Distinctio 12 Distinction 12 De sacramento tantum et de re tantum Appearance and Effects of the Eucharist Postquam determinavit Magister de uno trium, in quibus consistit integritas hujus sacramenti, scilicet de eo quod est res et sacramentum; in parte ista intendit determinare de aliis duobus, scilicet de eo quod est sacramentum tantum, et de eo quod est res tantum; unde dividitur in partes duas: in prima determinat de eo quod est res tantum, ibi: institutum est hoc sacramentum duabus de causis. After the Master has examined one of the three things in which the integrity of this sacrament consists, namely, what is reality-and-sacrament, in this part he intends to consider the other two things, namely, what is sacrament alone, and what is reality alone. Hence it is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers what is sacrament alone; in the second, the effect of the sacrament which is the reality alone, at: And this sacrament was instituted for two causes. Prima in duas: in prima determinat de accidentibus, quae sunt sacramenta, idest signa utriusque corporis Christi, scilicet veri et mystici; in secunda determinat de actu sacerdotis, qui est sacramentum sive signum passionis Christi, ibi: post haec quaeritur, si quod gerit sacerdos, proprie dicatur sacrificium. The first is in two parts; in the first, he considers the accidents, which are sacraments, i.e., signs of both the true body of Christ and the mystical body of Christ; in the second, he considers the act of the priest, which is a sacrament or sign of Christ’s Passion, at: After these matters it is asked whether what the priest does is properly called a sacrifice. Circa primum duo facit: primo determinat de ipsis accidentibus; secundo de fractione, quae in eis fundatur, ibi: solet etiam quaeri de fractione et partitione. Circa hoc duo facit: primo determinat de ipsa fractione; secundo de partium significatione, ibi: quid autem partes illae significent, Sergius Papa tradit. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he considers the accidents themselves; second, the breaking that is founded on them, at: it is also usual to ask about the breaking and division into parts. Concerning this he does two things: first, he examines the breaking itself; second, the meaning of the parts, at: As to what those parts may signify, Pope Sergius teaches. Circa primum duo facit: primo movet quaestionem; secundo determinat eam, ibi: ideo quibusdam placet, quod non sit ibi fractio, sicut videtur. Circa quod quatuor opiniones ponit; secunda incipit ibi: alii vero dicunt etc.; tertia ibi: alii tradunt corpus Christi essentialiter frangi; quarta, ibi: sed quia corpus Christi incorruptibile est, sane dici potest fractio illa et partitio non in substantia corporis, sed in ipsa forma panis sacramentaliter fieri. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit opinionem quartam; secundo confirmat eam, quia prae ceteris vera est, ibi: ne autem mireris vel insultes, si accidentia videantur frangi. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he raises the question; second, he considers it, at: And so some are pleased to hold that there is no breaking there, as there seems to be. Concerning this he cites four opinions, the second beginning at: But others say, etc.; the third at: others teach that the body of Christ is broken and divided according to essence; the fourth at: but because the body of Christ is incorruptible, it may be truly said that the breaking and division into parts is done not in the substance of the body, but in the sacramental form itself of the bread. And concerning this he does two things: first, he sets down the fourth opinion; second, he confirms it, for it is true above all the rest, at: nor should you wonder or scoff if the accidents appear to be broken. Institutum est hoc sacramentum duabus de causis. Hic ponit effectum hujus sacramenti; et quia ex effectu rei accipitur usus ejus, ideo circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit effectum; secundo determinat utendi modum, ibi: si autem quaeritur, utrum quotidie communicandum sit; audi quid inde tradit Augustinus. And this sacrament was instituted for two causes. Here he gives the effect of this sacrament. And because from the effect of a thing, its use is taken, for this reason he does two things about this: first, he sets down the effect; second, he determines the mode of using it, at: but if it is asked whether Communion is to be received daily, hear what Augustine teaches about this. Hic est triplex quaestio: prima de accidentibus. Secunda de effectibus hujus sacramenti. Tertia de frequentatione ipsius. Here there are three questions: first, about the accidents; second, about this sacrament’s effects; third, about its frequency. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De accidentibus Accidents and the Eucharist Circa primum quaeruntur tria: Concerning the first, three questions arise: primo, utrum accidentia sint hic sine substantia; first, whether the accidents are here without a substance; secundo, de operatione illorum accidentium; second, about the operation of those accidents; tertio, de fractione quae in eis fundatur. third, about the breaking which is founded on them. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum accidentia sint hic sine substantia Whether the accidents are here without a substance Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod accidentia sine substantia esse, Deus facere non possit. Si enim esse rei separaretur ab ente, ens esset non ens. Sed hoc Deus non potest facere: quia non potest facere quod duo contradictoria sint simul vera. Ergo non potest separare esse rei ab ente. Sed accidentis esse est inesse, secundum Philosophum. Ergo Deus non potest facere quin accidens insit. Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. It seems that God cannot make accidents exist without a substance. For if a being were separated from its existence, the being would be a non-being. But God cannot do this, for he cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. Therefore, he cannot separate a being from being. But accidental being is to be present-in, according to the Philosopher. Therefore God cannot make it so that an accident is not present in something. Praeterea, quicumque separat definitionem a definito, ponit duo contradictoria esse simul vera: quia hoc ipsum quod est homo, est animal rationale mortale; et ita si ponatur esse homo et non esse animal rationale mortale, ponitur esse homo et non esse. Sed definitio accidentis est quod inest substantiae; unde etiam in definitione singulorum accidentium oportet quod ponatur substantia. Ergo cum Deus non possit facere contradictoria simul esse vera, neque facere poterit quod accidens sit sine substantia. Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever separates a definition from the thing defined, holds two contradictories to be true at the same time. For this very thing that is man, is a mortal rational animal; and so if it is held to be a man and not a mortal rational animal, it is held to be a man and not to be one. But the definition of an accident is what is present in a substance; hence also in the definition of individual accidents, substance must be included. Therefore, since God cannot make contradictories true at the same time, neither could he make accidents exist without substance. Praeterea, Deus non potest facere quod definitio insit alicui, et definitum non insit eidem, nec quod inter affirmationem et negationem sit medium. Sed si ponamus accidentia esse sine substantia, oportet alterum dictorum sequi. Ergo Deus non potest hoc facere. Probatio mediae. Non esse enim in subjecto, sed per se existere, est definitio substantiae, et opponitur contradictorie ei quod est esse in subjecto. Sed si ponamus aliquod accidens non esse in subjecto; vel ponemus quod aliquid sit medium inter esse in subjecto et non esse, vel ponemus quod aliquid sit non ens in subjecto, et non sit substantia: quia si est substantia, non est accidens. Ergo si ponamus accidens esse simul subjecto, sequitur alterum duorum: vel quod inter contradictoria sit medium; vel quod definitio separetur a definito, quod iterum implicat contradictoria esse simul vera. Obj. 3: Furthermore, God cannot make it that a definition is present in something, and the defined thing is not present in the same thing; nor that there be a mean between affirmation and negation. But if we posited that accidents exist without substance, one of these statements would necessarily follow. Therefore, God cannot do this. Proof of the middle: for the definition of substance is not being in a subject, but existing through itself, and it is opposed like a contradictory to what is being in a subject. But if we posited that a certain accident did not exist in a subject, either we will posit that something is a mean between being in a subject and not being in a subject, or we will posit that something is not a being in a subject, and it is not substance; for if it is substance it is not accident. Therefore if we posit that an accident exists without a subject, one of the two statements follows: either that there is a middle between two contradictories, or that a definition may be separated from what it defines, which again implies contradictories to be true at the same time. Sed contra est quod dicitur Lucae 1, 37: non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum. On the contrary, it is said: for no word shall be impossible with God (Luke 1:37). Praeterea, potest Deus plura facere quam homo possit intelligere vel imaginari. Sed aliqui philosophi posuerunt dimensiones esse sine subjecto, sicut qui posuerunt mathematica separata. Ergo Deus potest hoc facere. Furthermore, God can do more things than a man can understand or imagine. But certain philosophers posited that dimensions can exist without a subject, like those who posited separated mathematicals. Therefore, God can do this. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod non sit congruum huic sacramento quod accidentia sint sine substantia. In sacramento enim perfectissimo non congruit esse aliquid quod divinae ordinationi repugnet. Sed divina ordinatio est quod accidens sit in subjecto. Ergo in hoc sacramento non competit quod sit sine subjecto. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is not fitting to this sacrament that accidents exist without substance. For in the most perfect sacrament it is not suitable that there be anything opposed to divine ordination. But the divine ordination is that accidents be in a subject. Therefore, in this sacrament it is not fitting that it be without a subject. Praeterea, sacramentum veritatis non decet aliqua fallacia. Sed hoc sacramentum est maximae veritatis, quia continet illum qui dixit, Joan. 14, 6: ego sum veritas. Cum ergo existentibus accidentibus sine subjecto sequatur fallacia; quia accidentia, quantum est in se, significant substantiam propriam subesse: videtur quod non competat huic sacramento accidentia esse sine subjecto. Obj. 2: Furthermore, no fallacy is appropriate to the sacrament of truth. But this sacrament is of the greatest truth, because it contains the one who said, I am the truth (John 14:6). Therefore, since a fallacy results when accidents exist without a subject, for accidents, in themselves, signify that their proper substance is underlying, therefore it seems that it does not befit this sacrament for accidents to be without a subject. Praeterea, materia debet esse formae proportionata. Sed ex parte formae sacramenti non competeret quod esset accidens verbi sine essentia verbi. Ergo nec ex parte materiae competit quod sit accidens elementi sine elemento. Obj. 3: Furthermore, matter should be proportioned to form. But in the sacrament’s form it would not be fitting for there to be the accidents of the words