Caput 44 Chapter 44 Quod Deus est intelligens That God is an intelligent being Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest quod Deus sit intelligens. It may be shown from the above that God is an intelligent being. Ostensum enim est supra quod in moventibus et motis non est possibile in infinitum procedere, sed oportet mobilia omnia reducere, ut probabile est, in unum primum movens seipsum. Movens autem seipsum se movet per appetitum et apprehensionem: sola enim huiusmodi inveniuntur seipsa movere, utpote in quibus est moveri et non moveri. Pars igitur movens in primo movente seipsum oportet et quod sit appetens et apprehendens. In motu autem qui est per appetitum et apprehensionem, appetens et apprehendens est movens motum: appetibile autem et apprehensum est movens non motum. For it was proved (ch. 13) that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, and that all things moved must be reduced, as is probable, to one self-moving principle. Now a self-mover moves itself by appetite and apprehension: for only such things are found to move themselves, since it is in them to be moved and not to be moved. Therefore, the moving part in the first self-mover must be appetitive and apprehensive. Now, in that movement which is by appetite and apprehension the appetent and apprehender is a moved mover, while the appetible and the apprehended is a mover not moved. Cum igitur id quod est omnium primum movens, quod Deum dicimus, sit movens omnino non motum, oportet quod comparetur ad motorem qui est pars moventis seipsum sicut appetibile ad appetentem. Non autem sicut appetibile sensuali appetitu: nam appetitus sensibilis non est boni simpliciter, sed huius particulati boni, cum et apprehensio sensus non sit nisi particularis; id autem quod est bonum et appetibile simpliciter, est prius eo quod est bonum et appetibile ut hic et nunc. Since, then, that which is the first mover of all, which we call God, is a mover altogether unmoved, it follows that it is compared to the motor which is a part of the self-mover as the appetible to the appetent. Not, however, as the appetible to the sensitive appetite, because the sensitive appetite is not of the good simply, but of this particular good, since also sensitive apprehension is only of the particular; and that which is good and appetible simply, is prior to that which is good and appetible here and now. Oportet igitur primum movens esse appetibile ut intellectum. Et ita oportet movens quod appetit ipsum, esse intelligens. Multo igitur magis et ipsum primum appetibile erit intelligens: quia appetens ipsum fit intelligens actu per hoc quod ei tamquam intelligibili unitur. Oportet igitur Deum esse intelligentem facta suppositione quod primum motum moveat seipsum, ut philosophi voluerunt. Therefore, the first mover must be the appetible as an object of the understanding, and consequently the mover that desires itself must be an intelligent being. Much more, therefore, is the very first appetible an intelligent being, because what desires it becomes actually understanding through being united to it as an intelligible object. Therefore, it follows that God is intelligent, if it is supposed that the first mover moves itself, as the early philosophers maintained. Adhuc. Idem necesse est sequi si fiat reductio mobilium non in aliquod primum movens seipsum, sed in movens omnino immobile. Nam primum movens est universale principium motus. Oportet igitur, cum omne movens moveat per aliquam formam quam intendit in movendo, quod forma per quam movet primum movens, sit universalis forma et universale bonum. Forma autem per modum universalem non invenitur nisi in intellectu. Oportet igitur primum movens, quod Deus est, esse intelligens. Again. The same conclusion follows necessarily if movable things be reduced not to some first self-mover, but to a mover that is utterly immovable. For the first mover is the universal principle of movement. Therefore, since every mover moves by some form which it intends in moving, it follows that the form by which the first mover moves must be universal form and universal good. Now a form is not found under conditions of universality save in the intellect. Therefore, the first mover, which is God, must be intelligent. Amplius. In nullo ordine moventium invenitur quod movens per intellectum sit instrumentum eius quod movet absque intellectu, sed magis e converso. Omnia autem moventia quae sunt in mundo, comparantur ad primum movens, quod Deus est, sicut instrumenta ad agens principale. Cum igitur in mundo inveniantur multa moventia per intellectum, impossibile est quod primum movens moveat absque intellectu. Necesse est igitur