Caput 60 Chapter 60 Quod Deus est veritas That God is truth Ex praemissis autem apparet quod ipse Deus est veritas. It follows from what has been said that God himself is truth. Veritas enim quaedam perfectio est intelligentiae, sive intellectualis operationis, ut dictum est. Intelligere autem Dei est sua substantia. Ipsum etiam intelligere, cum sit divinum esse, ut ostensum est, non supervenienti aliqua perfectione perfectum est, sed est per seipsum perfectum: sicut et de divino esse supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur quod divina substantia sit ipsa veritas. For truth is a perfection of the intelligence or intellectual operation, as stated above. Now God’s act of intelligence is his substance, and since this very act of intelligence is God’s being, as we have shown, it is not made perfect by some additional perfection, but is perfect in itself, just as we have said about the divine being. It remains, therefore, that the divine substance is truth itself. Item. Veritas est quaedam bonitas intellectus, secundum Philosophum. Deus autem est sua bonitas, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo est etiam sua veritas. Again. Truth is a good of the intellect, according to the Philosopher. Now God is his own goodness, as we have shown. Therefore, he is also his own truth. Praeterea. De Deo nihil participative dici potest: cum sit suum esse, quod nihil participat. Sed veritas est in Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Si igitur non dicatur participative, oportet quod dicatur essentialiter. Deus ergo est sua veritas. Further. Nothing can be said participatively of God, since he is his own being, which participates in nothing. Now truth is in God, as was shown above. If, then, it be not said of him participatively, it follows that it is said essentially. Therefore, God is his own truth. Amplius. Licet verum proprie non sit in rebus sed in mente, secundum Philosophum, res tamen interdum vera dicitur, secundum quod proprie actum propriae naturae consequitur. Unde Avicenna dicit, in sua Metaphysica, quod veritas rei est proprietas esse uniuscuiusque rei quod stabilitum est ei, inquantum talis res nata est de se facere veram aestimationem, et inquantum propriam sui rationem quae est in mente divina, imitatur. Sed Deus est sua essentia. Ergo, sive de veritate intellectus loquamur sive de veritate rei, Deus est sua veritas. Moreover. Although properly speaking the true is not in things but in the mind, according to the Philosopher, nevertheless sometimes a thing is said to be true, insofar as it attains to the act of its own nature. Hence, Avicenna says in his Metaphysics that the truth of a thing is a property of the nature immutably attached to it, insofar as that thing is naturally inclined to cause a true estimate of itself, and reflects the type of itself that is in the divine mind. Now God is his own essence. Therefore, whether we speak of the truth of the mind, or of the truth of the thing, God is his own truth. Hoc autem confirmatur auctoritate domini de se dicentis, Ioan. 14:6: ego sum via, veritas et vita. This is confirmed by the authority of our Lord, who says of himself: I am the way, the truth, and the life (John 14:6). Caput 61 Chapter 61 Quod Deus est purissima veritas That God is the most pure truth Hoc autem ostenso, manifestum est quod in Deo est pura veritas, cui nulla falsitas vel deceptio admisceri potest. The foregoing being established it is evident that in God there is pure truth, in which there can be no alloy of falsehood or deception. Veritas enim falsitatem non compatitur: sicut nec albedo nigredinem. Deus autem non solum est verus, sed est ipsa veritas. Ergo in eo falsitas esse non potest. For falsehood is incompatible with truth, even as black with white. Now God is not merely true, but is truth itself. Therefore, there can be no falsehood in him. Amplius. Intellectus non decipitur in cognoscendo quod quid est: sicut nec sensus in proprio sensibili. Omnis autem cognitio divini intellectus se habet ad modum intellectus cognoscentis quod quid est, ut ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur in divina cognitione errorem sive deceptionem aut falsitatem esse. Moreover. The intellect is not deceived in knowing what a thing is, as neither is the sense about its proper sensible. Now all knowledge of the divine intellect is as the knowledge of one who knows what a thing is, as was proved above. Therefore, it is impossible that there be error, deception, or falsehood in the divine knowledge. Praeterea. Intellectus in primis principiis non errat, sed in conclusionibus interdum, ad quas ex principiis primis ratiocinando procedit. Intellectus autem divinus non est ratiocinativus aut discursivus, ut supra ostensum est. Non igitur potest esse in ipso falsitas aut deceptio. Further. The intellect does not err about first principles, but it does sometimes about conclusions, to which it proceeds by arguing from first principles. Now, the divine intellect is not argumentative or discursive, as we proved above. Therefore, there can be no falsehood or deception in it. Item. Quanto aliqua vis cognoscitiva est altior, tanto eius proprium obiectum est universalius, plura sub se continens: unde illud quod