Caput 50 Chapter 50 Quod Deus habet propriam cognitionem de omnibus rebus That God has proper knowledge of all things Quia vero quidam dixerunt quod Deus de aliis rebus non habet cognitionem nisi universalem, utpote cognoscens ea inquantum sunt entia, ex hoc quod naturam essendi cognoscit per cognitionem sui ipsius; restat ostendendum quod Deus cognoscit omnes alias res prout ab invicem sunt distinctae et a Deo. Quod est cognoscere res secundum proprias rationes earum. Since, however, some have said that God has none but a universal knowledge of other things (in the sense that he knows them as beings through knowing the nature of being from his knowledge of himself) it remains to be shown that God knows all other things as distinct from one another and from God. This is to know things by their proper ideas. Ad huius autem ostensionem, Deum esse causam omnis entis supponatur: quod et ex supra dictis aliquatenus patet, et infra plenius ostendetur. Sic igitur nihil in aliqua re esse potest quod non sit ab eo causatum vel mediate vel immediate. Cognita autem causa, cognoscitur eius effectus. Quicquid igitur est in quacumque re potest cognosci cognito Deo et omnibus causis mediis quae sunt inter Deum et res. Sed Deus seipsum cognoscit et omnes causas medias quae sunt inter ipsum et rem quamlibet. Quod enim seipsum perfecte cognoscat, iam ostensum est. Seipso autem cognito, cognoscit quod ab ipso immediate est. Quo cognito, cognoscit iterum quod ab illo immediate est: et sic de omnibus causis mediis usque ad ultimum effectum. Ergo Deus cognoscit quicquid est in re. Hoc autem est habere propriam et completam cognitionem de re, cognoscere scilicet omnia quae in re sunt, communia et propria. Deus ergo propriam de rebus cognitionem habet, secundum quod sunt ab invicem distinctae. In evidence of this let us suppose that God is the cause of every being, which is clear to a certain extent from what has been said above and will be more fully proved further on. Accordingly, then, there can be nothing in a thing without its being caused by him indirectly or directly. Now if the cause be known, its effect is known. Therefore, all that is in anything whatsoever can be known if God be known as well as all the causes between God and that thing. Now God knows himself and all the causes between him and any thing whatever. For it has been shown already that he knows himself perfectly. And through knowing himself he knows whatever proceeds from him immediately. Again, through knowing this, he knows whatever proceeds from it immediately, and so on as regards every intervening cause until the ultimate effect. Therefore, God knows whatever is in a thing. Now this is to have proper and complete knowledge of a thing, namely, to know whatever is in a thing, whether common or proper. Therefore, God has proper knowledge of things according as they are distinct from one another. Adhuc. Omne quod agit per intellectum, habet cognitionem de re quam agit secundum propriam facti rationem: quia cognitio facientis determinat formam facto. Deus autem causa est rerum per intellectum: cum suum esse sit suum intelligere, unumquodque autem agit inquantum est actu. Cognoscit igitur causatum suum proprie, secundum quod est distinctum ab aliis. Further. Whatever acts by intellect has knowledge of what it does as regards the proper idea of the thing done, because the knowledge of the doer appoints the form to the thing done. Now God is cause of things by his intellect, since his being is his act of intelligence, and every thing acts insofar as it is actual. Therefore, he knows his effect properly, according as it is distinct from others. Amplius. Rerum distinctio non potest esse a casu: habet enim ordinem certum. Oportet ergo ex alicuius causae intentione distinctionem in rebus esse. Non autem ex intentione alicuius causae per necessitatem naturae agentis: quia natura determinatur ad unum, et sic nullius rei per naturae necessitatem agentis intentio potest esse ad multa inquantum distincta sunt. Restat ergo quod distinctio in rebus provenit ex intentione alicuius causae cognoscentis. Videtur autem intellectus proprium esse rerum distinctionem considerare: unde et Anaxagoras distinctionis principium intellectum dixit. Universalis autem rerum distinctio non potest esse ex intentione alicuius causarum secundarum: quia omnes huiusmodi causae sunt de universitate causatorum distinctorum. Est igitur hoc primae causae, quae per seipsam ab omnibus aliis distinguitur, intendere distinctionem omnium rerum. Deus igitur cognoscit res ut distinctas. Moreover. The distinction of things cannot arise from chance, for it has a fixed order. Hence it follows that the distinction among things proceeds from the intention of some cause. But it cannot proceed from the intention of a cause that acts from natural necessity, because nature is determined to one thing, so that nothing that acts from natural necessity can have an intention in relation to