Respondeo dicendum, quod ad significandum originem divinarum personarum, utendum est talibus nominibus qualia modo originis competant; quia secundum Hilarium, sermo debet esse rei subjectus. Hoc autem invenimus in origine divinarum personarum quod tota essentia unius accipitur in alia, ita quod una numero est essentia trium, et idem esse. I answer that, in order to signify the origin of the divine Persons, one must use the sorts of names that befit a mode of origin. For according to Hilary, speech ought to be subject to reality. Now, we find in the origin of the divine Persons that the entire essence of the one is received in the other, such that the essence of the three is numerically one, and their existence is the same. Et ideo ad significandum ordinem talis originis, non competit nomen causae propter duo: primo, quia omnis causa vel est extra essentiam rei, sicut efficiens et finis; vel pars essentiae, sicut materia et forma. Secundo, quia omnis causa habet ordinem principii ad esse sui causati quod per ipsam constituitur. Pater autem non habet aliquem ordinem principii ad esse filii, sicut nec ad esse suum, cum unum et idem sit esse utriusque: unde pater non est causa filii, sed principium. And therefore to signify the order of such origin the name "cause" is not fitting, for two reasons. The first is that every cause is either outside the thing's essence, as an efficient cause and an end, or part of its essence, as matter and form. The second is that every cause has an order of a principle to the existence of its effect, which is constituted by it. Now, the Father does not have the order of a principle to the Son's existence, just as neither does he to his own existence, since the existence for both is one and the same. Whence, the Father is not the Son's cause, but his principle. Quia principium dicit ordinem originis absolute, non determinando aliquem modum qui ab origine personarum alienus sit. Invenitur enim aliquod principium quod non est extra essentiam principiati, sicut punctus a quo fluit linea; et quod non habet aliquam influentiam ad esse principiati, sicut terminus a quo dicitur principium motus, et sicut mane dicitur principium diei. Sed nomen auctoris addit super rationem principii hoc quod est non esse ab aliquo; et ideo solus pater auctor dicitur, quamvis etiam filius principium dicatur notionaliter. For "principle" signifies the order of origin in an absolute way, without determining any way that is alien to the origin of the Persons. For one finds some principles that are not outside the essence of what comes from the principle, like a point from which a line flows; one also finds principles that have no influence on the existence of what comes from the principle, like a terminus of departure is called the "principle of the motion," and the morning is called the "principle of the day." But the name "originator" adds, over and above the account of principle, the fact that he is not from anything else. And therefore only the Father is called "originator," even though the Son is also called "principle" notionally. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quia nomen principii impositum est secundum quod invenitur in creaturis, ubi principium est prius aliquo modo principiato, ideo a prioritate imponitur; sed tamen imponitur ad significandum illud a quo est aliquid. Unde quamvis quantum ad modum significandi divinis non competat, sicut et alia nomina essentialia quae a nobis imposita sunt: tamen quantum ad rem significatam, propriissime ratio principii sibi competit. Reply to Obj. 1: Because the name "principle" has been imposed according to the way it is found in created things, where the principle is prior in some way to what comes from it, therefore it is imposed from priority. But nevertheless it is imposed for the sake of signifying that from which which something is. Whence, even though as regards mode of signifying it does not fit the divine, just as is the case with the other essential names that have been imposed by us, nonetheless as regards the reality being signified, the account of principle most properly fits him. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis pater dicatur principium filii, non tamen dicendus est causa, nisi improprie, sicut Chrysostomus utitur nomine causae, dicens patrem causam filii: principium enim in plus est quam causa, et causa in plus est quam elementum, sicut dicit Commentator. Unde omnis causa est principium, sed non convertitur. Reply to Obj. 2: Even though the Father is called the "principle of the Son," still he should not be called his cause, except improperly, the way Chrysostom uses the name "cause," calling the Father the cause of the Son. For "principle" is in more things than is "cause," and "cause" is in more than "element," as the Commentator says. Whence every cause is a principle, but this cannot be converted. