Caput 37 Chapter 37 Quod Deus est bonus That God is good Ex perfectione autem divina, quam ostendimus, bonitas ipsius concludi potest. The goodness of God may be concluded from his perfection which we have proved (ch. 28). Id enim quo unumquodque bonum dicitur, est propria virtus eius: nam virtus est uniuscuiusque quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit. Virtus autem est perfectio quaedam: tunc enim unumquodque perfectum dicimus quando attingit propriam virtutem, ut patet in VII physicorum. Ex hoc igitur unumquodque bonum est quod perfectum est. Et inde est quod unumquodque suam perfectionem appetit sicut proprium bonum. Ostensum est autem Deum esse perfectum. Est igitur bonus. For that by reason of which a thing is said to be good is its own virtue, since the virtue of any thing is that which makes its subject good and renders its work good. Now virtue is a perfection, since we say that a thing is perfect when it attains its proper virtue, as is clear in 7 Physics 3, 4. Therefore, a thing is good because it is perfect. And hence every thing desires its own perfection as its proper good. Now it has been proved that God is perfect (ch. 28). Therefore, he is good. Item. Ostensum est supra esse aliquod primum movens immobile, quod Deus est. Movet autem sicut movens omnino immobile. Quod movet sicut desideratum. Deus igitur, cum sit primum movens immobile, est primum desideratum. Desideratur autem dupliciter aliquid: aut quia est bonum; aut quia apparet bonum. Quorum primum est quod est bonum: nam apparens bonum non movet per seipsum, sed secundum quod habet aliquam speciem boni; bonum vero movet per seipsum. Primum igitur desideratum, quod Deus est, est vere bonum. Again. It has been proved above (ch. 13) that there is an immovable first mover, which is God. Now he moves as a mover absolutely immovable, and this moves as the object of desire. Therefore, God is the first object of desire since he is the first immovable mover. Now a thing is desired in two ways: either because it is good, or because it seems good. The former is that which is good, for the seeming good does not move essentially, but according as it has some appearance of good, whereas the good moves essentially. Therefore, the first object of desire, which is God, is good. Adhuc. Bonum est quod omnia appetunt: ut Philosophus optime dictum introducit, I Ethicorum. Omnia autem appetunt esse actu secundum suum modum: quod patet ex hoc quod unumquodque secundum naturam suam repugnat corruptioni. Esse igitur actu boni rationem constituit: unde et per privationem actus a potentia consequitur malum, quod est bono oppositum, ut per Philosophum patet, in IX Metaphysicae. Deus autem est ens actu non in potentia, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur vere bonus. Further. The good is that which all things desire, which the Philosopher quotes as very well said in 1 Ethics 1. Now all things desire to be in act according to their mode, which is evident from the fact that everything, by its nature, shrinks from corruption. Therefore, the essential notion of the good is to be in act, and consequently evil (which is opposed to good) results from the privation of act by potency, as the Philosopher declares in 9 Metaphysics. Now God is a being in act and not in potency, as we have proved above (ch. 15). Therefore, he is truly good. Amplius. Communicatio esse et bonitatis ex bonitate procedit. Quod quidem patet et ex ipsa natura boni, et ex eius ratione. Naturaliter enim bonum uniuscuiusque est actus et perfectio eius. Unumquodque autem ex hoc agit quod actu est. Agendo autem esse et bonitatem in alia diffundit. Unde et signum perfectionis est alicuius quod simile possit producere: ut patet per Philosophum in IV Meteororum. Ratio vero boni est ex hoc quod est appetibile. Quod est finis. Qui etiam movet agentem ad agendum. Propter quod dicitur bonum esse diffusivum sui et esse. Haec autem diffusio Deo competit: ostensum enim est supra quod aliis est causa essendi, sicut per se ens necesse. Est igitur vere bonus. Moreover. The bestowal of being and goodness proceeds from goodness. This is proved from the very nature of the good, and from the notion it conveys. For the good of a thing is naturally its act and perfection. Now a thing acts through being in act. But by acting, it bestows being and goodness on other things. Therefore, it is a sign of a thing’s perfection that it is able to produce its like, as the Philosopher declares in 4 Meteorology 3, 1. Again, the notion of the good is that it is something appetible, and this is an end. And the end moves the agent to act. Hence good is said to be diffusive of itself and being. Now, this diffusion is becoming to God: for it has been shown above (ch. 13) that he is the cause of being in other things, since he is the essentially necessary being. Therefore, he is truly good. Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: quam bonus Israel Deus his qui recto sunt corde. Et Thren. 3:25 dicitur: bonus est dominus sperantibus in se, animae quaerenti illum. Therefore, it is said in the Psalm: truly God is good to Israel, to those who are pure in heart (Ps 73[72]:1); and: the Lord is good to those who wait for him, to the soul that seeks him (Lam 3:25). Caput 38 Chapter 38 Quod Deus est ipsa bonitas That God is goodness itself Ex his autem haberi potest quod Deus sit sua bonitas. From the above we are able to conclude that God is his own goodness. Esse enim actu in unoquoque est bonum ipsius. Sed Deus non solum est ens actu, sed est ipsum suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur ipsa bonitas, non tantum bonus. For to be in act is for every thing its own good. Now, God is not only being in act, but is his own being, as proved above (ch. 22). Therefore, he is goodness itself and not merely good. Praeterea. Perfectio uniuscuiusque est bonitas eius, ut ostensum est. Perfectio autem divini esse non attenditur secundum aliquid additum supra ipsum, sed quia ipsum secundum seipsum perfectum est, ut supra ostensum est. Bonitas igitur Dei non est aliquid additum suae substantiae, sed sua substantia est sua bonitas. Further. The perfection of a thing is its goodness, as we have shown above (ch. 37). Now the perfection of the divine being does not consist in something added to it, but in its being perfect in itself, as proved above (ch. 28). Therefore, God’s goodness is not something added to his essence, but his essence is his goodness. Item. Unumquodque bonum quod non est sua bonitas, participative dicitur bonum. Quod autem per participationem dicitur, aliquid ante se praesupponit, a quo rationem suscipit bonitatis. Hoc autem in infinitum non est possibile abire: quia in causis finalibus non proceditur in infinitum, infinitum enim repugnat fini; bonum autem rationem finis habet. Oportet igitur devenire ad aliquod bonum primum, quod non participative sit bonum per ordinem ad aliquid aliud, sed sit per essentiam suam bonum. Hoc autem Deus est. Est igitur Deus sua bonitas. Again. Any good that is not its own goodness is good by participation. Now that which is by participation presupposes something antecedent to itself, from which it derives the nature of goodness. But it is not possible to continue thus to infinity, for in final causes there is no proceeding to infinity, since the infinite is inconsistent with finality, and the good has the nature of a final cause. We must, therefore, come to some first good that is good not by participation in relation to something else, but by its essence. Now this is God. Therefore, God is his own goodness. Item. Id quod est participare aliquid potest, ipsum autem esse nihil: quod enim participat potentia est, esse autem actus est. Sed Deus est ipsum esse, ut probatum est. Non est igitur bonus participative, sed essentialiter. Again. That which exists can participate in something, but being itself can participate in nothing, for that which participates is potency, whereas being is act. Now God is being itself, as we have proved (ch. 22). Therefore, he is good not by participation, but essentially. Amplius. Omne simplex suum esse et id quod est unum habet: nam, si sit aliud et aliud, iam simplicitas tolletur. Deus autem est omnino simplex, ut ostensum est. Igitur ipsum esse bonum non est aliud quam ipse. Est igitur sua bonitas. Moreover. In every simple thing, ‘being’ and ‘that which is’ are one: for if they are distinct, there is no longer simplicity (ch. 18). Now, God is absolutely simple, as we have proved. Therefore, that he is good is not distinct from himself. Therefore, he is his own goodness. Per eadem etiam patet quod nullum aliud bonum est sua bonitas. Propter quod dicitur Matth. 