Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum tempus septennii sit competenter assignatum sponsalibus contrahendis Whether seven years is fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tempus septennii non sit competenter assignatum sponsaliibus contrahendis. Contractus enim qui per alios fieri potest, non requirit discretionem in illis ad quos pertinet. Sed sponsalia fieri possunt per parentes, utroque illorum ignorante quorum sunt sponsalia. Ergo ita possunt fieri ante septennium sicut post. Objection 1: It would seem that seven years is not fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal. For a contract that can be formed by others does not require discretion in those whom it concerns. Now a betrothal can be arranged by the parents without the knowledge of either of the persons betrothed. Therefore, a betrothal can be arranged before the age of seven years as well as after. Praeterea, sicut ad contractum sponsalium requiritur aliquis rationis usus, ita ad consentiendum in; peccatum mortale. Sed, sicut Gregorius narrat, in IV Dialog., quidam puer propter blasphemiae peccatum extinctus est. Ergo ante septennium possunt sponsalia contrahi. Obj. 2: Further, just as some use of reason is necessary for the contract of betrothal, so is there for the consent to mortal sin. Now, as Gregory says (Dialogues 4), a boy of five years of age was carried off by the devil on account of the sin of blasphemy. Therefore, a betrothal can take place before the age of seven years. Praeterea, sponsalia ad matrimonium ordinantur. Sed in matrimonio non assignatur unum tempus puellae et puero. Ergo nec in sponsalibus septennium utrique assignari debet. Obj. 3: Further, a betrothal is directed to marriage. But for marriage the same age is not assigned to boy and girl. Therefore, neither in betrothal ought seven years be assigned to both. Praeterea, ex tunc aliqui possunt sponsalia contrahere ex quo eis possunt futurae nuptiae placere. Sed signa talis placentiae frequenter apparent in pueris ante septennium. Ergo ante illud tempus possunt contrahi sponsalia. Obj. 4: Further, one can become betrothed as soon as future marriage can please one. Now signs of this agreeableness are often apparent in boys before the age of seven. Therefore, they can become betrothed before that age. Praeterea, si aliqui ante septimum annum contrahunt sponsalia, et postea, post septennium ante tempus pubertatis, contrahunt per verba de praesenti, reputantur inter eos esse sponsalia. Sed hoc non est ex secundo contractu: quia tunc non intendunt sponsalia, sed matrimonium contrahere. Ergo ex primo. Et sic ante septennium possunt sponsalia contrahi. Obj. 5: Further, if persons become betrothed before they are seven years old, and subsequently after the age of seven and before the age of maturity renew their promise in words expressive of the present, they are reckoned to be betrothed. Now this is not by virtue of the second contract, since they intend to contract not betrothal but marriage. Therefore, it is by the virtue of the first; and thus espousals can be contracted before the age of seven. Praeterea, in his quae communiter fiunt a pluribus, quod deest uni suppletur ab altero: sicut patet in trahentibus navem. Sed contractus sponsalium est quaedam actio communis inter contrahentes. Ergo, si unus sit pubes, potest contrahere cum puella quae non habet septem annos sponsalia: quia quod uni deficit de tempore, alteri superabundat. Obj. 6: Further, when a thing is done by many persons in common, if one fails he is supplied by another, as in the case of those who row a boat. Now the contract of betrothal is an action common to the contracting parties. Therefore, if one be of mature age, he can contract a betrothal with a girl who is not seven years old, since the lack of age in one is more than counterbalanced in the other. Praeterea, si aliqui iuxta aetatem pubertatis, quamvis ante eam, contrahunt per verba de praesenti, reputatur inter eos matrimonium esse. Ergo, pari ratione, si ante septennium, dummodo sint propinqui, contrahunt per verba de futuro, reputabuntur inter eos esse sponsalia. Obj. 7: Further, those who at about the age of puberty, but before it, enter into the marriage contract by words expressive of the present are reputed to be married. Therefore, in like manner if they contract marriage by words expressive of the future, before yet close on the age of puberty, they are to be reputed as betrothed. Respondeo dicendum quod septennium est tempus determinatum a iure sponsalibus contrahendis satis rationabiliter. Quia, cum sponsalia sint quaedam promissio futurorum, ut dictum est, oportet quod illorum sint qui aliquo modo promittere possunt. Quod non est nisi illorum qui habent aliquam prudentiam de futuris: quae usum rationis requirit. Respectu cuius triplex gradus notatur, secundum