several things considered as distinct from one another. It remains, therefore, that the distinction among things arises from the intention of a cause endowed with knowledge. Now it would seem proper to an intellect to consider the distinction among things: and hence Anaxagoras declared that an intellect was the principle of distinction. But taken as a whole, the distinction of things cannot proceed from the intention of any second cause, since all such causes are included in the universality of distinct effects. Therefore, it belongs to the first cause, which is of itself distinct from all others, to intend the distinction among all things. Therefore, God knows things as distinct. Item. Quicquid Deus cognoscit, perfectissime cognoscit: est enim in eo omnis perfectio sicut in simpliciter perfecto, ut supra ostensum est. Quod autem cognoscitur in communi tantum, non perfecte cognoscitur: ignorantur enim ea quae sunt praecipua illius rei, scilicet ultimae perfectiones, quibus perficitur proprium esse eius; unde tali cognitione magis cognoscitur res in potentia quam in actu. Si igitur Deus cognoscendo essentiam suam cognoscit omnia in universali, oportet quod etiam propriam habeat cognitionem de rebus. Again. Whatsoever God knows, he knows most perfectly, for in him are all perfections as in that which is simply perfect, as shown above. Now that which is known only in general is not known perfectly, since the chief things belonging to it are ignored, namely, its ultimate perfections by which its own being is perfected. Thus by such knowledge as this a thing is known potentially, rather than actually. Accordingly, if God, by knowing his essence, knows all things in general, it follows that he has also proper knowledge of things. Adhuc. Quicumque cognoscit naturam aliquam, cognoscit per se accidentia illius naturae. Per se autem accidentia entis, inquantum est ens, sunt unum et multa, ut probatur in IV Metaph. Deus igitur, si cognoscendo essentiam suam cognoscit in universali naturam entis, sequitur quod cognoscat multitudinem. Multitudo autem sine distinctione intelligi non potest. Intelligit igitur res prout sunt ab invicem distinctae. Further. Whoever knows a nature knows the accidents of that nature in itself. Now the accidents of being in itself, as being, are one and many, as is proved in Metaphysics 4. Therefore, if God, by knowing his essence, knows the nature of being in general, it follows that he knows multitude. Now multitude is inconceivable without distinction. Therefore, he understands things as distinct from one another. Amplius. Quicumque cognoscit perfecte aliquam naturam universalem, cognoscit modum quo natura illa haberi potest: sicut qui cognoscit albedinem, scit quod recipit magis et minus. Sed ex diverso modo essendi constituuntur diversi gradus entium. Si igitur Deus cognoscendo se cognoscit naturam universalem entis; non autem imperfecte, quia ab eo omnis imperfectio longe est, ut supra probatum est: oportet quod cognoscat omnes gradus entium. Et sic de rebus aliis a se habebit propriam cognitionem. Moreover. Whoever knows perfectly a universal nature knows the mode in which that nature can be had: thus he who knows whiteness knows that it is susceptive of increase and decrease. Now the various degrees of being result from various modes of being. Therefore, if God by knowing himself knows the universal nature of being—and this not imperfectly, since all imperfection is far removed from him, as we have proved above—it follows that he knows all the degrees of being: and so he has proper knowledge of things other than himself. Praeterea. Quicumque cognoscit perfecte aliquid, cognoscit omnia quae sunt in illo. Sed Deus cognoscit seipsum perfecte. Ergo cognoscit omnia quae sunt in ipso secundum potentiam activam. Sed omnia secundum proprias formas sunt in ipso secundum potentiam activam: cum ipse sit omnis entis principium. Ipse igitur habet cognitionem propriam de omnibus rebus. Further. Whoever knows a thing perfectly knows all that is in that thing. Now God knows himself perfectly. Therefore, he knows all that is in him in relation to his active power. But all things according to their proper forms are in him in relation to his active power, since he is the principle of all being. Therefore, he has proper knowledge of all things. Adhuc. Quicumque scit naturam aliquam, scit an illa natura sit communicabilis: non enim animalis naturam sciret perfecte qui nesciret eam pluribus communicabilem esse. Divina autem natura communicabilis est per similitudinem. Scit ergo Deus quot modis eius essentiae aliquid simile esse potest. Sed ex hoc sunt diversitates formarum quod divinam essentiam res diversimode imitantur: unde Philosophus formam naturalem divinum quoddam nominat. Deus igitur de rebus habet cognitionem secundum proprias formas. Again. Whoever knows a nature knows whether that nature is communicable: for one would not know the nature of an animal perfectly unless one knew