Caput 32 Chapter 32 Quod nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicatur That nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things Ex his autem patet quod nihil de Deo et rebus aliis potest univoce praedicari. From the above it is clear that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things. Nam effectus qui non recipit formam secundum speciem similem ei per quam agens agit, nomen ab illa forma sumptum secundum univocam praedicationem recipere non potest: non enim univoce dicitur calidus ignis a sole generatus, et sol. Rerum quarum Deus est causa, formae ad speciem divinae virtutis non perveniunt: cum divisim et particulariter recipiant quod in Deo simpliciter et universaliter invenitur. Patet igitur quod de Deo et rebus aliis nihil univoce dici potest. For an effect which does not receive the same form specifically as that by which the agent acts cannot receive the name derived from that form in a univocal sense: for the sun and the heat generated from the sun are not called hot univocally. Now the forms of things which God causes do not come to the species of the divine virtue, since they receive severally and particularly that which is in God simply and universally (ch. 28-29). It is evident, therefore, that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things. Amplius. Si aliquis effectus ad speciem causae pertingat, praedicationem nominis univoce non consequetur nisi secundum eundem essendi modum eandem specie formam suscipiat: non enim univoce dicitur domus quae est in arte, et in materia, propter hoc quod forma domus habet esse dissimile utrobique. Res autem aliae, etiam si omnino similem formam consequerentur, non tamen consequuntur secundum eundem modum essendi: nam nihil est in Deo quod non sit ipsum esse divinum, ut ex dictis patet, quod in aliis rebus non accidit. Impossibile est igitur aliquid univoce de Deo et rebus aliis praedicari. Further. If an effect attains to the species of its cause, the name of the latter will not be predicated of it univocally, unless it receives the same specific form according to the same mode of being. For ‘house’ in art is not univocally the same as ‘house’ in matter, since the form of house has a dissimilar existence in each. Now, other things, even though they receive entirely the same form, do not receive it according to the same mode of being: for there is nothing in God that is not the divine being itself, as shown above (ch. 23), which does not apply to other things. Therefore, it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and other things. Adhuc. Omne quod de pluribus univoce praedicatur, vel est genus, vel species, vel differentia, vel accidens aut proprium. De Deo autem nihil praedicatur ut genus nec ut differentia, ut supra ostensum est; et sic nec ut definitio, nec etiam ut species, quae ex genere et differentia constituitur. Nec aliquid ei accidere potest, ut supra demonstratum est: et ita nihil de eo praedicatur neque ut accidens neque ut proprium; nam proprium de genere accidentium est. Relinquitur igitur nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicari. Moreover. Whatever is predicated of several things univocally is either genus, or species, or difference, or accident, or property. Now, nothing is predicated of God as genus or as difference, as we have proved above (ch. 24-25), and consequently neither as definition nor as species, which consists of genus and difference. Nor can anything be accidental to him, as was shown above (ch. 23), and consequently nothing is predicated of God either as accidental or as proper, for the proper is a kind of accident. It follows, therefore, that nothing is predicated of God and other things univocally. Item. Quod univoce de pluribus praedicatur, utroque illorum ad minus secundum intellectum simplicius est. Deo autem neque secundum rem neque secundum intellectum potest esse aliquid simplicius. Nihil igitur univoce de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur. Again. That which is predicated univocally of several things is more simple than either of them, at least in our way of understanding. Now nothing can be more simple than God, either in reality or in our way of understanding. Therefore, nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things. Amplius. Omne quod de pluribus praedicatur univoce, secundum participationem cuilibet eorum convenit de quo praedicatur: nam species participare dicitur genus, et individuum speciem. De Deo autem nihil dicitur per participationem: nam omne quod participatur determinatur ad modum participati, et sic partialiter habetur et non secundum omnem perfectionis modum. Oportet igitur nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicari. Further. Whatever is predicated univocally of several things belongs by participation to each of the things of which it is predicated: for the species is said to participate in the genus, and the individual in the species. But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is participated is confined to the mode of a participated thing, and thus is possessed partially, and not according to every mode of perfection. It follows, therefore, that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things. Adhuc. Quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum prius et posterius, certum est univoce non praedicari: nam prius in definitione posterioris includitur: sicut substantia in definitione accidentis secundum quod est ens. Si igitur diceretur univoce ens de substantia et accidente, oporteret quod substantia etiam poneretur in definitione entis secundum quod de substantia praedicatur. Quod patet esse impossibile. Nihil autem de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur eodem ordine, sed secundum prius et posterius: cum de Deo omnia praedicentur essentialiter, dicitur enim ens quasi ipsa essentia, et bonus quasi ipsa bonitas; de aliis autem praedicationes fiunt per participationem, sicut Socrates dicitur homo non quia sit ipsa humanitas, sed humanitatem habens. Impossibile est igitur aliquid de Deo et rebus aliis univoce dici. Again. That which is predicated of several things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated of them univocally, since that which comes first is included in the definition of what follows, as substance is in the definition of accident (considered as a being). If, therefore, we were to say ‘being’ univocally of substance and accident, it would follow that substance also should enter into the definition of being as predicated of substance, which is clearly impossible. Now, nothing is predicated in the same order of God and other things, but according to priority and posteriority, since all predicates of God are essential (for he is called ‘being’ because he is being itself, and ‘good’ because he is goodness itself), whereas predicates are applied to others by participation (thus Socrates is said to be a man not as though he were humanity itself, but because he has humanity). Therefore, it is impossible for any thing to be predicated univocally of God and other things. Caput 33 Chapter 33 Quod non omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis pure aequivoce That not all terms applied to God and creatures are purely equivocal Ex praemissis etiam patet quod non quicquid de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur, secundum puram aequivocationem dicitur, sicut ea quae sunt a casu aequivoca. It is also clear from what has been said that things predicated of God and other things are not all pure equivocations, as are the effects of an equivocal cause. Nam in his quae sunt a casu aequivoca, nullus ordo aut respectus attenditur unius ad alterum, sed omnino per accidens est quod unum nomen diversis rebus attribuitur: non enim nomen impositum uni significat ipsum habere ordinem ad aliud. Sic autem non est de nominibus quae de Deo dicuntur et creaturis. Consideratur enim in huiusmodi nominum communitate ordo causae et causati, ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur secundum puram aequivocationem aliquid de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur. For in the effects of an equivocal cause we find no mutual order or relationship, and it is altogether accidental that the same name is applied to various things, for the name applied to one does not signify that it has any relationship to another. But it is not so with the terms applied to God and creatures, for, in employing these common terms, we consider the order of cause and effect, as is clear from what we have said (ch. 32). Therefore, certain things predicated of God and other things are not pure equivocations. Amplius. Ubi est pura aequivocatio, nulla similitudo in rebus attenditur, sed solum unitas nominis. Rerum autem ad Deum est aliquis modus similitudinis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Relinquitur igitur quod non dicuntur de Deo secundum puram aequivocationem. Moreover. Where there is pure equivocation, we observe no likeness of things, but merely sameness of name. Now things have some kind of likeness to God, as shown above (ch. 29). Therefore, it follows that they are not said of God by pure equivocation. Item. Quando unum de pluribus secundum puram aequivocationem praedicatur, ex uno eorum non possumus duci in cognitionem alterius: nam cognitio rerum non dependet ex vocibus, sed ex nominum ratione. Ex his autem quae in rebus aliis inveniuntur in divinorum cognitionem pervenimus, ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur secundum puram aequivocationem dicuntur huiusmodi de Deo et aliis rebus. Again. When one thing is predicated of several by pure equivocation, we cannot be led from one to the knowledge of the other, for the knowledge of things depends not on words but on the meaning of names. Now, we come to the knowledge of divine things from our observation of other things, as shown above. Therefore, such things are not pure equivocations when said of God and other things. Adhuc. Aequivocatio nominis processum argumentationis impedit. Si igitur nihil diceretur de Deo et creaturis nisi pure aequivoce, nulla argumentatio fieri posset procedendo de creaturis ad Deum. Cuius contrarium patet ex omnibus loquentibus de divinis. Further. The use of equivocal terms breaks the continuity of an argument. Therefore, if nothing were said of God and creatures except by pure equivocation, no argument could be made by proceeding to God from creatures. But the contrary is evidenced by all who speak of divine things. Amplius. Frustra aliquod nomen de aliquo praedicatur nisi per illud nomen aliquid de eo intelligamus. Sed si nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis omnino aequivoce, nihil