Ulterius. Videtur quod non requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum, sive contritio. Luc. 7, 47: dimissa sunt ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit multum; dicit Glossa, quod ardor caritatis rubiginem peccatorum in ea consumpsit. Sed ardor caritatis potest esse sine motu in peccatum. Ergo ad justificationem non requiritur motus in peccatum. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that no contrition or motion of the free will against sin is required; for commenting on Luke 7:47: her sins are forgiven her, for she has loved much, the Gloss says that the ardor of charity consumes the rust of sin in itself. But the ardor of charity can exist without a motion against sin. Therefore, a motion against sin is not required for justification. Praeterea, conversio ad Deum potentior est ad bonum quam conversio ad rem temporalem ad malum. Sed conversio ad bonum commutabile sufficienter induxit culpam. Ergo et conversio ad Deum sufficienter justificat; et sic non requiritur motus in peccatum. Obj. 2: Furthermore, conversion toward God is more potent for the good than turning toward temporal things is for the evil. But turning toward a changeable good sufficiently introduces fault. Therefore, conversion toward God also sufficiently justifies; and thus no motion against sin is required. Sed contra est quod dicit Glossa in Psal. 50, super illum locum: sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus etc.: spiritus contribulatus et contritus est sacrificium in quo peccata solvuntur. On the contrary, commenting on Psalm 51:17: the sacrifice to God is a broken spirit, the Gloss says, a broken and contrite spirit is a sacrifice in which sins are absolved. Quaestiuncula 5 Quaestiuncula 5 Ulterius. Videtur quod non debeat addi quartum, scilicet peccatorum remissio. Quia effectus non connumeratur causae. Sed gratiae infusio et contritio sunt causae remissionis peccati. Ergo non debet connumerari eis. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a fourth thing should not be added, namely, the remission of sins. For an effect is not numbered with its causes. But contrition and the infusion of grace are the causes of the remission of sin. Therefore, it should not be numbered with them. Praeterea, remotio privationis nihil aliud est quam positio habitus. Sed culpa est privatio gratiae. Ergo idem est remotio culpae et infusio gratiae; et ita non debent ad invicem connumerari. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the removal of a privation is nothing other than the introduction of a habit. But guilt is the privation of grace. Therefore, the removal of guilt and the infusion of grace are the same thing; and so they should not be numbered with each other. Sed contra, generatio unius est corruptio alterius; et tamen generatio corruptioni connumeratur. Ergo cum infusio gratiae sit remissio culpae, debet unum alteri connumerari. On the contrary, The generation of one thing is the corruption of another; and nevertheless generation is numbered alongside corruption. Therefore, since the infusion of grace is the remission of guilt, the one should be numbered with the other. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod necessitas ponendi virtutum habitus in anima infusos, est ex hoc quod actus illi qui homini necessarii sunt ad vitam aeternam consequendam, sunt supra humanae naturae facultatem: quia propriae vires non sufficiunt ad merendum infinitum bonum. Sicut autem beatitudo futura infinitatem habet ex objecto, et per consequens facit actus suos meritorios aliquo modo infinitae virtutis, ut sint tali fini proportionati; ita offensa in Deum commissa habet quamdam infinitatem ex eo in quem commissa est; et ideo ad culpae remissionem non sufficit humana natura; et propter hoc oportet quod ad ejus remissionem, sicut ad merendum vitam aeternam, gratia infundatur. To the first question, I answer that the necessity of instilling habits of virtue infused in the soul is from the fact that those acts that a person must do to obtain eternal life are above the ability of human nature. For our own powers are not sufficient for meriting an infinite good. Now just as future beatitude has infiniteness from its object, and consequently it imparts to its meritorious acts an infinite power in some way, so that they are proportionate to such an end, so also offenses committed against God have a certain infiniteness from the one they are committed against. And so human nature does not suffice for the remission of guilt; and because of this, for its remission, just as for the meriting of eternal life, grace must be infused. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod gratia in remissione culpae non se habet sicut agens medium, sed sicut causa formalis, qua peccatum remittitur; sicut ignis frigus aufert, calorem in subjecto causato, non sicut instrumento, sed sicut forma contraria; et in creatione etiam est forma naturalis, qua res creata esse formaliter accipit, vel etiam ipsum quo est, quidquid sit illud. Reply Obj. 1: Grace is not related to the remission of guilt as an intermediate agent, but as a formal cause, by which sin is remitted; just as fire removes cold, having caused heat in a subject, not as an instrument, but as a contrary form. And in creation there is also a natural form, by which a created thing formally receives being, or even that by which it exists, whatever that may be. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis secundum consecutionem argumenti non sequatur positio gratiae ad remotionem, idest negationem, culpae; tamen destructio culpae prius existentis non potest fieri nisi per gratiam: quia illa innocentiae bonitas, quae inter utrumque media videtur, non sufficeret ad hoc quod dignum redderet immunitate ab infinita offensa commissa prius, quamvis sufficeret ut immunem redderet illum in quem peccatum non praecessit. In eo enim qui peccavit, requiritur non solum quod peccatum absit actu, sed etiam quod peccatum prius commissum expietur, et quodammodo tegatur; quod fieri non potest, nisi aliquo habente infinitam virtutem. Reply Obj. 2: Although according to the order of the argument the inclusion of grace does not follow from the removal, that is, the negation, of guilt; nevertheless the destruction of pre-existing guilt cannot happen except by grace. For that goodness of innocence, which seems to be a middle between the other two, would not suffice to render someone worthy by an immunity from the infinite offense committed before, although it would suffice to render him immune in whom the sin did not precede. For in someone who has sinned, it requires not only that the sin be gone in act, but also that the sin committed before be expiated, and covered in a certain way; which cannot be done except by someone having an infinite power. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod gratia quae datur ad recte vivendum et peccatorum remissionem, per prius respicit voluntatem quam alias potentias: per eam enim peccatur et recte vivitur; et ideo oportet quod infusio gratiae justificantis sit secundum talem modum qui voluntati competat; et propter hoc oportet quod a tali infusione omnis ratio violentiae excludatur, quia violentiae capax non est. Ad hoc autem quod violentia ab actione tollatur, oportet quod patiens cooperetur agenti secundum modum suum; unde in illis quae nata sunt agere, requiritur quod active cooperentur; in illis autem quae sunt nata recipere tantum, sicut materia prima, sufficit ad violentiam tollendam naturalis inclinatio ad formam; et ex hoc dicitur generatio naturalis. To the second question, it should be said that the grace that is given for living rightly and for the remission of sins has to do with the will before the other powers, for it is by it that we sin and live rightly. And so the infusion of justifying grace must take place in such a way that it applies to the will; and because of this it is necessary that every notion of violence be excluded from this infusion, for it has no capacity for violence. But in order for violence to be removed from the action, the one receiving the action must cooperate with the agent according to his own manner. And so among those things are such as to act, it is required that they cooperate actively. But among those that are such as only to receive, like prime matter, the inclination to a form is enough for the removal of violence; and from this natural generation is named. Sed quantum est ibi de contrarietate, tantum est ibi de violentia; unde quando voluntas non habet actum contrarium, sicut est in pueris, sine violentia voluntatis potest infundi gratia per sacramentum, sicut pueris baptizatis; et sine sacramento, sicut patet in sanctificatis in utero. Sed quando voluntas habet suum actum, sicut est in adultis, requiritur actus voluntatis ad gratiam suscipiendam, animam ad datorem ordinans; et ideo ad justificationem, quae per infusionem gratiae fit, requiritur motus liberi arbitrii in Deum. But there is as much of contrariety there as there is of violence; and so when the will does not have a contrary act, as is the case with children, grace can be infused by the sacrament without violence against the will, as in baptized children; and without the sacrament, as is seen in those sanctified in the womb. But when the will has its own act, as is the case in adults, the act of the will is required to receive grace, directing the soul to grace’s giver. And so for the justification that happens through the infusion of grace, the motion of the free will toward God is required. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod tractio illa de qua Dominus loquitur, non importat coactionem, sed inductionem et adjutorium ad bene operandum. Reply Obj. 1: That drawing that the Lord speaks of does not mean forcing, but leading along and helping to act well. Ad secundum dicendum, quod sapientia magis respicit intellectum quam voluntatem, sed gratia magis voluntatem, ut dictum est; et ideo quia intellectus cogi potest, non autem voluntas; ideo ad sapientiam percipiendam, et alias intellectus perfectiones, non requiritur consensus suscipientis, sicut ad perfectionem gratiae; unde in somno fiunt revelationes eorum quae ad sapientiam pertinent, ut patet Num. 2: non autem gratiae infusio. Reply Obj. 2: Wisdom has more to do with the intellect than the will, but grace more with the will, as was said; and thus, since the intellect can be forced, but not the will, this is why for receiving wisdom and other perfections of the intellect, the consent of the receiver is not required, as it is for the perfection of grace. And so the revelations of those things that pertain to wisdom are made during sleep, as seen in Numbers 12:6; but the infusion of grace is not. Ad tertium dicendum, quod per baptismum etiam adulti gratiam suscipere possunt in dormiendo: quia quamvis non adsit actualis dispositio ex actuali motu voluntatis, adest tamen habitualis dispositio ex motu liberi arbitrii praecedente: qui quidem quandoque ad gratiam percipiendam sufficienter disponit, et tunc gratia infunditur statim, ut dictum est; quandoque autem insufficienter, et tunc talis insufficientia non potest suppleri nisi per alium actum liberi arbitrii, vel per sacramentum, quod ad gratiam dispositive operatur, ut supra, dist. 1, dictum est; et propter hoc sine sacramento nullus adultus justificari potest, nisi actualiter motu liberi arbitrii existente; sed per sacramentum potest, si tamen praecessit motus liberi arbitrii prohibens fictionem. Reply Obj. 3: By baptism even adults can receive grace while asleep, for although an actual disposition is not present by the actual movement of their wills, there is nevertheless a habitual disposition by the previous movement of the free will; which indeed sometimes disposes one sufficiently to receive grace, and then grace is immediately infused, as was said. But sometimes it disposes insufficiently, and then such insufficiency cannot be supplied except by another act of the free will, either through the sacrament, which works dispositively for grace, as was said above in Distinction 1; and because of this without the sacrament no adult can be justified unless by an actually existing movement arising from his free will; but by the sacrament he can, so long as the movement of the free will that prevents a fictive reception came first. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod omne quod natum est ex pluribus sequi, attribuitur ei quod primum est; sicut vita attribuitur animae nutritivae, quia ipsa est prior inter principia vitae in viventibus corporaliter. Similiter dicitur animal esse animal per sensum primum, qui est tactus, ut patet in 3 de Anima. Unde si justificatio sequitur ad motum liberi arbitrii in Deum, oportet quod attribuatur illi motui qui naturaliter prior in justificatione apparet. Movetur autem mens in Deum et per intellectum et per affectum, et hi duo motus mentis simul esse possunt, quamvis non simul cogitari possint: quia unus est regula alterius, et per actum intellectus praesentatur suum objectum voluntati, quia objectum ejus est bonum imaginatum vel intellectum, ut Philosophus dicit in 3 de Anima. Sed naturaliter motus intellectus praecedit, sicut objectum naturaliter praecedit actum potentiae; unde cum motus intellectus in Deum sit per fidem, justificatio motum fidei requirit. To the third question, it should be said that anything whose nature is to follow from several things is attributed to the one that is first; as life is attributed to the nutritive soul, for it is first among the principles of life in things that live bodily. Likewise an animal is said to be an animal by its first sense, which is touch, as is evident from On the Soul 3. And so if justification follows the motion of the free will toward God, it must be attributed to that motion that appears naturally prior to justification. Now the mind is moved toward God by both the intellect and by the affections, and these two movements of the mind can be together, although they can be thought of separately, for one is the rule of the other, and by the act of the intellect its object is presented to the will, for its object is the good imagined or understood, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3. But the movement of the intellect naturally comes first, as an object naturally precedes the act of a power; and since the movement of the intellect toward God is by faith, justification requires the movement of faith. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod motum liberi arbitrii, cum quo gratia infunditur, oportet accipi in sua ultima perfectione. Actus autem fidei perfectus non est, nisi actu affectus perfecto existente: nullus enim credit nisi qui vult, ut Augustinus dicit; et ideo cum actu fidei in justificatione semper adjungitur actus caritatis; et his duobus anima Deo appropinquat. Non enim potest esse dubium quin actui caritatis semper actus fidei conjungatur, ex quo objectum per fidem caritati praesentatur: sicut etiam intelligere nostrum nunquam est in actu nisi imaginatione in actu existente. Reply Obj. 1: The movement of the free will, along with which grace is infused, must be taken in its last perfection. Now the act of faith is not complete unless perfected by an act of the affections. For no one believes unless he wills to, as Augustine says; and therefore an act of charity is always joined to the act of faith in justification; and by these two things the soul draws near to God. For there can be no doubt about whether an act of faith is always united to an act of charity, from the fact that the object is presented to charity by faith; just as also we never actually understand except by an imagination actually arising. Ad secundum dicendum, quod timor est remota dispositio ad gratiam: nunquam enim ad gratiam attingit, nisi amor adjungatur. Nos autem loquimur hic de dispositione ultima ad gratiam, cum qua gratia datur. Reply Obj. 2: Fear is a remote disposition to grace, for it never attains to grace unless love is joined to it. But we are speaking here of the last disposition to grace, with which grace is given. Ad tertium dicendum, quod non oportet in eodem esse dispositionem et perfectionem in rebus ad invicem ordinatis: quia dispositio facta in priori ordinat ad perfectionem factam in posteriori, sicut motus imaginationis est dispositio ad perfectionem intellectus; et similiter motus in intellectu factus potest esse dispositio ad motum affectus. Reply Obj. 3: In things that are ordered to each other, it is not necessary for there to be the disposition and the perfection in the same thing. For a disposition arising in what is prior orders toward the perfection accomplished in what comes later, just as the movement of the imagination is a disposition to the perfection of the intellect, and likewise the movement happening in understanding can be a disposition to the movement of the affections. Quaestiuncula 4 Response to Quaestiuncula 4 Ad quartam quaestionem dicendum, quod sicut in generationibus naturalibus, in quibus una forma expellitur et altera introducitur, propter hoc quod generatio unius est corruptio alterius, oportet esse disponens ad utrumque; ita in justificatione, qua gratia confertur et culpa expellitur, oportet esse dispositionem voluntatis secundum proprium actum ad utrumque. Et ideo sicut per motum liberi arbitrii in Deum disponitur ille qui justificatur, ad gratiam obtinendam; ita per motum liberi arbitrii in peccatum, oportet quod ad culpae expulsionem disponatur; et ideo in justificatione qua innocens justificaretur, oportet esse dispositionem solum ad gratiam inducendam; sed in justificatione qua justificatur impius, oportet dispositionem esse duplicem; unam ad introducendum gratiam, scilicet motum liberi arbitrii in Deum; alteram ad expellendam culpam, scilicet motum liberi arbitrii in peccatum. To the fourth question, it should be said that just as in natural generation, in which one form is expelled and another is introduced, because of the fact that the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, there must be something disposing to both; so also in justification, by which grace is conferred and guilt is expelled, there must be a disposition of the will according to its proper act toward both. And therefore just as by the movement of the free will toward God the person who is justified is disposed to obtain grace, so also by the motion of the free will against sin he must be disposed to the expulsion of guilt. And therefore in the justification by which the innocent would be justified, only a disposition to the introduction of grace is necessary. But in the justification by which the impious are justified, there must be two dispositions: one for introducing grace, namely, the movement of the free will toward God; and the other for expelling guilt, namely, the movement of the free will against sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod fervor dilectionis de necessitate secum conjunctum habet odium contrarii; et ideo fervor dilectionis ad dimissionem culpae non operatur sine peccati detestatione, quae directe dimissioni culpae respondeat. Reply Obj. 1: The fervor of love necessarily has joined to it the hatred of its opposite. And so the fervor of love does not work to the remission of guilt without detesting sin, which directly corresponds to the remission of guilt. Ad secundum dicendum, quod conversio ad Deum sufficit ad gratiam obtinendam quantum in se est, sicut conversio ad bonum commutabile sufficit ad culpam; sed requiritur conversio ad peccatum quasi removens impedimentum. Vel dicendum, quod etiam in peccato conversio non facit culpam sine aversione; et similiter