that it is communicable to several. Now the divine nature is communicable according to likeness. Therefore, God knows in how many ways a thing can be like his essence. But the diversity of forms arises from the different ways in which things reflect the divine essence: therefore, the Philosopher calls a natural form a godlike thing. Therefore, God has knowledge of things in reference to their proper forms. Praeterea. Apud homines et alios cognoscentes habetur cognitio de rebus prout in sua multitudine sunt ab invicem distinctae. Si igitur Deus res in sua distinctione non cognoscit, sequitur eum insipientissimum esse: sicut et illis qui ponebant Deum non cognoscere litem, quam omnes cognoscunt; quod pro inconvenienti habet Philosophus, in I De anima et in III Metaphysicae. Moreover. Men and other beings endowed with knowledge know things as many and distinct from one another. Accordingly, if God does not know things as distinct from one another, it follows that he is most foolish, as in the opinion of those who asserted that God is ignorant of discord, which all know, an opinion that the Philosopher considers inadmissible in On the Soul 1 and Metaphysics 3. Hoc etiam auctoritate Scripturae canonicae edocemur. Dicitur namque Gen. 1:31: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Et Heb. 4:13: non est ulla creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius: omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius. We are also taught this by the authority of canonical Scripture: for it is stated: God saw all the things that he had made and they were very good (Gen 1:31); and: before him no creature is hidden, but all are open and laid bare to his eyes (Heb 4:13). Caput 51 Chapter 51 Rationes ad inquirendum qualiter multitudo intellectorum sit in intellectu divino Reasons for inquiring how there is a multitude of things understood in the divine intellect Sed ne multitudo intellectorum in intellectum divinum compositionem inducat, investigandus est modus quo ista intellecta sint multa. Lest, however, from the fact that God understands many things, we be led to conclude that there is composition in the divine intellect, we must examine in what way the things he understands are many. Non autem haec multitudo sic intelligi potest quasi multa intellecta habeant esse distinctum in Deo. Ista enim intellecta aut essent idem quod essentia divina: et sic in essentia Dei poneretur aliqua multitudo, quod supra multipliciter est remotum. Aut essent superaddita essentiae divinae: et sic esset in Deo aliquod accidens, quod supra impossibile esse ostendimus. Now, they cannot be understood to be many as though the many things God understands had a distinct being in him. For these understood things would either be the same as the divine essence, and thus we should have multitude in the essence of God, which has been disproved above in many ways, or else they would be added to the divine essence, and thus there would be something accidental in God, and this again we have proved above to be impossible. Nec iterum potest poni huiusmodi formas intelligibilia per se existere: quod Plato, praedicta inconvenientia vitans, videtur posuisse, introducendo ideas. Nam formae rerum naturalium sine materia existere non possunt: cum nec sine materia intelligantur. Nor again can it be admitted that these intelligible forms exist in themselves, as Plato, in order to avoid the above impossibilities, seems to have maintained by holding the existence of Ideas. For the forms of natural things cannot exist apart from matter, since neither are they understood without matter. Quod etiam si poneretur, nec hoc sufficeret ad ponendum Deum intelligere multitudinem. Nam cum formae praedictae sint extra Dei essentiam, si sine his Deus multitudinem rerum intelligere non posset, quod ad perfectionem sui intellectus requiritur, sequeretur quod sua perfectio in intelligendo ab alio dependeret: et per consequens in essendo, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Cuius contrarium supra ostensum est. And even if the above supposition were admissible, it would not suffice to explain how God understands many things. For, since the aforesaid forms are outside the essence of God, if God were unable without them to understand the multitude of things (as is requisite for the perfection of his intellect), it would follow that the perfection of his understanding depends on something else. Consequently also the perfection of his being, since his being is his act of intelligence, the contrary of which has been shown above. Item. Cum omne quod est praeter essentiam suam sit causatum ab eo, ut infra ostendetur, necesse est, si formae praedictae extra Deum sunt, ab eo causatas esse. Ipse autem est causa rerum per intellectum, ut infra ostendetur. Ergo Deum intelligere huiusmodi intelligibilia praeexigitur ordine naturae ad hoc quod huiusmodi intelligibilia sint. Non igitur per hoc Deus intelligit multitudinem quod