Capitulum 129 Chapter 129 Quod solus Deus movet voluntatem hominis non res creata That God alone, and not a created thing, moves the will of man Cum autem omne mutabile et multiforme in aliquod primum immobile et unum reducatur sicut in causam, hominis autem intelligentia et voluntas mutabilis et multiformis appareat, necesse est quod in aliquam superiorem causam immobilem et uniformem reducantur. Et quia non reducuntur sicut in causam in corpora caelestia, ut ostensum est, oportet eas reducere in causas altiores. Everything that is changeable and multiform is traced back, as to its cause, to some first principle that is immobile and is one. Since man’s intellect and will are clearly changeable and multiform, they must be traced back to some higher cause that is immobile and uniform. The heavenly bodies are not the cause to which they are reduced, as we have shown; therefore they must be traced back to yet higher causes. Aliter autem se habet circa intelligentiam et voluntatem: nam actus intellectus est secundum quod res intellectae sunt in intellectu, actus autem voluntatis attenditur secundum inclinationem voluntatis ad res volitas. Intellectus igitur natus est perfici ab aliquo exteriori quod comparetur ad ipsum sicut ad potentiam: unde homo ad actum intellectus adiuvari potest a quolibet exteriori quod est magis perfectum secundum esse intelligibile, non solum a Deo, sed etiam ab angelo et etiam ab homine magis instructo, aliter tamen et aliter. In this matter the case of the intellect differs from that of the will. The act of the intellect is brought about by the presence of the things understood in the intellect; but the act of the will is accounted for by the inclination of the will toward the things willed. Thus the intellect is adapted by its nature to be perfected by something external that is related to it as act to potency. Hence man can be aided to elicit an act of the intellect by anything external that is more perfect in intelligible being: not only by God but also by an angel or even by a man who is better informed; but differently in each instance. Homo enim iuvatur ab homine ad intelligendum per hoc quod unus alteri proponit intelligibile quod non considerabat, non autem ita quod lumen intellectus unius hominis ab altero homine perficiatur, quia utriusque lumen naturale est unius speciei. A man is helped to understand by a man when one of them proposes to the other an intelligible object not previously contemplated; but not in such a way that the light of the intellect of one man is perfected by the other, because the natural light of both is of the same species. Sed quia lumen naturale angeli est secundum naturam sublimius naturali lumine hominis, homo ab angelo iuvari potest ad intelligendum non solum ex parte obiecti quod ei ab angelo proponitur, sed etiam ex parte luminis quod per lumen angeli confortatur. Non tamen lumen naturale hominis ab angelo est, cum natura rationalis animae, quae per creationem esse accipit, non nisi a Deo instituta sit; But the natural light of an angel is by nature of a higher excellence than the natural light of man, and so an angel can aid a man to understand, not only on the part of the object proposed to him by the angel, but also on the part of the light, which is strengthened by the angel’s light. However, man’s natural light does not come from an angel, for the nature of the rational soul, which receives existence through creation, is produced by God alone. Deus igitur ad intelligendum hominem iuvat non solum ex parte obiecti quod homini proponitur a Deo, aut per additionem luminis, sed etiam per hoc quod ipsum lumen naturale hominis quo intellectualis est a Deo est; et per hoc etiam quod, cum ipse sit veritas prima a qua omnis alia veritas certitudinem habet, sicut secundae propositiones a primis in syllogismis demonstrativis, nihil intellectui certum fieri potest nisi virtute divina, sicut nec conclusiones fiunt certae in scientiis nisi secundum virtutem primorum principiorum. God helps man to understand, not only on the part of the object proposed by God to man, or by an increase of light, but also by the very fact that man’s natural light, which is what makes him intellectual, is from God. Moreover, God himself is the first truth from which all other truth has its certitude, just as secondary propositions in demonstrative sciences derive their certitude from primary propositions. For this reason nothing can become certain for the intellect except through God’s power, just as conclusions do not achieve certitude in science except in virtue of primary principles. Sed cum actus voluntatis sit inclinatio quaedam ab interiori ad exterius procedens et comparetur inclinationibus naturalibus, sicut inclinationes naturales rebus naturalibus sunt a causa suae naturae, ita actus voluntatis a solo Deo est, qui solus causa est naturae rationalis voluntatem habentis. Unde patet quod non est contra arbitrii libertatem si Deus voluntatem hominis movet, sicut non est contra naturam quod Deus in rebus naturalibus operatur, sed tam inclinatio naturalis quam voluntaria a Deo est, utraque proveniens secundum conditionem rei cuius est: sic enim Deus res movet secundum quod competit earum