Praeterea, ordo justitiae in rebus humanis est conformis ordini rerum naturalium; unde justitia humana a justitia rerum naturalium trahitur, secundum philosophos. Sed Deus immutat quandoque ordinem rerum naturalium ab eo statutum, ut patet in operibus miraculosis. Ergo et potest ordinem justitiae in rebus humanis statutum immutare. Furthermore, the order of justice in human affairs is like the order of natural things, which is why human justice is drawn from the justice of natural things, according to the philosophers. But God sometimes changes the order of natural things established by him, as is clear in miraculous works. Therefore, he can also change the order of justice established in human affairs. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod Deus nullum puniat nisi pro peccato. Quia, ut dicit Hieronymus, quidquid patimur, peccata nostra meruerunt. Per passionem autem poenam designat. Ergo omnis poena pro peccato redditur. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that God punishes no one except for sinning. For as Jerome says, whatever we suffer, our sins have merited. But he appoints punishment by means of suffering. Therefore, all punishment is a repayment for sin. Praeterea, sicut praemium habet se ad meritum, ita poena ad peccatum. Sed praemium non redditur nisi merito. Ergo nec poena nisi peccato. Obj. 2: Furthermore, reward is related to merit as punishment is related to sin. But reward is only rendered for merit. Therefore, neither is punishment meted out for anything but sin. Praeterea, poena est quasi medicina quaedam, dum scilicet vel ipse qui punitur, per poenam corrigitur, vel alii, qui ex hoc terrentur. Sed hoc non esset, si poena etiam absque peccato inferretur. Ergo non infertur poena nisi pro peccato. Obj. 3: Furthermore, punishment is like a kind of medicine, namely, when either a person who is punished is corrected by his penalty, or there are others who are frightened away by it. But this would not be the case if punishment were also imposed without sin. Therefore, punishment is only imposed for sin. Praeterea, humana justitia a divina exemplatur. Sed secundum humanam justitiam reputaretur injustum punire aliquem sine culpa. Ergo multo fortius hoc est inconveniens divinae justitiae. Obj. 4: Furthermore, human justice is patterned after divine justice. But, according to human justice, it would be considered unjust to punish someone without fault. Therefore, much more is this unfitting to divine justice. Sed contra, Job gravissime punitus fuit. Sed poena non fuit ei inflicta pro culpa, ut frequenter dicit Gregorius. Ergo non semper Deus infert poenam pro culpa. On the contrary, Job was heavily punished. But the punishment was not inflicted on him for his fault, as Gregory often says. Therefore, God does not always impose punishment for fault. Praeterea, infortunia quae in hoc mundo accidunt, communia sunt bonis et malis, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Civ. Dei. Sed culpa non est utrisque communis. Ergo aliquando poena infertur sine culpa. Furthermore, misfortunes that happen in this world are common to both the good and the wicked, as Augustine says in his book City of God. But fault is not common to both. Therefore, sometimes punishment is imposed without fault. Quaestiuncula 4 Quaestiuncula 4 Ulterius. Videtur quod Dominus agat justius cum uno quam cum alio. Punitio enim est opus justitiae. Sed magis punit unum quam alium. Ergo justius agit cum uno quam cum alio. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the Lord acts more justly with one person than with another. For punishment is a work of justice. But he punishes one person more than another. Therefore, he acts more justly with one person than another. Praeterea, misericordia temperat severitatem justitiae. Sed Deus misericordius agit cum uno quam cum alio. Ergo et justius. Obj. 2: Furthermore, mercy tempers the severity of justice. But God acts more mercifully with one person than with another. Therefore, also more justly. Sed contra, justitia aequalitas quaedam est. Sed aequale non suscipit magis et minus. Ergo Deus non agit justius cum uno quam cum alio. On the contrary, justice is a certain equality. But equal does not admit of more and less. Therefore, God does not act more justly with one person than with another. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod justitia et voluntas in Deo idem sunt secundum rem; sed secundum rationem justitia aliquid supra voluntatem addit; scilicet ordinem divinis effectibus convenientem, secundum quod unum alteri proportionaliter adaequatur. Est enim in rebus creatis duplex ordo: unus secundum quem creatura ordinatur ad Deum; alius secundum quem una creatura dependet ab alia. Nomine igitur voluntatis non exprimitur nisi ordo ille qui est creaturae ad creaturam. Sicut enim igni in tali natura constituto debetur ut sit sursum, considerato rerum ordine ad invicem; ita etiam culpae debetur ut puniatur secundum ordinem eumdem. Unde patet quod non ex hoc tantum aliquid dicitur esse justum quia est a Deo volitum; sed quia est debitum alicui rei creatae secundum ordinem creaturae ad creaturam. Nihil enim alicui rei potest esse debitum nisi ratione suae naturae vel conditionis. Naturae autem et proprietatis rei causa est divina voluntas; et ideo totus ordo justitiae originaliter ad divinam voluntatem reducitur. I answer that, justice and will in God are the same in reality, but in notion, justice adds something beyond the will: namely, an order befitting divine effects, according to which one is made to conform proportionally to another. For there is a twofold order in created things: one, according to which a creature is ordered toward God, and another according to which one creature depends on another. Thus, by the word ‘will,’ only the order of created things to God is expressed, but ‘justice’ includes together with this the order of one creature to another. For just as it is due to fire, having been constituted in such a nature, that it be up, when the order of things to each other is considered, so it is also due to fault that it be punished in keeping with the same order. This is why it is evident that something is said to be just not only because it is willed by God, but because it is due to a certain created thing according to the order of creature to creature. For nothing can be due to any thing except by reason of its own nature or condition. However, the cause of a thing’s nature and properties is the divine will; and therefore the whole order of justice can be traced back to the divine will as to its origin. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis omne quod Deus vult, justum sit; non tamen ex hoc justum dicitur quod Deus illud vult, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Although everything that God wills is just, nevertheless, it is not said to be just merely because God wills it, as was said. Ad secundum dicendum, quod luto non est magis debitum quod ex eo formentur vasa nobilia quam ignobilia; sed cum ex luto formatum est vas nobile, nobilitati illius vasis est debitum ut ad usum conveniens deputetur. Similiter quod Deus talem creaturam producat qualem voluerit, indifferens est ad rationem justitiae: sed quod, aliqua natura producta, ei attribuatur quod illi naturae competit, hoc ad ejus justitiam pertinet; et contrarium ejus justitiae repugnaret: et similiter indifferens est quantum ad justitiam ejus ut det gratiam vel non det, cum donum gratiae non sit naturae debitum; sed postquam gratiam contulit, quae est merendi principium, ad judicium ejus pertinet ut pro meritis praemia reddat; et sic ex suppositione voluntatis justitia causatur. Reply Obj. 2: It is not owed to mud that noble vessels be formed from it rather than base ones, but when a noble vessel is formed out of mud, it is owed to the nobility of that vessel that it be put to a fitting use. Likewise, that God produces the sort of creature he wishes is a fact indifferent to the account of justice; but once a certain nature has been produced, attributing to it what befits its nature does pertain to his justice, and the contrary is opposed to his justice. And similarly it is indifferent to his justice that he give grace or not give it, since the gift of grace is not due to nature; but after he has conferred grace, which is the principle of merit, it pertains to his judgment that he grant rewards for merits. And this is how justice is caused by the supposition of his will. Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod in voluntate includitur, voluntatem non restringit. Ex hoc autem ipso quod Deus vult aliquam naturam facere, vult attribuere ei ea quae illi naturae competunt; sicut cum homo vult finem, ex hoc ipso vult ea quae sunt ad finem; et ideo voluntas Dei neque justitia ejus restringitur, neque justitiae ejus resistere potest. Reply Obj. 3: What is included in the will does not restrain the will. However, by the very fact that God wills to make a certain nature, he wills to attribute to it those things that befit that nature; just as if a man wishes an end, by this very fact he wishes all those things that are for the sake of the end. And so the will of God is neither restrained by his justice, nor can it resist his justice. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis Deus non sit debitor alicui creaturae, tamen creaturae potest esse aliquid debitum; quod scilicet requiritur ad ipsam ad hoc quod exemplar divinae sapientiae imitetur; et hoc debitum concernit justitia, cum dicitur Deus aliquid juste facere: quod quidem magis pertinet ad ordinem rei ad rem, quam ad ordinem rei creatae ad Deum. Reply Obj. 4: Although God is not a debtor to any creature, nevertheless there can be something due to a creature, namely, when something is needed if that creature is to imitate the exemplar of divine wisdom. And justice does concern this debt, when God is said to do something justly; which indeed does pertain more to the order of thing to thing than to the order of a creature to God. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod justitiae opus potest dupliciter praetermitti. Uno modo ut fiat contra justitiam; alio modo ut fiat praeter justitiam. Cum enim justitia dicatur per comparationem ad alterum; tunc contra ordinem fit quando ei subtrahitur quod ei debetur, vel quod conditio ejus exigit. Si autem aliquid amplius ei impendatur, non est contra justitiam, sed praeter justitiam: quia etiamsi alicui rei aliquid non debeatur, non tamen illius privatio est ei debita. Unde si aliquid ei exhibeatur quod non debetur, nihil contra ordinem justitiae fiet; sicut patet in eo qui alicui liberaliter sua bona communicat. Sed, sicut Philosophus dicit in 5 Ethic., pro eodem computatur minus de malo et plus de bono; unde sicut sine praejudicio justitiae potest aliquis de bonis suis plus alicui conferre quam debeat, ita sine praejudicio justitiae potest ei minus irrogare de poena pro peccato in eum commisso quam ei debeatur. Sed sicut non potest sine injuria aliquis de bonis alterius plus alicui conferre quam ei debetur; ita non potest minus irrogare de poena pro peccato commisso in alterum; et ideo judex non potest sine praejudicio justitiae poenas diminuere debitas pro peccatis in Deum vel in rempublicam commissis, nisi forte quatenus viderit hoc utilitati reipublicae expedire. To the second question, it should be said that a work of justice can be omitted in two ways. In one way, such that it is done against justice; in the other way, so that it is done above and beyond justice. For since justice is said by the relation to another, it happens against the order when what is due to someone or a condition that he requires is taken away from him. However, if something more is bestowed on him, it is not against justice, but above and beyond justice; for even if something is not owed to a certain thing, nevertheless its privation is not owed to it. This is why if something is presented to it that is not owed to it, nothing is done against the order of justice, as is evident in someone who shares his goods generously with another. But, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 5, the lesser evil is reckoned a good in comparison with the greater evil. This is why just as without prejudice to justice someone can bestow his own goods on someone else more than he is due, so too without prejudice to justice he can impose less of a penalty for sins committed against him than was due. But just as someone cannot without injury bestow more of another’s goods on someone than he was due, so he cannot impose less penalty for a sin committed against someone else. And thus a judge cannot without prejudice to justice diminish due penalties for sins committed against God or the state, except perhaps to the extent that he sees it would be to the state’s benefit. Deus autem donator bonorum omnium est, et in eum omnis peccator peccat; unde ipse potest plus conferre de bonis quam sit alicui debitum, et minus inferre de malis, vel etiam poenam totaliter relaxare; nec in hoc contra justitiam, sed praeter justitiam faceret. Sed si alicui minus conferret de bonis quam ei debetur, vel plus puniret quam peccasset, hoc contra ordinem justitiae esset; nec Deus hoc posset, loquendo de potentia ordinaria, sicut non posset facere quin ejus opus, secundum quod esse participat, eum imitaretur. Ex hoc enim ipso aliquid alicui rei est debitum secundum exigentiam suae conditionis, quod sine illo exemplar divinum secundum propriam suam rationem imitari non potest. Now God is the giver of all goods, and every sinner sins against him. This is why he can bestow more goods than are due to someone, and impose fewer evils, or even completely relax a punishment. And in this he would not act against justice, but above and beyond justice. But if he bestowed on someone less of his goods than the person was due, or if he punished someone more than he had sinned, this would be against the order of justice. Nor could God do this, speaking of his ordinary power, just as he could not make it so that his work, according as it participates in being, did not imitate him. For something is due to a thing according to the exigencies of its condition, by the very fact that without this it cannot imitate the divine exemplar according to its own proper character. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus seipsum negaret, si creaturae non conferret quod ei debetur secundum suam dispositionem. Sic enim veritatem non servaret in operum conditione vel gubernatione. Non autem seipsum negat, si aliquid amplius creaturae exhibeat quam ei debeatur, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: God would deny himself if he did not bestow on a creation what is due to it according to its own disposition. For then he would not preserve the truth in the condition and governance of his works. But he does not deny himself if he presents something more to a creation than is due to it, as was said. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus etsi nihil faciat contra naturam, tamen facit aliquid praeter naturam, inquantum scilicet facit aliquid in natura ad quod non sufficiunt vires naturae; similiter etiam etsi non faciat aliquid contra justitiam, potest tamen aliquid praeter justitiam facere. Reply Obj. 2: Although God does nothing against nature, nevertheless he does something above and beyond nature, namely, inasmuch as he does something in nature for which the powers of nature do not suffice. Likewise too even if he does nothing against justice, he can nevertheless do something above and beyond justice. Ad tertium dicendum, quod damnare Petrum, cui ex beneficio gratiae sibi collatae salus debetur, esset contrarium justitiae; unde hoc Deus non potest, loquendo de potentia ordinaria. Sed salvare Judam non esset justitiae contrarium, sed praeter eam, ut patet ex dictis; sed tamen esset contrarium ejus praescientiae et dispositioni, qua ei aeternam poenam paravit; unde justitiae ordo non impedit quin posset salvare Judam; sed impedit ordo praescientiae et dispositionis aeternae. Reply Obj. 3: To damn Peter, to whom salvation is due by the favor of the grace conferred on him, would be contrary to justice; and so God cannot do this, speaking of his ordinary power. But to save Judas would not be contrary to justice, but above and beyond it, as is clear from what has been said. But nevertheless it would be contrary to his foreknowledge and disposition, by which he prepared for him an eternal punishment. Therefore, the order of justice does not prevent him from saving Judas, but the order of foreknowledge and eternal disposition prevents it. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod poena de sui ratione semper importat aliquid nocivum. Ex hoc autem est aliquid nocivum quod per ipsum subtrahitur aliquod bonum. Inter bona autem hominis quaedam sunt per se loquendo ei bona, quae sunt bona hominis in eo quod homo; quaedam autem sunt bona secundum ordinem ad ista bona, sicut temporalia bona. Unde ista intantum sunt bona, inquantum ad illa spiritualia bona sunt homini adjumento; si autem impediant, ex hoc non sunt ei bona, sed mala; unde etiam Philosophus in 7 Ethic. dicit, quod bona fortuna est judicanda secundum comparationem ad virtutem, prout adjuvat vel impedit eam. To the third question, it should be said that punishment by its very nature always includes something harmful. But something is harmful from the fact that it takes some good away. Now among a person’s goods there are some that are good for him per se, which are the goods of a person as a human being, but some are goods according to his order to those goods, like temporal goods. Therefore, these are goods to the extent that they assist a person to those spiritual goods. But if they impede him, then they are not goods for him but evils. This is also why the Philosopher says in Ethics 7 that good fortune should be judged according to its relation to virtue, as it assists or impedes it. Pati ergo detrimentum in spiritualibus bonis semper malum est; sed pati detrimentum in bonis temporalibus quandoque quidem est bonum, quandoque vero malum. Malum quidem est, secundum quod impedit ab operatione virtutis et consecutione spiritualis boni; sed bonum est, secundum quod adjuvat ad virtutem sive ad consecutionem spiritualis boni, sicut exercitium corporale utile est ad corporalem fortitudinem acquirendam. Et quia, ut dictum est, poena a nocendo dicitur, ideo detrimentum in spiritualibus bonis semper poena est; sed detrimentum in temporalibus bonis quandoque quidem non est poena, sed medicina proficiens ad salutem; sicut amaritudo potionis non est poena, sed medela corporalis sanitatis. Sed tamen, quia natura nostra talis est ut ad perfectionem spiritualis boni per temporalium detrimenta oporteat pervenire, ex culpa peccati venit quod tota natura vitiata est: nec tali medicina opus erit, quando vulnus peccati perfecte erit curatum, cum homo ad ultimum finem spiritualis perfectionis