visus cognoscit per accidens, sensus communis aut imaginatio apprehendit ut sub proprio obiecto contentum. Sed vis divini intellectus est in fine sublimitatis in cognoscendo. Ergo omnia cognoscibilia comparantur ad ipsum sicut cognoscibilia proprie et per se et non secundum accidens. In talibus autem virtus cognoscitiva non errat. In nullo igitur cognoscibili possibile est divinum intellectum errare. Again. The higher a cognitive power is, the more universal and the more comprehensive is its proper object: therefore, that which the sight knows accidentally, the common sense or the imagination apprehends as included in its proper object. Now the power of the divine intellect is absolutely supreme in knowledge. Therefore, all things knowable are compared to it as knowable properly and essentially, and not accidentally. But the cognitive power errs not about such things. Therefore, it is impossible for the divine intellect to err about any knowable object. Amplius. Virtus intellectualis est quaedam perfectio intellectus in cognoscendo. Secundum autem virtutem intellectualem non contingit intellectum falsum dicere, sed semper verum: verum enim dicere est bonus actus intellectus, virtutis autem est actum bonum reddere. Sed divinus intellectus perfectior est per suam naturam quam intellectus humanus per habitum virtutis: est enim in fine perfectionis. Relinquitur igitur quod in intellectu divino non potest esse falsitas. Moreover. An intellectual virtue is a perfection of the intellect in knowing things. Now the intellect cannot, according to an intellectual virtue, speak false, but always speaks true, because to speak true is the good act of the intellect, and it belongs to virtue to perform a good act. Now the divine intellect is more perfect by its nature than the human intellect is by a habit of virtue, for it is in the summit of perfection. It remains, therefore, that falsehood cannot be in the divine intellect. Adhuc. Scientia intellectus humani a rebus quodammodo causatur: unde provenit quod scibilia sunt mensura scientiae humanae; ex hoc enim verum est quod intellectu diiudicatur, quia res ita se habet, et non e converso. Intellectus autem divinus per suam scientiam est causa rerum. Unde oportet quod scientia eius sit mensura rerum: sicut ars est mensura artificiatorum, quorum unumquodque in tantum perfectum est inquantum arti concordat. Talis igitur est comparatio intellectus divini ad res qualis rerum ad intellectum humanum. Falsitas autem causata ex inaequalitate intellectus humani et rei non est in rebus, sed in intellectu. Si igitur non esset omnimoda adaequatio intellectus divini ad res, falsitas esset in rebus, non in intellectu divino. Nec tamen in rebus est falsitas: quia quantum unumquodque habet de esse, tantum habet de veritate. Nulla igitur inaequalitas est inter intellectum divinum et res; nec aliqua falsitas in intellectu divino esse potest. Further. The knowledge of the human intellect is somewhat caused by things; the result being that man’s knowledge is measured by its objects, since the judgment of the intellect is true through being in accordance with things, and not vice versa. Now the divine intellect is the cause of things by its knowledge. Therefore, his knowledge must be the measure of things, even as art is the measure of the products of art, each of which is so far perfect as it accords with art. Hence the divine intellect is compared to things as things to the human intellect. Now falsehood resulting from inequality between man’s mind and things is not in things but in the mind. Therefore, if there were not perfect equality between the divine mind and things, falsehood would be in things, but not in the divine mind. And yet there is no falsehood in things, because as much as a thing has of being, so much has it of truth. Therefore, there is no inequality between the divine intellect and things: nor is any falsehood possible in the divine mind. Item. Sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum ipsius: naturaliter enim appetimus verum cognoscere et refugimus falso decipi. Malum autem in Deo esse non potest, ut probatum est. Non potest igitur in eo esse falsitas. Again. As the true is the good of the intellect, so is falsehood its evil, for we naturally desire to know the true and shun to be deceived by the false. Now evil cannot be in God, as was proved above. Therefore, falsehood cannot be in him. Hinc est quod dicitur Rom. 3:4: est autem Deus verax; et Num. 23:19: non est Deus ut homo, ut mentiatur; et I Ioan. 1:5: Deus lux est et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae. Hence it is said: but God is true (Rom 3:4); and: God is not man, that he should lie (Num 23:19); and: God is light and in him is no darkness (1 John 1:5). Caput 62 Chapter 62 Quod divina veritas est prima et summa veritas That the divine truth is the first and supreme truth Ex his autem quae ostensa sunt manifeste habetur quod divina veritas sit prima et summa veritas. From what has been proved it clearly follows that the divine truth is the first and supreme truth. Sicut enim est dispositio rerum in esse, ita et in veritate, ut patet per Philosophum, in II Metaph.: et hoc ideo quia verum et ens se invicem consequuntur; est enim verum cum