Capitulum 153 Chapter 153 Quod anima omnino idem corpus resumet That the soul takes up again exactly the same body Cum autem anima corpori uniatur ut forma, unicuique autem formae propria materia respondeat, necesse est quod corpus cui iterato anima unietur sit eiusdem rationis et speciei cum corpore quod deponit per mortem. Non igitur resumet anima in resurrectione corpus caeleste vel aereum, vel corpus alicuius alterius animalis, ut quidam fabulantur, sed corpus humanum ex carnibus et ossibus compositum, organizatum eisdem organis ex quibus nunc consistit. Since the soul is united to the body as its form, and since each form has the right matter corresponding to it, the body to which the soul will be reunited must be of the same nature and species as was the body laid down by the soul at death. At the resurrection the soul will not resume a celestial or ethereal body, or the body of some animal, as certain people fancifully prattle. No, it will resume a human body made up of flesh and bones, and equipped with the same organs it now possesses. Rursus, sicut eidem formae secundum speciem debetur eadem materia secundum speciem, ita eidem formae secundum numerum debetur eadem materia secundum numerum: sicut enim anima bovis non potest esse anima corporis equi, ita anima huius bovis non posset esse anima corporis alterius bovis. Oportet igitur quod, cum eadem numero anima rationalis remaneat, quod corpori eidem numero in resurrectione rursus uniatur. Furthermore, just as the same specific form ought to have the same specific matter, so the same numerical form ought to have the same numerical matter. For even as the soul of an ox cannot be the soul of a horse’s body, neither can the soul of this ox be the soul of any other ox. Therefore, since the rational soul that survives remains numerically the same, at the resurrection it must be reunited to numerically the same body. Capitulum 154 Chapter 154 Quod resumet idem numero corpus sola Dei virtute That the soul takes up again one and the same body solely by the power of God Ea vero quae secundum substantiam corrumpuntur, non reiterantur eadem numero secundum operationem naturae, sed solum eadem secundum speciem: non enim eadem numero nubes est ex qua pluvia generatur, et quae iterum ex aqua pluente et rursus evaporante generatur. Cum igitur corpus humanum per mortem substantialiter corrumpatur, non potest operatione naturae idem numero reparari. Cum igitur hoc exigat resurrectionis ratio, ut ostensum est, consequens fit quod resurrectio hominum non fiet per actionem naturae, ut quidam posuerunt, post multa annorum curricula redeuntibus caelestibus corporibus ad eundem situm, rursus eosdem numero homines redire; sed resurgentium reparatio sola virtute divina fiet. When substances corrupt, the survival of the species, but not the restoration of the individual, is effected by the action of nature. The cloud from which rain is produced and the cloud which is again formed by evaporation from the fallen rain water are not numerically the same. Accordingly, since the human body substantially dissolves in death, it cannot be restored to numerical identity by the action of nature. But the concept of resurrection requires such identity, as we have just shown. Consequently, the resurrection of man will not be brought about by the action of nature, as some philosophers have held in their theory that, when all bodies return to the position formerly occupied after untold cycles of years, then also men will return to life in the same numerical identity. No, the restoration of all who rise will be effected solely by divine power. Item, manifestum est quod sensus privati restitui non possunt per operationem naturae, neque aliquid eorum quae solum per generationem accipiuntur, eo quod non sit possibile idem numero pluries generari. Si autem aliquid huiusmodi restituatur alicui, puta oculus erutus aut manus abscissa, hoc erit virtute divina, quae supra naturae ordinem operatur, ut supra ostensum est. Cum igitur per mortem omnes sensus et omnia membra depereant, impossibile est hominem mortuum rursus reparari ad vitam nisi operatione divina. Moreover, it is clear that senses once destroyed, and anything possessed solely as a result of generation, cannot be restored by the activity of nature, for the simple reason that the same numerical being cannot be generated several times. If any such perfection is restored to anyone, for example, an eye that has been torn out or a hand that has been cut off, it will be through divine power which operates beyond the order of nature, as we said above. Therefore, since all the senses and all the members of man corrupt in death, a dead man cannot be brought back to life except by divine action. Ex hoc autem quod resurrectionem ponimus divina virtute