perveniet. Therefore, to suffer loss in spiritual goods is always bad; but to suffer loss in temporal goods is indeed sometimes good, but sometimes bad. It is bad according as it impedes one from the exercise of virtue and the obtainment of spiritual goods; but it is good according as it helps virtue or the obtainment of spiritual good, just as physical exercise is useful to acquiring physical strength. And because, as was said, punishment means harming, therefore loss in spiritual goods is always a punishment, whereas loss in temporal goods is sometimes not a punishment but a medicine working toward salvation; just as the bitterness of a drink is not a punishment, but a remedy for physical health. But nevertheless, because our nature is such that it must arrive at the perfection of spiritual good by the loss of temporal ones, from the fault of sin it comes that all nature has been damaged: nor will such medicine be any longer useful when the wound of sin is perfectly cured, since man will have attained the final end of his spiritual perfection. Unde dicendum, quod poena, proprie loquendo, nunquam datur nisi culpae; sed tamen id quod contingit esse poenale, scilicet detrimentum temporalium bonorum in statu viae, aliquando infertur homini absque culpa praecedenti in persona, quamvis non absque culpa praecedenti in natura; sed post hanc vitam cessante spirituali profectu, nullum detrimentum, etiam in corporalibus, aliquis sine culpa sustinebit; quia tunc absterget Deus omnem lacrymam ab oculis sanctorum; Apoc. 21. Sed in spiritualibus bonis nullus detrimentum sustinet neque in hac vita neque in futura, sine culpa personae. This is why it should be said that punishment, properly speaking, is never given except for a fault; but nevertheless what happens to be penal, namely, the loss of temporal goods while in the wayfaring state, sometimes is imposed on a man without previous fault in his person, although not without the previous fault in the nature. But after this life when spiritual progress has ended, a person will sustain no loss, even in physical things, without fault. For then he will wipe away every tear from their eyes (Rev 21:4). But in spiritual goods a person will endure no loss, whether in this life or in the future life, without personal fault. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Hieronymus loquitur generaliter de merito peccati actualis et originalis praecedente vel in persona vel in natura. Reply Obj. 1: Jerome speaks generally about what previous actual and original sin have merited, whether in the person or in the nature. Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquod bonum alicui exhibetur nullo merito praecedente, sicut prima gratia; non tamen habet rationem praemii; unde non est inconveniens, si aliquod malum inferatur alicui nulla culpa praecedente, quod non habeat rationem poenae, sed potius medicinae promoventis ad bonum. Reply Obj. 2: A good may be presented to a person without any previous merit, like the first grace; but then it does not have the account of a reward. Therefore, it is not unfitting if some evil is imposed on someone without previous fault, which does not have the account of punishment, but rather of a medicine moving him toward the good. Ad tertium dicendum, quod poena non solum dicitur medicina ex hoc quod retrahit a malo, terrendo; de quo etiam objectio procedit; sed etiam inquantum promovet ad bonum, exercitando, et abstrahendo hominem ab amore temporalium: unde ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 3: Punishment is not called a medicine only because it deters people from evil by frightening them, as the objection assumes, but also inasmuch as it moves people toward the good by training them and withdrawing them from the love of temporal things. And so the argument does not follow. Ad quartum dicendum, quod etiam nulla culpa praecedente sine praejudicio humanae justitiae aliquid poenale alicui infertur, ut vel exercitatio juvenibus, vel medicina infirmis; unde non est inconveniens, si hoc idem fiat secundum justitiam divinam. Reply Obj. 4: Even with no previous fault, without prejudice to human justice something penal may be imposed on someone, like the training of youths or medicine for the infirm. Therefore, it is not unfitting if the same thing happens according to divine justice. Quaestiuncula 4 Response to Quaestiuncula 4 Ad quartam quaestionem dicendum, quod actio cum sit media inter agentem et effectum, ex utraque parte modificari potest. Cum ergo quaeritur, an Deus justius cum uno agat quam cum alio; si hoc referatur ad actionem prout exit ab agente, cum justitia sua, qua cum omnibus juste agit, sit una et invariabilis, non agit justius cum uno quam cum alio; si autem referatur ad actionem prout