dicitur esse quod est vel non esse quod non est. Sed divinum esse est primum et perfectissimum. Ergo et sua veritas est prima et summa. For the disposition of things in truth is as their disposition in being, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2, and this because truth and being are mutually consequent upon one another, since the true is when that is said to be which is, and that not to be which is not. Now God’s being is first and most perfect. Therefore, his truth is also first and supreme. Item. Quod per essentiam alicui convenit, perfectissime ei convenit. Sed veritas Deo attribuitur essentialiter, ut ostensum est. Sua igitur veritas est summa et prima veritas. Again. That which belongs to a thing essentially belongs to it most perfectly. Now truth is ascribed to God essentially, as we have proved. Therefore, his truth is the supreme and first truth. Praeterea. Veritas in nostro intellectu ex hoc est quod adaequatur rei intellectae. Aequalitatis autem causa est unitas, ut patet in V Metaphysicae. Cum igitur in intellectu divino sit omnino idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, sua veritas erit prima et summa veritas. Further. Truth is in our intellect through the latter being equated to the thing understood. Now the cause of equality is unity, as stated in Metaphysics 5. Since, then, in the divine intellect, intellect and thing understood are absolutely the same, his truth must be the first and supreme truth. Amplius. Illud quod est mensura in unoquoque genere, est perfectissimum illius generis: unde omnes colores mensurantur albo. Sed divina veritas est mensura omnis veritatis. Veritas enim nostri intellectus mensuratur a re quae est extra animam, ex hoc enim intellectus noster verus dicitur quod consonat rei: veritas autem rei mensuratur ad intellectum divinum, qui est causa rerum, ut infra probabitur; sicut veritas artificiatorum ab arte artificis; tunc enim vera est arca quando consonat arti. Cum etiam Deus sit primus intellectus et primum intelligibile, oportet quod veritas intellectus cuiuslibet eius veritate mensuretur: si unumquodque mensuratur primo sui generis, ut Philosophus tradit, in X Metaphysicae. Divina igitur veritas est prima, summa et perfectissima veritas. Moreover. That which is the measure in any genus must be the most perfect in that genus; thus all colors are measured by white. Now the divine truth is the measure of all truth. For the truth of our intellect is measured by the thing that is outside the mind, since our intellect is said to be true from the very fact that it accords with the thing. And the truth of a thing is measured according to the divine intellect which is the cause of things, as we shall prove further on. Thus the truth of art-products is measured by the art of the craftsman, for a casket is true when it accords with art. Also, since God is the first intellect and the first intelligible, it follows that the truth of every intellect must be measured by his truth, if each thing is measured by the first in its genus, as the Philosopher teaches in Metaphysics 10. Hence the divine truth is the first, supreme and most perfect truth. Caput 63 Chapter 63 Rationes volentium subtrahere Deo cognitionem singularium The arguments of those who would deny to God the knowledge of singulars Sunt autem quidam qui perfectioni divinae cognitionis singularium notitiam subtrahere nituntur. Ad quod quidem confirmandum septem viis procedunt. Now there are some who endeavor to withhold knowledge of singulars from the perfection of God’s knowledge. In support of their contention, they proceed by seven ways. Prima est ex ipsa singularitatis conditione. Cum enim singularitatis principium sit materia signata, non videtur per aliquam virtutem immaterialem singularia posse cognosci, si omnis cognitio per quandam assimilationem fiat. Unde et in nobis illae solae potentiae singularia apprehendunt quae materialibus organis utuntur, ut imaginatio et sensus et huiusmodi; intellectus autem noster, quia immaterialis est, singularia non cognoscit. Multo igitur minus intellectus divinus singularium est cognoscitivus, qui maxime a materia recedit. Et sic nullo modo videtur quod Deus singularia cognoscere possit. The first is from the very nature of singularity. For, since the principle of singularity is signate matter, it seems impossible for singulars to be known by an immaterial power, if all knowledge result from some kind of assimilation. Therefore, in us only those powers which use material organs apprehend singulars (for instance, the imagination, the senses and so on), while our intellect, since it is immaterial, does not know singulars. Much less, therefore, is the divine intellect cognizant of singulars, since it is furthest removed from matter. Hence by no means does it seem possible that God should know singulars. Secunda est quod singularia non semper sunt. Aut igitur semper scientur a Deo: aut quandoque scientur et quandoque non scientur. Primum esse non potest: quia de eo quod non est non potest esse scientia, quae solum verorum est; ea autem quae non sunt, vera esse non possunt. Secundum etiam esse non potest: quia divini intellectus cognitio est omnino invariabilis, ut ostensum est. The second argument is that