Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod nec etiam ante carnalem copulam. Indivisibilitas enim matrimonii pertinet ad matrimonii sacramentum, inquantum, scilicet, significat perpetuam conjunctionem Christi ad Ecclesiam. Sed ante carnalem copulam post consensum per verba de praesenti expressum, est verum matrimonii sacramentum. Ergo non potest fieri divisio per hoc quod alter ad religionem intrat. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that one of the spouses cannot enter the religious life even before physical intimacy. For the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the sacrament of marriage, inasmuch as it signifies the perpetual union of Christ to the Church. But there is a true sacrament of marriage after the words of consent are expressed in terms of the present but before physical intimacy. Therefore, a division cannot be made by one party entering religious life. Praeterea, in ipso consensu per verba de praesenti expresso unus conjugum in alterum potestatem sui corporis transfert. Ergo statim potest exigere debitum, et alter tenetur reddere; et ita nec potest unus invito altero ad religionem transire. Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the consent itself, expressed in terms of the present, one spouse transfers power over his own body to the other spouse. Therefore, the debt can be exacted right away, and the other is bound to render it. And therefore one spouse cannot enter into religious life while the other is unwilling. Praeterea, Matth. 19, 6: quod Deus conjunxit, homo non separet. Sed conjunctio quae est ante carnalem copulam, divinitus facta est. Ergo non potest separari humana voluntate. Obj. 3: Furthermore, what God has joined together, let no man put asunder (Matt 19:6). But the union which exists before physical intimacy was divinely made. Therefore, it cannot be separated by human will. Sed contra est quod, secundum Hieronymum, dominus Joannem vocavit de nuptiis. On the contrary, according to Jerome, the Lord called John from his wedding. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod mulier non possit nubere alteri, viro ante carnalem copulam religionem ingresso. Quia illud quod cum matrimonio stare potest, non solvit matrimoniale vinculum. Sed adhuc manet matrimoniale vinculum inter eos qui pari voto religionem intrant. Ergo ex hoc quod unus intrat religionem, alter non absolvitur a vinculo matrimoniali. Sed quamdiu manet vinculum matrimoniale ad unum, non potest nubere alteri. Ergo, etc. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that if a woman’s husband has entered religious life before physical intimacy took place, she cannot marry another. For anything that can remain alongside marriage does not dissolve the matrimonial bond. But the matrimonial bond remains between those who both vow to enter religious life. Therefore, by the fact that one enters religious life, the other is not absolved from the marital bond. But as long as the marital bond remains for one person, he may not marry anyone else. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, vir post ingressum religionis potest ante professionem redire ad saeculum. Si ergo mulier posset alteri nubere, viro intrante religionem, et ipse posset aliam ducere rediens ad saeculum; quod est absurdum. Obj. 2: Furthermore, after entering religious life a man can return to the world before his profession. But then if a woman could marry another after her husband entered religious life, he could also marry another once he returned to the world; which is absurd. Praeterea, per decretalem novam, professio ante annum emissa pro nulla reputatur. Ergo si post talem professionem ad uxorem redeat, tenetur eum recipere: ergo neque per introitum viri in religionem, neque per votum datur mulieri potestas nubendi alteri: alias una mulier haberet duos viros. Obj. 3: Furthermore, by the new decretals, a religious profession made before one year is considered null. Therefore, if after such a profession someone should return to his wife, she is bound to receive him; therefore, neither by her husband’s entrance into religious life nor by his vow is the woman given power to marry another: otherwise one woman would have two husbands. Sed contra, nullus potest alterum obligare ad ea quae sunt perfectionis. Sed continentia est de his quae ad perfectionem pertinent. Ergo mulier non arctatur ad continentiam ex hoc quod vir ad religionem ingreditur, et sic potest nubere. On the contrary, no one can oblige another to those things that belong to the life of perfection. But continence is one of the things that belong to the life of perfection. Therefore, a woman should not be constrained to continence by her husband’s entrance into religious life, and so she can marry. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod nullus potest facere oblationem Deo de alieno; unde cum per matrimonium consummatum jam sit corpus viri factum uxoris, non potest absque consensu ipsius Deo ipsum offerre per continentiae votum. I answer that, no one can make an offering to God from what belongs to someone else. Therefore, since in a consummated marriage the body of the man has already become his wife’s, he cannot offer himself to God by a vow of continence without her consent. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod lex humana considerabat matrimonium solum inquantum est in officium; sed lex divina secundum quod est sacramentum, ex quo habet omnimodam indivisibilitatem; et ideo non est simile. Reply Obj. 1: Human law considered marriage only as it is an office, but divine law considers it according as it is a sacrament, by which it has absolute indissolubility; and therefore, they are not the same. Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est inconveniens majus bonum impediri per minus bonum quod habet contrarietatem ad ipsum, sicut etiam bonum per malum impeditur. Reply Obj. 2: It is not inappropriate for a greater good to be impeded by a lesser good which is contrary to it, just as good is also impeded by evil. Ad tertium dicendum, quod in qualibet religione contrahitur matrimonium ad unam personam, scilicet Christum, cui quantum ad plura obligatur aliquis in una religione quam in alia; sed matrimonium materiale et religionis non fiunt ad unam personam; et ideo non est simile. Reply Obj. 3: In every religious community marriage is contracted with one person, namely, Christ, for whose sake someone is pledged to one religious community rather than another in many respects; but material marriage and religious life are not directed toward the same person; therefore, it is not the same. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod ante carnalem copulam est inter conjuges tantum spirituale vinculum, sed post est inter eos etiam vinculum carnale; et ideo sicut post carnalem copulam matrimonium solvitur per mortem carnalem, ita per ingressum religionis ante carnalem copulam solvitur: quia religio est mors quaedam spiritualis, qua aliquis saeculo moriens vivit Deo. To the second question, it should be said that before physical intimacy there is only a spiritual bond between the spouses, but after it there is a physical bond between them as well. And therefore, just as after physical intimacy, marriage is dissolved by physical death, so also it is dissolved before physical intimacy by entrance into religious life: for the religious life is a certain spiritual death, by which someone, dying to the world, lives for God. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod matrimonium ante carnalem copulam significat illam conjunctionem quae est Christi ad animam per gratiam; quae quidem solvitur per dispositionem spiritualem contrariam, scilicet peccatum; sed per carnalem copulam significat conjunctionem ad Ecclesiam quantum ad assumptionem humanae naturae in unitatem personae, quae omnino est indivisibilis. Reply Obj. 1: Before physical intimacy marriage signifies the union of Christ to the soul by grace; which indeed is dissolved by a contrary spiritual disposition, namely, sin. But by physical intimacy is signified his union with the Church by the assumption of human nature into the unity of his person, which is indivisible in every way. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ante carnalem copulam non est omnino translatum corpus unius sub potestate alterius, sed sub conditione si interea alter conjugum ad frugem melioris vitae non convolet: sed per carnalem copulam completur dicta translatio, quia tunc intrat uterque in corporalem possessionem sibi traditae potestatis; unde etiam ante carnalem copulam non statim tenetur reddere debitum post matrimonium contractum per verba de praesenti; sed datur ei tempus duorum mensium, propter tria. Primo, ut interim possit deliberare de transeundo ad religionem. Secundo, ut praeparentur quae sunt necessaria ad solemnitatem nuptiarum. Tertio, ne vilem habeat maritus datam quam non suspiravit dilatam. Reply Obj. 2: Before physical intimacy one person’s body has not been transferred to the power of the other absolutely, but under the condition that in the interim the other spouse does not aspire to the fruits of a better life. But by physical intimacy the aforementioned transfer is completed, for then each person enters into bodily possession of the power handed over to each other. This is also why before sexual intercourse someone is not bound to render the debt immediately after the marriage is contracted in terms of the present, but the time of two months is given to them, for three reasons. First, so that in the meantime he might deliberate about entering religious