Deum esse intelligentem. Moreover. In no order of movers do we find that a mover by the intellect is the instrument of that which moves without intellect, but rather the opposite. Now all movers that are in the world are compared to the first mover, which is God, as instruments to the principal agent. Since, then, we find in the world many movers by intellect, it is impossible that the first mover move without intellect. Therefore, God must of necessity be intelligent. Item. Ex hoc aliqua res est intelligens quod est sine materia: cuius signum est quod formae fiunt intellectae in actu per abstractionem a materia. Unde et intellectus est universalium et non singularium: quia materia est individuationis principium. Formae autem intellectae in actu fiunt unum cum intellectu actu intelligente. Unde, si ex hoc sunt formae intellectae in actu quod sunt sine materia, oportet rem aliquam ex hoc esse intelligentem quod est sine materia. Ostensum est autem supra Deum esse omnino immaterialem. Est igitur intelligens. Again. A thing is intelligent from the fact of its being without matter. The sign of this is that forms become understood through abstraction from matter. Hence also understanding is of universals and not of singulars, because matter is the principle of individualization. Now forms actually understood become one with the intellect actually understanding. Therefore, if forms are actually understood from the very fact that they are without matter, it follows that a thing is actually intelligent from the fact that it is without matter. Now it was shown above (ch. 17, 27) that God is absolutely immaterial. Therefore, he is intelligent. Adhuc. Deo nulla perfectio deest quae in aliquo genere entium inveniatur, ut supra ostensum est: nec ex hoc aliqua compositio in eo consequitur, ut etiam ex superioribus patet. Inter perfectiones autem rerum potissima est quod aliquid sit intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est quodammodo omnia, habens in se omnium perfectionem. Deus igitur est intelligens. Again. God lacks no perfection that is to be found in any genus of things, as we have proved above (ch. 28), nor does it follow from this that there is any composition in him, as was also shown above (ch. 31) Now the greatest among the perfections of things is that a thing is intellectual, because thereby it is, after a fashion, all things, having in itself the perfection of all. Therefore, God is intelligent. Item. Omne quod tendit determinate in aliquem finem, aut ipsum praestituit sibi finem, aut praestituitur ei finis ab alio: alias non magis in hunc quam in illum finem tenderet. Naturalia autem tendunt in fines determinatos: non enim a casu naturales utilitates consequuntur: sic enim non essent semper aut in pluribus, sed raro; horum enim est casus. Cum ergo ipsa non praestituant sibi finem, quia rationem finis non cognoscunt; oportet quod eis praestituatur finis ab alio, qui sit naturae institutor. Hic autem est qui praebet omnibus esse, et est per seipsum necesse esse, quem Deum dicimus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non autem posset naturae finem praestituere nisi intelligeret. Deus igitur est intelligens. Moreover. Whatever tends definitely to an end either prescribes that end to itself, or that end is prescribed to it by another, else it would not tend to this end rather than to that. Now natural things tend to definite ends, for they do not pursue their natural purposes by chance, since in that case those purposes would not be realized always or for the most part, but seldom, for such is chance. Since, then, they do not prescribe the end to themselves, for they do not apprehend the notion of end, it follows that the end is prescribed to them by another, who is the author of nature. This is he who gives being to all, and who necessarily exists of himself, whom we call God, as shown above (ch. 13). Now he would be unable to prescribe nature its end unless he were intelligent. Therefore, God is intelligent. Amplius. Omne quod est imperfectum, derivatur ab aliquo perfecto: nam perfecta naturaliter sunt priora imperfectis, sicut actus potentia. Sed formae in rebus particularibus existentes sunt imperfectae: quia partialiter, et non secundum communitatem suae rationis. Oportet igitur quod deriventur ab aliquibus formis perfectis et non particulatis. Tales autem formae esse non possunt nisi intellectae: cum non inveniatur aliqua forma in sua universalitate nisi in intellectu. Et per consequens oportet eas esse intelligentes, si sint subsistentes: sic enim solum possunt esse operantes. Deum igitur, qui est actus primus subsistens, a quo omnia alia derivantur, oportet