Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod affirmatio et negatio dicuntur maxime opponi, quia in eis non importatur aliqua convenientia: in privative enim oppositis importatur convenientia quantum ad subjectum, quia nata sunt fieri circa idem: in contrariis autem relativis etiam quantum ad genus, quia scilicet sunt in eodem genere. Unde in utraque oppositione utrumque extremorum significatur per modum entis et naturae cujusdam. Illud autem in quo invenitur aliquid non permixtum contrario, est maximum et primum in genere illo, et causa omnium aliorum; et ideo oppositio affirmationis et negationis, cui non admiscetur aliqua convenientia, est prima et maxima oppositio, et causa omnis oppositionis et distinctionis; et ideo oportet quod in qualibet alia oppositione includatur affirmatio et negatio, sicut primum in posteriori. Unde plura requiruntur ad alias oppositiones quam ad oppositionem contradictionis, quia se habent ex additione ad ipsam. Unde non oportet quod, si contrarietas non inveniatur nisi in diversis realiter, quod affirmatio et negatio inveniatur in diversis realiter; immo sufficit etiam distinctio rationis ad affirmationem et negationem, cum quaelibet distinctio, ut dictum est, includat affirmationem et negationem: et talis distinctio, scilicet rationis, est inter essentiam et personam. Sed opposita relative aliquando requirunt diversitatem vel distinctionem realem; et talia sunt quae divinas personas distinguunt: aliquando autem distinctionem rationis tantum; ut cum dicitur idem eidem idem: et hoc melius dicetur in Tract. de relationibus, dist. 26, q. 2, a. 1. Reply Obj. 1: Affirmation and negation are said to be most opposed to each other because no agreement is implied in them. For in privative opposites an agreement in subject is implied, since they are naturally apt to occur in the same thing, and in contrary relatives there is agreement in genus, since they are in the same genus. Whence in both oppositions each extreme is signified through the mode of being and a certain nature. Now, that wherein is found no mixture with its contrary is the greatest and first in that genus, and the cause of all the others. And therefore the opposition of affirmation and negation, in which is mixed no agreement, is the first and greatest opposition, and the cause of every opposition and distinction. And therefore affirmation and negation must be included in every other opposition, just as the first is included in the posterior. Whence more things are required for the other oppositions than for the opposition of contradiction, since they are based on an addition to it. Whence it is not necessary that, if contrariety is found only in things that are really diverse, then affirmation and negation is also found in things that are really diverse; indeed, even a distinction of account is enough for affirmation and negation, since every distinction, as was said, includes affirmation and negation, and such a distinction, that is, one of account, is that between the essence and the person. But relative opposites sometimes require real diversity or distinction, and such are what distinguish the divine persons. But sometimes they require only a distinction of account, as when one says that a thing is the same as itself. And this will be explained better in the treatment of relations. Ad secundum dicendum, quod essentia non praedicatur de supposito ratione modi significandi in utroque, sed ratione indifferentiae secundum rem propter simplicitatem divinae naturae, et ideo non oportet quod supponat Patrem. Reply Obj. 2: The essence is not predicated of the supposit by reason of the mode of signifying in each of them, but by reason of the lack of real difference between them, on account of the simplicity of the divine nature. And therefore it need not stand for the Father. Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum dicitur essentia est Pater, est duplex locutio ex eo quod ly Pater potest teneri quasi adjective, ut ponat formam suam circa essentiam; et sic falsa est, quia proprietates non determinant essentiam: vel potest sumi substantive, et tunc supponit Pater in praedicato pro persona Patris; et sic vera est, nec oportet quod fiat hoc modo conversio: ergo Filius est Filius essentiae; sed: ergo Filius est Filius Patris, qui est essentia. Reply Obj. 3: When one says that the essence is the Father, the expression is of two sorts, because the word “Father” can be taken, as it were, adjectivally, so that places its form on the essence—and in this way it is false. For the personal properties do not determine the essence. Or it can be taken substantively, and then “Father” in the predicate stands for the person of the Father—and in this way it is true. Nor must its converse be put this way: therefore the Son is the Son of the essence; rather, it would be: therefore the Son is the Son of the Father, who is the essence. Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum dicitur, essentia est res generans, ly res potest supponere essentiam vel personam. Si essentiam, sic falsa est, quia sic adjectivum poneret formam suam circa essentiam; si personam, sic vera est; et tunc non sequitur: ergo essentia est generans, quia tunc non circa idem ponetur forma adjectivi. Reply Obj. 4: When one says, “the essence is the generating reality,” the word “reality” can stand for the essence or the person. If it stands for the essence, then it is false, since thereby the adjective “generating” would place its form on the essence. But if it stands for the Person, then it is true, and then “therefore the essence is the generating” does not follow, since then the adjective’s form is not placed on the same thing. Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum essentia et persona differant in modo significandi, illud quod praedicatur de persona ratione modi significandi secundum quod ab essentia distinguitur, non praedicatur de essentia, ut generans genitum et hujusmodi, similiter est ex parte essentiae; illud enim quod praedicatur de essentia ratione modi significandi quod differt a supposito distincto, non praedicatur de supposito; sicut essentia est communis tribus, tamen non potest dici hoc de aliqua personarum. Reply Obj. 5: Since “essence” and “person” differ in mode of signifying, what is predicated of a person by reason of the mode of signifying, insofar as it is distinguished from the essence, is not predicated of the essence—for example, generating, generated, and things of this sort. Similarly on the side of the essence: for what is predicated of the essence by reason of the mode of signifying, by which it differs from the distinct supposit, is not predicated of the supposit—for example, the essence is common to the three, yet this commonness cannot be said of any one of the persons. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum actus generandi praedicetur ab aliquo nominum essentialium Whether the act of generating can be predicated of any of the essential names Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus generandi de nullo nominum essentialium praedicetur. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the act of generating is predicated of none of the essential names. Sicut enim tres personae sunt una essentia, ita etiam sunt unus Deus. Sed, secundum rationem Magistri, non potest dici essentia generare, ne notetur essentiae distinctio. Ergo similiter non potest dici, Deus generat, ne sequatur deorum pluralitas. Obj. 1: For just as the three persons are one essence, so also are they one God. But, by the Master’s reasoning, one cannot say that the essence generates, lest it indicate a distinction of essence. Therefore likewise one cannot say God generates, lest a plurality of gods follow. Item, persona et hypostasis et substantia non dicuntur relative. Sed, secundum Magistrum, ideo essentia non potest dici generare, quia relative non dicitur. Ergo similiter nec persona vel hypostasis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, “person,” “hypostasis,” and “substance” are not relative terms. But according to the Master, the essence cannot be said to generate because “essence” is not a relative term. Therefore likewise neither does a person or hypostasis generate. Item, ista nomina, natura, bonitas et hujusmodi, sunt aequalis abstractionis sicut essentia. Si igitur essentia propter modum significandi in abstracto non potest generare, ergo videtur quod nec aliquod aliorum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the names “nature,” “goodness,” and the like are just as abstract as “essence.” Therefore, if “essence” on account of its mode of signifying in the abstract cannot generate, then it seems that neither do the others. Contrarium ostenditur per multas auctoritates in littera. On the contrary is what is shown by the many authorities in the text. Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, generare proprie convenit supposito inquantum distinctum; et ideo quanto magis appropinquat nomen ad suppositum distinctum, tanto verius potest praedicari de ipso actus generandi. Unde haec est propriissima, Pater generat, quia imponitur nomen Patris a proprietate distinguente. Et similiter potest dici, persona generat, quia nomen personae imponitur a proprietate communi, quae dicitur personalitas: et consequenter minus proprie dicitur, Deus generat; quia, quamvis claudat in se suppositum, non tamen suppositum distinctum; nec imponitur nomen a proprietate distinguente, sed ab essentia communi. I answer that, as was said in the previous article, generating belongs properly to the supposit as distinct from the others. And therefore the more a name approaches the distinct supposit, so much more truly can the act of generating be predicated of it. Whence “the Father generates” is the most proper, because the name “Father” is imposed from his distinguishing property. Likewise one can say, “a person generates,” since the name “person” is imposed from property in common, which is called “personhood.” And consequently, “God generates” is said less properly, since even though it contains the supposit in itself, still it does not contain a distinct supposit, nor is the name imposed from a distinguishing property, but rather from the common essence. In omnibus autem abstractis etiam est ordo: quia quaedam ordinem dicunt ad actum, sicut virtus, bonitas, lux, natura et hujusmodi: et quia actus sunt suppositorum, ideo in istis invenitur dictum, quod sapientia generat vel natura generat; tamen hujusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendae, sed pie intelligendae. Quaedam vero nomina sunt quae non dicunt ordinem ad operationem, sed tantum imponuntur secundum rationem nominis ab actu substandi, sicut substantia. Unde hoc nomen substantia adhuc accedit ad rationem suppositi, sed hoc nomen essentia removetur omnino a ratione suppositi: et ideo minime potest dici, quod essentia generet. Si tamen inveniretur, esset exponenda, essentia generat, id est Pater, qui est essentia. Moreover, in all abstract names