intelligibilia multa per se existunt extra eum. Again. Since all that is beside his essence is caused by him, as we shall prove further on, it must be that if the aforesaid forms are outside God, they are caused by him. Now he is the cause of things by his intellect, as we shall show further on. Therefore, in order that these intelligible forms may exist, it is required that previously in the order of nature God should understand them. And consequently, God does not understand multitude through the fact that many intelligible things exist outside him in themselves. Adhuc. Intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu: sicut et sensibile in actu est sensus in actu. Secundum vero quod intelligibile ab intellectu distinguitur, est utrumque in potentia, sicut et in sensu patet: nam neque visus est videns actu, neque visibile videtur actu, nisi cum visus informatur visibilis specie, ut sic ex visu et visibili unum fiat. Si igitur intelligibilia Dei sunt extra intellectum ipsius, sequetur quod intellectus suus sit in potentia, et similiter intelligibilia ipsius. Et sic indigebit aliquo reducente in actu. Quod est impossibile: nam hoc esset eo prius. Again. The intelligible in act is the intellect in act, even as the sensible in act is the sense in act. But so far as the intelligible is distinct from the intellect, both are in potency, as appears in the senses: for neither is the sight actually seeing, nor the visible actually seen, except when the sight is informed by the species of the visible object, so that one thing results from sight and visible. Accordingly, if the intelligible objects of God are outside his intellect, it will follow that his intellect is in potency, and likewise his intelligible objects: and thus he will need something to reduce him to act. But this is impossible, since this thing would be prior to him. Praeterea. Intellectum oportet esse in intelligente. Non igitur sufficit ponere formas rerum per se existentes extra intellectum divinum ad hoc quod Deus multitudinem rerum intelligat, sed oportet quod sint in ipso intellectu divino. Further. The object understood must be in the intellect. Therefore, in order to explain how God understands the multitude of things, it is not enough to suppose that the forms of things exist in themselves outside the divine intellect, but they must be in the divine intellect itself. Caput 52 Chapter 52 Continuatio praecedentii Continuation of the foregoing Ex eisdem etiam rationibus apparet quod non potest poni quod multitudo intelligibilium praedictorum sit in aliquo alio intellectu praeter divinum, vel animae vel angeli sive intelligentiae. From these very same reasons it appears that the multitude of the aforesaid intelligibles cannot be said to be in something beside the divine intellect, either that of the soul, or that of an angel or intelligence. Nam sic intellectus divinus, quantum ad aliquam suam operationem, dependeret ab aliquo posteriori intellectu. Quod etiam est impossibile. For in that case the divine intellect, in respect of one of its operations, would depend on some secondary intellect, which also is impossible. Sicut etiam res in se subsistentes a Deo sunt, ita et quae rebus insunt. Unde et ad esse praedictorum intelligibilium in aliquo posteriorum intellectuum praeexigitur intelligere divinum, per quod Deus est causa. Just as things that subsist in themselves are from God, so are those that exist in a subject. Therefore, the existence of the aforesaid intelligibles in some secondary intellect presupposes God’s act of intelligence through which he is their cause. Sequetur etiam intellectum divinum esse in potentia: cum sua intelligibilia non sint ei coniuncta. It would also follow that God’s intellect is in potency, since his intelligibles would not be united to him. Sicut etiam unicuique est proprium esse, ita et propria operatio. Non igitur esse potest ut per hoc quod aliquis intellectus ad operandum disponitur, alius operationem intellectualem exequatur, sed ipsemet intellectus apud quem dispositio invenitur: sicut unumquodque est per essentiam suam, non per essentiam alterius. Per hoc igitur quod intelligibilia multa sunt apud aliquem secundorum intellectuum, non poterit esse quod intellectus primus multitudinem cognoscat. Just as each thing has its proper being, so does it have its proper operation. Thus it is impossible that because one intellect is disposed to operate, another exercises intellectual operation, but only that same intellect where we find the disposition, even as a thing is by its own essence and not by another’s. Hence it does not become possible for the first intellect to understand multitude, through the fact that many intelligibles are in some second intellect. Caput 53 Chapter 53 Solutio praemissae dubitationis Solution of the foregoing doubt Praemissa autem dubitatio faciliter solvi potest, si diligenter inspiciatur qualiter res intellectae in intellectu existant. The foregoing doubt