naturae. But with regard to the will, its act is a certain inclination flowing from the interior to the exterior, and has much in common with natural inclinations. Accordingly, as natural inclinations are placed in natural things exclusively by the cause of their nature, the act of the will is from God alone, for he alone is the cause of a rational nature endowed with will. Therefore, if God moves man’s will, this is evidently not opposed to freedom of choice, just as God’s activity in natural things is not contrary to their nature. Both the natural inclination and the voluntary inclination are from God; each of them issues in action according to the condition of the thing to which it pertains. For thus God moves things in a way that is consonant with their nature. Patet igitur ex praedictis quod in corpus humanum et virtutes corporeas eius imprimere possunt corpora caelestia, sicut et in alia corpora; non autem in intellectum, sed hoc potest creatura intellectualis. In voluntatem autem solus Deus imprimere potest. From all that has been said, it is clear that heavenly bodies can exert an influence on the human body and its bodily powers, as they can on other bodies. But they cannot influence the intellect, although an intellectual creature can. And God alone can act upon the will. Capitulum 130 Chapter 130 Quod Deus est in omnibus rebus et providentia eius se extendit ad omnia That God is in all things and extends his providence to all Quia vero causae secundae non agunt nisi per virtutem primae causae, sicut instrumenta agunt per directionem artis, necesse est quod omnia alia agentia per quae Deus ordinem suae gubernationis adimplet, virtute ipsius Dei agant. Agere igitur cuiuslibet ipsorum a Deo causatur, sicut motus mobilis a motione moventis; movens autem et motum oportet esse simul: oportet igitur quod Deus cuilibet agenti assit interius quasi in ipso agens, dum ipsum ad agendum movet. Because second causes do not act except through the power of the first cause, as instruments operate under the direction of art, it is necessary that all the agents through which God carries out the order of his government act only through the power of God himself. The action of any of them is caused by God, just as the movement of a mobile object is caused by the motion of the mover. In such event the mover and the one moved must be simultaneous. Hence God must be inwardly present to any agent as acting therein whenever he moves the agent to act. Adhuc, non solum agere agentium secundorum causatur a Deo sed ipsum eorum esse, sicut in superioribus est ostensum. Non autem sic intelligendum est quod esse rerum causetur a Deo sicut esse domus causatur ab aedificatore, quo remoto adhuc remanet esse domus. Aedificator enim non causat esse domus nisi inquantum movet ad esse domus, quae quidem motio est factio domus; unde directe est causa fieri ipsius domus, quod quidem cessat aedificatore remoto. Deus autem est per se directe causa ipsius esse, quasi esse communicans omnibus rebus, sicut sol communicat lumen aeri et aliis quae ab ipso illuminantur. Et sic, sicut ad conservationem luminis in aere requiritur perseverans illuminatio solis, ita ad hoc quod res conserventur in esse requiritur quod Deus esse incessanter tribuat rebus; et sic omnia non solum inquantum esse incipiunt, sed etiam inquantum in esse conservantur, comparantur ad Deum sicut factum ad faciens. Faciens autem et factum oportet esse simul, sicut movens et motum; oportet igitur Deum adesse omnibus rebus inquantum esse habent. Esse autem est id quod rebus omnibus intimius adest; oportet igitur Deum in omnibus rebus esse. Moreover, not only the action of secondary agents, but their very existence, is caused by God, as was shown above. However, we are not to suppose that the existence of things is caused by God in the same way as the existence of a house is caused by its builder. When the builder departs, the house still remains standing. For the builder causes the existence of the house only in the sense that he moves toward the house’s existence, and his motion is the building of the house. Thus the builder is directly the cause of the becoming of the house, a process that ceases when he leaves. But God is directly, by himself, the cause of a creature’s very being, and communicates existence to all things just as the sun communicates light to the air and to other things illuminated by the sun. The continuous shining of the sun is required for the preservation of light in the air; similarly, God must unceasingly confer existence on things if they are to persevere in existence. Thus all things are related to God as an object made is to its maker, and this not only so far as they begin to exist, but so far as they continue to exist. But a maker and the object made must be simultaneous, just as in the case of a mover and the object moved. Hence God is necessarily present to all things to the extent that they have existence. But existence is that which is the most intimately present in all things. Therefore, God must be in all things. Item, quicumque exequitur suae providentiae ordinem per aliquas medias causas, necesse est quod effectus illarum mediarum causarum cognoscat et ordinet, alioquin