futuram, de facili videri potest quomodo corpus idem numero reparetur. Cum enim supra ostensum sit quod omnia etiam minima sub divina providentia continentur, manifestum est quod materia huius humani corporis, quamcumque formam post mortem hominis accipiat, non effugit neque virtutem neque cognitionem divinam. Quae quidem materia eadem numero manet, inquantum intelligitur sub dimensionibus existens secundum quas haec materia dici potest et est individuationis principium. Hac igitur materia eadem manente, et ex ea virtute divina corpore reparato humano, nec non et anima rationali, quae cum sit incorruptibilis eadem manet, eidem corpori coniuncta, consequens fit ut homo idem numero reparetur. The fact that the future resurrection will be effected by divine power, as we hold, enables us to perceive readily how the same numerical body will be revived. Since all things, even the very least, are included under divine providence, as we showed above, the matter composing this human body of ours, whatever form it may take after man’s death, evidently does not elude the power or the knowledge of God. Such matter remains numerically the same, in the sense that it exists under quantitative dimensions, by reason of which it can be said to be this particular matter, and is the principle of individuation. When this same matter remains, and the human body is refashioned from it by divine power, and likewise the rational soul which remains the same in its incorruptibility is united to the same body, it follows that identically the same man is restored. Nec potest identitas secundum numerum impediri, ut quidam obiiciunt, per hoc quod non sit humanitas eadem numero. Nam humanitas, quae dicitur forma totius, secundum quosdam nihil est aliud quam forma partis quae est anima: quae quidem dicitur forma corporis secundum quod dat ei vitam, forma autem totius secundum quod dat speciem toti; quod si verum est, manifestum est et humanitatem eandem numero remanere, cum anima rationalis eadem numero maneat. Numerical identity cannot be impeded, as some object, by the consideration that the humanity is not numerically the same as before. In the view of some philosophers, humanity, which is said to be the form of the whole, is nothing else than the form of a part, namely, the soul, and they admit that humanity is the form of the body, in the sense that it confers species on the whole. If this is true, evidently the humanity remains numerically the same, since the rational soul remains numerically the same. Sed quia humanitas est quam significat definitio hominis, sicut et essentia cuiuslibet rei est quam significat sua definitio, definitio autem hominis non solum significat formam sed etiam materiam, cum in definitionibus rerum naturalium necesse sit materiam poni: convenientius secundum alios dicitur quod in ratione humanitatis et anima et corpus includatur, aliter tamen quam in definitione hominis. Nam in ratione humanitatis includuntur essentialia principia hominis sola, cum praecisione aliorum; cum enim humanitas dicatur qua homo est homo, manifestum est quod omnia de quibus non est verum dicere quod eis homo sit homo, ab humanitate praeciduntur. Cum vero homo dicatur qui humanitatem habet, per hoc vero quod humanitatem habet non excluditur quin et alia habeat, puta albedinem aut aliquid huiusmodi, hoc nomen homo significat sua essentialia principia, non tamen cum praecisione aliorum, licet alia non includantur actu in eius ratione sed potentia tantum: unde homo significatur per modum totius, humanitas vero per modum partis, nec de homine praedicatur. In Socrate vero aut Platone includitur haec materia et haec forma, ut sicut ratio hominis est ex hoc quod componitur ex corpore et anima, ita, si Socrates definiretur, ratio eius esset quod esset compositus ex his carnibus et his ossibus et hac anima. Cum igitur humanitas non sit aliqua alia forma praeter animam et corpus, sed sit aliquid compositum ex utroque, manifestum est quod eodem corpore reparato et eadem anima manente, eadem numero humanitas erit. Humanity, however, is that which is signified by the definition of man, as the essence of anything whatever is that which is signified by its definition. But the definition of man signifies not form alone but also matter, since matter must be comprised in the definition of material things. Hence we shall do better to say, with others, that both soul and body are included in the notion of humanity, although otherwise than in the definition of man. The notion of humanity embraces only the essential principles of man, leaving out all other factors. For, since humanity is understood to be that whereby man is man, whatever cannot truly be said to constitute man as man is evidently cut off from the notion of humanity. But when we speak of man, who