Caput 16 Chapter 16 Quod in Deo non est potentia passiva That in God there is no passive potency Si autem Deus aeternus est, necesse est ipsum non esse in potentia. Now if God is eternal, it follows of necessity that he is not in potency. Omne enim id in cuius substantia admiscetur potentia, secundum id quod habet de potentia potest non esse: quia quod potest esse, potest non esse. Deus autem secundum se non potest non esse: cum sit sempiternus. In Deo igitur non est potentia ad esse. For everything in whose substance there is an admixture of potency is possibly nonexistent as regards whatever it has of potency, for that which may possibly be may possibly not be. Now God in himself cannot not be, since he is eternal. Therefore, in God there is no potency to be. Adhuc. Quamvis id quod quandoque est in potentia quandoque actu, prius sit tempore in potentia quam in actu, tamen simpliciter actus est prior potentia: quia potentia non educit se in actum, sed oportet quod educatur in actum per aliquid quod sit in actu. Omne igitur quod est aliquo modo in potentia, habet aliquid prius se. Deus autem est primum ens et prima causa, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non igitur habet in se aliquid potentiae admixtum. Again. Although that which is sometimes potential and sometimes actual, is in point of time potential before being actual, nevertheless act is simply before potency, because potency does not bring itself into act, but needs to be brought into act by something actual. Therefore, whatever is in any way potential has something previous to it. Now God is the first being and the first cause, as stated above (ch. 13). Therefore, in him there is no admixture of potency. Item. Illud quod est per se necesse esse, nullo modo est possibile esse: quia quod est per se necesse esse, non habet causam; omne autem quod est possibile esse, habet causam, ut supra ostensum est. Deum autem est per se necesse esse. Nullo igitur modo est possibile esse. Nihil ergo potentiae in sua substantia invenitur. Again. That which of itself must necessarily exist can in no way have possible existence, since whatever of itself must necessarily exist has no cause, whereas whatever has possible existence has a cause, as proved above (ch. 15). Now God, in himself, must necessarily exist. Therefore, he can in no way have possible existence. Therefore, no potency is to be found in his essence. Item. Unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu. Quod igitur non est totus actus, non toto se agit, sed aliquo sui. Quod autem non toto se agit, non est primum agens: agit enim alicuius participatione, non per essentiam suam. Primum igitur agens, quod Deus est, nullam habet potentiam admixtam, sed est actus purus. Again. Everything acts according as it is actual. Therefore, that which is not wholly actual acts not by its whole self, but by part of itself. Now that which does not act by its whole self is not the first agent, since it acts by participation of something and not by its essence. Therefore, the first agent, which is God, has no admixture of potency, but is pure act. Adhuc. Unumquodque, sicut natum est agere inquantum est actu, ita natum est pati inquantum est potentia: nam motus est actus potentia existentis. Sed Deus est omnino impassibilis ac immutabilis, ut patet ex dictis. Nihil ergo habet de potentia, scilicet passiva. Moreover. Just as a thing is naturally apt to act insofar as it is actual, so is it natural for it to be passive insofar as it is in potency, for movement is the act of that which is in potency. Now God is altogether impassible and immovable, as stated above (ch. 13). Therefore, in him there is no potency, namely that which is passive. Item. Videmus aliquid esse in mundo quod exit de potentia in actum. Non autem educit se de potentia in actum: quia quod est potentia, nondum est; unde nec agere potest. Ergo oportet esse aliquid aliud prius, qui educatur de potentia in actum. Et iterum, si hoc est exiens de potentia in actum, oportet ante hoc aliquid aliud poni, quo reducatur in actum. Hoc autem in infinitum procedere non potest. Ergo oportet devenire ad aliquid quod est tantum actu et nullo modo in potentia. Et hoc dicimus Deum. Further. We notice in the world something that passes from potency to act. Now it does not reduce itself from potency to act, because that which is potential is not yet; hence, neither can it act. Therefore, it must be preceded by something else by which it can be