terminatur ad effectum, sic etiam dici non potest, quod cum uno justius agat quam cum alio; eo quod opus aliquod dicitur justum ex hoc quod est proportionaliter adaequatum; aequalitas autem, sive quantitatis sive proportionis, est ejusdem rationis in minimis et in magnis; eadem enim proportio quae est inter duo et unum, est inter viginti et decem; et aequalitas eadem quae est inter unum et unum, est inter centum et centum. Et ideo non potest esse unum opus altero justius, dummodo utrumque sit justum; eadem enim justitia servatur dum mala redduntur pro malis, et bona pro bonis, sive sint parva, sive sint magna. Sed tamen, quia in nobis non requiritur ad virtutem ut semper medium attingamus, sed sufficit quandoque juxta medium esse propter difficultatem inventionis medii, ut dicitur in 2 Ethic.; inde est quod apud nos unus alio justius agere dicitur, secundum quod magis vel minus accedit ad medium non perveniente utroque ad ipsum. Sed ipse Deus, cui sunt notae omnium rerum mensurae, semper in operatione sua ad medium indivisibile pertingit; unde nullo modo justius cum uno quam cum alio agit. To the fourth question, it should be said that since action is the middle between an agent and an effect, it can be modified from either side. Therefore, when it is asked whether God acts more justly with one person than with another, if this referred to the action as issuing from the agent, since his own justice, by which he acts justly with everyone, is one and invariable, he does not act more justly with one person than with another. However, if it referred to the action as terminating in the effect, then it also cannot be said that he acts more justly with one person than with another, because any work is called just by the fact that it is brought into proportional equality. However, equality, whether of quantity or of proportion, has the same account in the least things as in great things; for there is the same proportion between two and one as between twenty and ten, and the same equality that exists between one and one exists between hundred and hundred. And therefore one work cannot be more just than another, as long as both are just; for the same justice is preserved when bad things are rendered for evil, and good things for good, whether they are small or large. But nevertheless, because in us it is not required for virtue that we always attain the mean, but it suffices sometimes to be near the mean because of the difficulty of finding the mean, as it says in Ethics 2, this is why among us one person is said to act more justly than another, according as he approaches the mean more or less, while neither person actually attains it. But God himself, to whom is known the measure of every thing, always reaches the mean indivisibly in his operation, and thus in no way does he act more justly with one person than with another. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod punitio non est effectus justitiae inquantum hujusmodi, sed inquantum est culpae proportionata. Licet ergo a Deo inferatur major poena vel minor; semper tamen ex ejus justitia secundum eamdem proportionem infertur. Reply Obj. 1: Punishment is not an effect of justice insofar as it is justice, but insofar as it is proportioned to a fault. Therefore, it is permitted by God that a greater or lesser punishment be imposed; however, it will always be imposed by his justice according to the same proportion. Ad secundum dicendum, quod misericordia respicit absolute divinum effectum, non concernendo aliquam proportionem vel aequalitatem in ipso; unde secundum majorem vel minorem misericordiae effectum dicitur misericordius agere cum uno quam cum alio, si hoc referatur ad actionem secundum quod determinatur ad effectum; non autem si referatur ad eam secundum quod exit ab agente: quia ipse una et invariabili misericordia cum omnibus misericorditer agit. Nec tamen sequitur propter hoc, quod aliquo modo cum uno justius agat quam cum alio: effectus enim misericordiae non est contra justitiam, sed praeter eam, ut ex praedictis patet. Reply Obj. 2: Mercy has to do with the divine effect absolutely, not concerning any proportion or equality in it. This is why he is said to act more mercifully with one person than with another according to the greater or lesser effect of mercy, if this is referred to the action according as it is determined to the effect, but not if it is referred to it according as it issues from an agent: for he acts mercifully toward all men with a single invariable mercy. Nor, however, does it follow because of this that he might act in any way more justly with one person than with another: for the effect of his mercy is not against justice, but above and beyond justice, as is clear from what has been said.