esse intelligentem. Moreover. Whatever is imperfect originates from something perfect, because the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect, as act precedes potency. Now the forms that exist in particular things are imperfect, since their existence is limited and does not extend to the full universality of their nature. Therefore, they must originate from certain perfect and not limited forms. Now such forms are impossible except as an object of the understanding, since no form is found in a state of universality except in the intellect. Consequently, those forms must be intelligent if they are subsistent, for in no other way can they be operative. Therefore, it follows that God, who is the first subsistent act from which all others derive, is intelligent. Hanc autem veritatem etiam fides Catholica confitetur. Dicitur enim Iob 9:4 de Deo: sapiens corde est et fortis robore. Et 12:16: apud ipsum est fortitudo et sapientia. In Psalmo: mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me. Et Rom. 11:33: o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei. The Catholic faith confesses this truth. For it is said of God: he is wise in heart and mighty in strength (Job 9:4); and: with him are strength and wisdom (Job 12:16); and in the Psalm: your knowledge is become wonderful to me (Ps 139[138]:6); and: O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God (Rom 11:33). Huius autem fidei veritas in tantum apud homines invaluit ut ab intelligendo nomen Dei imponerent: nam Theos, quod secundum Graecos Deum significat, dicitur a theasthe, quod est considerare vel videre. The truth of this belief took such hold on men that they named God from understanding: for Theos, which is the Greek for ‘God,’ is derived from theasthai, which means ‘to consider’ or ‘to see.’ Caput 45 Chapter 45 Quod intelligere Dei est sua essentia That God’s act of intelligence is his essence Ex hoc autem quod Deus est intelligens, sequitur quod suum intelligere sit sua essentia. From the fact that God is intelligent it follows that his act of intelligence is his essence. Intelligere enim est actus intelligentis in ipso existens, non in aliud extrinsecum transiens, sicut calefactio transit in calefactum: non enim aliquid patitur intelligibile ex hoc quod intelligitur, sed intelligens perficitur. Quicquid autem est in Deo, est divina essentia. Intelligere ergo Dei est divina essentia, et divinum esse, et ipse Deus: nam Deus est sua essentia et suum esse. For intelligence is the act of an intelligent being, existing within that being and not passing on to something outside of it, as heating passes into the thing heated: for the intelligible suffers nothing through being understood, but the one who understands is perfected. Now, whatever is in God is the divine essence (ch. 23). Therefore, God’s act of intelligence is the divine essence, the divine existence, and God himself, since God is his essence and his existence (ch. 21, 22). Praeterea. Intelligere comparatur ad intellectum sicut esse ad essentiam. Sed esse divinum est eius essentia, ut supra probatum est. Ergo et intelligere divinum eius intellectus. Intellectus autem divinus est Dei essentia: alias esset accidens Deo. Oportet igitur quod intelligere divinum sit eius essentia. Further. The act of intelligence is compared to the intellect as existence to essence. But God’s existence is his essence, as proved above (ch. 22). Therefore, God’s act of intelligence is his intellect. Now the divine intellect is God’s essence, otherwise it would be accidental to God (cf. ch. 23). Therefore, the divine act of intelligence must be his essence. Amplius. Actus secundus est perfectior quam actus primus: sicut consideratio quam scientia. Scientia autem vel intellectus Dei est ipsa eius essentia, si est intelligens, ut ostensum est: cum nulla perfectio conveniat ei participative, sed per essentiam, ut ex superioribus patet. Si igitur sua consideratio non sit sua essentia, aliquid erit sua essentia nobilius et perfectius. Et sic non erit in fine perfectionis et bonitatis. Unde non erit primum. Moreover. Second act is more perfect than first act, for example, as consideration is more perfect than knowledge. Now God’s knowledge or intellect is his very essence if he is intelligent, as shown above (ch. 44), since no perfection belongs to him by participation, but by essence, as already proved (ch. 23). If, therefore, his act of consideration be not his essence, something will be more noble and perfect than his essence. And thus he will not be in the summit of perfection and goodness (cf. ch. 28), and consequently he will not be first. Adhuc. Intelligere est actus