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia factio et operatio semper terminantur ad esse rei, ideo filius non potest dici factus nec operatus a patre, cum quo unum esse habet; sed tantum generatus, propter originem personae. Reply to Obj. 3: Because making and production are always terminated at the existence of a reality, therefore the Son cannot be said to be made or produced by the Father, with whom he has one existence. Rather, he can only be said to be generated by him, on account of the origin of the Person. Articulus 2 Article 2 Whether "principle" is said univocally of God in relation to divine Persons and to creation Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod principium univoce dicatur secundum quod Deus dicitur principium personae divinae et creaturae. Sicut enim dicit Basilius, accipere a patre filius habet commune cum omni creatura; sed habere per naturam est filii proprium. Sed ratio principii fundatur supra originem unius ab alio, ut dictum est, art. praeced. Ergo principium univoce dicitur respectu personae divinae et respectu creaturae. Obj. 1: To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that "principle" is said univocally insofar as God is called a principle of a divine Person and that of something created. For as Basil says, receiving from the Father is what the Son has in common with everything created, but having [existence] by nature is proper to the Son. But the account of a principle is founded upon the origin of one thing from another, as was said before. Therefore "principle" is said univocally with respect to the divine Person and what is created. Praeterea, Magister utitur tali divisione principii, quod principium est de non principio, et principium de principio, et principium de utroque principio. In hac autem divisione oportet quod principium accipiatur et secundum quod dicit respectum ad creaturam, et secundum quod dicit respectum ad personam. Cum igitur haec divisio omnino esset inartificialis si principium aequivoce diceretur, videtur quod principium univoce dicatur secundum utrumque modum. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Master uses the following division of "principle": one principle is not from a principle, another principle is from a principle, and another principle is from both principles. Now, in this division "principle" must be taken both insofar as it signifies a reference to what is created and insofar as it signifies a reference to a Person. Therefore, since this division would be wholly artless if "principle" were being said equivocally, it seems that "principle" is said univocally in each way. Contra, aeterno et temporali nihil potest esse univocum. Sed principium respectu creaturae est ex tempore, principium autem respectu divinae personae est ab aeterno. Ergo principium aequivoce dicitur. On the contrary, for the eternal and the temporal nothing can be univocal. But a principle relative to the created is from time, whereas a principle relative to a divine Person is from eternity. Therefore "principle" is being said equivocally. Praeterea, pater est principium filii per generationem, et spiritus sancti per spirationem, et creaturae per creationem. Hae autem sunt diversae rationes originis. Ergo videtur quod principium in istis acceptionibus aequivoce sumatur. Furthermore, the Father is the principle of the Son through generation, and of the Holy Spirit through spiration, and of the created through creation. Now, these are diverse accounts of origin. Therefore it seems that "principle" is taken equivocally in these uses. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius quaeritur, quomodo per prius dicatur. Videtur enim quod secundum quod dicit respectum ad creaturam. Essentiale enim est prius secundum intellectum notionali, et commune proprio. Sed esse principium creaturae, est essentiale et toti Trinitati commune; esse autem principium divinae personae, est notionale et proprium. Ergo et cetera. Obj. 1: Moreover, one asks how it is said with priority. For it seems to be with priority insofar as it signifies reference to the created. For the essential is prior to the notional, according to concept, and the common prior to the proper. But to be a principle of the created is essential and common to the entire Trinity, whereas to be the principle of a divine Person is notional and is proper. Therefore and so on. Contra, aeternum est prius temporali. Sed principium personae dicitur ab aeterno; principium autem creaturae a tempore. Ergo et cetera. On the contrary, the eternal is prior to the temporal. But "principle" is said of the Person from eternity, whereas "principle" is said of the created from time. Therefore and so on. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum, quod idem judicium est de principio et de origine super quam fundatur ratio principii. Potest autem origo considerari dupliciter: aut secundum communem rationem originis, quae est aliquid ab aliquo esse; et sic una ratio est communis ad originem personarum et originem creaturarum, non quidem communitate univocationis, sed analogiae: et similiter etiam nomen principii. Potest etiam considerari secundum determinatum modum originis; et sic sunt diversae speciales rationes originis et principii; sed hoc non facit aequivocationem: quia sic etiam, secundum philosophum, animalis ratio secundum unumquodque est alia. I answer that the judgment about "principle" is the same as that about "origin," on which the account of a principle is founded. Now, an origin can be considered in two ways. The first is according to the common account of origin, which is something being from something else; and in this way there is one account common to the origin of the Persons and the origin of created things, but not according to a commonness of univocation, but rather, one of analogy. And so it is also for the name "principle." But it can also be considered according to the determinate mode of origin, and then there are diverse specific accounts of origin and principle. But this does not cause equivocation, since even in this way the account for each animal is different, according to the Philosopher. Ad primum dicendum, quod principium est commune communitate analogiae, et non univocationis. Reply to Obj. 1: "Principle" is common with a commonness of analogy, not one of univocation. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Magister accipit principium in divisione secundum communem rationem, quae una est, ut dictum est, in corp. art., et non secundum speciales, quae differunt. Reply to Obj. 2: In the division the Master is taking "principle" according to its common account, which is one, as was said in the body, and not according to the specific accounts, which differ. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis aeterno et temporali nihil sit univocum; est tamen aliquid commune secundum analogiam, ut saepe dictum est. Reply to Obj. 3: Although nothing is univocal to the eternal and the temporal, nonetheless there is something common according to analogy, as has often been said. Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad speciales rationes originis quae non faciunt aequivocationem, ut dictum est. Reply to Obj. 4: That argument follows in reference to the specific accounts of origin, which do not cause an equivocation, as was said. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad id quod ulterius quaeritur, dicendum, quod processio creaturarum exemplatur a processione divinarum personarum; unde, absolute loquendo, per prius dicitur principium respectu personae quam respectu creaturae. Sed tamen sciendum, quod in principio, secundum quod dicitur respectu creaturae, est considerare ipsam habitudinem quae temporalis est, et illud in quo fundatur ista habitudo, scilicet virtus et operatio divina; in quibus tamen non est ratio principii nisi quasi habitualiter; et sic secundo modo considerando principium secundum quod dicitur principium creaturae, est prius quam principium divinae personae quod fundatur in proprietate, per modum quo essentiale dicitur prius notionali secundum intellectum. Sed hoc non est nisi secundum quid. To what is further asked, one should say that the procession of created things has as its exemplar the procession of the divine Persons. Whence, speaking absolutely, "principle" is said with priority in reference to the Person over the reference to the created. But nonetheless one should know that in a principle, insofar as it is said in reference to the created, one must consider the orientation itself, which is temporal, and that on which this orientation is founded, the divine power and action. Yet the account of a principle is in these latter only, as it were, habitually. And thus, in considering "principle" in the second way, insofar as one speaks of the principle of the created, this is prior to [being] the principle of the divine Person, which is founded in a [personal] property, in the way in which the essential is said to be prior in understanding to the notional. But this is [prior] only in a certain respect. Et per hoc patet responsio ad utrumque objectum. And thereby the replies to each objection is clear. Articulus 3 Article 3 Whether by a single property the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit nisi una proprietas patris et filii, secundum quam dicuntur principium spiritus sancti. Proprietas enim unitatem et multitudinem trahit a suppositis. Sed pater et filius non sunt unum suppositum. Ergo nec ipsorum est una proprietas. Obj. 1: To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that there is not but one property of the Father and the Son according to which they are called the principle of the Holy Spirit. For a property draws its unity or multiplicity from its supposits. But the Father and the Son are not one supposit. Therefore neither do they have just one property. Praeterea, nihil idem est uniens principium, et distinguens. Sed notiones in divinis sunt distinguentes. Ergo videtur quod nulla notio patrem et filium uniat. Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing the same is both a uniting and a distinguishing principle. But in the divine the notions distinguish. Therefore it seems that no notion unites the Father and the Son. Item, magis sunt unum quae uniuntur in natura et proprietate, quam quae uniuntur in natura tantum. Sed pater et filius non sunt magis unum quam pater et spiritus sanctus. Cum igitur pater et spiritus sanctus non conveniant nisi in natura, videtur quod pater et filius non uniantur in aliqua proprietate una. Obj. 3: Furthermore, things united in nature and property are more one than things that are united only in nature. But the Father and the Son are not more one than are the Father and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, since the Father and the Holy Spirit agree only in their nature, it seems that the Father and the Son are not united in any one property. Praeterea, propinquius est proprietati illud in quo est, quam illud ad quod dicitur. Sed proprietates quae sunt in una persona, sunt plures ex hoc quod ad diversa referuntur; sicut generatio in patre ad filium, et communis spiratio ad spiritum sanctum. Ergo multo magis efficientur duae proprietates ex hoc quod sunt in duabus personis. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a property is closer to that in which it exists than to that relative to which it is spoken. But properties in one Person are many from the fact that they are referred to diverse things; for example, in the Father, generation in reference to the Son, and common spiration in reference to the Holy Spirit. Therefore so much more do they become two properties if they are in two Persons. Contra, secundum Anselmum, in omnibus pater et filius unum sunt, in quibus non distinguit inter eos relationis oppositio. Sed in communi spiratione pater et filius non opponuntur. Ergo est una et eadem numero in utroque. On the contrary, according to Anselm the Father and the Son are one in all things wherein an opposition of relation does not distinguish them. But in common spiration the Father and the Son are not opposed. Therefore it is numerically one and the same in both of them. Respondeo dicendum, quod una numero notio est patris et filii, secundum quod principium spiritus sancti dicuntur, ut dicitur in littera. Cujus ratio est, quia distinctionem rerum secundum formam aliquam non invenimus nisi dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod aliquid commune distinguitur per plures rationes speciales, sicut ratio generis distinguitur in plures species; alio modo secundum quod natura specialis distinguitur in plura secundum numerum. I answer that the notion of the Father and the Son according to which they are called the principle of the Holy Spirit is numerically one, as is said in the text. The reason for this is that we find the distinction of realities according to some form only in two ways: in one way, insofar as something common is distinguished by several specifying accounts, like the way the account of a genus is distinguished into several species; in the other way, insofar as a specific nature is distinguished into a numerical multitude. Hic autem secundus modus non potest esse in divinis, duplici ratione: primo, quia multiplicatio secundum numerum unius speciei non est ex aliquo formali adjuncto, sed ex materiali principio diviso: quia ratio speciei specialissimae constituitur per adventum ultimae formae constitutivae: materia autem non est in divinis. Secundo, quia natura specialis non multiplicatur nisi secundum esse quod in diversis habet: quia tota quidditas completa est in specie. In divinis autem non est nisi unum esse; unde non potest esse quod aliquid dictum secundum specialem rationem, in divinis numero multiplicetur. Now, this second mode cannot be present in the divine for two reasons. The first is because numerical multiplication of one species is not due to anything formal being added, but due to a divided material principle. For the account of a most specified species is constituted by the advent of the last constitutive form. But matter is not in the divine. The second is because a specific nature is multiplied only according to the existence that it has in diverse things, since the entire "whatness" is completed in the species. Now, in the divine there is only one existence. Whence, it cannot be that something said according to a specific account would be numerically multiplied in the divine. Relinquitur igitur quod quidquid est in divinis, vel remaneat indistinctum et unum numero, sicut natura communis tribus personis: vel habeat rationem communem distinguibilem secundum plures rationes speciales: sicut relatio communis est tribus, non tamen una numero relatio, sed alia et alia, etiam secundum rationem specialem distincta. Cum igitur communis spiratio nominet specialem rationem principii secundum specialem modum originis, impossibile est quod sit nisi una numero in patre et filio. Therefore it remains that whatever is in the divine either remains undistinguished and numerically one, as the nature common to the three Persons, or it has a common account distinguishable according to several specific accounts, just as relation is common to the three, yet not numerically one relation, but different ones, and ones distinct according to a specific account. Therefore, since "common spiration" names a specific account of "principle" according to a specific mode of origin, it is impossible that it be but numerically one in the Father and the Son. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod in creaturis supposita distincta sunt per esse; et ideo proprietates ipsorum etiam secundum esse distinguuntur. Sed in divinis suppositis est unum esse; unde et proprietas non potest multiplicari secundum esse, sed solum secundum rationem proprietatis specialem. Reply to Obj. 1: In created things supposits are distinct through their existence, and therefore their properties are distinguished also according to their existence. But in the divine supposits there is one existence. Whence neither can a property be multiplied according to existence, but only according to the specific account of a property.