singulars are not always. Either, therefore, they are always known by God, or they are known at one time and unknown at another. The first is impossible, since about what is not there can be no knowledge, which is always about true things, and things which are not cannot be true. The second is also impossible, because the knowledge of the divine intellect is altogether unchangeable, as we have proved. Tertia, ex eo quod non omnia singularia de necessitate proveniunt, sed quaedam contingenter. Unde de eis certa cognitio esse non potest nisi quando sunt. Certa enim cognitio est quae falli non potest: cognitio autem omnis quae est de contingenti, cum futurum est, falli potest; potest enim evenire oppositum eius quod cognitione tenetur; si enim non posset oppositum evenire, iam necessarium esset. Unde et de contingentibus futuris non potest esse in nobis scientia, sed coniecturalis aestimatio quaedam. Supponere autem oportet omnem Dei cognitionem esse certissimam et infallibilem, ut supra ostensum est. Impassibile est etiam quod Deus aliquid de novo cognoscere incipiat, propter eius immutabilitatem, ut dictum est. Ex his igitur videtur sequi quod singularia contingentia non cognoscat. The third argument proceeds from the fact that singulars do not all happen of necessity, but some contingently. Therefore, there can be no certain knowledge about them except when they are. For certain knowledge is that which cannot be deceived, and every knowledge of contingencies, since these are future, can be deceived, because the event may prove the opposite of that to which the mind holds, since if the opposite could not happen, they would be necessary. Therefore, we can have no knowledge of future contingencies, but only a kind of conjectural estimate. Now we must suppose that all God’s knowledge is most certain and infallible, as we have proved above. Moreover, it is impossible that God begin anew to know something, on account of his unchangeableness, as stated. Hence it would seem to follow that he knows not contingent singulars. Quarta est ex hoc quod quorundam singularium causa est voluntas. Effectus autem, antequam sit, non potest nisi in sua causa cognosci: sic enim solum esse potest antequam in se esse incipiat. Motus autem voluntatis a nullo possunt per certitudinem cognosci nisi a volente, in cuius potestate sunt. Impossibile igitur videtur quod Deus de huiusmodi singularibus quae causam ex voluntate sumunt, notitiam aeternam habeat. The fourth is based on the fact that the will is the cause of certain singulars. Now an effect, until it actually is, cannot be known save in its cause, for only thus can it be before it begins to be in itself. But the movements of the will cannot be known for certain by anyone except the willer in whose power they are. Therefore, it seems impossible for God to have eternal knowledge of such singulars as have their cause in the will. Quinta est ex singularium infinitate. Infinitum enim, inquantum huiusmodi, est ignotum: nam omne quod cognoscitur sub cognoscentis comprehensione quodammodo mensuratur; cum mensuratio nihil aliud sit quam quaedam certificatio rei mensuratae. Unde omnis ars infinita repudiat. Singularia autem sunt infinita, ad minus in potentia. Impossibile igitur videtur quod Deus singularia cognoscat. The fifth proceeds from the infinity of singulars. For the infinite as such is unknown, because whatever is known is measured in a way by the comprehension of the knower, since measurement is nothing else than a kind of certification of the thing measured. Thus every art rejects the infinite. Now singulars are infinite, at least in potency. Therefore, it seems impossible for God to know singulars. Sexta est ex ipsa vilitate singularium. Cum enim nobilitas scientiae ex nobilitate scibilis quodammodo pensetur, vilitas etiam scibilis in vilitatem scientiae redundare videtur. Divinus autem intellectus nobilissimus est. Non igitur eius nobilitas patitur quod Deus quaedam vilissima inter singularia cognoscat. The sixth proceeds from the pettiness of singulars. For as the excellence of knowledge is gauged by the excellence of its object, so apparently the pettiness of the object conduces to pettiness of knowledge. Now the divine intellect is supremely excellent. Therefore, it is incompatible with its excellence that God should know the most trivial of singulars. Septima est ex malitia quae in quibusdam singularibus invenitur. Cum enim cognitum sit aliquo modo in cognoscente; malum autem in Deo esse non possit, ut supra ostensum est: videtur sequi quod Deus malum et privationem omnino non cognoscat, sed solum intellectus qui est in potentia; privatio enim non nisi in potentia esse potest. Et ex hoc sequitur quod non habeat Deus de singularium notitiam, in quibus malum et privatio invenitur. The seventh argues from the presence of evil in certain singulars. For, since the thing known is, in a manner, in the knower, and since evil cannot be in God, as proved above, it would seem to follow that evil and privation are entirely unknown to God, and known only by an intellect that is in potency, since privation can only be in that which is potential. Hence it follows that God has no knowledge of singulars, in which evil and privation are found.