intelligentis. Si igitur Deus intelligens non sit suum intelligere, oportet quod comparetur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum. Et ita in Deo erit potentia et actus. Quod est impossibile, ut supra probatum est. Again. Intelligence is the act of the intelligent. If, then, God, being intelligent, is not his act of intelligence, he must be compared to it as potency to act, and so there will be potency and act in God, which is impossible, as we have proved above (ch. 16). Item. Omnis substantia est propter suam operationem. Si igitur operatio Dei sit aliud quam divina substantia, erit finis eius aliquid aliud a se. Et sic Deus non erit sua bonitas: cum bonum cuiuslibet sit finis eius. Again. Every substance is for the sake of its operation. If, therefore, God’s operation is other than the divine substance, his end will be other than himself. And thus God will not be his own goodness, since the good of a thing is its end (cf. ch. 37, 38). Si autem divinum intelligere est eius esse, necesse est quod intelligere eius sit simplex, aeternum et invariabile, et actu tantum existens, et omnia quae de divino esse probata sunt. Non est igitur Deus in potentia intelligens, aut de novo aliquid intelligere incipiens, vel quamcumque mutationem aut compositionem in intelligendo habens. If, however, God’s act of intelligence is his existence, his act of intelligence must be simple, eternal, unchangeable, existing only in act, and all those things which have been proved about the divine existence. Therefore, God is not in potency to intelligence, nor does he begin to understand a thing anew, nor is his act of intelligence subject to any change or composition whatsoever. Caput 46 Chapter 46 Quod Deus per nihil aliud intelligit quam per suam essentiam That God understands by nothing else than his essence Ex his autem quae supra ostensa sunt, evidenter apparet quod intellectus divinus nulla alia specie intelligibili intelligat quam sua essentia. From what has been proved above it is made evident that the divine intellect understands by no other intelligible species but the divine essence. Species enim intelligibilis principium formale est intellectualis operationis: sicut forma cuiuslibet agentis principium est propriae operationis. Divina autem operatio intellectualis est eius essentia, ut ostensum est. Esset igitur aliquid aliud divinae essentiae principium et causa si alia intelligibili specie quam sua essentia intellectus divinus intelligeret. Quod supra ostensis repugnat. For the intelligible species is the formal principle of the intellectual operation, even as the form of every agent is the principle of that agent’s proper operation. Now, the intellectual operation of God is his essence, as we have shown (ch. 45). Therefore, something else would be the principle and cause of the divine essence, if the divine intellect understood by some intelligible species other than his essence, and this is in contradiction with what has been shown above (ch. 13). Adhuc. Per speciem intelligibilem fit intellectus intelligens actu: sicut per speciem sensibilem sensus actu sentiens. Comparatur igitur species intelligibilis ad intellectum sicut actus ad potentiam. Si igitur intellectus divinus aliqua alia specie intelligibili intelligeret quam seipso, esset in potentia respectu alicuius. Quod esse non potest, ut supra ostensum est. Again. The intellect is made actually intelligent by the intelligible species, just as sense is made actually sentient by the sensible species. Hence the intelligible species is compared to the intellect as act to potency. And consequently if the divine intellect were to understand by a species other than itself, it would be in potency with respect to something: and this is impossible, as we have proved above (ch. 16). Amplius. Species intelligibilis in intellectu praeter essentiam eius existens esse accidentale habet: ratione cuius scientia nostra inter accidentia computatur. In Deo autem non potest aliquod esse accidens, ut supra ostensum est. Igitur non est in intellectu eius aliqua species praeter ipsam divinam essentiam. Moreover. An intelligible species that is other than the essence of the intellect in which it is has an accidental being: for which reason our knowledge is reckoned among the accidents. Now, there can be no accident in God, as proved above (ch. 23). Therefore, there is no species in his intellect besides the divine essence. Adhuc. Species intelligibilis similitudo est alicuius intellecti. Si igitur in intellectu divino sit aliqua intelligibilis species praeter essentiam ipsius, similitudo alicuius intellecti erit. Aut igitur divinae essentiae: aut alterius