per illa nomina de Deo intelligimus: cum significationes illorum nominum notae sint nobis solum secundum quod de creaturis dicuntur. Frustra igitur diceretur aut probaretur de Deo quod Deus est ens, bonus, vel si quid aliud huiusmodi est. Moreover. It is useless to predicate a name of a thing unless by that name we understand something about that thing. Now, if names are predicated equivocally of God and creatures, we understand nothing of God by those names, since the meanings of those names are known to us only as applied to creatures. It would, therefore, be useless to say or prove about God that God is being, good, or any thing else of the kind. Si autem dicatur quod per huiusmodi nomina solum de Deo cognoscimus quid non est, ut scilicet ea ratione dicatur vivens quia non est de genere rerum inanimatarum et sic de aliis; ad minus oportebit quod vivum de Deo et creaturis dictum conveniat in negatione inanimati. Et sic non erit pure aequivocum. If, however, it be asserted that by such terms we only know of God what he is not (namely, so that he is called ‘living’ because he is not in the genus of inanimate beings, and so forth), it follows at least that ‘living’ when said of God and creatures agrees in the negation of inanimate being: and thus it will not be a pure equivocation. Caput 34 Chapter 34 Quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis dicuntur analogice That terms applied to God and creatures are said analogically Sic igitur ex dictis relinquitur quod ea quae de Deo et rebus aliis dicuntur, praedicantur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice: hoc est, secundum ordinem vel respectum ad aliquid unum. It follows, then, from what has been said (ch. 32-33) that those things which are said of God and other things are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically, that is, according to an order or relation to some one thing. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit: uno modo, secundum quod multa habent respectum ad aliquid unum: sicut secundum respectum ad unam sanitatem animal dicitur sanum ut eius subiectum, medicina ut eius effectivum, cibus ut conservativum, urina ut signum. This happens in two ways. First, according as many things have a relation to some one thing: thus in relation to the one health, an animal is said to be ‘healthy’ as its subject, medicine as effective thereof, food as preserving it, and urine as its sign. Alio modo, secundum quod duorum attenditur ordo vel respectus, non ad aliquid alterum, sed ad unum ipsorum: sicut ens de substantia et accidente dicitur secundum quod accidens ad substantiam respectum habet, non quod substantia et accidens ad aliquid tertium referantur. Second, according as an order or relation of two things may be observed not to some other thing, but to one of them. Thus being is said of substance and accident insofar as accident bears a relation to substance, and not as though substance and accident were referred to a third thing. Huiusmodi igitur nomina de Deo et rebus aliis non dicuntur analogice secundum primum modum, oporteret enim aliquid Deo ponere prius: sed modo secundo. Accordingly, such names are not said of God and other things analogically in the first way, for it would be necessary to suppose something prior to God, but in the second way. In huiusmodi autem analogica praedicatione ordo attenditur idem secundum nomen et secundum rem quandoque, quandoque vero non idem. Nam ordo nominis sequitur ordinem cognitionis: quia est signum intelligibilis conceptionis. Quando igitur id quod est prius secundum rem, invenitur etiam cognitione prius, idem invenitur prius et secundum nominis rationem et secundum rei naturam: sicut substantia est prior accidente et natura, inquantum substantia est causa accidentis; et cognitione, inquantum substantia in definitione accidentis ponitur. Et ideo ens dicitur prius de substantia quam de accidente et secundum rei naturam et secundum nominis rationem. Quando vero id quod est prius secundum naturam, est posterius secundum cognitionem, tunc in analogicis non est idem ordo secundum rem et secundum nominis rationem: sicut virtus sanandi quae est in sanativis, prior est naturaliter sanitate quae est in animali, sicut causa effectu; sed quia hanc virtutem per effectum cognoscimus, ideo etiam ex effectu nominamus. Et inde est quod sanativum est prius ordine rei, sed animal dicitur per prius sanum secundum nominis rationem. Now in this analogical predication the relationship is sometimes found to be the same both as to the name and as to the thing, and sometimes it is not the same. For the relationship of the name follows on the relationship of knowledge, since the name is the sign of intellectual conception. Accordingly, when that which comes first in reality is found to be first also in knowledge, the same thing is found to be first both as to the meaning of the name and as to the nature of the thing. Thus substance is prior to accident both in nature (inasmuch as substance is the cause of accident), and in knowledge (inasmuch as substance is placed in the definition of accident). Therefore, ‘being’ is said of substance prior to being said of accident, both in reality and according to the meaning of the word. On the other hand, when that which comes first according to nature comes afterwards according to knowledge, then, in