Philosophum, in I Ethic.: primus est cum quis neque intelligit per se, neque ab alio capere potest; secundus status est quo homo ab aliis capere potest, sed ipse per se non sufficit ad intelligendum; tertius est cum homo et ab alio iam capere potest, et per seipsum considerare. Et quia ratio paulatim in homine convalescit, secundum quod quietantur motus et fluxibilitates humorum, ideo primum statum rationis obtinet homo ante primum septennium: et propter hoc illo tempore nulli contractui aptus est, et ita nec sponsalibus. Sed ad secundum statum incipit pervenire in fine primi septennii: unde etiam tunc temporis pueri ad scholas ponuntur. Sed ad tertium statum incipit homo pervenire in fine secundi septennii, quantum ad ea quae ad personam ipsius pertinent, in qua ratio naturalis citius convalescit: sed quantum ad ea quae extra ipsum sunt, in fine tertii septennii. I answer that, The age of seven years is fixed reasonably enough by law for the contracting of betrothals, for since a betrothal is a promise of the future, as already stated (A. 1), it follows that they are within the competency of those who can make a promise in some way, and this is only for those who can have some foresight of the future, and this requires the use of reason, of which three degrees are to be observed, according to the Philosopher (Ethics 1.4). The first is when a person neither understands by himself nor is able to learn from another; the second stage is when a man can learn from another but is incapable by himself of consideration and understanding; the third degree is when a man is both able to learn from another and to consider by himself. And since reason develops in man little by little, in proportion as the movement and fluctuation of the humors is calmed, man reaches the first stage of reason before his seventh year; and consequently during that period he is unfit for any contract, and therefore for betrothal. But he begins to reach the second stage at the end of his first seven years, wherefore children at that age are sent to school. But man begins to reach the third stage at the end of his second seven years, as regards things concerning his person, when his natural reason develops; but as regards things outside his person, at the end of his third seven years. Et ideo ante primum septennium nulli contractui homo aptus est. Sed in fine primi septennii incipit esse aptus ad aliqua promittendum in futurum, praecipue de his ad quae ratio naturalis inclinat magis: non autem ad obligandum se perpetuo vinculo, quia adhuc non firmam voluntatem habet. Et ideo tali tempore possunt contrahere sponsalia. Sed in fine secundi septennii, iam potest obligare se de his quae ad personam ipsius pertinent, vel ad religionem vel ad coniugium. Sed post tertium septennium etiam potest de aliis se obligare. Et secundum leges constituitur ei potestas de rebus suis disponendi post viginti quinque annos. Hence before his first seven years a man is not fit to make any contract, but at the end of that period he begins to be fit to make certain promises for the future, especially about those things to which natural reason inclines us more, though he is not fit to bind himself by a perpetual obligation, because as yet he has not a firm will. Hence at that age betrothals can be contracted. But at the end of the second seven years he can already bind himself in matters concerning his person, either to religion or to wedlock. And after the third seven years he can bind himself in other matters also; and according to the laws he is given the power of disposing of his property after his twenty-fifth year. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si ante annos pubertatis fiat contractus sponsalium per alium, ambo vel alter reclamare possunt. Unde nihil tunc actum est: adeo quod nec aliqua affinitas contrahatur ex hoc. Et ideo sponsalia quae inter aliquos per personas alias contrahuntur, robur habent inquantum illi inter quos contrahuntur, ad aetatem debitam venientes, non reclamant, ex quo intelliguntur consentire de his quae per alios facta sunt. Reply Obj. 1: If the parties are betrothed by another person before they reach the age of puberty, either of them or both can demur; wherefore in that case the betrothal does not take effect, so that neither does any affinity result therefrom. Hence a betrothal made between certain persons by some other takes effect insofar as those between whom the betrothal is arranged do not demur when they reach the proper age, whence they are understood to consent to what others have done. Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod ille puer de quo Gregorius narrat non fuit damnatus, nec mortaliter peccavit, sed visio illa ostensa fuit ad patrem contristandum, qui in puero illo peccaverat non corrigens eum. Sed hoc est expresse contra intentionem Gregorii dicentis quod pater pueri, animam parvuli filii negligens, non parvulum peccatorem gehennae ignibus nutrivit. Reply Obj. 2: Some say that the boy of whom Gregory tells this story was not damned, and that he did not sin mortally; and that this vision was for the purpose of making the father sorrowful, for he had sinned in the boy through failing to correct him. But this is contrary to the express intention of Gregory, who says (Dialogues 4) that the boy’s father, having neglected the soul of his little son, fostered no little sinner for the flames of hell. Et ideo dicendum quod ad peccatum mortale sufficit etiam consensus in praesens. Sed in sponsalibus est consensus in futurum. Maior autem discretio rationis requiritur ad providendum in futurum quam ad consentiendum in actum unum praesentem. Et ideo ante potest homo peccare mortaliter quam possit se obligare ad aliquid futurum. Consequently, it must be said that for a mortal sin it is sufficient to give consent to something present, whereas in a betrothal the consent is to something future; and greater discretion of reason is required for looking to the future than for consenting to one present act. Therefore, a man can sin mortally before he can bind himself to a future obligation. Ad tertium dicendum quod in tempore contractus matrimonii non solum requiritur dispositio ex parte usus rationis, sed etiam ex parte corporis, ut sit tempus generationi aptum. Et quia puella in duodecimo anno ad hoc venit ut possit esse actui generationis apta, puer autem in finem secundi septennii, ut Philosophus ait, in IX Animalium; simul autem usum discretionis accipiunt, qui tantum iri sponsalibus requiritur: ideo in sponsalibus determinatur unum tempus utrique, non autem in matrimonio. Reply Obj. 3: Regarding the age for the marriage contract, a disposition is required not only on the part of the use of reason, but also on the part of the body, in that it is necessary to be of an age adapted to procreation. And since a girl becomes apt for the act of procreation in her twelfth year, and a boy at the end of his second seven years, as the Philosopher says (History of Animals 7), whereas the age is the same in both for attaining the use of reason (which is the sole condition for betrothal), hence it is that the one age is assigned for both as regards betrothal, but not as regards marriage. Ad quartum dicendum quod illa placentia quae est in pueris ante septennium, non procedit ex perfecto usu rationis, cum nondum sint plene susceptibiles disciplinae: sed magis contingit ex motu naturae quam ex aliqua ratione. Et ideo non sufficit talis placentia ad sponsalia contrahendum. Reply Obj. 4: This agreeableness in regard to boys under the age of seven does not result from the perfect use of reason, since they are not as yet possessed of complete self-control; it results rather from the movement of nature than from any process of reason. Consequently, this agreeableness does not suffice for contracting a betrothal. Ad quintum dicendum quod, quamvis per secundum contractum in casu illo non faciunt matrimonium, tamen ostendunt se ratam habere priorem promissionem. Et ideo prior contractus accipit firmitatem. Reply Obj. 5: In this case, although the second contract does not amount to marriage, nevertheless the parties show that they ratify their former promise; wherefore the first contract is confirmed by the second. Ad sextum dicendum quod trahentes navem agunt per modum unius causae: et ideo quod deest urii potest suppleri ex altero. Sed sponsalia contrahentes agunt ut distinctae personae: quia sponsalia non nisi inter duos esse possunt. Unde in utroque requiritur quod sit sufficiens ad contrahendum. Et ideo defectus unius sponsalia impedit, nec ex altero potest suppleri. Reply Obj. 6: Those who row a boat act by way of one cause, and consequently what is lacking in one can be supplied by another. But those who make a contract of betrothal act as distinct persons, since a betrothal can only be between two parties; therefore, it is necessary for each to be qualified to contract, and thus the defect of one is an obstacle to their betrothal, nor can it be supplied by the other. Ad septimum dicendum quod iri sponsalibus etiam similiter, si appropinquant contrahentes ad tempus septennii, contractus sponsalium habet robur: quia, secundum Philosophum, in II Physic., quod parum deest, quasi nihil deesse videtur. Reply Obj. 7: It is true that in the matter of betrothal if the contracting parties are close upon the age of seven, the contract of betrothal is valid, since, according to the Philosopher (Physics 2.56), when little is lacking it seems as though nothing were lacking. Haec autem propinquitas a quibusdam determinatur tempus sex mensium. Sed melius est quod determinetur secundum conditionem contrahentium: quia in quibusdam magis acceleratur usus rationis quam in aliis. Some fix the margin at six months. But it is better to determine it according to the condition of the contracting parties, since the use of reason comes sooner to some than to others. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum sponsalia dirimi possint Whether a betrothal can be dissolved? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod sponsalia dirimi non possunt altero religionem intrante. Quia de pecunia quam alteri promisi, non possum alteri licite oblationem facere. Sed ille qui sponsalia contrahit, corpus suum promittit mulieri. Ergo non potest se offerre Deo ulterius in religionem. Objection 1: It would seem that a betrothal cannot be dissolved if one of the parties enter religion. For if I have promised a thing to someone, I cannot lawfully pledge it to someone else. Now he who betroths himself promises his body to the woman. Therefore, he cannot make a further offering of himself to God in religion. Item, videtur quod non debeant dirimi quando alter coniugum ad longinquam regionem se transfert. Quia in dubiis semper tutior pars est eligenda. Se tutius esset quod eum expectaret. Ergo tenetur eum expectare. Obj. 2: Again, seemingly it should not be dissolved when one of the parties leaves for a distant country, because in doubtful matters one should always choose the safer course. Now the safer course would be to wait for him. Therefore, she is bound to wait for him. Item, videtur quod nec dirimantur per aegritudinem quam aliquis incurrit post contracta sponsalia. Quia pro poena nullus debet puniri. Sed vir qui infirmitatem incurrit, punitur in eo quod ei ius suum aufertur, quod in illa habebat quae sibi fuerat desponsata. Ergo propter corporalem infirmitatem non debent sponsalia dirimi. Obj. 3: Again, seemingly neither is it dissolved by sickness contracted after betrothal, for no man should be punished for being under a penalty. Now the man who contracts an infirmity would be punished if he were to lose his right to the woman betrothed to him. Therefore, a betrothal should not be dissolved on account of a bodily infirmity. Item, videtur quod nec propter affinitatem intervenientem: utpote si sponsus consanguineam sponsae fornicario concubitu cognoscat. Quia secundum hoc sponsa puniretur pro peccato sponsi. Quod non est conveniens. Obj. 4: Again, neither seemingly should a betrothal be dissolved on account of a supervening affinity, for instance, if the spouse were to commit fornication with a kinswoman of his betrothed; for in that case the affianced bride would be penalized for the sin of her affianced spouse, which is unreasonable. Item, videtur quod non possint se invicem absolvere. Quia hoc est maximae levitatis, ut primo contrahant et postmodum se absolvant. Sed talia non debent ab Ecclesia sustineri. Ergo etc. Obj. 5: Again, seemingly they cannot set one another free; for it would be a proof of greatest fickleness if they contracted together and then set one another free; and such conduct ought not to be tolerated by the Church. Therefore, etc. Item, videtur quod nec propter alterius fornicationem. Quia adhuc per sponsalia unus non accipit potestatem in corpus alterius. Et ita videtur quod in nullo contra invicem peccent si interim fornicantur. Et sic sponsalia dirimi non debent per hoc. Obj. 6: Again, neither seemingly ought a betrothal to be dissolved on account of the fornication of one of the parties. For a betrothal does not yet give the one power over the body of the other; wherefore it would seem that they in no way sin against one another if meanwhile they commit fornication. Consequently, a betrothal should not be dissolved on that account. Item, videtur quod nec per contractum cum alia per verba de praesenti. Quia venditio secunda non derogat venditioni primae. Ergo nec secundus contractus potest derogare primo. Obj. 7: Again, neither seemingly on account of his contracting with another woman by words expressive of the present. For a subsequent sale does not void a previous sale. Therefore, neither should a second contract void a previous one. Item, videtur quod nec per defectum aetatis possint dirimi. Quia quod non est, non potest dissolvi. Sed ante aetatem determinatam nulla fuerunt sponsalia. Ergo dirimi non possunt. Obj. 8: Again, neither seemingly should it be dissolved on account of deficient age; since what is not cannot be dissolved. Now a betrothal is null before the requisite age. Therefore, it cannot be dissolved. Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus praedictis casibus sponsalia contracta dirimuntur, sed diversimode. Quia in duobus, scilicet cum quis ad religionem confugit, et cum alter coniugum cum altero per verba de praesenti contrahit, ipso iure sponsalia dirimuntur. Sed iri aliis casibus dirimi debent secundum iudicium Ecclesiae. I answer that, In all the cases mentioned above the betrothal that has been contracted is dissolved, but in different ways. For in two of them—namely, when a party enters religion, and when either of the affianced spouses contracts with another party by words expressive of the present—the betrothal is dissolved by law, whereas in the other cases it has to be dissolved according to the judgment of the Church. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod talis promissio solvitur per mortem spiritualem: cum sit spiritualis tantum, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Such a promise is dissolved by spiritual death, for that promise is purely spiritual, as we shall state further on (Q. 61, A. 2). Ad secundum dicendum quod dubium illud determinatur ex hoc quod alter non comparet tempore statuto ad rnatrimonium perficiendum. Unde, si ex parte eius non defuit quin matrimonium compleret, potest licite alteri nubere sine peccato aliquo. Si autem per eum stetit quod matrimonium non est completum, debet agere poenitentiam de peccato fractae promissionis, aut iuramenti, si iuramentum intervenit: et contrahere cum alia, si vult, iudicio Ecclesiae. Reply Obj. 2: This doubt is solved by either party not putting in an appearance at the time fixed for completing the marriage. Wherefore if it was no fault of that party that the marriage was not completed, he or she can lawfully marry without any sin. But if he or she was responsible for the non-completion of the marriage, this responsibility involves the obligation of doing penance for the broken promise—or oath if the promise was confirmed by oath—and he or she can contract with another if they wish it, subject to the judgment of the Church. Ad tertium dicendum quod si, ante contractum matrimonium, aliquam gravem infirmitatem incurrat alter eorum inter quos sunt contracta sponsalia, quae ipsum debilitet nimis, ut epilepsia aut paralysis; aut eum deformet, ut abscissio nasi vel orbitas oculorum aut aliquid huiusmodi; aut quae sunt contra bonum prolis, utpote lepra, quae solet prolem inficere: possunt sponsalia dirimere, ne sibi invicem displiceant, et matrimonium sic contractum malum exitum sortiatur. Nec pro poena punitur aliquis: sed ex poena damnum reportat. Quod non est inconveniens. Reply Obj. 3: If either of the betrothed parties incur an infirmity which notably weakens the subject (as epilepsy or paralysis), or causes a deformity (as loss of the nose or eyes, and the like), or is contrary to the good of the offspring (as leprosy, which tends to be transmitted to the children), the betrothal can be dissolved, lest the betrothed be displeasing to one another, and the marriage thus contracted have an evil result. Nor is one punished for being under a penalty, although one incurs a loss from one’s penalty, and this is not unreasonable. Ad quartum dicendum quod, si sponsus cognovit consanguineam sponsae vel e converso, tunc dirimi debent sponsalia. Et ad hoc probandum sola fama sufficit, propter scandalum vitandum. Causae enim quae in futurum expectant effectus suos, impediuntur a suis effectibus non solum ex eo quod est, sed ex eo quod futurum est. Unde, sicut affinitas, si esset tempore contractus sponsalium, impedivisset contractum illum; ita, si interveniat ante matrimonium, quod est effectus quidam sponsalium, prior contractus ab effectu suo impeditur. Nec in hoc aliquid detrahitur alteri; immo ei confertur, quia absolvitur ab eo qui per fornicationem se Deo odiosum reddidit. Reply Obj. 4: If the affianced bridegroom has carnal knowledge of a kinswoman of his spouse, or vice versa, the betrothal must be dissolved; and for proof it is sufficient that the fact be the common talk, in order to avoid scandal; for causes whose effects mature in the future are voided of their effects not only by what actually is, but also by what happens subsequently. Hence just as affinity, had it existed at the time of the betrothal, would have prevented that contract, so, if it supervene before marriage, which is an effect of the betrothal, the previous contract is voided of its effect. Nor does the other party suffer in consequence: rather, he or she gains, being set free from one who has become hateful to God by committing fornication. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quidam non recipiunt istum casum. Sed contra eos est Decretalis, quae expresse dicit: ad instar, inquit, eorum qui societatem interpositione fidei contrahunt, et postea eandem remittunt, potest in patientia tolerari, si mutuo se absolvunt qui sponsalia contraxerunt. Reply Obj. 5: Some do not admit this case. Yet they have against them the Decretals, which says expressly: just as those who enter into a contract of fellowship by pledging their faith to one another and afterwards give it back, so it may be patiently tolerated that those who are betrothed to one another should set one another free.