, secundum illud Ps. V, 7: odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem, perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium.
168. Third, he considers those who deserve this punishment: first, they who do such things, i.e., the above mentioned sins: you hate all evildoers. You destroy those who speak lies (Ps 5:5–6).
Et non solum illis qui faciunt sed etiam his qui consentiunt facientibus. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo directe, vel laudando peccatum, secundum illud Ps. IX, 24: laudatur peccator in desideriis animae suae, vel etiam praebendo consilium et favorem, secundum illud II Par. XIX, 2: impio praebes auxilium. Alio modo indirecte, quando non reprehendit aut impedit quocumque modo, si potest, et praecipue si ex officio incumbat, sicut peccata filiorum imputantur Heli, sicut patet I Reg. III, 13. Haec autem specialiter Apostolus dicit propter quosdam sapientes gentilium, qui, et si idola non colebant, tamen colentibus non resistebant.
But not only they who do them, but they also who consent to those who do them. And this in two ways: in one way directly, by applauding sin: the wicked is praised in the desires of his heart (Ps 10:3), or even by offering advice and help: should you help the wicked (2 Chr 19:2). In another way, indirectly, by not objecting or opposing in any way, and especially when one is obliged by his office. Thus, the sins of his sons were imputed to Eli (1 Sam 3:13). In particular, this is directed against those gentile wise men who, even though they did not worship idols, did nothing to oppose those who did.
Caput 2
Chapter 2
Judicium Dei et Lex Judaeorum
Divine Judgment and the Jewish Law
Lectio 1
Lecture 1
Inordinatum iudicium hominum
Man’s inordinate judgment
2:1 Propter quod inexcusabilis es, o homo omnis qui judicas. In quo enim judicas alterum, teipsum condemnas: eadem enim agis quae judicas. [n. 169]
2:1 Wherefore you are inexcusable, O man, whosoever you are who judges. For wherein you judge another, you condemn yourself. For you do the same things which you judge. [n. 169]
2:2 Scimus enim quoniam judicium Dei est secundum veritatem in eos qui talia agunt. [n. 178]
2:2 For we know that the judgment of God is, according to truth, against those who do such things. [n. 178]
2:3 Existimas autem hoc, o homo, qui judicas eos qui talia agunt, et facis ea, quia tu effugies judicium Dei? [n. 180]
2:3 But do you think this, O man, who judges those who do such things and does the same, that you shall escape the judgment of God? [n. 180]
2:4 an divitias bonitatis ejus, et patientiae, et longanimitatis contemnis? ignoras quoniam benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam te adducit? [n. 183]
2:4 Or do you despise the riches of his goodness and patience and longsuffering? Do you not know that the benignity of God leads you to penance? [n. 183]
2:5 Secundum autem duritiam tuam, et impoenitens cor, thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae, et revelationis justi judicii Dei, [n. 186]
2:5 But according to your hardness and impenitent heart, you treasure up to yourself wrath, against the day of wrath and revelation of the just judgment of God: [n. 186]
169. Postquam Apostolus ostendit quod gentiles iustificati non sunt ex veritatis cognitione quam habuerunt, hic ostendit quod neque etiam Iudaei iustificati sunt ex his in quibus gloriabantur. Et sic utrisque est necessaria ad salutem virtus evangelicae gratiae.
169. After showing that the gentiles did not become just from the knowledge of the truth they had, the Apostle now shows that neither were the Jews made just by the things in which they gloried. Consequently, both of them need the power of the Gospel’s grace for salvation.
Primo ergo dicit quod Iudaei non sunt iustificati ex lege.
First, therefore, he says that the Jews were not made just by the law;
Secundo, quod non sunt iustificati ex genere, de quo gloriabantur, cap. III: quid ergo est amplius?
second, that they were not made just by the race in which they gloried: what advantage then has the Jew? (Rom 3:1).
Tertio, quod non sunt iustificati ex circumcisione, cap. IV: quid ergo dicemus?
third, that they were not made just by circumcision: what shall we say then? (Rom 4:1).
170. Circa primum considerandum est quod Iudaei et gentiles, ad fidem conversi, se invicem iudicabant de priori vita. Iudaei enim gentibus obiiciebant, quod sine Dei lege viventes, idolis immolabant. gentes autem obiiciebant Iudaeis quod, lege Dei accepta, eam non servabant.
170. In regard to the first point it should be noted that Jews and gentiles converted to the faith judged each other on their previous life. For the Jews objected to the gentiles that when they lived without God’s law, they sacrificed to idols. The gentiles on their part objected to the Jews that even though they received God’s law, they did not keep it.
Primo ergo utrosque arguit de inordinato iudicio;
First, therefore, he rebukes both sides and their extravagant judgment;
secundo specialiter ostendit quod Iudaei non erant digni praemio, quia ea in quibus gloriabantur non sufficiebant ad salutem, ibi non enim auditores legis.
second, he shows that the Jews were not worthy of a reward, because the things they glory in were not sufficient for salvation, at for not the hearers of the law (Rom 2:13).
Circa primum duo facit.
In regard to the first he does two things.
Primo confutat humanum iudicium;
First, he confutes human judgment;
secundo astruit et commendat divinum, ibi scimus enim.
second, he discloses and commends the divine judgment, at for we know.
Circa primum duo facit.
