Capitulum 137 Chapter 137 Quod dicantur esse aliqua casualia et fortuita That some things are said to be by chance and fortuitous Quamvis autem omnia etiam minima divinitus dispensentur, ut ostensum est, nihil tamen prohibet aliqua accidere a casu et fortuna. Contingit enim aliquid respectu inferioris causae esse fortuitum vel casuale, dum praeter eius intentionem aliquid agitur quod tamen non est fortuitum vel casuale respectu superioris causae, praeter cuius intentionem non agitur; sicut patet de domino qui duos servos ad eundem locum mittit ita quod unus ignoret de alio: horum igitur concursus casualis est quantum ad utrumque, non autem quantum ad dominum. Although all events, even the most trifling, are disposed according to God’s plan, as we have shown, there is nothing to prevent some things from happening by chance or accident. An occurrence may be accidental or fortuitous with respect to a lower cause when an effect not intended is brought about, and yet not be accidental or fortuitous with respect to a higher cause, inasmuch as the effect does not take place apart from the latter’s intention. For example, a master may send two servants to the same place, but in such a way that neither is aware of the mission of the other. Their meeting is accidental so far as each of them is concerned, but not as regards the master. Sic igitur cum aliqua accidunt praeter intentionem causarum secundarum, fortuita sunt vel casualia habito respectu ad illas causas; et simpliciter casualia dici possunt, quia effectus simpliciter denominantur secundum conditionem proximarum causarum. Si vero habeatur respectus ad Deum, non sunt fortuita sed provisa. So, when certain events occur apart from the intention of secondary causes, they are accidental or fortuitous with respect to those causes; and they may be said to be fortuitous simply speaking, because effects are described simply in terms of their proximate causes. But if God’s point of view is considered, they are not fortuitous, but foreseen. Capitulum 138 Chapter 138 Utrum fatum sit aliqua natura et quid sit Whether fate is a nature, and what it is Ex hoc autem patet quae sit ratio fati. Cum enim multi effectus inveniarentur casualiter provenire secundum considerationem secundarum causarum, quidam huiusmodi effectus in nullam superiorem causam ordinantem eos reducere voluerunt, quos totaliter negare fatum necesse est. Quidam vero hos effectus qui videntur casuales et fortuiti, in superiorem causam ordinantem eos reducere voluerunt, sed corporalium ordinem non transcendentes, attribuerunt ordinationem horum corporibus primis, scilicet caelestibus: et hi fatum esse dixerunt vim positionis siderum ex qua huiusmodi effectus contingere dicebant. Sed quia ostensum est quod intellectus et voluntas, quae sunt propria principia humanorum actuum, corporibus caelestibus non subduntur, non potest dici quod ea quae casualiter vel fortuito in rebus humanis accidere videntur, reducantur in corpora caelestia sicut in causam ordinantem. This suggests what we ought to think of fate. Many effects are found to occur haphazardly if they are regarded from the standpoint of secondary causes. Some thinkers are unwilling to refer such effects to a higher cause that ordains them. In consequence, they must utterly reject fate. On the other hand, others have desired to trace back these seemingly accidental and fortuitous effects to a higher cause that plans them. But, failing to rise above the order of bodily entities, they attributed such devising to the highest bodies, namely, the heavenly bodies. And so they contended that fate is a force deriving from the position of the stars, and that this accounts for happenings of this kind. But we showed above that the intellect and will, which are the true principles of human acts, are not in any proper sense subject to heavenly bodies. Hence we cannot maintain that events which seemingly occur at random and by chance in human affairs are to be referred to heavenly bodies as to the ordering cause. Fatum autem non videtur esse nisi de rebus humanis, in quibus est et fortuna; de his enim solent aliqui inquirere futura cognoscere volentes, et de his a divinantibus responderi consuevit, unde et fatum a fando est appellatum. Et ideo sic fatum ponere est alienum a fide. There seems to be no place for fate except in human affairs, in which fortune has a part to play. It is only about such events that men are accustomed to inquire in their craving to know the future, and it is also about these that an answer is usually given by fortunetellers. Hence fate is a word formed from the Latin verb fari, to foretell. To acknowledge fate thus understood is opposed to faith. Sed quia non solum res naturales sed etiam res humanae divinae providentiae subduntur, huiusmodi quae casualiter in rebus humanis accidere videntur in ordinationem divinae providentiae reducere oportet. Et sic necesse est ponere fatum ponentibus divinae providentiae omnia subiacere. Fatum enim sic acceptum se habet ad divinam providentiam sicut proprius eius effectus: est enim explicatio divinae providentiae rebus adhibita, secundum quod Boetius dicit quod fatum est dispositio, id est