Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum voluntas moveatur ab aliquo exteriori Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur ab aliquo exteriori. Motus enim voluntatis est voluntarius. Sed de ratione voluntarii est quod sit a principio intrinseco, sicut et de ratione naturalis. Non ergo motus voluntatis est ab aliquo extrinseco. Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from anything exterior. Praeterea, voluntas violentiam pati non potest, ut supra ostensum est. Sed violentum est cuius principium est extra. Ergo voluntas non potest ab aliquo exteriori moveri. Obj. 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above (Q6, A4). But the violent act is one the principle of which is outside the agent. Therefore the will cannot be moved by anything exterior. Praeterea, quod sufficienter movetur ab uno motore, non indiget moveri ab alio. Sed voluntas sufficienter movet seipsam. Non ergo movetur ab aliquo exteriori. Obj. 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior. Sed contra, voluntas movetur ab obiecto, ut dictum est. Sed obiectum voluntatis potest esse aliqua exterior res sensui proposita. Ergo voluntas potest ab aliquo exteriori moveri. On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A1). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum quod voluntas movetur ab obiecto, manifestum est quod moveri potest ab aliquo exteriori. Sed eo modo quo movetur quantum ad exercitium actus, adhuc necesse est ponere voluntatem ab aliquo principio exteriori moveri. I answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But insofar as it is moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle. Omne enim quod quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum. Et quidem, sicut dictum est, ipsa movet seipsam, inquantum per hoc quod vult finem, reducit seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem. Hoc autem non potest facere nisi consilio mediante, cum enim aliquis vult sanari, incipit cogitare quomodo hoc consequi possit, et per talem cogitationem pervenit ad hoc quod potest sanari per medicum, et hoc vult. Sed quia non semper sanitatem actu voluit, necesse est quod inciperet velle sanari, aliquo movente. Et si quidem ipsa moveret seipsam ad volendum, oportuisset quod mediante consilio hoc ageret, ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita. Hoc autem non est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles concludit in quodam capitulo Ethicae Eudemicae. For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above (A3), insofar as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de ratione voluntarii est quod principium eius sit intra, sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinsecum sit primum principium non motum ab alio. Unde motus voluntarius etsi habeat principium proximum intrinsecum, tamen principium primum est ab extra. Sicut et primum principium motus naturalis est ab extra, quod scilicet movet naturam. Reply Obj. 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves nature. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc non sufficit ad rationem violenti, quod principium sit extra, sed oportet addere quod nil conferat vim patiens. Quod non contingit, dum voluntas ab exteriori movetur, nam ipsa est quae vult, ab alio tamen mota. Esset autem motus iste violentus, si esset contrarius motui voluntatis. Quod in proposito esse non potest, quia sic idem vellet et non vellet. Reply Obj. 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add without the concurrence of him that suffers violence. This does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible; since then the will would will and not will the same thing. Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas quantum ad aliquid sufficienter se movet, et in suo ordine, scilicet sicut agens proximum, sed non potest seipsam movere quantum ad omnia, ut ostensum est. Unde indiget moveri ab alio sicut a primo movente. Reply Obj. 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum voluntas humana a corpore caelesti moveatur Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas humana a corpore caelesti moveatur. Omnes enim motus varii et multiformes reducuntur, sicut in causam, in motum uniformem, qui est motus caeli ut probatur VIII Physic. Sed motus humani sunt varii et multiformes, incipientes postquam prius non fuerant. Ergo reducuntur in motum caeli sicut in causam, qui est uniformis secundum naturam. Objection 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved in Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various and multiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is uniform according to its nature. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, in III de Trin., corpora inferiora moventur per corpora superiora. Sed motus humani corporis, qui causantur a voluntate, non possent reduci in motum caeli sicut in causam, nisi etiam voluntas a caelo moveretur. Ergo caelum movet voluntatem humanam. Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) the lower bodies are moved by the higher. But the movements of the human body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will. Praeterea, per observationem caelestium corporum astrologi quaedam vera praenuntiant de humanis actibus futuris, qui sunt a voluntate. Quod non esset, si corpora caelestia voluntatem hominis movere non possent. Movetur ergo voluntas humana a caelesti corpore. Obj. 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move man’s will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod corpora caelestia non sunt causae nostrorum actuum. Essent autem, si voluntas, quae est humanorum actuum principium, a corporibus caelestibus moveretur. Non ergo movetur voluntas a corporibus caelestibus. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts. But they would be, if the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies. Respondeo dicendum quod eo modo quo voluntas movetur ab exteriori obiecto, manifestum est quod voluntas potest moveri a corporibus caelestibus, inquantum scilicet corpora exteriora, quae sensui proposita movent voluntatem, et etiam ipsa organa potentiarum sensitivarum, subiacent motibus caelestium corporum. I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to say, insofar as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies. Sed eo modo quo voluntas movetur, quantum ad exercitium actus, ab aliquo exteriori agente, adhuc quidam posuerunt corpora caelestia directe imprimere in voluntatem humanam. Sed hoc est impossibile. Voluntas enim, ut dicitur in III de anima, est in ratione. Ratio autem est potentia animae non alligata organo corporali. Unde relinquitur quod voluntas sit potentia omnino immaterialis et incorporea. Manifestum est autem quod nullum corpus agere potest in rem incorpoream, sed potius e converso, eo quod res incorporeae et immateriales sunt formalioris et universalioris virtutis quam quaecumque res corporales. Unde impossibile est quod corpus caeleste imprimat directe in intellectum aut voluntatem. Et propter hoc Aristoteles, in libro de anima, opinionem dicentium quod talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in diem ducit pater deorum virorumque (scilicet Iupiter, per quem totum caelum intelligunt), attribuit eis qui ponebant intellectum non differre a sensu. Omnes enim vires sensitivae, cum sint actus organorum corporalium, per accidens moveri possunt a caelestibus corporibus, motis scilicet corporibus quorum sunt actus. But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the will, as stated in De Anima iii, 9, is in the reason. Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the heavenly bodies, i.e., through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are. Sed quia dictum est quod appetitus intellectivus quodammodo movetur ab appetitu sensitivo, indirecte redundat motus caelestium corporum in voluntatem, inquantum scilicet per passiones appetitus sensitivi voluntatem moveri contingit. But since it has been stated (A2) that the intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will; insofar as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod multiformes motus voluntatis humanae reducuntur in aliquam causam uniformem, quae tamen est intellectu et voluntate superior. Quod non potest dici de aliquo corpore, sed de aliqua superiori substantia immateriali. Unde non oportet quod motus voluntatis in motum caeli reducatur sicut in causam. Reply Obj. 1: The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its cause. Ad secundum dicendum quod motus corporales humani reducuntur in motum caelestis corporis sicut in causam, inquantum ipsa dispositio organorum congrua ad motum, est aliqualiter ex impressione caelestium corporum; et inquantum etiam appetitus sensitivus commovetur ex impressione caelestium corporum; et ulterius inquantum corpora exteriora moventur secundum motum caelestium corporum, ex quorum occursu voluntas incipit aliquid velle vel non velle, sicut adveniente frigore incipit aliquis velle facere ignem. Sed ista motio voluntatis est ex parte obiecti exterius praesentati, non ex parte interioris instinctus. Reply Obj. 2: The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, insofar as the disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies; also, insofar as the sensitive appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, insofar as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, appetitus sensitivus est actus organi corporalis. Unde nihil prohibet ex impressione corporum caelestium aliquos esse habiles ad irascendum vel concupiscendum, vel aliquam huiusmodi passionem, sicut et ex complexione naturali. Plures autem hominum sequuntur passiones, quibus soli sapientes resistunt. Et ideo ut in pluribus verificantur ea quae praenuntiantur de actibus hominum secundum considerationem caelestium corporum. Sed tamen, ut Ptolomaeus dicit in Centiloquio, sapiens dominatur astris, scilicet quia, resistens passionibus, impedit per voluntatem liberam, et nequaquam motui caelesti subiectam, huiusmodi corporum caelestium effectus. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Cf. FP, Q84, AA6,7) the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v), the wise man governs the stars; which is a though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to such like effects of the heavenly bodies. Vel, ut Augustinus dicit II super Gen. ad Litt., fatendum est, quando ab astrologis vera dicuntur, instinctu quodam occultissimo dici, quem nescientes humanae mentes patiuntur. Quod cum ad decipiendum homines fit, spirituum seductorum operatio est. Or, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 15): We must confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the lying spirits. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum voluntas a solo Deo moveatur sicut ab exteriori principio Whether the will is moved by God alone as exterior principle? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non a solo Deo moveatur sicut ab exteriori principio. Inferius enim natum est moveri a suo superiori, sicut corpora inferiora a corporibus caelestibus. Sed voluntas hominis habet aliquid superius post Deum; scilicet Angelum. Ergo voluntas hominis potest moveri, sicut ab exteriori principio, etiam ab Angelo. Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is something which is higher than the will of man and below God, namely, the angel. Therefore man’s will can be moved by an angel also, as exterior principle. Praeterea, actus voluntatis sequitur actum intellectus. Sed intellectus hominis reducitur in suum actum non solum a Deo, sed etiam ab Angelo per illuminationes, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo eadem ratione et voluntas. Obj. 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect. But man’s intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an angel. Praeterea, Deus non est causa nisi bonorum; secundum illud Gen. I, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Si ergo a solo Deo voluntas hominis moveretur, nunquam moveretur ad malum, cum tamen voluntas sit qua peccatur et recte vivitur, ut Augustinus dicit. Obj. 3: Further, God is not the cause of other than good things, according to Gen. 1:31: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. If, therefore man’s will were moved by God alone, it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby we sin and whereby we do right, as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9). Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere. On the contrary, It is written (Phil 2:13): It is God Who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish. Respondeo dicendum quod motus voluntatis est ab intrinseco, sicut et motus naturalis. Quamvis autem rem naturalem possit aliquid movere quod non est causa naturae rei motae, tamen motum naturalem causare non potest nisi quod est aliqualiter causa naturae. Movetur enim lapis sursum ab homine, qui naturam lapidis non causat, sed hic motus non est lapidi naturalis, naturalis autem motus eius non causatur nisi ab eo quod causat naturam. Unde dicitur in VIII Physic. quod generans movet secundum locum gravia et levia. Sic ergo hominem, voluntatem habentem, contingit moveri ab aliquo qui non est causa eius, sed quod motus voluntarius eius sit ab aliquo principio extrinseco quod non est causa voluntatis, est impossibile. I answer that, The movement of the will is from within, as also is the movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to move a natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing’s nature, can cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone’s nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys. vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible. Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia animae rationalis, quae a solo Deo causatur per creationem, ut in primo dictum est. Secundo vero ex hoc patet, quod voluntas habet ordinem ad universale bonum. Unde nihil aliud potest esse voluntatis causa, nisi ipse Deus, qui est universale bonum. Omne autem aliud bonum per participationem dicitur, et est quoddam particulare bonum, particularis autem causa non dat inclinationem universalem. Unde nec materia prima, quae est in potentia ad omnes formas, potest causari ab aliquo particulari agente. Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in the FP, Q90, A2. Second, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Angelus non sic est supra hominem, quod sit causa voluntatis eius; sicut corpora caelestia sunt causa formarum naturalium, ad quas consequuntur naturales motus corporum naturalium. Reply Obj. 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus hominis movetur ab Angelo ex parte obiecti, quod sibi proponitur virtute angelici luminis ad cognoscendum. Et sic etiam voluntas ab exteriori creatura potest moveri, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: Man’s intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man’s knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from without, as stated above (A4). Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum. Et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle. Sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam, ut infra dicetur. Reply Obj. 3: God moves man’s will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (Q109, A2). Quaestio 10 Question 10