there is also an order. For some signify an order to act, for example, “power,” “goodness,” “light,” “nature,” and the like, and because acts belong to supposits, therefore with such one finds sayings such as “wisdom generates,” or “the nature generates.” Nonetheless expressions of this sort should not be extended further, but should be understood in a pious way. Now, some names do not signify an order to action, but rather are imposed according to the name’s account, from the act of standing under it, like “substance.” Whence this name “substance” still approaches the account of a supposit, whereas the name “essence” is wholly remote from the account of a supposit, so least of all can one say, “the essence generates.” Nevertheless, if it were so found, it would have to be expounded as “the essence, that is, the Father who is the essence, generates.” Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc nomen Deus includit in se suppositum indeterminate, et ratione ejus a quo nomen imponitur, includit in se naturam: unde ratione modi significandi est quasi medium inter essentiam et personam distinctam: et ideo nec repugnat sibi modus essentiae ratione indeterminationis, nec modus distinctae personae ratione suppositi: et ideo potest dici, Deus generat, et, Deus est communis tribus personis. Reply Obj. 1: The name “God” indeterminately includes within itself the supposit, and by reason of what the name is imposed from, it includes within itself the nature. Whence, by reason of the mode of signifying it is, as it were, an intermediate between the essence and a distinct person. And therefore by reason of its indeterminacy, the mode of the essence is not repugnant to it, nor is the mode of a distinct person, by reason of its supposit. Therefore one can say, “God generates,” and “‘God’ is common to the three persons.” Ad secundum dicendum, quod relativum in divinis multipliciter dicitur; propriissime enim relativum est quod secundum suum nomen ad aliud refertur, ut Pater. Aliud autem dicitur relativum quod sequitur vel causat relationem, sicut generatio et generare. Aliud autem quod implicite claudit in se relationem, sicut Trinitas personas distinctas relatione; et hoc nomen persona includit in se relationem distinguentem. Aliud autem potest dici relativum, inquantum pro relatione ponitur, sicut Deus, et etiam quaedam nomina abstracta, cujus ratio dicta est in corpore. Reply Obj. 2: In the divine, the relative is spoken of in many ways. For most properly the relative is what according to its name refers to another, like “Father.” However, another relative is what follows or causes a relation, like “generation” and “to generate.” Moreover, a still different relative is what implicitly contains a relation within itself, as “Trinity” implicitly contains persons distinct by relation; and this name “person” includes within itself a distinguishing relation. Moreover, something else can be called relative insofar as it is put down in place of a relation, like “God,” and even certain abstract names, the account of which was given in the body. Ad tertium dicendum, quod majoris abstractionis est essentia quam bonitas vel sapientia: quia quamvis aequaliter abstrahant a supposito, tamen essentia super hoc abstrahit etiam ab actu; illa vero dicunt ordinem ad actum. Reply Obj. 3: “Essence” is of greater abstraction than is “goodness” or “wisdom,” because even though they equally abstract from the supposit, still “essence” over and above this abstracts even from act, whereas the other two signify an order to act. Quaestio 2 Question 2 Utrum essentia se habeat ad generationem sicut id de quo est generatio Whether the essence is that of which there is generation Deinde quaeritur, utrum essentia se habeat ad generationem sicut id de quo est generatio; et circa hoc duo quaeruntur: Next it is asked whether the essence stands to the generation as that of which there is generation. And two things are asked about this: primo utrum Filius generetur de substantia Patris; first, whether the Son is generated of the Father’s substance; secundo utrum sit ex nihilo. second, whether he is generated out of nothing. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Filius sit genitus de substantia Patris Whether the Son is generated of the Father’s substance Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Filius non sit genitus de substantia Patris. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the Son is not generated of the Father’s substance. Omnis enim praepositio transitiva est. Transitio autem requirit diversitatem vel distinctionem. Cum igitur Filius non distinguatur ab essentia Patris, non potest dici de essentia ejus natus. Obj. 1: For every preposition is transitive, and transitivity requires diversity or distinction. Therefore, since the Son is not distinguished from the Father’s essence, he cannot be said to be born of his essence. Item, sicut se habet natura humana ad Socratem, ita divina essentia ad Filium. Sed Socrates non potest dici de essentia humana. Ergo nec Filius de essentia Patris. Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as human nature stands to Socrates, so does the divine essence stand to the Son. But Socrates cannot be said to be of the human essence. Therefore neither can the Son be of the Father’s essence. Item “de” semper dicit ordinem. Sed inter Filium et essentiam non est ordo neque temporis, neque naturae, cum essentia non sit generans, sed Pater; neque causalitatis. Ergo videtur quod nullo modo sit de essentia Patris. Obj. 3: Furthermore, “of” always indicates an order. But between the Son and the divine essence there is no order of time, or of nature, since the essence is not the generator, the Father is, or of causality. Therefore it seems that he is in no way of the Father’s essence. Si dicas, quod hoc dicitur propter consubstantialitatem Filii ad Patrem; Obj. 4: But you might say that this is said on account of the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. contra. Sicut essentia Patris est essentia Filii, ita tota essentia Filii est in Patre. Ergo eadem ratione potest dici Pater de substantia Filii, sicut e contrario. On the contrary, just as the Father’s essence is the Son’s essence, so too the entire essence of the Son is in the Father. Therefore, for the same reason as the converse, one can say that the Father is of the Son’s essence. Contrarium ostenditur per auctoritates in littera. On the contrary is what is shown through the authorities in the text. Respondeo dicendum, quod haec praepositio “de” proprie designat principium et consubstantialitatem; haec autem praepositio “ex” designat tantum ordinem principii. Unde quidquid dicitur esse de aliquo, ex illo est, sed non convertitur, sicut dicitur infra, 36 dist. Unde haec praepositio “ex” quandoque notat ordinem temporis tantum, ut, ex mane fit dies; quandoque ordinem principii agentis, sicut artificiata sunt ex artifice: quandoque principium materiale, ut cultellus fit ex ferro. Sed “de,” cum notet consubstantialitatem, semper notat vel principium materiale, vel agens consubstantiale, sicut dicimus quod homo filius generatur de patre suo, cum sit generatio per decisionem substantiae. I answer that the preposition “of” properly designates a principle and consubstantiality, whereas the preposition “from” designates only the order of a principle. Whence whatever is said to be of something is also from it, but not vice versa, as will be explained below. This is why the preposition “from” sometimes notes only an order of time, like day comes from night, but sometimes an order of the active principle, like works of art are from the artisan, and sometimes the material principle, like the knife is made from iron. But “of,” since it notes consubstantiality, always notes either the material principle or a consubstantial agent, as when we say that a man is begotten of his father, since the generation occurs through a separation from his substance. Et secundum istum modum Filius dicitur de Patre et de essentia Patris: tamen de Patre sicut de generante, et de essentia sicut de principio generationis communicato. Unde etiam accedit ad similitudinem secundum materiam, si a materia removeatur totum quod est imperfectionis et remaneat haec sola de conditionibus materiae, quod est manens in re et per eam res subsistit; et praecipue res artificiata quae est in genere substantiae propter suam materiam et non propter suam formam, ut dicit Commentator in 2 De anima, com. 4. And in this way the Son is said to be of the Father and of the Father’s essence. Yet he is of the Father as of a generator, and of his essence as of the communicated principle of generation. This is also why it approaches a likeness with matter, if one were to remove from matter all there is of imperfection and this alone were to remain of the conditions of matter: that it endures in the thing and through it the thing subsists. And this is especially the case with a thing made by art, which is in the genus of substance on account of its matter and not on account of its form, as the Commentator says. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod “de,” ut deductum est, dicit consubstantialitatem et ordinem ad principium, et consubstantialitas respicit essentiam; et ordo ratione cujus est transitio, respicit personam generantem: non enim dicimus quod Filius sit de essentia, sed quod sit de essentia Patris et ideo non oportet esse distinctionem Filii ab essentia sed a Patre. Reply Obj. 1: “Of,” as has been deduced, signifies consubstantiality and order to a principle, and the substantiality looks to the essence, while the order, by reason of its transitivity, looks to the generating person. For we do not say that the Son is of the essence, but that he is of the essence of the Father. And therefore there need not be a distinction of the Son from the essence, but only from the Father. Ad secundum dicendum, quod similiter Socrates dicitur nasci de natura patris vel substantia, sicut Filius Dei, tamen differenter; quia Filius Dei est de tota substantia Patris, sed Socrates est de parte substantiae. Item ad aliud. Quia Socrates subsistit non tantum per essentiam, sed etiam per materiam, per quam individuatur natura humanitatis in ipso. Sed Filius Dei subsistit per essentiam Patris, cum essentia non sit pars Filii, sed totum quod est Filius. Reply Obj. 2: Likewise, Socrates is said to be born of his father’s nature or from his substance just as the Son of God is, yet in a different way. For the Son of God is of the entire substance of the Father, whereas Socrates is from part of his father’s substance. Further, they differ in another way, for Socrates subsists not only through his essence but also through his matter, whereby the nature of humanity is individuated in him. But the Son of God subsists through the Father’s essence, since the essence is not a part of the Son, but the whole that is the Son. Ad tertium dicendum, sicut ad primum. Reply Obj. 3: This should be answered in the same way as was the first.