extra ordinem providentiae suae caderent; et tanto perfectior est providentia gubernantis, quanto eius cognitio et ordinatio magis descendit ad singularia, quia si aliquid singularium cognitioni gubernantis subtrahitur, determinatio ipsius singularis eius providentiam diffugiet. Ostensum est autem supra quod necesse est omnia divinae providentiae subdi; et manifestum est quod divina providentia perfectissima est, quia quidquid de Deo dicitur secundum maximum convenit ei: oportet igitur quod ordinatio providentiae ipsius se extendat usque ad minimos effectus. Likewise, whoever carries out the order he has foreseen through the agency of intermediate causes must know and arrange the effects of these intermediate causes. Otherwise, the effects would occur outside the order he has foreseen. The prearranged plan of a governor is more perfect in proportion as his knowledge and design descend to details. For if any detail escapes the governor’s awareness, the disposition of that detail will elude his foresight. We showed above that all things are necessarily subject to divine providence; and divine providence must evidently be most perfect, because whatever is predicated of God must befit him in the highest possible degree. Consequently, his providential arrangements must extend to the most minute effects. Capitulum 131 Chapter 131 Quod Deus omnia disponit immediate That God disposes all things immediately Secundum hoc igitur patet quod, licet rerum gubernatio fiat a Deo mediantibus causis secundis quantum pertinet ad providentiae executionem, tamen ipsa dispositio seu ordinatio divinae providentiae immediate se extendit ad omnia. Non enim sic prima et universalia ordinat ut ultima et singularia aliis disponenda committat; hoc enim apud homines agitur propter debilitatem cognitionis ipsorum, quae non potest simul vacare pluribus: unde superiores gubernatores disponunt de magnis et minima aliis disponenda committunt. Sed Deus simul multa potest cognoscere, ut supra ostensum est, unde non retrahitur ab ordinatione maximorum per hoc quod dispensat minima. In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that, although God’s government of things is effected through the agency of secondary causes, as far as the carrying out of his providence is concerned, yet the plan itself or ordination of divine providence extends directly to all details. God does not arrange the first and universal matters in such a way as to turn over to others the disposal of the last and most particular things. Men act thus because of the limitations of their knowledge, which cannot at any one time take in many items. This is why higher rulers personally take charge of great concerns, and entrust the management of unimportant affairs to others. But God can take cognizance of a multitude of things simultaneously, as was indicated above. Hence the fact that he attends to the slightest details does not keep him from organizing the weightiest matters. Capitulum 132 Chapter 132 Rationes quae videntur ostendere quod Deus non habet providentiam de particularibus Arguments that seem to show that God does not have providence over particulars Posset tamen alicui videri quod singularia non disponantur a Deo. Nullus enim per suam providentiam disponit nisi quae cognoscit. Deo autem singularium cognitio deesse videri potest ex hoc quod singularia non intellectu sed sensu cognoscuntur; in Deo autem, qui omnino incorporeus est, non potest esse sensitiva, sed solum intellectiva cognitio. Potest igitur alicui videri ex hoc, quod singularia divina providentia non ordinentur. Nevertheless, some may think that singulars are not arranged by God. For a person arranges by planning only what he knows. But knowledge of singulars may well seem to be lacking in God, for the reason that singulars are known not by the intellect but by the senses. God, who is wholly non-bodily, can have no sense knowledge, but only intellectual knowledge. Consequently, singulars may seem to lie outside the scope of divine providence. Item, cum singularia sint infinita, infinitorum autem non possit esse cognitio, infinitum enim inquantum huiusmodi ignotum est, videtur quod singularia divinam cognitionem et providentiam effugiant. Moreover, singulars are infinite, and knowledge of infinity is impossible, since the infinite as such is unknown. Therefore, singulars seemingly escape the divine knowledge and providence. Adhuc, singularium multa contingentia sunt; horum autem non potest esse certa scientia: cum igitur scientiam Dei oporteat esse certissimam, videtur quod singularia non cognoscantur nec dispensentur a Deo. Again, many singulars are contingent. But it is impossible to have certain knowledge of such things. Accordingly, since God’s knowledge must be absolutely certain, it seems that singulars are not known or regulated by God. Praeterea, singularia non omnia simul sunt, quia quibusdam succedentibus alia corrumpuntur. Eorum autem quae non sunt non potest esse scientia; si igitur singularium Deus scientiam habeat, sequetur quod quaedam scire incipiat et desinat, ex quo sequitur eum esse mutabilem. Non igitur videtur singularium cognitor et dispositor esse. Besides, singulars do not all exist simultaneously, for