19:17: nemo bonus nisi solus Deus. These same arguments show that nothing else is its own goodness. Hence it is said: none is good but God alone (Matt 19:17). Caput 39 Chapter 39 Quod in Deo non potest esse malum That no evil can be in God Ex hoc autem manifeste apparet quod in Deo non potest esse malum. Hence it is manifestly apparent that evil cannot be in God. Esse enim et bonitas, et omnia quae per essentiam dicuntur, nihil praeter se habent admixtum: licet id quod est vel bonum possit aliquid praeter esse et bonitatem habere. Nihil enim prohibet quod est uni perfectioni suppositum, etiam alii supponi, sicut quod est corpus potest esse album et dulce: unaquaeque autem natura suae rationis termino concluditur, ut nihil extraneum intra se capere possit. Deus autem est bonitas, non solum bonus, ut ostensum est. Non potest igitur in eo esse aliquid non bonitas. Et ita malum in eo omnino esse non potest. For ‘being’ and ‘goodness’ and all essential predicates have nothing besides themselves added to them, although ‘that which is’ or ‘the good’ may have something besides being or goodness. For nothing hinders the subject of one perfection being the subject of another besides: thus that which is a body may be white and sweet. But every nature is confined within the bounds of its essence, so that it admits of nothing extraneous within itself. Now God is goodness, and not merely good, as we have proved above (ch. 38). Therefore, nothing that is not goodness can be in him, and consequently evil can in no way be in him. Amplius. Id quod est oppositum essentiae alicuius rei, sibi omnino convenire non potest dum manet: sicut homini non potest convenire irrationalitas vel insensibilitas nisi homo esse desistat. Sed divina essentia est ipsa bonitas, ut ostensum est. Ergo malum, quod est bono oppositum, in eo locum habere non potest nisi esse desisteret. Quod est impossibile: cum sit aeternus, ut supra ostensum est. Moreover. As long as a thing remains, that which is contrary to its essence is altogether incompatible with it: thus irrationality or insensibility is incompatible with man, unless he ceases to be man. Now the divine essence is goodness itself, as we have proved (ch. 38). Therefore, evil (which is contrary to good) can have no place in God unless he ceases to be God, which is impossible, since he is eternal, as was proved above (ch. 15). Adhuc. Cum Deus sit suum esse, nihil participative de ipso dici potest, ut patet ex ratione supra inducta. Si igitur malum de ipso dicatur; non dicetur participative, sed essentialiter. Sic autem malum de nullo dici potest ut sit essentia alicuius: ei enim esse deficeret, quod bonum est, ut ostensum est; in malitia autem non potest esse aliquid extraneum admixtum, sicut nec in bonitate. Malum igitur de Deo dici non potest. Again. Since God is his own being, nothing can be said of him by participation, as is clear from the argument given above (ch. 38). If, then, evil were predicated of him, it would be a predicate not by participation, but by essence. But evil cannot be predicated of any thing in such a way as to be the essence of that thing, for it would lack being, which is a good, as we have shown above (ch. 37). And in evil there can be no extraneous admixture, as neither can there be in goodness. Therefore, evil cannot be predicated of God. Item. Malum bono oppositum est. Ratio autem boni in perfectione consistit. Ergo ratio mali in imperfectione. Defectus autem vel imperfectio in Deo, qui est universaliter perfectus, esse non potest, ut supra ostensum est. In Deo igitur malum esse non potest. Again. Evil is opposed to good. But the notion of good consists in perfection (ch. 37). And therefore the notion of evil consists in imperfection. Now defect or imperfection cannot be in God, since he is completely perfect, as shown above (ch. 28). Therefore, evil cannot be in God. Praeterea. Perfectum est aliquid secundum quod est actu. Ergo imperfectum erit secundum quod est deficiens ab actu. Ergo malum vel privatio est, vel privationem includit. Privationis autem subiectum est potentia. Haec autem in Deo esse non potest. Igitur nec malum. Further. A thing is perfect according as it is in act (ch. 28). Therefore, it will be imperfect according as it is deficient in act. Therefore, evil is either privation or includes privation. Now the subject of privation is a potency. But this cannot be in God (ch. 16). Consequently, neither can evil. Praeterea. Si bonum est quod ab omnibus appetitur, igitur malum