may be easily solved if we examine carefully how things understood are in the understanding. Et ut ab intellectu nostro ad divini intellectus cognitionem, prout est possibile, procedamus, considerandum est quod res exterior intellecta a nobis in intellectu nostro non existit secundum propriam naturam, sed oportet quod species eius sit in intellectu nostro, per quam fit intellectus in actu. Existens autem in actu per huiusmodi speciem sicut per propriam formam, intelligit rem ipsam. Non autem ita quod ipsum intelligere sit actio transiens in intellectum, sicut calefactio transit in calefactum, sed manet in intelligente: sed habet relationem ad rem quae intelligitur, ex eo quod species praedicta, quae est principium intellectualis operationis ut forma, est similitudo illius. And in order that, as far as possible, we may proceed from our intellect to the knowledge of the divine intellect, it must be observed that the external objects which we understand do not exist in our intellect according to their own nature, but it is necessary that our intellect contain their species by which it becomes intellect in act. And being in act by this species, as by its proper form, it understands the object itself. And yet the act of understanding is not an act passing into the intellect, as heating passes into the object heated, but it remains in the one who understands, although it bears a relation to the object understood, for the very reason that the aforesaid species, which is the formal principle of intellectual operation, is the image of that object. Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio. Et hoc quidem necessarium est: eo quod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et praesentem, in quo cum intellectu imaginatio convenit; sed intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit; et hoc non posset esse nisi intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam formaret. Moreover, it must be observed that the intellect, informed by the species of the object, by understanding forms in itself some intention of the understood object, which is this notion of the object, signified by its definition. This indeed is necessary, since the intellect understands indifferently a thing absent or present, and in this point agrees with the imagination. Yet the intellect has this besides: it understands a thing as separate from material conditions, without which it does not exist in reality; and this is impossible unless the intellect forms for itself the aforesaid intention. Haec autem intentio intellecta, cum sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili quae facit intellectum in actu, quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis principium: licet utrumque sit rei intellectae similitudo. Per hoc enim quod species intelligibilis quae est forma intellectus et intelligendi principium, est similitudo rei exterioris, sequitur quod intellectus intentionem formet illi rei similem: quia quale est unumquodque, talia operatur. Et ex hoc quod intentio intellecta est similis alicui rei, sequitur quod intellectus, formando huiusmodi intentionem, rem illam intelligat. Now this understood intention, since it is the term, so to speak, of the intellectual operation, is distinct from the intelligible species which makes the intellect in act, and which we must look upon as the principle of the intellectual operation (although each is an image of the object understood). It is because the intelligible species (which is the form of the intellect and the principle of understanding) is the image of the external object that the intellect in consequence forms an intention like that object: for such as a thing is, such is the effect of its operation. And since the understood intention is like a particular thing, it follows that the intellect, by forming this intention, understands that thing. Intellectus autem divinus nulla alia specie intelligit quam essentia sua, ut supra ostensum est. Sed tamen essentia sua est similitudo omnium rerum. Per hoc ergo sequitur quod conceptio intellectus divini, prout seipsum intelligit, quae est verbum ipsius, non solum sit similitudo ipsius Dei intellecti, sed etiam omnium quorum est divina essentia similitudo. Sic ergo per unam speciem intelligibilem, quae est divina essentia, et per unam intentionem intellectam, quae est verbum divinum, multa possunt a Deo intelligi. On the other hand, the divine intellect understands by no species other than his essence, as we have proved. And yet his essence is the likeness of all things. Therefore, it follows from this that the concept of the divine intellect, according as he understands himself, which concept is his word, is the likeness not only of God himself understood, but also of all things of which the divine essence is the likeness. Accordingly, God can understand many things by one intelligible species, which is the divine essence, and by one understood intention, which is the divine word.