ordinatio, immobilis rebus mobilibus inhaerens. Since, however, not only natural things but also human affairs are under divine providence, those events that seem to happen at random in men’s lives must be referred to the ordination of divine providence. Consequently, those who hold that all things are subject to divine providence must admit the existence of fate. Fate taken in this sense is related to divine providence as a real effect of the latter. For it is an unfolding of divine providence as applied to things, and is in agreement with the definition given by Boethius, who says that fate is an unchangeable disposition, that is, ordination, inherent in changeable things. Sed quia cum infidelibus quantum possumus nec nomina debemus habere communia, ne a non intelligentibus erroris occasio sumi possit, cautius est fidelibus ut fati nomen reticeant propter hoc quod fatum communius secundum primam acceptionem sumitur. Unde et Augustinus dicit in V de Civitate Dei, quod, si quis secundo modo fatum esse credat, sententiam teneat et linguam corrigat. Yet, since we ought not to have even words in common with infidels, so far as possible, lest an occasion for going astray be taken by those who do not understand, it is more prudent for the faithful to abstain from the word ‘fate,’ for the reason that fate is more properly and generally used in the first sense. Therefore, Augustine says in the City of God that if anyone believes in the existence of fate in the second sense, he may keep to his opinion but should correct his language. Capitulum 139 Chapter 139 Quod non omnia sunt ex necessitate That not everything is of necessity Quamvis autem ordo divinae providentiae rebus adhibitus sit certus, ratione cuius Boetius dicit quod fatum est dispositio immobilis rebus mobilibus inhaerens, non tamen propter hoc sequitur omnia ex necessitate accidere; nam effectus necessarii vel contingentes dicuntur secundum conditionem proximarum causarum. Manifestum est enim quod si causa prima fuerit necessaria et causa secunda fuerit contingens, effectus sequitur contingens, sicut prima causa in rebus corporalibus generationis in istis inferioribus est motus caelestis corporis; qui cum ex necessitate proveniat, generatio tamen et corruptio in istis inferioribus provenit contingenter, propter hoc quod causae inferiores contingentes sunt et deficere possunt. Ostensum est autem quod Deus suae providentiae ordinem per causas inferiores exequitur; erunt igitur aliqui effectus divinae providentiae contingentes secundum conditionem inferiorum causarum. The order of divine providence as carried out in things is certain. This is why Boethius could say that fate is an unchangeable disposition inherent in changeable things. But we may not conclude from this that all things happen of necessity. For effects are said to be necessary or contingent according to the condition of proximate causes. Evidently, if the first cause is necessary and the second cause is contingent, a contingent effect will follow. Thus in the case of lower bodies, the first cause of generation is the movement of a heavenly body; although this movement takes place necessarily, generation and corruption in those lower bodies occur contingently, because the lower causes are contingent and can fail. As we demonstrated above, God carries out the order of his providence through the intermediacy of lower causes. Therefore, some of the effects of divine providence will be contingent, in keeping with the condition of the lower causes. Capitulum 140 Chapter 140 Quod divina providentia manente, multa sunt contingentia That even under divine providence, many things are contingent Nec tamen effectuum contingentia seu causarum certitudinem providentiae perturbare potest. Tria enim sunt quae providentiae certitudinem praestare videntur: scilicet infallibilitas divinae praescientiae, efficacia divinae voluntatis, et sapientia divinae dispositionis quae vias sufficientes ad effectum consequendum adinvenit; quorum nullum congingentiae rerum repugnat. Nam prescientia Dei infallibilis est etiam contingentium futurorum, inquantum Deus intuetur in suo aeterno futura prout sunt actu in suo esse, ut supra expositum est. The contingency of effects or of causes cannot upset the certainty of divine providence. Three things seem to guarantee the certainty of providence: the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, the efficaciousness of the divine will, and the wisdom of the divine management, which discovers adequate ways of procuring an effect. None of these factors is opposed to the contingency of things. God’s infallible knowledge embraces even future contingents, inasmuch as God beholds in his eternity future events as actually existing. But we dealt with this question above. Voluntas etiam Dei, cum sit universalis rerum causa, non solum est de hoc quod aliquid fiat, sed ut sic fiat; hoc igitur ad efficaciam divinae voluntatis pertinet ut non solum fiat quod Deus fieri vult, sed ut hoc modo fiat quo illud fieri vult. Vult autem quaedam fieri necessario et quaedam contingenter, quia utrumque requiritur ad completum esse universi. Ut igitur utroque modo res provenirent, quibusdam