unaquaeque natura refugit inquantum huiusmodi. Quod autem inest alicui contra motum naturalis appetitus, est violentum et praeter naturam. Malum igitur in unoquoque est violentum et praeter naturam secundum quod est ei malum: etsi possit ei esse naturale secundum aliquid eius in rebus compositis. Deus autem compositus non est, nec aliquid esse potest in eo violentum vel praeter naturam, ut ostensum est. Malum igitur in Deo esse non potest. Moreover. If good is what is desired by all, it follows that evil as such is shunned by every nature. Now that which is in a thing against the mode of its natural appetite is violent and unnatural. Therefore, evil in a thing is violent and unnatural insofar as it is an evil to that thing (although in composite things it may be natural in respect of some part). But God is not composite, nor can anything be violent or unnatural in him, as shown above (ch. 18, 19). Therefore, evil cannot be in God. Hoc etiam sacra Scriptura confirmat. Dicitur enim prima canonica Ioannis: Deus lux est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae. Et in Iob 34:10: absit a Deo impietas, et ab omnipotente iniquitas. This is moreover confirmed by Sacred Scripture. For it is written in the first canonical epistle of John: God is light and in him is no darkness at all (1 John 1:5); and: far be it from God that he should do wickedness, and from the Almighty that he should do wrong (Job 34:10). Caput 40 Chapter 40 Quod Deus est omnis boni bonum That God is the good of every good Ostenditur etiam ex praedictis quod Deus sit omnis boni bonum. It is also proved from the foregoing that God is the good of every good. Bonitas enim uniuscuiusque est perfectio ipsius, ut dictum est. Deus autem, cum sit simpliciter perfectus, sua perfectione omnes rerum perfectiones comprehendit, ut ostensum est. Sua igitur bonitas omnes bonitates comprehendit. Et ita est omnis boni bonum. For the goodness of a thing is its perfection, as we have stated (ch. 37). Now, since God is simply perfect, he contains in his perfection the perfections of all things, as we have shown (ch. 28). Therefore, his goodness contains all goodnesses, and consequently he is the good of every good. Item. Quod per participationem dicitur aliquale, non dicitur tale nisi inquantum habet quandam similitudinem eius quod per essentiam dicitur: sicut ferrum dicitur ignitum inquantum quandam similitudinem ignis participat. Sed Deus est bonus per essentiam, omnia vero alia per participationem, ut ostensum est. Igitur nihil dicetur bonum nisi inquantum habet aliquam similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Est igitur ipse bonum omnis boni. Again. A thing is not said to have a quality by participation, except insofar as it bears some resemblance to that which is said to have that quality essentially. Thus iron is said to be ‘fiery’ insofar as it partakes of a resemblance to fire. Now, God is good essentially, while everything else is good by participation, as we have proved (ch. 38). Therefore, nothing is said to be good except insofar as it bears some resemblance to the divine goodness. Therefore, he is the good of every good. Adhuc. Cum unumquodque appetibile sit propter finem; boni autem ratio consistat in hoc quod est appetibile: oportet quod unumquodque dicatur bonum vel quia est finis, vel quia ordinatur ad finem. Finis igitur ultimus est a quo omnia rationem boni accipiunt. Hoc autem Deus est, ut infra probabitur. Est igitur Deus omnis boni bonum. Further. Since a thing is desirable for the sake of an end, and the aspect of good consists in its being desirable (ch. 37), it follows that a thing is said to be good either because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end. Therefore, the last end is that from which all things take the aspect of good. Now this is God, as we shall prove further on (bk. III, ch. 17). Therefore, God is the good of every good. Hinc est quod dominus, suam visionem Moysi promittens, dicit, Exodi 33:19: ego ostendam tibi omne bonum. Et Sap. 8, dicitur de divina sapientia: venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa. Hence the Lord, in promising Moses that he should see him, said: I will make all my goodness pass before you (Exod 33:19). And it is said of divine wisdom: all good things came to me along with her (Wis 7:11). Caput 41 Chapter 41 Quod Deus sit summum bonum That God is the highest good