some things decay only to have others take their place. But there can be no knowledge of non-existent things. Hence, if God has knowledge of singulars, there must be some things which he begins and ceases to know, and this would lead to the conclusion that he is mutable. Apparently, therefore, he does not know and arrange singulars. Capitulum 133 Chapter 133 Solutio praedictarum rationum Refutation of the aforesaid arguments Sed haec facile solvuntur, si quis rei veritatem consideret. Cum enim Deus se ipsum perfecte cognoscat, oportet quod cognoscat omne quod in ipso est quocumque modo. Cum autem ab ipso sit omnis essentia et virtus entis creati, quod autem est ab aliquo virtute in ipso est, necesse est quod se ipsum cognoscens cognoscat essentiam entis creati et quidquid virtute in eo est; et sic cognoscit omnia singularia quae virtute sunt in ipso et in aliis suis causis. But these objections are easily answered if we consider the truth of the matter. God knows himself perfectly, and therefore he must have knowledge of all that exists in himself in any manner whatever. Since every essence and power of created being is from him, and since whatever comes from anyone exists virtually in him, we necessarily conclude that in knowing himself he knows the essence of a created being and whatever is virtually contained in him. And thus he knows all the singulars that are virtually in him and in all their other causes. Nec est simile de cognitione intellectus divini et nostri, ut prima ratio procedebat. Nam intellectus noster cognitionem de rebus accipit per species abstractas, quae sunt similitudines formarum et non materiae, nec materialium dispositionum quae sunt individuationis principia: unde intellectus noster singularia cognoscere non potest, sed solum universalia. Intellectus autem divinus cognoscit res per essentiam suam, in qua sicut in primo principio virtute continetur non solum forma sed etiam materia; et ideo non solum universalium, sed singularium cognitor est. The knowledge possessed by the divine intellect is not like our knowledge, as the first objection urged. Our intellect derives knowledge of things through the species it abstracts, and these are the likenesses of forms and not of matter or of material dispositions, which are principles of individuation. Therefore, our intellect cannot know particulars, but only universals. But the divine intellect knows things through its own essence, in which, as in the first principle of being, is virtually contained not only form, but matter. And so God knows not only universals but also particulars. Similiter etiam non est inconveniens Deum infinita cognoscere, quamvis intellectus noster infinita cognoscere non possit. Intellectus enim noster non potest simul actu plura considerare, et sic si infinita cognosceret considerando ea, oporteret quod numeraret infinita unum post unum, quod est contra rationem infiniti; sed virtute et in potentia intellectus noster infinita cognoscere potest, utpote omnes species numerorum vel proportionum, inquantum habet sufficiens principium ad omnia cognoscenda. Deus autem simul multa cognoscere potest, ut supra ostensum est; et id per quod omnia cognoscit, scilicet sua essentia, est sufficiens principium omnia cognoscendi, non solum quae sunt sed quae esse possunt. Sicut igitur intellectus noster potentia et virtute cognoscit infinita quorum cognitionis principium habet, ita Deus omnia infinita actu considerat. Likewise, God is able to know an infinite number of objects, even though our intellect cannot know the infinite. Our intellect cannot actually contemplate many things at the same time. Hence, if it knew and considered an infinite number of objects, it would have to number them one by one, which is contrary to the very notion of infinity. However, our intellect can know infinity virtually and potentially: for example, it can know all the species of numbers or of proportions, seeing that it possesses an adequate principle for knowing all things. But God can know many things simultaneously, as was indicated above; and that whereby he knows all things (namely, his essence) is an adequate principle for knowing not only all that is, but all that can be. Therefore, as our intellect potentially and virtually knows those infinite objects for which it has a principle of cognition, so God actually contemplates all the infinite objects. Manifestum est etiam quod, licet singularia corruptibilia et temporalia non simul sint, tamen eorum Deus simul cognitionem habet: cognoscit enim ea secundum modum sui esse, quod est aeternum et sine successione. Sicut igitur materialia immaterialiter et multa per unum cognoscit, sic et quae non simul sunt uno intuitu conspicit: et sic non oportet quod eius cognitioni aliquid addatur vel subtrahatur per hoc quod singularia cognoscit. Furthermore, although bodily and temporal particulars do not exist simultaneously, God surely has simultaneous knowledge of them. For he knows them according to his manner of being, which is eternal and without succession. Consequently, as he knows material things in an immaterial way, and many things through one, so in a single glance he beholds objects that do not exist at the same time. And