brought from potency to act. And if this again passes from potency to act, it must be preceded by something else, by which it can be brought from potency to act. But we cannot go on thus to infinity. Therefore, we must come to something that is wholly actual and in no way potential. And this we call God. Caput 17 Chapter 17 Quod in Deo non est materia That in God there is no matter Apparet etiam ex hoc Deum non esse materiam. Quia materia id quod est, in potentia est. From this it follows that God is not matter. For matter, such as it is, is in potency. Item. Materia non est agendi principium: unde efficiens et materia in idem non incidunt, secundum Philosophum. Deo autem convenit esse primam causam effectivam rerum, ut supra dictum est. Ipse igitur materia non est. Again. Matter is not a principle of activity. Hence, as the Philosopher puts it, efficient and material causes do not coincide. Now, as stated above (ch. 13), it belongs to God to be the first efficient cause of things. Therefore, he is not matter. Amplius. Sequitur res naturales casu existere his qui omnia in materiam reducebant sicut in causam primam: contra quos agitur in II physicorum. Si igitur Deus, qui est prima causa, sit causa materialis rerum, sequitur omnia a casu existere. Moreover. For those who referred all things to matter as their first cause, it followed that natural things exist by chance, and against these it is argued in 2 Physics 8-9. Therefore, if God, who is the first cause, is the material cause of things, it follows that all things exist by chance. Item. Materia non fit causa alicuius in actu nisi secundum quod alteratur et mutatur. Si igitur Deus est immobilis, ut probatum est, nullo modo potest esse rerum causa per modum materiae. Further. Matter does not become the cause of an actual thing except by being altered and changed. Therefore, if God is immovable, as proved above (ch. 13), he can in no way be a cause of things as their matter. Hanc autem veritatem fides Catholica confitetur, qua Deum non de sua substantia, sed de nihilo asserit cuncta creasse. The Catholic faith professes this truth, asserting that God created all things not out of his substance, but out of nothing. In hoc autem insania David de Dinando confunditur, qui ausus est dicere Deum esse idem quod prima materia, ex hoc quod, si non esset idem, oporteret differre ea aliquibus differentiis, et sic non essent simplicia; nam in eo quod per differentiam ab alio differt, ipsa differentia compositionem facit. The ravings of David of Dinant are confounded by this, who dared to assert that God is the same as prime matter, because if they were not the same, they would need to differ by certain differences, and thus they would not be simple, since in that which differs from another thing by a difference, the very difference argues composition. Hoc autem processit ex ignorantia qua nescivit quid inter differentiam et diversitatem intersit. Differens enim, ut in X Metaph. determinatur, dicitur ad aliquid, nam omne differens aliquo est differens: diversum autem aliquid absolute dicitur, ex hoc quod non est idem. Differentia igitur in his quaerenda est quae in aliquo conveniunt: oportet enim aliquid in eis assignari secundum quod differant; sicut duae species conveniunt in genere, unde oportet quod differentiis distinguantur. In his autem quae in nullo conveniunt, non est quaerendum quo differant, sed seipsis diversa sunt. Sic enim et oppositae differentiae ab invicem distinguuntur: non enim participant genus quasi partem suae essentiae: et ideo non est quaerendum quibus differant, seipsis enim diversa sunt. Sic etiam Deus et materia prima distinguuntur, quorum unus est actus purus, aliud potentia pura, in nullo convenientiam habentes. Now this proceeded from his ignorance of the distinction between difference and diversity. For a thing is said to be different in relation to something, as is said in 10 Metaphysics 3, 6 because whatever is different differs by something, whereas things are said to be diverse absolutely from the fact that they are not the same thing. Accordingly, we must seek for a difference in things which have something in common, for we have to point to something in them whereby they differ: thus two species have a common genus from which they must be distinguished by differences. But in those things which have nothing in common, we do not have to look for their differences, for they are diverse by themselves. For thus are opposite differences