adaptavit necessarias causas, quibusdam vero contingentes, ut sic dum quaedam fiunt necessario, quaedam contingentes, divina voluntas efficaciter impleatur. Moreover, God’s will, since it is the universal cause of things, decides not only that something will come to pass, but that it will come about in this or that manner. The efficaciousness of the divine will demands not only that what God wishes will happen, but that it will happen in the way he wishes. But he wills that some things should happen necessarily and that other things should happen contingently; both are required for the perfection of the universe. That events may occur in both ways, he applies necessary causes to some things and contingent causes to others. In this manner, with some things happening necessarily and other things happening contingently, the divine will is efficaciously carried out. Manifestum est etiam quod per sapientiam divinae dispositionis providentiae certitudo servatur, contingentia rerum manente. Nam si hoc per prudentiam hominis fieri potest, ut causae quae deficere potest ab effectu sic ferat auxilium ut interdum indeficienter sequatur effectus, sicut patet in medico sanante et in vineae cultore contra sterilitatem vitis adhibendo remedium: multo magis hoc ex sapientia divinae dispositionis contingit, ut quamvis causae contingentes deficere possint quantum est de se ab effectu, tamen aliquibus adminiculis adhibitis indeficienter sequatur effectus, quod eius contingentiam non tollit. Sic igitur manifestum est quod rerum contingentia divinae providentiae certitudinem non excludit. Furthermore, it is clear that the certainty of providence is safeguarded by the wisdom of the divine dispensation, without prejudice to the contingency of things. Even the providence exercised by man can enable him so to bolster up a cause which can fail to produce an effect so that, in some cases, the effect will inevitably follow. We find that a physician acts thus in exercising his healing art, as also does the vine-dresser who employs the proper remedy against barrenness in his vines. Much more, then, does the wisdom of the divine economy bring it about that, although contingent causes left to themselves can fail to produce an effect, the effect will inevitably follow when certain supplementary measures are employed; nor does this do away with the contingency of the effect. Evidently, therefore, contingency in things does not exclude the certainty of divine providence. Capitulum 141 Chapter 141 Quod divinae providentiae certitudo non excludit mala a rebus That the certainty of divine providence does not exclude evil from things Eodem etiam modo perspici potest quod, divina providentia manente, mala in mundo accidere possunt propter defectum causarum secundarum. Videmus enim in causis ordinatis accidere malum in effectu ex defectu causae secundae, qui tamen defectus a causa prima nullo modo causatur, sicut malum claudicationis causatur a curvitate cruris, non autem a virtute motiva animae; unde quidquid est in claudicatione de motu refertur in virtutem motivam sicut in causam, quod autem est ibi de obliquitate non causatur a virtute motiva, sed a curvitate cruris. Sic igitur quidquid in rebus malum accidit, quantum ad id quod esse vel speciem vel naturam aliquam habet, reducitur in Deum sicut in causam non enim potest esse malum nisi in bono, ut ex supradictis patet; quantum vero ad id quod habet de defectu, reducitur in causam inferiorem defectibilem. Et sic licet Deus sit universalis omnium causa, non tamen est causa malorum inquantum sunt mala, sed quidquid boni eis adiungitur causatur a Deo. The same process of reasoning enables us to perceive that, without prejudice to divine providence, evil can arise in the world because of defects in secondary causes. Thus in causes that follow one another in order, we see that evil finds its way into an effect owing to some fault in a secondary cause, although this fault is by no means the product of the first cause. For example, the evil of lameness is caused by a curvature in the leg, not by the motive power of the soul. Whatever movement there is in the progress of a lame man is attributed to the motive power as to its cause; but the unevenness of the progress is caused by the curvature of the leg, not by the motive power. Similarly, the evil that arises in things, so far as it has existence or species or a certain nature, is referred to God as to its cause; for there can be no evil unless it resides in something good, as is clear from what we said above. But with regard to the defect that disfigures it, the evil is referred to a lower, defectible cause. Accordingly, although God is the universal cause of all things, he is not the cause of evil as evil. But whatever good is bound up with the evil has God as its cause. Capitulum 142 Chapter 142 Quod non derogat bonitati Dei quod mala permittat That it does not derogate from God’s goodness that he permits evils Nec tamen hoc bonitati divinae repugnat quod mala esse permittit in rebus ab eo gubernatis. Primo quidem quia providentiae non est naturam gubernatorum perdere, sed salvare. Requirit autem hoc perfectio universi ut sint quaedam