life. Second, so that the necessary things may be prepared for solemnization of the wedding. Third, lest the husband should hold cheap a wife whom he did not have to pine in wait for. Ad tertium dicendum, quod conjunctio matrimonialis ante carnalem copulam est quid imperfectum quantum ad esse primum, ut supra dictum est, sed non consummata quantum ad actum secundum qui est operatio; et similatur possessioni corporali; et ideo nec omnimodam indivisibilitatem habet. Reply Obj. 3: The matrimonial union before physical intimacy is something imperfect as regards first being, as was said above, but not consummated as regards second act which is activity; and likewise for bodily possession; and thus it does not have indivisibility in every way. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod sicut corporalis mors viri hoc modo vinculum matrimoniale solvit ut mulier nubat cui vult secundum apostoli sententiam, ita etiam post mortem spiritualem viri per religionis ingressum poterit cui voluerit nubere. To the third question, it must be said that just as the bodily death of a man dissolves the matrimonial bond so that the wife may marry whomever she wishes, according to the statement of the Apostle, so also after the spiritual death of the man by entry into religious life, she could marry whomever she wanted. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quando uterque pari voto continentiam vovet, tunc neuter conjugali vinculo abrenuntiat; et ideo adhuc manet; sed quando unus tantum vovet, tunc quantum est in se, abrenuntiat vinculo conjugali; et ideo alter absolvitur a vinculo illo. Reply Obj. 1: When both vow continence by equivalent vows, then neither renounces the conjugal bond, and thus it continues to endure afterward. But when only one makes the vow, then as far as in him lies he renounces the conjugal bond, and that is why the other is loosed from this bond. Ad secundum dicendum, quod non intelligitur mortuus saeculo per religionis ingressum, quousque professionem emiserit; et ideo usque ad tempus illud tenetur eum uxor sua expectare. Reply Obj. 2: Someone is not considered dead to the world by entrance into religious life until he has made his profession; and thus until that time his wife is bound to wait for him. Ad tertium dicendum, quod de professione sic emissa ante tempus determinatum a jure, est idem judicium quod de voto simplici; unde sicut post votum simplex viri mulier ei reddere debitum non tenetur, tamen ipsa non haberet potestatem alteri nubere; ita et hic. Reply Obj. 3: A profession made in this way, before the time determined by law, is judged as if it were a simple vow. Therefore, just as after a man’s simple vow, the woman is not bound to render the debt to him, but she does not have the power to marry another, so it is in this case. Quaestio 2 Question 2 De sponsalibus On betrothals Deinde quaeritur de sponsalibus; et circa hoc quaeruntur tria: Next betrothals are investigated; and concerning this, three questions arise: primo, quid sint sponsalia; first, what betrothals are; secundo, qui possunt sponsalia contrahere; second, who can contract a betrothal; tertio, utrum sponsalia dirimi possint. third, whether betrothals can be dissolved. Articulus 1 Article 1 Quid sint sponsalia What betrothals are Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sponsalia non convenienter dicantur futurarum nuptiarum promissio, ut habetur ex verbis Nicolai Papae. Quia, sicut dicit Isidorus, est aliquis sponsus non quia promittit, sed quia spondet, et sponsores dat. Sed a sponsalibus dicitur aliquis sponsus. Ergo male dicitur promissio. Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that betrothals are not fittingly called the promise of a future wedding, as we have from the words of Pope Nicholas. For as Isidore says, someone is not a spouse because he promises, but because he pledges himself and gives sureties of his pledge. But after the betrothal, one is called a spouse. Therefore, it is misnamed a promise. Praeterea, quicumque promittit aliquid, debet compelli ad solvendum. Sed illi qui sponsalia contrahunt, non compelluntur per Ecclesiam ad matrimonium contrahendum. Ergo sponsalia non sunt promissio. Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever promises something should be compelled to keep his promise. But people who contract a betrothal are not compelled by the Church to contract a marriage. Therefore, a betrothal is not a promise. Praeterea, in sponsalibus non est quandoque sola promissio, sed additur juramentum, et aliquae arrhae. Ergo videtur quod non debuerit solum per promissionem definiri. Obj. 3: Furthermore, in a betrothal there is sometimes not only a promise, but an oath is added to it, and some earnest money. Therefore, it seems that it should not have been defined only as a promise.