distinguished from one another, because they do not participate in a genus as a part of their essence. Consequently, we must not ask in what they differ, for they are diversified by their very selves. Thus too God and prime matter are distinguished, since they have nothing in common, the one being pure act and the other pure potency. Caput 18 Chapter 18 Quod in Deo nulla est compositio That in God there is no composition Ex praemissis autem concludi potest quod in Deo nulla sit compositio. From the foregoing we are able to conclude that there is no composition in God. Nam in omni composito oportet esse actum et potentiam. Non enim plura possunt simpliciter unum fieri nisi aliquid sit ibi actus, et aliud potentia. Quae enim actu sunt, non uniuntur nisi quasi colligata vel congregata, quae non sunt unum simpliciter. In quibus etiam ipsae partes congregatae sunt sicut potentia respectu unionis: sunt enim unitae in actu postquam fuerint in potentia unibiles. In Deo autem nulla est potentia. Non est igitur in eo aliqua compositio. For in every composite thing there must be act and potency, since several things cannot become one simply, unless there be something actual there and something else potential. For those things that are in act are not united except as an assemblage or group, which are not one simply. Also, in these the very parts that are gathered together are as a potency with respect to the union: for they are actually united after being potentially unitable. But in God there is no potency (ch. 16). Therefore, in him there is no composition. Item. Omne compositum posterius est suis componentibus. Primum ergo ens, quod Deus est, ex nullis compositum est. Again. Every composite comes after its components. Therefore, the first being, which is God (ch. 14), has no component parts. Adhuc. Omne compositum est potentia dissolubile, quantum est ex ratione compositionis: licet in quibusdam sit aliquid aliud dissolutioni repugnans. Quod autem est dissolubile, est in potentia ad non esse. Quod Deo non competit: cum sit per se necesse esse. Non est igitur in eo aliqua compositio. Further. Every composite is potentially dissoluble, so far as its composite nature is concerned, although in some there is something else incompatible with dissolution. Now that which is dissoluble is in potency to non-being. But this cannot be said of God, since he necessarily exists by his very essence. Therefore, there is no composition in him. Amplius. Omnis compositio indiget aliquo componente: si enim compositio est, ex pluribus est; quae autem secundum se sunt plura, in unum non convenirent nisi ab aliquo componente unirentur. Si igitur compositus esset Deus, haberet componentem: non enim ipse seipsum componere posset, quia nihil est causa sui ipsius; esset enim prius seipso, quod est impossibile. Componens autem est causa efficiens compositi. Ergo Deus haberet causam efficientem. Et sic non esset causa prima, quod supra habitum est. Moreover. Every composition requires a compounder, for if there is composition, it results from several things, and things that are several in themselves would not combine together unless they were united by a compounder. If, then, God were composite, he would have a compounder, for he could not compound himself, since no thing is its own cause, for it would precede itself, which is impossible. Now the compounder is the efficient cause of the composite. Therefore, God would have an efficient cause: and thus he would not be the first cause, which was proved above (ch. 13). Item. In quolibet genere tanto aliquid est nobilius quanto simplicius: sicut in genere calidi ignis, qui non habet aliquam frigidi permixtionem. Quod igitur est in fine nobilitatis omnium entium, oportet esse in fine simplicitatis. Hoc autem quod est in fine nobilitatis omnium entium, dicimus Deum, cum sit prima causa: causa enim est nobilior effectu. Nulla igitur compositio ei accidere potest. Again. In any genus, the more simple a thing is, the more excellent it is. For example, in the genus of hot things is fire, which has no admixture of cold. Therefore, whatever is the most noble of all things must be the height of simplicity. Now that which obtains the summit of nobility in things is what we call God, since he is the first cause, because the cause is more excellent than its effect. Therefore, there can be no composition in him. Praeterea. In omni composito bonum non est huius vel illius partis, sed totius, et dico bonum