Ulterius. Videtur quod confessio non sit actus virtutis. Omnis enim actus virtutis est de jure naturali: quia ad virtutes apti sumus a natura, ut Philosophus dicit in 2 Ethica. Sed confessio non est de jure naturali. Ergo non est actus virtutis. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that confession is not the act of a virtue. For every act of a virtue is from natural law, for we are adapted to virtues by nature, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. But confession is not from natural law. Therefore, it is not an act of a virtue. Praeterea, actus virtutis magis potest convenire innocenti quam ei qui peccavit. Sed confessio peccati de qua loquimur, non potest innocenti convenire. Ergo non est actus virtutis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, an act of virtue has more to do with the innocent than with someone who has sinned. But the confession of sin that we are speaking of cannot apply to the innocent. Therefore, it is not an act of virtue. Praeterea, gratia quae est in sacramentis, aliquo modo differt a gratia quae est in virtutibus et donis, ut in prima distinctione dictum est. Sed confessio est sacramenti pars. Ergo non est actus virtutis. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the grace that is in the sacraments differs in a certain way from the grace that is in the virtues and gifts, as was said in Distinction 1. But confession is a part of a sacrament. Therefore, it is not an act of virtue. Sed contra, non meremur nisi actibus virtutum. Sed confessio est meritoria, quia aperit caelum, ut in littera Magister dicit. Ergo videtur quod sit actus virtutis. On the contrary, precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But confession falls under precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue. Furthermore, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is meritorious, for it opens heaven, as the Master says in the text. Therefore, it seems that it is an act of virtue. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod confessio non sit actus poenitentiae virtutis. Quia actus illius virtutis est quae est causa ejus. Sed causa confessionis est spes veniae, ut ex definitione inducta apparet. Ergo videtur quod sit actus spei, et non poenitentiae. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that confession is not an act of the virtue of penance. For an act belongs to that virtue which is its cause. But the cause of confession is the hope of forgiveness, as appears from the definition cited. Therefore, it seems that this is an act of hope, not of penance. Praeterea, verecundia est pars temperantiae, ut in 3 Lib., dist. 33, dictum est. Sed confessio ex erubescentia operatur, ut ex praeassignata definitione apparet. Ergo est actus temperantiae, non poenitentiae. Obj. 2: Furthermore, shame is a part of temperance, as was said in Book III, Distinction 33. But confession works from shamefacedness, as appears in the definition designated above. Therefore, it is an act of temperance, not penance. Praeterea, actus poenitentiae innititur divinae misericordiae. Sed confessio magis innititur sapientiae propter veritatem, quae in ipsa esse debet. Ergo non est actus poenitentiae. Obj. 3: Furthermore, an act of penance depends on divine mercy. But confession depends more on wisdom because of truth, which must exist in it. Therefore, it is not an act of penance. Praeterea, ad poenitentiam movet articulus de judicio propter timorem, qui poenitentiae origo est. Sed ad confessionem movet articulus de vita aeterna, quia est propter spem veniae. Ergo non est actus poenitentiae. Obj. 4: Furthermore, the article about judgment moves one to penance because of fear, which is the origin of penance. But the article about life eternal moves one to confession because of the hope of forgiveness. Therefore, it is not an act of penance. Praeterea, ad virtutem veritatis pertinet ut ostendat se quis talem qualis est. Sed hoc facit confitens. Ergo est actus virtutis quae dicitur veritas, et non poenitentiae. Obj. 5: Furthermore, it pertains to the virtue of truth to show someone himself such as he is. But this is what a person confessing does. Therefore, it is an act of the virtue that is called truth, and not of penance. Sed contra, poenitentia ordinatur ad destructionem peccati. Sed ad hoc idem confessio ordinatur. Ergo est actus poenitentiae. On the contrary, penance is ordered to the destruction of sins. But confession is ordered to the same thing. Therefore, it is an act of penance. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod in actu confessionis plura consideranda occurrunt. Primo ipsa substantia actus, sive genus ejus, quod est manifestatio quaedam. Secundo de quo sit, scilicet peccatum. Tertio cui fiat, scilicet sacerdos. Quarto causa cujus, scilicet spes veniae. Quinto effectus ejus, scilicet absolutio a parte poenae, et obligatio ad aliam partem exsolvendam. In prima ergo definitione Augustini tangitur et substantia actus in apertione, et de quo sit confessio cum dicitur morbus latens, et causa in spe veniae; et in aliis definitionibus tanguntur aliqua de illis quinque assignatis, ut cuilibet inspicienti patet. To the first question, I answer that in the act of confession many things occur to be considered. First, the very substance of the act, or its genus, which is a kind of manifestation. Second, what it is about, namely, sin. Third, to whom it is made, namely, a priest. Fourth, its cause, namely, hope of forgiveness. Fifth, its effect, namely, absolution on the part of the punishment, and obligation to another part to be discharged. Therefore, in the first definition of Augustine both the substance of the act is touched upon, in opening, and what confession is about when he says, a hidden disease, and the cause, in the hope of forgiveness; and in the other definitions some of these five designated things are touched upon as is evident to anyone who looks closely. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis sacerdos aliquando sciat ejus peccatum ut homo, non tamen scit ut Christi vicarius; sicut etiam judex aliquando scit aliquid ut homo, quod nescit ut judex; et quantum ad hoc per confessionem aperitur. Vel dicendum, quod quamvis actus peccati exterior in aperto sit, actus interior, qui tamen principalior est, in occulto est; et ideo oportet quod per confessionem aperiatur. Reply Obj. 1: To the first, therefore, it should be said that although sometimes a priest knows of someone’s sin as a man, nevertheless he does not know it as Christ’s vicar; just as also a judge sometimes knows something as a man that he does not know as a judge; and as to this it is opened up by confession. Or it could be said that although an outward act of sin is in the open, an interior act which is nevertheless more important is concealed; and so it must be opened by confession. Ad secundum dicendum, quod confessio praesupponit caritatem, quia jam vivus aliquis confitetur, ut in littera dicitur; contritio autem est in qua datur caritas; timor autem servilis, qui est sine spe, est praevius ad caritatem. Sed habens caritatem magis movetur ex spe quam ex timore; et ideo causa confessionis potius ponitur spes quam timor. Reply Obj. 2: Confession presupposes charity, because someone confesses when alive, as is said in the text. But contrition is what charity is given in; while servile fear, which is without hope, goes before charity. But someone who has charity is more moved by hope than by fear; and so the cause of confession is set down as hope rather than fear. Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatum in confessione aperitur sacerdoti, et clauditur aliis confessionis sigillo. Reply Obj. 3: Sin is opened to a priest in confession, and closed to all others by the seal of the confessional. Ad quartum dicendum, quod non oportet in qualibet definitione omnia tangere quae ad rem definitam concurrunt; et ideo inveniuntur quaedam definitiones, sive assignationes, datae penes unam causam, quaedam penes aliam. Reply Obj. 4: It is not necessary that in every definition everything is referred to that concurs in the thing defined. And thus some definitions or assignations are found to be given according to one cause, some according to another. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod ad hoc quod aliquis dicatur actus virtutis, ut prius dictum est, sufficit quod in sui ratione aliquam conditionem implicet quae ad virtutem pertineat. Quamvis autem non omnia quae ad virtutem requiruntur, importet confessio; tamen importat ex suo nomine manifestationem alicujus quod in conscientia tenet aliquis; sic enim simul in unum os et cor conveniunt. Si enim quis aliquid proferat ore quod corde non teneat, non confessio, sed fictio dicitur. Haec autem conditio ad virtutem pertinet, ut aliquis ore confiteatur quod corde tenet; et ideo confessio est bonum ex genere, et est actus virtutis; sed tamen potest male fieri, nisi aliis debitis circumstantiis vestiatur. To the second question, it should be said that for something to be called an act of virtue, as has been said before, it is enough that it imply in its own account a certain condition that pertains to virtue. Now, although confession does not denote all the things that are required for virtue, nevertheless it conveys by its very name a revealing of something that someone holds in his conscience, for in this way the mouth and heart come together in one. For if someone utters with his mouth something that he does not hold in his heart, it is not called a confession but a deception. Now this condition pertains to virtue, that someone confess with his mouth what he holds in his heart; and so confession is good by its genus, and it is an act of virtue; but nevertheless it can be done badly, unless it is invested with the other due circumstances. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad confessionem veri debito modo faciendam ubi oportet et cui oportet, in generali inclinat ratio naturalis; et secundum hoc confessio est de jure naturali. Sed determinatio circumstantiarum, quando et quomodo et quid confiteri oporteat, et cui, hoc est ex institutione juris divini in confessione, de qua loquimur. Et sic patet quod jus naturale inclinat ad confessionem mediante jure divino, quo circumstantiae determinantur, sicut etiam est in omnibus quae sunt de jure positivo. Reply Obj. 1: Natural reason in general inclines toward confessing the truth in the right way, where it is fitting and to whom it is fitting, and this is how confession belongs to natural law. But the determination of circumstances, when and how and what must be confessed, and to whom, is from the institution of divine law about confession, which is what we are speaking about. And so it is clear that natural law inclines to confession by means of divine law, by which circumstances are determined, as is also the case in all things that are of positive law. Ad secundum dicendum, quod illius virtutis cujus objectum est peccatum commissum, quamvis habitum possit innocens habere, tamen actum non habet innocentia permanente, ut supra de poenitentia dictum est; et ideo etiam confessio peccatorum, de qua nunc loquimur, non competit innocenti, quamvis sit actus virtutis. Reply Obj. 2: Although an innocent person could have the habit of that virtue whose object is sin committed, nevertheless he does not have the act while his innocence endures, as was said above about repentance. And so also the confession of sins, which is what we are discussing, does not apply to the innocent, although it is an act of a virtue. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis gratia sacramentorum et gratia virtutum sit alia et alia; non tamen sunt contrariae, sed disparatae; et ideo non est inconveniens ut idem sit actus virtutis secundum quod ex libero arbitrio gratia informato procedit, et sit sacramentum vel pars sacramenti secundum quod est medicina in remedium peccati ordinata. Reply Obj. 3: Although the grace of the sacraments and the grace of the virtues are two different things, nevertheless, they are not contrary, but distinct. And so it is not unfitting that the same thing be an act of virtue according as it proceeds from a free will informed by grace, and a sacrament or part of a sacrament according as it is medicine ordained as a remedy for sin. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod in virtutibus hoc considerandum est, quod quando supra objectum virtutis additur specialis ratio boni et difficilis, requiritur specialis virtus; sicut magni sumptus ad magnificentiam pertinent, quamvis communiter sumptus mediocres et donationes pertineant ad liberalitatem, ut patet in 2 et 4 Ethica; et similiter est in confessione veri, quae quamvis ad veritatis virtutem pertineat absolute, tamen secundum quod aliqua ratio boni additur, ad aliam virtutem pertinere incipit; et ideo dicit Philosophus in 4 Ethica, quod confessio quae fit in judiciis, non pertinet ad veritatis virtutem, sed magis ad justitiam. Et similiter confessio beneficiorum Dei in laudem divinam non pertinet ad virtutem veritatis, sed ad virtutem latriae; et ita etiam confessio peccatorum ad remissionem eorum consequendam non pertinet elicitive ad virtutem veritatis, ut quidam dicunt, sed ad virtutem poenitentiae; imperative autem ad multas virtutes pertinere potest, secundum quod in finem multarum virtutum trahi potest confessionis actus. To the third question, it should be said that in the virtues this is to be considered, that when a special account of good and difficult is added above the object of the virtue, it requires a special virtue, as great expenses pertains to magnificence, although moderate expenses and donations generally pertain to liberality, as is clear in the Ethics 2 and 4. And it is similar with the confessing of truth, which, although it pertains to the virtue of truth in an absolute sense, nevertheless according as a certain account of good is added, begins to pertain to another virtue. And so the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4 that the confession that is made in court does not pertain to the virtue of truth, but rather to justice. And likewise the confession of God’s blessings in divine praise does not pertain to the virtue of truth, but to the virtue of worship; and so also the confession of sins for obtaining their remission is not elicited by the virtue of truth, as some people say, but by the virtue of penance; but it can be commanded by many virtues, according as the act of confessing can be derived from the end of many virtues. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod spes est causa confessionis non sicut eliciens, sed sicut imperans. Reply Obj. 1: Hope is the cause of confession not as eliciting it, but as commanding it. Ad secundum dicendum, quod erubescentia in illa definitione non ponitur quasi causa confessionis, cum magis nata sit impedire confessionis actum, sed quasi concausa ad liberandum a poena, inquantum ipsa erubescentia poena quaedam est; et sic etiam claves Ecclesiae concausae confessionis ad hoc sunt. Reply Obj. 2: Shamefacedness is included in that definition not as a cause of confession, since it is rather its nature to impede the act of confession, but as a concurrent cause for freeing from punishment, inasmuch as that shamefacedness is a certain punishment. And in this way the Church’s power of the keys is also a concurrent cause of confession working toward this. Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum quamdam adaptationem partes poenitentiae tribus attributis Personarum adaptari possunt; ut contritio misericordiae vel bonitati respondeat propter dolorem de malo; confessio sapientiae propter veritatis manifestationem; satisfactio potentiae propter satisfaciendi laborem: et quia contritio est prima poenitentiae pars efficaciam aliis partibus praebens, ideo eodem modo judicatur de tota poenitentia sicut de contritione. Reply Obj. 3: According to a certain correspondence, the parts of penance can correspond to three attributes of the Persons, so that contrition corresponds to mercy or goodness, because of the sorrow for evil; confession corresponds to wisdom because of the manifestation of the truth; satisfaction corresponds to power because of the work of making satisfaction. And since contrition is the first part of penance bestowing efficacy on the other parts, therefore in the same way the whole of penance is judged according to its contrition. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quia confessio magis ex spe procedit quam ex timore, ut dictum est, ideo magis innititur articulo de vita aeterna, quem respicit spes, quam articulo de judicio, quem respicit timor; quamvis poenitentia ratione contritionis e converso se habeat. Reply Obj. 4: Since confession proceeds more from hope than from fear, as has been said, this is why it depends more on the article of eternal life, which has to do with hope, than the article of judgment, which has to do with fear; although penance stands the other way around by reason of contrition. Ad quintum patet solutio ex dictis. The solution to the fifth is clear from what has been said. Articulus 3 Article 3 Cui sit facienda To whom one should confess Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium sacerdoti confiteri. Ad confessionem enim non obligamur nisi ex divina institutione. Sed divina institutio nobis proponitur Jacob. 5: confitemini alterutrum peccata vestra; ubi non fit mentio de sacerdote. Ergo non oportet confiteri sacerdoti. Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. It seems that it is not necessary to confess to a priest. For we are not obliged to go to confession except by divine institution. But divine institution proposes to us confess your sins to one another (Jas 5:16), where no mention is made of a priest. Therefore, it is not necessary to confess to a priest. Praeterea, poenitentia est sacramentum necessitatis, sicut et baptismus. Sed in baptismo propter sacramenti necessitatem est minister quilibet homo. Ergo et in poenitentia. Sed ministro Ecclesiae facienda est confessio. Ergo sufficit cuilibet confiteri. Obj. 2: Furthermore, penance is a sacrament of necessity, like baptism. But in baptism the minister is any human being, because it is a sacrament of necessity. Therefore, it is the same in penance. But confession is to be made to a minister of the Church. Therefore, it suffices to confess to anyone. Praeterea, confessio ad hoc est necessaria, ut taxetur poenitenti satisfactionis modus. Sed aliquando aliquis non sacerdos discretius posset poenitenti dare satisfactionis modum quam multi sacerdotes. Ergo non est necessarium quod confessio fiat sacerdoti. Obj. 3: Furthermore, confession is necessary for a manner of satisfaction to be assigned to the penitent. But sometimes someone who is not a priest could more wisely give the penitent a manner of satisfaction than many priests. Therefore, it is not necessary that confession should be made to a priest. Praeterea, confessio ad hoc est ordinata in Ecclesia, ut rectores pecorum suorum vultum cognoscant. Sed quandoque rector, sive praelatus, non est sacerdos. Ergo confessio non semper facienda est sacerdoti. Obj. 4: Furthermore, confession in the Church is ordered to rectors knowing the face of their own flocks (Prov 27:23). But sometimes a rector, or a prelate, is not a priest. Therefore, confession is not always to be made to a priest.