in quibus malum non possit accidere, quaedam vero quae defectum mali pati possint secundum suam naturam. Si igitur malum totaliter excluderetur a rebus per providentiam divinam, non regerentur res secundum earum naturam, quod esset maior defectus quam singulares defectus qui tollerentur. God’s permission of evil in the things governed by him is not inconsistent with the divine goodness. For, in the first place, the function of providence is not to destroy but to save the nature of the beings governed. The perfection of the universe requires the existence of some beings that are not subject to evil, and of other beings that can suffer the defect of evil in keeping with their nature. If evil were completely eliminated from things, they would not be governed by divine providence in accord with their nature; and this would be a greater defect than the particular defects eradicated. Secundo, quia bonum unius non potest interdum accidere sine malo alterius, sicut videmus quod generatio unius non est sine corruptione alterius, et nutrimentum leonis non est sine occisione alicuius animalis, et patientia iusti non est sine persecutione iniusti. Si igitur malum totaliter excluderetur a rebus, sequeretur quod multa etiam bona tollerentur. Non igitur pertinet ad divinam providentiam ut malum totaliter excludat a rebus, sed ut mala quae proveniunt ad aliquod bonum ordinentur. Second, the good of one cannot be realized without the suffering of evil by another. For instance, we find that the generation of one being does not take place without the corruption of another being, and that the nourishment of a lion is impossible without the destruction of some other animal, and that the patient endurance of the just involves persecution by the unjust. If evil were completely excluded from things, much good would be rendered impossible. Consequently, it is the concern of divine providence not that evil be totally excluded from things, but to see to it that the evil which arises is ordered to some good. Tertio, quia ex ipsis malis particularibus commendabiliora redduntur bona dum eis comparantur, sicut ex obscuritate nigri magis declaratur claritas albi. Et sic per hoc quod mala permittuntur esse in mundo, divina bonitas magis declaratur in bonis, et sapientia in ordinatione malorum ad bona. Third, good is rendered more estimable when compared with particular evils. For example, the brilliance of white is brought out more clearly when set off by the dinginess of black. And so, by permitting the existence of evil in the world, the divine goodness is more emphatically asserted in the good, just as is the divine wisdom when it orders evil to the good. Capitulum 143 Chapter 143 Quod Deus specialiter homini providet per gratiam That God specially provides for man by grace Quia ergo divina providentia rebus singulis secundum earum modum providet, creatura autem rationalis per liberum arbitrium est domina sui actus prae ceteris creaturis, necesse est ut etiam ei singulari modo provideatur quantum ad duo. Primo quidem quantum ad adiumenta operis quae ei dantur a Deo; secundo quantum ad ea quae pro suis operibus ei redduntur. Divine providence governs individual beings in keeping with their nature. Consequently, since rational creatures through free will have dominion over their actions in a way impossible to other creatures, a special providence must be exercised over them in two respects. First, with regard to the aids God gives to rational creatures in their activity; second, with regard to the recompense allotted for their works. Creaturis enim irrationalibus haec solum adiumenta dantur divinitus ad agendum quibus naturaliter moventur ad agendum; creaturis vero rationalibus dantur documenta et praecepta vivendi. Non enim praeceptum dari competit nisi ei qui est dominus sui actus, quamvis et creaturis irrationalibus praecepta per quandam similitudinem Deus dare dicatur, secundum illud Psalmi praeceptum posuit et non praeteribit: quod quidem praeceptum nihil aliud est quam dispositio divinae providentiae movens res naturales ad proprias actiones. God gives to irrational creatures only those aids by which they are naturally moved to act. But to rational creatures are issued instructions and commands regulating their lives. A precept is not fittingly given except to a being that is master of his actions, although in an analogous sense God is said to also give commands to irrational creatures, about which Psalm 148:6 says: He set a law which cannot pass away. But this sort of decree is nothing else than the dispensation of divine providence moving natural things to their proper actions. Similiter etiam actiones creaturarum rationalium imputantur eis ad culpam vel ad laudem pro eo quod habent dominium sui actus, non solum hominibus ab homine praesidente sed etiam a Deo, cum homines non solum regantur ab homine sed etiam a Deo. Cuiuscumque autem regimini aliquis subditur, ab eo sibi imputatur quod laudabiliter vel culpabiliter agit. Et quia pro bene actis debetur praemium, culpae vero debetur poena, ut supra dictum est, creaturae rationales secundum iustitiam divinae providentiae et puniuntur pro malis et praemiantur pro bonis. In