In regard to the first he does two things:
Primo proponit mutuo se iudicantes inexcusabiles esse;
first, he proposes that although they judge one another, neither has an excuse;
secundo assignat rationem, ibi in quo enim.
second, he gives the reason, at for wherein you judge.
171. Primo ergo concludit ex praemissis, dicens: Propter quod gentiles veritatem de Deo cognitam in iniustitia detinuerunt, O homo, qui iudicas alium hominem, inexcusabilis es, sicut supra dixit: ita ut sint inexcusabiles.
171. First, therefore, he concludes from what he stated in the first chapter that even though the gentiles by their wickedness suppressed the truth they knew about God, you are inexcusable, O man, whosoever you are who judges another man, just as he said earlier: so that they are inexcusable (Rom 1:20).
Addit autem omnis, quasi dicat, quicumque sis, sive gentilis sive Iudaeus, quia etiam gentilis de quo magis videbatur, non potest excusari per ignorantiam, sicut supra ostensum est. I Cor. IV, 5: nolite ante tempus iudicare.
He says whoever you are as if to say: whether Jew or gentile, because even the gentiles, who might seem to have an excuse, cannot be excused on the plea of ignorance, as he stated above (Rom 1:20ff.); do not pronounce judgment before the time (1 Cor 4:5).
172. Deinde cum dicit in quo enim assignat rationem, excludendo causam excusationis.
172. Then when he says for wherein you judge he gives the reason by rejecting the causes for excuse:
Primo, quidem ignorantiam;
first, ignorance;
secundo, innocentiam, ibi eadem enim.
second, innocence, at for you do the same.
173. Ignorantia quidem excluditur per iudicium. Quicumque enim iudicat aliquem quasi male agentem, demonstrat se cognoscere illud esse malum, et ex hoc ostendit esse condemnabilem. Et hoc est quod dicit: Ideo (inquam) es inexcusabilis, in quo enim iudicas alterum quasi male agentem, teipsum condemnas, id est, ostendis te esse condemnabilem. Matth. VII, 1: nolite iudicare, et non iudicabimini.
173. Ignorance is excluded by the very act of judging. For whoever judges another an evildoer shows that he knows that the conduct is evil and, therefore, that he is himself worthy of condemnation. And this is what he says: you have no excuse, for wherein you judge another as an evildoer you condemn yourself, i.e., you show that you are worthy of being condemned: judge not, that you may not be judged (Matt 7:1).
174. Non tamen credendum est, quod omne iudicium sit condemnationis causa.
174. This does not mean that every judgment is a cause of condemnation.
Est enim triplex iudicium. Unum quidem iustum, quod scilicet fit secundum regulam iustitiae. Sap. I, 1: diligite iustitiam, qui iudicatis terram. Aliud est iudicium non iustum, quod scilicet fit contra regulam iustitiae. Sap. VI, 5: cum essetis ministri regni eius, non recte iudicastis. Est autem tertium iudicium temerarium, contra quod dicitur Eccle. V, 1: ne temere quid loquaris.
For there are three kinds of judgment: one is just, i.e., made according to the rule of justice: love justice, you rulers of the earth (Wis 1:1); another is not just, i.e., made contrary to the rule of justice: although servants of his kingdom, you did not rule rightly (Wis 6:4); the third is rash judgment against which it is said: be not rash with your mouth (Eccl 5:2).
Quod quidem dupliciter committitur. Uno modo, quando aliquis procedit circa id quod est sibi commissum iudicium absque debita veritatis cognitione; contra id quod dicitur Iob XXIX, 6: causam quam ignorabam diligentissime investigabam. Alio modo, quando aliquis usurpat sibi iudicium de occultis, de quibus solus Deus iudicare habet; contra id quod dicitur I Cor. IV, 5: nolite ante tempus iudicare, quoadusque veniat Dominus, qui illuminabit, etc.
A rash judgment is made in two ways: in one way, when a person passes judgment on a matter committed to him without due knowledge of the truth, contrary to what is stated: I searched out the cause of him whom I did not know (Job 29:16). In another way, when a person presumes to judge about hidden matters, of which God alone has the power to judge, contrary to what is stated: do not pronounce judgment before the time, before the Lord comes, who will bring to light the things now hidden in darkness (1 Cor 4:5).
175. Est autem aliquid occultum, non solum quoad nos, sed secundum sui naturam, ad solam Dei cognitionem pertinens. Primo quidem cogitatio cordis, secundum illud Ier. XVII, 9 s.: pravum est cor hominis et inscrutabile, quis cognoscet illud? Ego Dominus scrutans corda, et probans renes. Secundo, contingens futurum, secundum illud Is. XLI, 23: annuntiate quae ventura sunt in futurum, et dicemus quia dii estis vos. Et ideo, sicut dicit Augustinus, de Sermone Domini in monte: duo sunt in quibus temerarium iudicium cavere debemus: cum incertum est quo animo quidque factum fuerit, vel cum incertum est qualis quisque futurus est, qui nunc vel bonus vel malus apparet.
175. But some things are hidden not only in relation to us but of their very nature and so belong solely to God’s knowledge: first, the thoughts of the heart: man’s heart is deceitful and unsearchable. Who can understand it? I, the Lord, search the mind and try the heart (Jer 17:9); second, the contingent future: tell us what is to come hereafter, that we may know you are gods (Isa 41:23). Hence, as Augustine says: there are two cases in which we must beware of rash judgment: when it is not certain in what spirit something was done, or when it is not certain how a person will turn out, who now appears to be good or to be wicked.