Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, quod in comparatione duorum malorum levius est aperte peccare quam sanctitatem simulare. Sed aperte peccare est peccatum mortale. Ergo et sanctitatem simulare semper. Obj. 2: Furthermore, Jerome says that in the comparison of two evils, it is less serious to sin openly than to feign sanctity. But to sin openly is a mortal sin. Therefore, so is feigning sanctity, always. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, quod illi qui amicitiam simulant, magis sunt accusandi quam illi qui numisma violant, quanto contra melius fraudem committunt. Sed qui numisma violant, semper mortaliter peccant. Ergo et hypocritae. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Philosopher says that those who fake friendship are more to be accused than those who counterfeit money, as they commit fraud against something better. But those who counterfeit money always sin mortally. Therefore, so do hypocrites. Praeterea, omne quod excludit a visione Dei est peccatum mortale. Sed hypocrisis est hujusmodi, ut patet Job 13, 16: in conspectu ejus non veniet omnis hypocrita. Ergo semper est mortale peccatum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that excludes someone from the vision of God is a mortal sin. But hypocrisy does this, as is clear from Job 13:16: every hypocrite shall not come before his sight. Therefore, it is always a mortal sin. Sed contra, veritatis virtus corrumpitur tam per mendacium oris, quam per simulationem operis. Sed mendacium non est semper mortale. Ergo nec simulatio. On the contrary, the virtue of truth is corrupted as much by a verbal lie as by pretence in works. But a lie is not always a mortal sin. Therefore, neither is pretending. Quaestiuncula 4 Quaestiuncula 4 Ulterius. Videtur quod hypocrisis non debeat poni impedimentum poenitentiae prae aliis vitiis. Quia quanto aliquod peccatum est gravius, tanto magis poenitentiam impedit. Sed alia interiora peccata quaedam sunt majora quam hypocrisis. Ergo illa magis debent poni impedimentum poenitentiae. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that hypocrisy should not be considered an impediment to penance more than other vices. For the more serious any sin is, the more it impedes penance. But certain other interior sins are greater than hypocrisy. Therefore, they should be considered greater impediments to penance. Praeterea, hypocrisis, secundum Gregorium, est filia inanis gloriae. Sed causa magis operatur ad aliquid quam effectus. Ergo magis debet poni inanis gloria impedimentum poenitentiae quam hypocrisis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, hypocrisy, according to Gregory, is the daughter of vainglory. But the cause works more of something than the effect. Therefore, vainglory should be considered more of an impediment to penance than hypocrisy. Sed contrarium in littera apparet. On the contrary is what appears in the text. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod hypocrita proprie dicitur qui personam alterius repraesentat, quasi submissus, vel suppositus loco alterius; unde in theatris illi qui personam aliorum gerebant repraesentantes, dicebantur hypocritae; et sic accipit hypocritas Philosophus in 3 Ethica: et ideo ille qui cum non sit virtuosus, personam virtuosi ostentat, hypocrita dicitur: hypocrita enim Graece, Latine dicitur simulator. Et quia ostentare de se melius quam sit, est vitium jactantiae, sive verbis, sive factis fiat, ut dicitur in 4 Ethic.; ideo hypocrisis semper est peccatum. To the first question, I answer that ‘hypocrite’ properly means someone who displays himself as another person, as though put forth or substituted for another. And this is why in theaters, those who acted as depicting the persons of others were called hypocrites; and this is how the Philosopher takes hypocrites in the Ethics 3. And therefore someone who, although he is not virtuous, displays the person of a virtuous man, is called a hypocrite, for hypocrita in Greek means pretender in Latin. And so to display oneself as better than one is is a vice of boasting, whether it is done in words or in deeds, as it says in the Ethics 4; and so hypocrisy is always a sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliud est peccatum occultum non propalare, quod discretionis est, et secunda tabula dicitur eo modo quo supra, dist. 14, qu. 1, art. 2, qu. 3, dictum est; et aliud virtutem ostentare, cum aliquis peccato subjaceat, quod hypocrisis est. Reply Obj. 1: It is one thing to not make a hidden sin known, which belongs to discretion, and is called the second plank in the way discussed above in Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 2, Question 3; and another thing to display a virtue when someone is hiding a sin, which is hypocrisy. Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccatum occultare sufficit ad vitandum scandalum; sed peccatum sub specie virtutis palliare hypocrisis est, et malum semper; et per hoc quis famam non conservat, sed furatur. Reply Obj. 2: To keep a sin hidden does enough for avoiding scandal; but to disguise a sin under the appearance of virtue is hypocrisy, and always evil. And by this a person’s reputation is not preserved, but stolen. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod privationes specificantur per habitus oppositos; et ideo illud peccatum est generale quod privat aliquam conditionem quae requiritur in qualibet virtute, sicut inobedientia, prout est generale peccatum. Hypocrisis autem privat conformitatem signi ostendentis conditionem personae ad rem significatam; quae quidem conformitas ad unam virtutem specialiter pertinet, scilicet veritatem; et ideo est speciale peccatum. To the second question, it should be said that privations are specified by their opposite habits, and so a sin is general when it takes away some condition that is required for any virtue, like disobedience, and that is how it is a general sin. Now hypocrisy takes away the conformity between the sign, which displays the condition of a person, and the thing signified; and this conformity does indeed pertain specifically to one virtue, namely truth; and so it is a specific sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod apertum, non importat aliquam specialem rationem peccati; et ideo aperta malitia non nominat peccatum speciale, sicut simulatio, quae specialem rationem peccati importat. Reply Obj. 1: Openness does not carry any specific character of sin, and so open malice is not called a specific sin, like feigning, which does carry a specific character of sin. Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est inconveniens quod aliquod speciale peccatum vel specialis virtus utatur actibus aliarum virtutum vel vitiorum materialiter, sicut magnanimitas utitur omnibus aliis actibus virtutum, ut in eis magna operetur, ut dicitur in 4 Ethic. Et similiter cum hypocrisis sit quaedam species jactantiae, quia non jactat quidlibet, sed sanctitatem, utitur omnibus actibus quae sanctitatem ostendere possunt, et praecipue illis in quibus magis sanctitas ostenditur, sicut est oratio jejunium, et eleemosyna. Reply Obj. 2: It is not unfitting that some specific sin or specific virtue be materially used in acts of other virtues or vices, as magnanimity uses for all other acts of virtue, so that it works great things in them, as is said in the Ethics 4. And likewise since hypocrisy is a particular species of boasting, for it does not boast of just anything, but of sanctity, it uses all the acts that can display sanctity, and particularly those in which sanctity is most shown, like prayer, fasting, and almsgiving. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod hypocrisis habet eamdem rationem peccati, sicut et mendacium: mendacium autem non semper est peccatum mortale, sed quando est perniciosum; et similiter hypocrisis non semper est peccatum mortale, sed quando est perniciosa, cadens in nocumentum alterius personae, dum propter creditam sanctitatem alium defraudat re quam habet, vel habere debet; aut in nocumentum fidei et Ecclesiae, dum propter sanctitatem creditam de ipso, ei contra fidem et Ecclesiam creditur. To the third question, it should be said that hypocrisy has the same character of sin as lying: for lying is not always a mortal sin, but only when it is pernicious. And likewise, hypocrisy is not always a mortal sin, but only when it is pernicious, resulting in harm to another person, when because of believing in the sanctity of the other he denies himself what he has, or should have; or in harm to faith and to the Church, when because of the sanctity believed about him, he is believed against faith and the Church. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod peccatum veniale quod poenitentiam non impedit, non impedit remissionem peccati mortalis, quae per poenitentiam fit; sed per aliquod peccatum veniale potest impediri poenitentiae opus ne sit poenitentiae; quia peccatum veniale impedit actum virtutis, quamvis non tollat habitum; et sic impedire potest veniam peccati. Reply Obj. 1: The venial sin that does not impede penance does not impede the remission of mortal sin, which happens through penance. But by some venial sins the work of penance can be impeded so that it does not belong to penance. For venial sin impedes the act of virtue, even though it does not destroy the habit, and so it can impede the forgiveness of sin. Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum Hieronymi intelligendum est secundum quid, et non simpliciter: quia quantum ad unam circumstantiam unum peccatum potest esse gravius illo quod est gravius simpliciter. Vel dicendum, quod etiam aperte peccare non semper est mortale, sed quandoque veniale. Reply Obj. 2: The words of Jerome are to be understood in a certain respect, and not simply: for one sin can be more serious as to one circumstance than another which is more serious simply. Or it could be said that sinning openly is also not always mortal, but sometimes venial. Ad tertium dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur, quando simulatio amicitiae in nocumentum personae redundat. Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher is speaking about when faking friendship results in harm to a person. Ad quartum dicendum, quod loquitur de hypocrita qui totum bonum quod agit, ad ostentationem ordinat. Vel dicendum, quod loquitur quantum ad hoc quod opera bona ex hypocrisi facta ad conspectum Dei non perducunt. Reply Obj. 4: He is speaking about the hypocrite orders all the good he does to showing off. Or it could be said that he speaks to the fact that good works done out of hypocrisy do not bring one into God’s sight. Quaestiuncula 4 Response to Quaestiuncula 4 Ad quartam quaestionem dicendum, quod opera poenitentiae, exteriora praecipue, nata sunt sanctitatem ostendere; et ideo eis utitur hypocrisis intentionem poenitentiae rectae excludens. Et propter hoc directius impedit poenitentiae effectum quam alia vitia etiam graviora. To the fourth question, it should be said that works of penance, particularly external ones, are naturally such as to show sanctity; and this is why hypocrisy employs them while excluding the intention of true penance. And because of this it directly impedes the effect of penance even more seriously than other vices. Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum. And by this the solution to the first objection is clear. Ad secundum dicendum, quod inanis gloria surgit quandoque ex operibus etiam recta intentione factis; sed hypocrisis semper intentionem factorum pervertit, et ideo magis impedit poenitentiae fructum. Reply Obj. 2: Vainglory arises sometimes even from works done with the right intention, but hypocrisy always perverts the intention behind deeds, and so it does more to impede the fruit of penance. Articulus 2 Article 2 De exterioribus impedimentis Outward impediments Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ludi poenitentiam exterius non impediant. Illud enim in quo potest consistere virtus, poenitentiam non impedit. Sed in ludis consistit virtus eutrapeliae, ut in 4 Ethica patet. Ergo ludus poenitentiam non impedit. Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. It seems that playing does not outwardly impede penance. For what virtue can consist in does not impede penance. But the virtue of eutrapelia consists in games, as is clear from the Ethics 4. Therefore, a game does not impede penance. Praeterea, oportet operibus laboriosis requiem interponere, eo quod impossibile est semper agere. Sed ludus est requies quaedam. Ergo oportet inter opera poenitentiae aliquando ludere; ergo ludus poenitentiam non impedit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is necessary to intersperse laborious works with rest, by the fact that it is impossible to act continuously. But playing is a kind of rest. Therefore, it is necessary sometimes to play between works of penance; therefore, playing does not impede penance. Sed contra, Eccle. 3, tempus ridendi aliud describitur a tempore flendi. Sed tempus poenitentiae est tempus flendi: quia poenitentia est commissa flere. Ergo non est tempus ludendi. On the contrary, the time for laughing is described as different from the time for weeping (Eccl 3:4); But the time for penance is a time for weeping, for penance means to weep over what one has done. Therefore, it is not a time for playing. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod spectacula non impediant poenitentiam. Spectacula enim ad utilitatem hominum sunt instituta. Sed poenitentia non resecat utilia, sed superflua. Ergo poenitentia per spectacula non impeditur. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that shows do not impede penance. For shows were instituted for their usefulness to man. But penance does not shear away useful things, but only superfluous ones. Therefore penance is not impeded by shows. Praeterea, in spectando aliud non potest esse nisi peccatum curiositatis. Sed aliae curiositates, ut scientiarum, non ponuntur impedimenta poenitentiae. Ergo nec spectaculum impedimentum poenitentiae dici debet. Obj. 2: Furthermore, in watching something there cannot be anything but curiosity. But other curiosities, like those of the sciences, are not considered impediments to penance. Therefore, neither should a show be called an impediment to penance. Praeterea, alia sunt multo graviora peccata quam spectacula et ludi. Ergo illa multo magis debent poni impedimenta poenitentiae quam ista. Obj. 3: Furthermore, other things are much more serious sins than shows and games. Therefore, those things should be included much more than these as impediments to penance.