without the essence of the words. Therefore, neither in the matter is it fitting that the accidents of the element exist without the element. Sed contra, accidens subjecto respondet. Sed substantia panis, qui prius erat subjectum priorum accidentium, mutata est in alterum statum per hoc quod conversa est in corpus Christi. Ergo et accidentia congruit in alterum statum mutari, ut scilicet sint sine subjecto. On the contrary, accidents correspond to their subject. But the substance of bread, which was formerly the subject of the former accidents, is changed into another state by the fact that it is converted into the body of Christ. Therefore, it was fitting that the accidents also be changed into another state, namely, so that they are there without a subject. Praeterea, hoc sacramentum dicitur mysterium fidei. Sed fides non solum est supra intellectum, sed etiam supra sensum. Ergo in hoc sacramento non solum debet aliquid esse supra intellectum, sicut quod corpus Christi sub tam parvis panis dimensionibus contineatur; sed etiam supra sensum, scilicet quod accidentibus quae sensui subjacent, substantia propria non subsit. Furthermore, this sacrament is called the mystery of faith. But faith is not only above the intellect, but also above the senses. Therefore, in this sacrament there should not only be something above the understanding, like the fact that the body of Christ is contained under such small dimensions of bread; but also something above the senses, namely, that the accidents that the senses perceive do not exist in their proper substance. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod accidentia non sint in hoc sacramento sine substantia. Esse enim in substantia aequaliter convenit omnibus accidentibus. Sed albedo non est hic sine subjecto: quod patet ex hoc quod dividitur per accidens, quod non competit nisi existenti in subjecto. Ergo nec quantitas aut aliquod accidens est hic sine subjecto. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that accidents are not in this sacrament without substance. For to be in a substance applies equally to all accidents. But whiteness is not here without a subject, which is clear from the fact that it is divided per accidens, which only belongs to something existing in a subject. Therefore, neither quantity nor any accident is here without a subject. Praeterea, illud quod sensus percipit in hoc sacramento, est ibi secundum veritatem; alias esset fictio in hoc sacramento. Sed sensus non tantum percipit ibi quantitatem aut albedinem, sed etiam quantum et album. Ergo non est ibi accidens sine subjecto. Obj. 2: Furthermore, what the senses perceive in this sacrament is there according to truth; otherwise there would be false pretenses in this sacrament. But the senses do not only perceive there quantity or whiteness, but also a certain quantity and something white. Therefore, there are no accidents there without a subject. Praeterea, accidens non individuatur nisi ex subjecto, sicut nec forma nisi ex materia. Sed accidentia sunt ibi individuata; alias non essent sensibilia. Ergo non sunt sine subjecto. Obj. 3: Furthermore, an accident is only individuated by its subject, just as form is by matter. But accidents are individuated there, or else they would not be sensible. Therefore, they do not exist without a subject. Praeterea, omnis forma separata a materia est intellectus in actu, ut a philosophis probatur. Sed si accidentia sunt hic sine subjecto, erunt quaedam formae sine materia: non enim habent materiam partem sui. Ergo erunt intellectus in actu, quod falsum apparet. Obj. 4: Furthermore, every form separated from matter is understanding in act, as is proved by philosophers. But if accidents are here without a subject, they will be certain forms without matter: for they do not have their own material part. Therefore, they will be understanding in act, which seems false. Praeterea, quanto aliquid appropinquat ad divinam simplicitatem, tanto est simplicius. Sed si sunt hic accidentia sine substantia, magis appropinquant ad divinam simplicitatem quam angeli: quia in angelis est compositio, ad minus ex quo est et quod est; quae in his accidentibus inveniri non potest. Ergo erunt nobiliora angelis; quod falsum est. Obj. 5: Furthermore, the more something approaches divine simplicity, the more simple it is. But if there are accidents here without substance, they approach divine simplicity more than the angels: for in the angels there is composition, at least of what it is and that it is, which cannot be found in these accidents. Therefore, they will be more noble than the angels, which is false. Praeterea, impossibile est densitatem esse sine materia, neque raritatem: quia haec est definitio densi, quod multum de materia contineatur sub parvis dimensionibus; et contraria est definitio rari. Sed tactus percipit in hoc sacramento densitatem. Ergo est ibi materia sub dimensionibus; ergo dimensiones non per se existunt, et ita nec alia accidentia. Obj. 6: Furthermore, it is impossible for density to exist without matter, nor rarity: for this is the definition of the dense, that a lot of matter is contained under small dimensions; and the definition of the rare is the opposite. But the sense of touch perceives density in this sacrament. Therefore, there is matter here under the dimensions; therefore the dimensions do not exist by themselves, and so neither do the other accidents. Sed contra: sicut, in praecedenti dist., dictum est, ibi non est alia substantia quam corporis Christi. Sed non sunt accidentia quae apparent in corpore Christi sicut in subjecto, quia non denominant ipsum. Ergo non sunt in subjecto aliquo. On the contrary, just as was said in the previous distinction, no substance exists there other than that of the body of Christ. But the accidents that appear are not in the body of Christ as in a subject, for they do not denominate it. Therefore, they are not in any subject.