secundum illam bonitatem quae est propria totius et perfectio eius: nam partes sunt imperfectae respectu totius: sicut partes hominis non sunt homo, partes etiam numeri senarii non habent perfectionem senarii, et similiter partes lineae non perveniunt ad perfectionem mensurae quae in tota linea invenitur. Si ergo Deus est compositus, perfectio et bonitas eius propria invenitur in toto, non autem in aliqua eius partium. Et sic non erit in eo pure illud bonum quod est proprium ei. Non est ergo ipse primum et summum bonum. Furthermore. In every composite thing the good does not belong to this or that part, but to the whole (and I speak of good in reference to that goodness which is proper to, and is the perfection of, the whole). Thus the parts are imperfect in relation to the whole: for example, the parts of a man are not a man, nor do the parts of the number six have the perfection of six, nor do the parts of a line come to the perfection of the measure found in the whole line. Therefore, if God is composite, his proper perfection and goodness are found in the whole of God but not in any of his parts. And thus the good that is proper to him will not be purely in him; and consequently he will not be the first and supreme good. Item. Ante omnem multitudinem oportet invenire unitatem. In omni autem composito est multitudo. Igitur oportet id quod est ante omnia, scilicet Deum, omni compositione carere. Further. Before every multitude it is necessary to find unity. Now in every composite there is multitude. Therefore, that which is before all things, namely God, must be devoid of all composition. Caput 19 Chapter 19 Quod in Deo nihil est violentum neque praeter naturam That in God there is nothing violent or beside nature Ex hoc autem Philosophus concludit quod in Deo nihil potest esse violentum neque extra naturam. Hence the Philosopher concludes that in God there cannot be anything violent or outside nature. Omne enim illud in quo aliquid violentum et praeter naturam invenitur, aliquid sibi additum habet: nam quod est de substantia rei non potest esse violentum neque praeter naturam. Nullum autem simplex habet in se aliquid additum: ex hoc enim compositio relinqueretur. Cum igitur Deus sit simplex, ut ostensum est, nihil in eo potest esse violentum neque praeter naturam. For whatever has in itself anything violent or beside nature has something added to itself, since that which belongs to a thing’s essence cannot be violent or beside nature. Now no simple thing has in itself anything that is added, for this would mean it is composite. Since, then, God is simple, as shown above (ch. 18), there can be nothing in him that is violent or beside nature. Amplius. Necessitas coactionis est necessitas ex alio. In Deo autem non est necessitas ex alio, sed est per seipsum necessarium, et causa necessitatis aliis. Igitur nihil in eo est coactum. Further. The necessity of compulsion is a necessity imposed by another. But in God there is no necessity imposed by another, for he is necessary of himself, and the cause of necessity in other things (ch. 15). Therefore, nothing is compulsory in him. Adhuc. Ubicumque est aliquid violentum, ibi potest esse aliquid praeter id quod rei per se convenit: nam violentum contrariatur ei quod est secundum naturam. Sed in Deo non est possibile esse aliquid praeter id quod secundum se ei convenit: cum secundum se sit necesse esse, ut ostensum est. Non potest igitur in eo esse aliquid violentum. Moreover. Wherever there is violence, there can be something other than what belongs to a thing by its very nature, since violence is contrary to that which is according to nature. But it is not possible for anything to be in God that does not belong to him according to his nature, since by his very nature he exists necessarily, as shown above (ch. 15). Therefore, there can be nothing violent in him. Item. Omne in quo est aliquid violentum vel innaturale, natum est ab alio moveri: nam violentum est cuius principium est extra nil conferente vim passo. Deus autem est omnino immobilis, ut ostensum est. Igitur non potest in eo esse aliquid violentum vel innaturale. Again. Everything that is compelled or unnatural is naturally apt to be moved by another, because that which is done by compulsion has an external principle, without any concurrence on the part of the patient. Now God is altogether immovable, as shown above (ch. 13). Therefore, nothing in him can be violent or unnatural. Caput 20 Chapter 20