analogical terms, there is not the same order according to the reality and according to the meaning of the name. Thus the healing power in health-giving medicine is naturally prior to health in the animal, as cause is prior to effect; yet, as we know this power through its effect, we name it from that effect. Hence it is that ‘health-giving’ is first in the order of reality, and yet ‘healthy’ is predicated of animal first according to the meaning of the term. Sic igitur, quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominum de Deo et rebus aliis dictorum per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum, sed ratio nominis per posterius. Unde et nominari dicitur a suis causatis. Accordingly, since we arrive at the knowledge of God from other things, the reality of the names predicated of God and other things is first in God according to his mode, but the meaning of the name is in him afterwards. Therefore, he is said to be named from his effects. Caput 35 Chapter 35 Quod plura nomina dicta de Deo non sunt synonyma That the several names predicated of God are not synonymous Ostenditur etiam ex dictis quod, quamvis nomina de Deo dicta eandem rem significent, non tamen sunt synonyma: quia non significant rationem eandem. From what we have said it is also proved that although names predicated of God signify the same thing, they are not synonymous, because they do not convey the same meaning. Nam sicut diversae res uni simplici rei quae Deus est similantur per formas diversas, ita intellectus noster per diversas conceptiones ei aliqualiter similatur, inquantum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum in ipsum cognoscendum perducitur. Et ideo de uno, intellectus noster multa concipiens non est falsus neque vanus: quia illud simplex esse divinum huiusmodi est ut ei secundum formas multiplices aliqua similari possint, ut supra ostensum est. Secundum autem diversas conceptiones diversa nomina intellectus adinvenit quae Deo attribuit. Et ita, cum non secundum eandem rationem attribuantur, constat ea non esse synonyma, quamvis rem omnino unam significent: non enim est eadem nominis significatio, cum nomen per prius conceptionem intellectus quam rem intellectam significet. For just as various things are by their various forms like one simple thing (which is God), so our intellect is somewhat like him by its various conceptions, insofar as it is led to know him by the various perfections of creatures. Therefore, our understanding is neither false nor vain in conceiving many things about one thing; because that simple divine being is such that certain things can be likened to him according to their manifold forms, as we have proved above (ch. 29, 31). And, according to its various conceptions, our intellect devises various names which it applies to God. Therefore, since they are not applied with the same meaning, it is clear that they are not synonymous, although they signify a thing absolutely one: for the name does not have the same meaning, since it denotes the concept of the intellect prior to the thing understood. Caput 36 Chapter 36 Qualiter intellectus noster de Deo propositionem formet How our intellect forms a proposition about God Ex hoc etiam ulterius patet quod intellectus noster de Deo simplici non in vanum enuntiationes format componendo et dividendo, quamvis Deus omnino sit simplex. Furthermore, from this it is clear that our intellect does not vainly form propositions about a simple God by composition and division, although God is altogether simple. Quamvis namque intellectus noster in Dei cognitionem per diversas conceptiones deveniat, ut dictum est, intelligit tamen id quod omnibus eis respondet omnino unum esse: non enim intellectus modum quo intelligit rebus attribuit intellectis; sicut nec lapidi immaterialitatem, quamvis eum immaterialiter cognoscat. Et ideo rei unitatem proponit per compositionem verbalem, quae est identitatis nota, cum dicit, Deus est bonus vel bonitas: ita quod si qua diversitas in compositione est, ad intellectum referatur, unitas vero ad rem intellectam. Et ex hac ratione quandoque intellectus noster enuntiationem de Deo format cum aliqua diversitatis nota, praepositionem interponendo, ut cum dicitur, bonitas est in Deo: quia et hic designatur aliqua diversitas, quae competit intellectui, et aliqua unitas, quam oportet ad rem referre. For, although our intellect arrives at the knowledge of God by various conceptions, as stated above (ch. 35), it understands that what corresponds to them all is absolutely one, because our intellect does not ascribe its mode of understanding to the things which it understands, even as neither does it ascribe immateriality to a stone, although it knows it immaterially. Consequently, it enunciates the unity of the thing by a verbal composition implying identity when it says ‘God is good’ or ‘is goodness’: so that if there be any diversity in the composition it is referred to the understanding, and unity to the thing understood. Similarly, sometimes our intellect forms a proposition about God with an implication of diversity by inserting a preposition, as when we say: ‘goodness is in God’, because here we imply both a certain diversity that is befitting the understanding, and a certain unity which must be referred to the thing. Caput 37 Chapter 37 Quod Deus est bonus That God is good