has humanity, the fact that he has humanity does not exclude the possession of other attributes, for instance, whiteness and the like. The term ‘man’ signifies man’s essential principles, but not to the exclusion of other factors, even though these other factors are not actually, but only potentially, contained in the notion of man. Hence ‘man’ signifies in the manner of a whole whereas ‘humanity’ signifies in the manner of a part and is not predicated of man. In Socrates, then, or in Plato, this determinate matter and this particular form are included. Just as the notion of man implies composition of matter and form, so if Socrates were to be defined, the notion of him would imply that he is composed of this flesh and these bones and this soul. Consequently, since humanity is not some third form in addition to soul and body, but is composed of both, we see clearly that, if the same body is restored and if the same soul remains, the humanity will be numerically the same. Neque etiam praedicta identitas secundum numerum impeditur ex hoc quod corporeitas non redeat eadem numero, cum corrupto corpore corrumpatur. Nam si per corporeitatem intelligatur forma substantialis per quam aliquid in genere substantiae corporeae ordinatur, cum non sit unius nisi una forma substantialis, talis corporeitas non est aliud quam anima; nam hoc animal per hanc animam non solum est animal, sed animatum corpus et corpus et etiam hoc aliquid in genere substantiae existens: alioquin anima adveniret corpori existenti in actu, et sic esset forma accidentalis. Subiectum enim substantialis formae non est actu hoc aliquid, sed potentia tantum: unde cum accipit formam substantialem non dicitur tantum generari hoc aut illud, sicut dicitur in formis accidentalibus, sed dicitur simpliciter generari, quasi simpliciter esse accipiens; et sic corporeitas accepta eadem numero manet, rationali anima incorruptibili existente. The numerical identity in question is not frustrated on the ground that the corporeity recovered is not numerically the same, for the reason that it corrupts when the body corrupts. If by corporeity is meant the substantial form by which a thing is classified in the genus of bodily substance, such corporeity is nothing else than the soul, seeing that there is but one substantial form for each thing. In virtue of this particular soul, this animal is not only animal, but is animated body, and body, and also this thing existing in the genus of substance. Otherwise the soul would come to a body already existing in act, and so would be an accidental form. The subject of a substantial form is something existing only in potency, not in act. When it receives the substantial form it is not said to be generated merely in this or that respect, as is the case with accidental forms, but is said to be generated simply, as simply receiving existence. And therefore the corporeity that is received remains numerically the same, since the same rational soul continues to exist. Si vero corporeitatis nomine forma quaedam intelligatur a qua denominatur corpus quod ponitur in genere quantitatis, sic est quaedam forma accidentalis, cum nihil aliud significet quam trinam dimensionem. Unde licet non eadem numero redeat, identitas subiecti non impeditur ad quam sufficit unitas essentialium principiorum; et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis accidentibus, quorum diversitas identitatem secundum numerum non tollit. Unde cum unio sit quaedam relatio ac per hoc sit accidens, eius diversitas secundum numerum non tollit identitatem subiecti. Similiter etiam nec diversitas secundum numerum potentiarum animae sensitivae et vegetativae, si tamen corrumpi ponantur: sunt enim in genere accidentis potentiae naturales coniuncti existentes; nec a sensu sumitur sensibile secundum quod est differentia constitutiva animalis, sed ab ipsa substantia animae sensitivae, quae in homine est eadem secundum substantiam cum rationali. If, however, the word ‘corporeity’ is taken to mean a form designating a body, which is placed in the genus of quantity, such a form is accidental, since it signifies nothing else than three-dimensional existence. Even though the same numerical form, thus understood, is not recovered, the identity of the subject is not thereby impeded, for unity of the essential principles suffices for this. The same reasoning holds for all the accidents, the diversity among which does not destroy numerical identity. Consequently, since union is a kind of relation, and therefore an accident, its numerical diversity does not prevent the numerical identity of the subject; nor, for that matter, does numerical diversity among the powers of the sensitive and vegetative soul, if they are supposed to have corrupted. For the natural powers existing