rei. Ipsius quidem divinae essentiae non potest esse: quia sic divina essentia non esset intelligibilis per seipsam, sed illa species faceret eam intelligibilem. Nec etiam potest esse in intellectu divino species alia praeter essentiam ipsius quae sit alterius rei similitudo. Illa enim similitudo imprimeretur ei ab aliquo. Non autem a seipso: quia sic idem esset agens et patiens; essetque aliquod agens quod non suam sed alterius similitudinem induceret patienti, et sic non omne agens sibi simile ageret. Nec ab alio: esset enim aliquod agens prius eo. Ergo impossibile est quod in ipso sit aliqua species intelligibilis praeter ipsius essentiam. Further. An intelligible species is the image of something understood. Therefore, if there be an intelligible species besides its essence in the divine intellect, it will be the image of something understood. Either, therefore, it will be the image of the divine essence or of some other thing. But it cannot be the image of the divine essence: for then the divine essence would not be intelligible by itself, and this species would make it intelligible. Nor again can there be in the divine intellect a species distinct from its essence and representative of some other thing. For this image would be imprinted on it by something. Not, however, by the divine intellect itself, because then the same thing would be agent and patient, and there would be an agent which imprints not its own but another’s image on the patient, and thus not every agent would produce its like. Nor again by another, for then there would be an agent prior to the divine intellect. Therefore, there cannot possibly be in it an intelligible species besides its essence. Praeterea. Intelligere Dei est eius esse, ut ostensum est. Si igitur intelligeret per aliquam speciem quae non sit sua essentia, esset per aliquod aliud a sua essentia. Quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit per aliquam speciem quae non sit sua essentia. Moreover. God’s act of intelligence is his essence, as we have proved (ch. 45). Therefore, if he understood by a species that is not his essence, it would be by something other than his essence. But this is impossible (ch. 22). Therefore, he does not understand by a species that is not his essence. Caput 47 Chapter 47 Quod Deus intelligit perfecte seipsum That God understands himself perfectly Ex hoc autem ulterius patet quod ipse seipsum perfecte intelligit. It is furthermore clear from the above that God understands himself perfectly. Cum enim per speciem intelligibilem intellectus in rem intellectam feratur, ex duobus perfectio intellectualis operationis dependet. Unum est ut species intelligibilis perfecte rei intellectae conformetur. Aliud est ut perfecte intellectui coniungatur: quod quidem tanto fit amplius quanto intellectus in intelligendo maiorem efficaciam habet. Ipsa autem divina essentia quae est species intelligibilis qua intellectus divinus intelligit, est ipsi Deo penitus idem; estque intellectui ipsius idem omnino. Seipsum igitur Deus perfectissime cognoscit. For, since the intellect is directed by the intelligible species to the thing understood, the perfection of intellectual operation depends on two things. One is that the intelligible species be perfectly conformed to the thing understood. The other is that it be perfectly united to the intellect; and this is all the more so according as the intellect is endowed with greater efficacy in understanding. Now, the divine essence, which is the intelligible species by which the divine intellect understands, is absolutely the same as God himself, and is altogether identified with his intellect. Therefore, God understands himself most perfectly. Adhuc. Res materialis intelligibilis efficitur per hoc quod a materia et materialibus conditionibus separatur. Quod ergo est per sui naturam ab omni materia et materialibus conditionibus separatum, hoc est intelligibile secundum suam naturam. Sed omne intelligibile intelligitur secundum quod est unum actu cum intelligente. Ipse autem Deus intelligens est, ut probatum est. Igitur, cum sit immaterialis omnino, et sibi ipsi maxime sit unum, maxime seipsum intelligit. Further. A material thing is made intelligible by being abstracted from matter and from material conditions. Therefore, that which by its nature is severed from matter and from material conditions is intelligible by its very nature. Now, every intelligible is understood according as it is actually one with the intelligent, and God is himself intelligent, as we have proved (ch. 44). Therefore, since he is altogether immaterial, and is absolutely one with himself, he understands himself most perfectly.