creaturis autem irrationalibus non habet locum poena et praemium, sicut nec culpari vel laudari. Similarly, the deeds of rational creatures are imputed to them in blame or in praise, because they have dominion over their acts. The actions of men are ascribed to them not only by a man who is placed over them, but also by God. Thus any praiseworthy or blameworthy action that a man performs is imputed to him by the person to whose rule he is subject. Since good actions merit a reward and sin calls for punishment, as was said above, rational creatures are punished for the evil they do and are rewarded for the good they do according to the measure of justice fixed by divine providence. But there is no place for reward or punishment in dealing with irrational creatures, just as there is none for praise or blame. Quia vero ultimus finis creaturae rationalis facultatem naturae ipsius excedit, ea vero quae sunt ad finem debent esse fini proportionata secundum rectum providentiae ordinem, consequens est ut creaturae rationali etiam adiutoria divinitus conferantur, non solum quae sunt proportionata naturae, sed etiam quae facultatem naturae excedunt. Unde supra naturalem facultatem rationis imponitur divinitus homini lumen gratiae, per quod interius perficitur ad virtutes: et quantum ad cognitionem, dum elevatur mens hominis per lumen huiusmodi ad cognoscendum ea quae rationem excedunt, et quantum ad actionem et affectionem, dum per lumen huiusmodi affectus hominis super omnia creata elevatur ad Deum diligendum et sperandum in ipso, et ad agendum ea quae talis amor requirit. But since the last end of rational creatures exceeds the capacity of their nature and since whatever conduces to the end must be proportionate to the end according to the right order of providence, rational creatures are given divine aids that are not merely proportionate to nature but that transcend the capacity of nature. God infuses into man, over and above the natural faculty of reason, the light of grace whereby he is internally perfected for the exercise of virtue, both as regards knowledge, inasmuch as man’s mind is elevated by this light to the knowledge of truths surpassing reason, and as regards action and affection, inasmuch as man’s affective power is raised by this light above all created things to the love of God, to hope in him, and to the performance of acts that such love imposes. Huiusmodi autem auxilia supernaturaliter homini data, gratuita vocantur duplici ratione: primo quidem quia gratis divinitus dantur, non enim potest in homine aliquid inveniri cui condigne huiusmodi auxilia debeantur, cum haec facultatem humanae naturae excedant; secundo vero quia speciali quodam modo per huiusmodi dona homo Deo efficitur gratus. Cum enim dilectio Dei sit causa bonitatis in rebus, non a praeexistente bonitate provocata sicut est dilectio nostra, necesse est quod quibus aliquos speciales bonitatis effectus largitur, respectu horum specialis ratio dilectionis divinae consideretur. Unde eos maxime et simpliciter diligere dicitur, quibus tales bonitatis effectus largitur per quos ad ultimum finem perveniant, quod est ipse qui est fons bonitatis. These gifts or aids supernaturally given to man are called ‘graces’ for two reasons. First, because they are given by God gratis. There is nothing found in man which makes such aids due to him by right, for they exceed the capacity of nature. Second, because in a very special way man is made gratus (or pleasing) to God by such gifts. Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things and is not called forth by any preexisting goodness, as our love is, a special intensity of divine love must be discerned in those whom he showers with such extraordinary effects of his goodness. Therefore, God is said chiefly and simply to love those whom he endows with these effects of his love by which they are enabled to reach their last end, which is he himself, the fountainhead of all goodness. Capitulum 144 Chapter 144 Quod Deus per dona gratuita remittit peccata That God remits sins by freely-given gifts Et quia peccata contingunt ex hoc quod actiones deficiunt a recto ordine ad finem, ad finem autem homo ordinatur non solum per naturalia auxilia sed per gratuita, necesse est quod peccata hominum non solum naturalibus auxiliis sed etiam gratuitis contrarientur. Contraria autem se invicem expellunt: unde sicut per peccata huiusmodi auxilia gratuita ab homine tolluntur, ita per gratuita dona peccata homini remittuntur; alioquin malitia hominis in peccando plus posset dum removet gratiam, quam divina bonitas ad removendum peccata per gratiae dona. Sins arise when actions deflect from the right course leading to the end. Since man is conducted to his end not only by natural aids, but by the aids of grace, the sins men commit must be counteracted not by natural aids alone, but also by the helps which grace confers. Contraries exclude each other; therefore, as the aids of grace are taken from man by sin, so sins are forgiven by the gifts of grace. Otherwise man’s malice in committing sin would be more powerful in banishing divine grace than the divine goodness is in expelling sin by the gifts of grace.