in the human composite are in the genus of accident; and what we call ‘sensible’ is derived not from the senses according as sense is the specific difference constituting animal, but from the very substance of the sensitive soul, which in man is essentially identical with the rational soul. Capitulum 155 Chapter 155 Quod homines resurgent ad statum incorruptibilis vitae That men rise to incorruptible life Quamvis autem homines iidem numero resurgant, non tamen eundem modum vivendi habebunt: nunc enim corruptibilem vitam habent, tunc vero incorruptibilem. Si enim natura in generatione hominis perpetuum esse intendit, multo magis Deus in hominis reparatione; quod enim natura perpetuum esse intendat, habet ex hoc quod a Deo movetur. Non autem in reparatione hominis resurgentis intenditur perpetuum esse speciei, quia hoc per continuam generationem poterat optineri; relinquitur igitur quod intendatur perpetuum esse individui: homines igitur resurgentes in perpetuum vivent. Although men will rise as the same individuals, they will not have the same kind of life as before. Now their life is corruptible; then it will be incorruptible. If nature aims at perpetual existence in the generation of man, much more so does God in the restoration of man. Nature’s tendency toward never-ending existence comes from an impulse implanted by God. The perpetual existence of the species is not in question in the restoration of risen man, for this could be procured by repeated generation. Therefore, what is intended is the perpetual existence of the individual. Accordingly, risen men will live forever. Praeterea, si homines resurgentes moriantur, animae a corporibus separatae non in perpetuum absque corpore remanebunt: hoc enim est contra naturam animae, ut supra dictum est. Oportebit igitur quod iterato resurgant; et hoc idem continget, si post secundam resurrectionem iterum moriantur. Sic igitur in infinitum mors et vita circulariter circa eundem hominem reiterabuntur: quod videtur esse vanum. Convenientius est igitur ut stetur in primo, ut scilicet in prima resurrectione homines immortales resurgant. Besides, if men once risen were to die, the souls separated from their bodies would not remain forever deprived of the body, for this would be against the nature of the soul, as we said above. Therefore, they would have to rise again; and the same thing would happen if they were to die again after the second resurrection. Thus death and life would revolve around each man in cycles of infinite succession, which seems futile. Surely a halt is better called at the initial stage, so that men might rise to immortal life at the first resurrection. Nec tamen mortalitatis ablatio diversitatem vel secundum speciem vel secundum numerum inducet. Mortale enim secundum propriam rationem differentia specifica hominis esse non potest, cum passionem quandam designet; sed ponitur loco differentiae hominis, ut per hoc quod dicitur mortale designetur materia hominis, quod scilicet est ex contrariis compositus, sicut per hoc quod rationale designatur proprie forma eius: res enim naturales non possunt sine materia definiri. Non autem auferetur mortalitas per ablationem propriae materiae: non enim resumet anima corpus caeleste vel aereum, ut supra habitum est, sed corpus humanum ex contrariis compositum. Incorruptibilitas tamen adveniet ex virtute divina, per quam anima supra corpus usque ad hoc dominabitur quod corrumpi non possit; tandiu enim res conservatur in esse, quandiu forma supra materiam dominatur. However, the conquest of mortality will not introduce any diversity either in species or in number. The idea of mortality contains nothing that could make it a specific difference of man, since it signifies only something suffered. It is used to serve as a specific difference of man in the sense that the nature of man is designated by calling him mortal to bring out the fact that he is composed of contrary elements, just as his proper form is designated by the predicate ‘rational’; material things cannot be defined without including matter. However, mortality is not overcome by taking away man’s proper matter. For the soul will not resume a celestial or ethereal body, as was mentioned above; it will resume a human body made up of contrary elements. Incorruptibility will come as an effect of divine power, whereby the soul will gain dominion over the body to the point that the body cannot corrupt. For a thing continues in being as long as form has dominion over matter. Capitulum 156 Chapter 156 Quod post resurrectionem usus cibi et generationis cessabunt That after the resurrection the use of food and generation will cease Quia vero subtracto fine removeri oportet ea quae sunt ad finem, oportet quod remota mortalitate a resurgentibus, ea etiam subtrahantur