oportet duo esse in justificatione. Reply Obj. 2: Conversion to God suffices for obtaining grace as far as in it lies, just as turning toward a changeable good suffices for guilt; but a turning toward sin is required, as it were, to remove an impediment. Or it could be said that even in sin turning toward does not cause guilt without a turning away; and likewise, two things are necessary in justification. Quaestiuncula 5 Response to Quaestiuncula 5 Ad quintam quaestionem dicendum, quod illa quae per accidens se habent ad aliquid, non includuntur ab illo. Remissio autem culpae se habet accidentaliter ad gratiae infusionem, quia accidit ex subjecto in quo culpam invenit: posset enim esse infusio gratiae sine hoc quod culpa remitteretur, sicut in statu innocentiae fuit, et in Christo homine quantum ad primum instans suae conceptionis; et ideo infusio gratiae non includit culpae remissionem. To the fifth question, it should be said that those things that are related incidentally to something are not included in it. But the remission of guilt is related incidentally to the infusion of grace, for it arises from the subject where it finds guilt. For the infusion of grace could exist without guilt being remitted, as it was in the state of innocence, and in Christ as a man from the first instant of his conception. And thus the infusion of grace does not include the remission of guilt. Unde cum ad justificationem impii, de qua loquimur, sit necessaria culpae remissio, oportet quod connumeretur gratiae infusioni; et sic sunt quatuor quae requiruntur in ipsa justificatione: scilicet gratiae infusio, culpae remissio, motus liberi arbitrii in Deum, et motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum. And so since the remission of guilt is necessary for the justification of the impious, which we are speaking of, it is necessary that it be numbered along with the infusion of grace. And this is why there are four things that are required in justification itself: namely, the infusion of grace, the remission of guilt, the movement of the free will toward God, and the movement of the free will against sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de effectu proportionato causae qui intelligitur in ipsa causa; non est autem ita de peccati remissione, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: That objection holds for an effect proportionate to a cause, which is understood in the cause itself; but it is not this way with the remission of sin, as was said. Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccatum et gratia non se habent sicut affirmatio et negatio, vel sicut privatio et habitus: quia aliquis potest esse gratia destitutus, et tamen non habebit peccatum, sicut patet de Adam secundum illos qui dicunt eum non fuisse in gratia creatum, quia peccatum aliquid ponit vel esse vel fuisse in peccante. Transeunte enim actu peccati, adhuc peccatum praecedens manet aliquo modo in ipso peccante, secundum quod ex eo reus apud Deum efficitur, sicut etiam actus meritorii manent, ut supra, dist. 14, dictum est; et ideo ratio non procedit. Reply Obj. 2: Sin and grace are not related as affirmation and negation, or as privation and habit: for someone can be devoid of grace and nevertheless not have sin, as in the case of Adam, according to those who say he was not created in grace; for sin means that something exists or did exist in the sinner. For once an act of sin has passed, the preceding sin still remains in some way in the sinner himself, according as by it he became guilty before God, just as also meritorious acts remain, as was said above in Distinction 14, and so the argument does not proceed. Articulus 4 Article 4 De ordine ipsorum The order of events in justification Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod culpae remotio naturaliter praecedat gratiae infusionem. In Psalm. 62, ubi super illud: sic in sancto apparui tibi, dicit Glossa: nisi quis prius deficiat in malo, nunquam perveniet ad bonum. Ergo remissio mali culpae est prior quam perventio ad bonum gratiae. Obj. 1: To the fourth question we proceed thus. It seems that the removal of guilt naturally precedes the infusion of grace. For in commenting upon Psalm 63(62):2: so I have come before you in the sanctuary, the Gloss says, unless someone is first lacking in evil, he will never arrive at good. Therefore, the remission of the evil of fault is prior to the attainment of the good of grace. Praeterea, remissio culpae et infusio gratiae se habent sicut illuminatio et purgatio. Sed purgatio praecedit illuminationem, secundum Dionysium. Ergo et remissio culpae praecedit gratiae infusionem. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the remission of guilt and the infusion of grace are related as purification and illumination. But purification precedes illumination, according to Dionysius. Therefore, also the remission of guilt precedes the infusion of grace.