so his knowledge of particulars does not involve the consequence that anything is added to, or subtracted from, his knowledge. Ex quo etiam manifestum fit quod de contingentibus certam cognitionem habet, quia etiam antequam fiant intuetur ea prout sunt actu in suo esse, et non solum prout sunt futura et virtute in suis causis, sicut nos aliqua futura cognoscere possumus. Contingentia autem, licet prout sunt in suis causis virtute futura existentia non sint determinata ad unum, ut de eis certa cognitio haberi possit, tamen prout sunt actu in suo esse iam sunt determinata ad unum, et potest de eis certa haberi cognitio: nam Socratem sedere dum sedet, per certitudinem visionis cognoscere possumus. Et similiter Deus per certitudinem cognoscit omnia, quaecumque per totum decursum temporis aguntur, in suo aeterno: nam aeternitas sua praesentialitate totum temporis decursum attingit et ultra transcendit; ut sic consideremus Deum in sua aeternitate fluxum temporis cognoscere, sicut qui in altitudine speculae constitutus totum transitum viatorum simul intuetur. This also makes it clear that he has certain knowledge of contingent things. Even before they come into being, he sees them as they are in act in their own being, and not merely as things yet to come and as virtually present in their causes, in the way we are able to know some future things. Contingent things, regarded as future realities virtually present in their causes, are not sufficiently determinate to admit of certain knowledge about them; but, regarded as actually possessing existence, they are determinate, and hence certain knowledge of them is possible. Thus we can know, through vision’s certitude, that Socrates is sitting while he is seated. With like certitude God knows, in his eternity, all that takes place throughout the whole course of time: for his eternity is in present contact with the whole course of time, and even passes beyond time. And thus we may contemplate that God knows the flight of time in his eternity, in the way that a person standing on top of a watchtower embraces in a single glance a whole caravan of passing travelers. Capitulum 134 Chapter 134 Quod Deus solus cognoscit singularia futura contingentia That God alone knows singular future contingents Manifestum est autem quod hoc modo futura contingentia cognoscere prout sunt actu in suo esse, quod est certitudinem de ipsis habere, solius Dei proprium est, cui proprie et vere competit aeternitas; unde futurorum praenunciatio certa ponitur esse divinitatis signum, secundum illud Ysaiae XL:23 Futura quoque nuncietis et dicemus quia dii estis vos. Sed cognoscere futura in suis causis etiam aliis competere potest; sed haec cognitio non est certa sed coniecturalis magis, nisi circa effectus qui de necessitate ex suis causis sequuntur: et per hunc modum medicus pronunciat infirmitates futuras et nauta tempestates. Now it is clear that to know future contingents in this way, as actually existing (which is to have certitude about them), is restricted to God alone, to whom alone belongs eternity in the true and proper sense. For this reason, certain prediction of future events is accounted a proof of divinity. This accords with Isaiah 41:23: Tell us what is to come hereafter, that we may know that you are gods. Of course, others can know future events in their causes, but such knowledge is not certain, but is rather conjectural, except as regards effects that necessarily flow from their causes. In this way a physician foretells future illnesses, and a sailor predicts storms. Capitulum 135 Chapter 135 Quod Deus omnibus adest per potentiam, essentiam, et praesentiam, et omnia immediate disponit That God is in all things by power, essence, and presence, and disposes all immediately Sic igitur nihil impedit quin Deus etiam singularium effectuum cognitionem habeat et eos immediate ordinet per se ipsum, licet per causas medias exequatur. Sed et in ipsa executione quodammodo immediate se habet ad omnes effectus, inquantum omnes causae mediae agunt in virtute causae primae, ut quodammodo ipse in omnibus agere videatur; et omnia opera secundarum causarum ei possunt attribui sicut artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti: convenientius enim dicitur quod faber facit cultellum quam martellus. Habet etiam se immediate ad omnes effectus, inquantum ipse est per se causa essendi et omnia ab ipso servantur in esse. Thus there is no reason why God should not have knowledge of singular effects, or why he should not directly order them by himself, even though he may carry them out through intermediate causes. However, in the very execution he is, in some fashion, in immediate touch with all effects to the extent that all intermediate causes operate in virtue of the first cause, so that in a certain way he himself appears to act in them all. Thus all the achievements of secondary causes can be attributed to him, as the effect produced by a tool is ascribed to the artisan; for it is more fittingly said that an artisan makes the knife than that a hammer does. God is also in immediate contact with all effects inasmuch as he is the essential cause of their existence, and so far as everything is kept in being by him.