quae ad statum mortalis vitae ordinantur. Huiusmodi autem sunt cibi et potus, qui ad hoc sunt necessarii ut mortalis vita sustentetur, dum id quod per calorem naturalem resolvitur per cibos restauratur; non igitur post resurrectionem erit usus cibi et potus. When an end is removed, the means leading to that end must also be removed. Therefore, after mortality is done away with in those who have risen, the means serving the condition of mortal life must cease to have any function. Such are food and drink, which are necessary for the sustenance of mortal life, during which what is dissolved by natural heat has to be restored by food. Consequently, there will be no use of food or drink after the resurrection. Similiter etiam nec vestimentorum, cum vestimenta ad hoc homini necessaria sint ne corpus ab exterioribus corrumpatur per calorem vel frigus. Similiter etiam necesse est et venereorum usum cessare, cum ad generationem animalium ordinetur; generatio autem mortali vitae deservit, ut quod secundum individuum conservari non potest, conservetur saltem in specie. Cum igitur homines iidem numero in perpetuum conservabuntur, generatio in eis locum non habebit, unde nec venereorum usus. Nor will there be any need of clothing. Man needs clothes so that the body does not suffer harm from heat or cold, which beset him from outside. Likewise, exercise of the reproductive functions, which is designed for the generation of animals, must cease. Generation serves the ends of mortal life, so that what cannot be preserved in the individual may be preserved at least in the species. Since the same individual men will continue in eternal existence, generation will have no place among them; nor, consequently, will the exercise of reproductive power. Rursus, cum semen sit superfluum alimenti, cessante usu ciborum necesse est ut etiam venereorum usus cesset. Again, since semen is the superfluous part of nourishment, cessation of the use of food necessarily entails cessation of the exercise of the reproductive functions. Non autem potest convenienter dici quod propter solam delectationem remaneat usus cibi et potus et venereorum. nihil enim inordinatum in illo finali statu erit, quia tunc omnia suo modo perfectam consummationem accipient: inordinatio autem perfectioni opponitur. Et praeterea, cum reparatio hominis per resurrectionem sit immediate a Deo, non poterit in illo statu aliqua inordinatio esse, cum quae a Deo sunt ordinata sunt, ut dicitur Ro. XIII. Est autem hoc inordinatum ut usus cibi et potus vel venereorum propter solam delectationem quaeratur, unde et nunc apud homines vitiosum reputatur. Non igitur propter solam delectationem in resurgentibus usus cibi et potus et venereorum esse poterit. On the other hand, we cannot fittingly maintain that the use of food, drink, and the reproductive powers will remain solely for the sake of pleasure. Nothing inordinate will occur in that final state, because then all things, each in its own way, will receive their perfect consummation, but inordinance is opposed to perfection. Also, since the restoration of man through resurrection will be effected directly by God, no inordinance will be able to find its way into that state: those that exist have been ordained by God (Rom 13:1). But desire for the use of food and the exercise of the reproductive powers for pleasure alone would be inordinate; indeed, even during our present life people regard such conduct as vicious. Among the risen, consequently, the use of food, drink, and the reproductive functions for mere pleasure can have no place. Capitulum 157 Chapter 157 Quod tamen omnia membra resurgent That nevertheless all bodily members will be resurrected Quamvis autem usus talium rerum resurgentibus desit, non tamen eis deerunt membra ad usus tales ordinata, quia sine his corpus resurgentis integrum non esset. Conveniens est autem ut in reparatione hominis resurgentis, quae erit immediate a Deo cuius perfecta sunt opera, natura integre reparetur. Erunt igitur huiusmodi membra in resurgentibus propter integritatem naturae conservandam, et non propter actus quibus nunc deputantur. Although risen men will not occupy themselves with activities of this sort, they will not lack the organs requisite for such functions. Without the organs in question the risen body would not be complete. But it is fitting that nature should be completely restored at the renovation of risen man, for such renovation will be accomplished directly by God, whose works are perfect. Therefore, all the members of the body will have their place in the risen, for the preservation of nature in its entirety rather than for the exercise of their normal functions. Item, si in illo statu homines pro actibus quos nunc agunt poenam vel praemium consequentur, ut postea manifestabitur, conveniens est ut eadem membra homines habeant quibus peccato vel iustitiae deservierunt in hac vita, ut in quibus peccaverunt vel meruerunt, puniantur vel praemientur. Moreover, as we shall bring out later, men will receive punishment or reward in that future state for the acts they perform now. This being the case, it is no more than right that men should keep the organs with which they served the reign of sin or of justice during the present life, so that they may be punished or rewarded in the members they employed for sin or for merit. Capitulum 158 Chapter 158 Quod non resurgent cum aliquo defectu That they will not rise up with any defect Similiter autem conveniens est ut omnes naturales defectus a corporibus resurgentium auferantur; per omnes enim huiusmodi defectus integritati naturae derogatur. Si igitur conveniens est ut in resurrectione natura humana integraliter reparetur a Deo, consequens est ut etiam huiusmodi defectus tollantur. In like manner, it is fitting that all natural defects should be corrected in the risen body. Any defect of this sort is prejudicial to the integrity of nature. And so, if human nature is to be completely renewed by God at the resurrection, such defects must be taken away. Praeterea, huiusmodi defectus ex defectu virtutis naturalis quae fuit generationis humanae principium provenerunt; in resurrectione autem non erit virtus agens nisi divina, in quam defectus non cadit: non igitur huiusmodi defectus qui fuerunt in hominibus generatis, erunt in hominibus per resurrectionem reparatis. Besides, these defects arose from a deficiency in the natural power which is the principle of human generation. But in the resurrection there will be no active causality other than the divine, which does not admit of deficiency. Therefore, such defects as are found in men naturally begotten will have no place in men restored by the resurrection. Capitulum 159 Chapter 159 Quod resurgent solum quae sunt de veritate naturae That only those things that are of the truth of human nature rise up Quod autem dictum est de integritate resurgentium, referri oportet ad id quod est de veritate humanae naturae. Quod enim de veritate humanae naturae non est, in resurgentibus non resumetur; alioquin oporteret immoderatam esse magnitudinem resurgentium, si quidquid ex cibis in carnem et sanguinem est conversum in resurgentibus resumetur. Veritas autem uniuscuiusque naturae secundum suam speciem et formam attenditur. Partes igitur hominis secundum speciem omnes integraliter in resurgentibus erunt, non solum partes organicae, sed etiam partes consimiles, ut caro, nervus et huiusmodi ex quibus membra organica componuntur. Non autem totum quidquid materialiter fuit sub his partibus resumetur, sed quantum sufficiens erit ad dispositionem partium reintegrandam. These remarks about the integrity of risen men should be understood as referring to whatever pertains to the truth of human nature. What is not required for the truth of human nature will not be resumed by risen man. Thus, if all the accretion of matter from the food that has been changed into flesh and blood were to be resumed, the size of risen man would exceed all bounds. The truth of any nature is looked to according to its species and form. Accordingly, all the parts that are consonant with the human species and form will be integrally present in risen man: not only organic parts, but other parts of like nature, such as flesh and sinews, which enter into the composition of the various organs. Of course, not all the matter that was ever contained in those parts during man’s natural life will again be taken up, but only so much as will be enough to constitute the species of the parts in integrity. Nec tamen propter hoc homo idem numero aut integer non erit, si totum quidquid materialiter in eo fuit non resurget. Manifestum est enim quod in statu huius vitae a principio usque ad finem homo idem numero manet; id tamen quod materialiter in eo est sub specie partium non idem manet, sed paulatim fluit et refluit, ac si ignis idem conservaretur consumptis et appositis lignis. Et tunc est integer quando species et quantitas speciei debita conservatur. Even though not all the material elements ever possessed by man will arise, we cannot say on this account that man will not be the same individual, or that he will not be complete. For in this present life it is manifest that a man remains one and the same in number from the beginning all the way to the end. That, however, which is in him materially under the aspect of parts does not remain the same, but undergoes gradual flux and reflux (as if the same fire were preserved by logs being consumed and replaced). And then he is a complete man when the species and the quantity due to the species are preserved.