Capitulum 50 Chapter 50 Quod in divinis Trinitas personarum non repugnat unitati essentiae That a Trinity of persons in God is not opposed to unity of essence Ex omnibus autem quae dicta sunt colligere oportet quod in divinitate quendam ternarium ponimus, qui tamen unitati et simplicitati divinae essentiae non repugnat. Oportet enim concedi Deum esse et existentem in sua natura, et intellectum et amatum a se ipso. From all that has been said we must gather that we hold there to be a kind of three in the Godhead, which nevertheless is not opposed to the unity and simplicity of the divine essence. For we must acknowledge that God exists both in his nature and as known and loved by himself. Aliter autem hoc accidit in Deo et in nobis. Quia enim homo in sua natura substantia est, intelligere autem et amare ipsius non sunt eius substantia, homo quidem secundum quod in natura sua consideratur quaedam res subsistens est; secundum autem quod est in suo intellectu, non est res subsistens sed intentio quaedam rei subsistentis, et similiter secundum quod est in se ipso ut amatum in amante. Etsi ergo in homine tria quaedam considerari possunt, id est homo in natura sua existens et homo in intellectu existens et homo in amore existens, tamen hi tres non sunt unum quia intelligere eius non est eius esse, similiter autem et amare; et horum trium unus solus est res quaedam subsistens, scilicet homo in natura sua existens. But this occurs otherwise in God than in us. For man is a substance in his nature, but his actions of knowing and loving are not his substance. Considered in his nature, man is indeed a subsisting thing; as he exists in his mind, however, he is not a subsisting thing, but a certain representation of a subsisting thing; and similarly with regard to his existence in himself as beloved in lover. Therefore, even though a kind of three can be considered in man—that is, man existing in his nature, man existing in his intellect, and man existing in his love—yet these three are not one, for man’s knowing is not his existence, and the same is true of his loving. Only one of these three is a subsisting thing: namely, man existing in his nature. In Deo autem idem est esse, intelligere et amare; Deus ergo in esse suo naturali existens et Deus existens in intellectu suo et Deus existens in amore suo unum sunt, et tamen unusquisque eorum est subsistens. Et quia res subsistentes in intellectuali natura personas Latini nominare consueverunt, Graeci vero hypostases, propter hoc in divinis Latini dicunt tres personas, Graeci vero tres hypostases, Patrem scilicet et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. In God, on the contrary, to be, to know, and to love are the same thing. Therefore, God existing in his natural being and God existing in the divine intellect and God existing in the divine love are one thing. Yet each of them is subsistent. And, because Latins are accustomed to call things subsisting in intellectual nature persons, while Greeks call them hypostases, consequently the Latins say that there are three persons in God, and the Greeks say that there are three hypostases, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Capitulum 51 Chapter 51 Quomodo videtur esse repugnantia ponendo numerum in divinis How a Trinity of persons in God seems to be a contradiction Videtur autem ex praedictis repugnantia quaedam suboriri. Si enim in Deo ternarius aliquis ponitur, cum omnis numerus divisionem aliquam consequatur, oportebit in Deo aliquam differentiam ponere per quam tres ab invicem distinguantur; et ita non erit in Deo summa simplicitas. Nam si in aliquo tres conveniunt et in alio differunt, necesse est ibi esse compositionem, quod superioribus repugnat. But a certain contradiction seems to arise from what has been said. For if some kind of three is asserted in God, then, since number always follows on some division, some division will have to be acknowledged in God, whereby the three may be distinguished from one another. Thus supreme simplicity will be lacking in God. For, if three agree in some respect and differ in another, composition must be present; which is contrary to what was set forth above. Rursus, si necesse est esse unum solum Deum, ut supra ostensum est, nulla autem res una oritur vel procedit a se ipsa, impossibile videtur quod sit Deus genitus vel Deus procedens; falso igitur in divinis ponitur nomen Patris et Filii et Spiritus procedentis. Again, if there can be only one God, as was shown above, and if one and the same thing cannot originate or proceed from itself, it seems impossible for God to be begotten or to proceed. Wrongly, therefore, are the names of Father and of Son and of proceeding Spirit posited in the Godhead. Capitulum 52 Chapter 52 Solutio rationis, et quod in divinis non est distinctio nisi secundum relationes Solution of the difficulty: in God there is no distinction except according to relation Principium autem ad dissolvendum hanc dubitationem hinc sumere oportet, quod secundum diversitatem naturarum est in diversis rebus diversus modus aliquid exoriendi vel procedendi. In rebus enim vita carentibus, quia non sunt se ipsa moventia sed solum extrinseca movere possunt, oritur ex uno aliud quasi exterius alteratum et immutatum, sicut ab igne generatur ignis et ab aere aer. The principle for solving this difficulty must be derived from this fact: namely, that there are different ways something can originate or proceed among different kinds of things. Among lifeless beings, which do not move themselves but can only be moved from outside, one thing arises from another by being, as it were, outwardly altered and changed. In this way fire is generated from fire and air from air. In rebus vero viventibus, quarum proprietas est ut se ipsa moveant, generatur aliquid in ipso generante, sicut fetus animalium et fructus plantarum. In viventibus autem est considerare diversum modum processionis secundum diversas vires et operationes earundem. Sunt enim quaedam vires in eis quarum operationes non se extendunt nisi ad corpora secundum quod materialia sunt, sicut patet de viribus animae vegetabilis, quae sunt nutritiva et augmentativa et generativa; et secundum hoc genus virium animae non procedit nisi aliquid corporale corporaliter distinctum, et tamen aliquo modo coniunctum in viventibus ei a quo procedit. But among living beings, whose characteristic property is that they move themselves, something is generated within the one generating; for example, the fetuses of animals and the fruits of plants. Moreover, one must notice different ways of proceeding among living beings according to their different powers and operations. For there are certain powers in them whose operations extend only to bodies according as they are material; this is clear with regard to the powers of the vegetative soul, which serve nutrition, growth, and generation. In virtue of this class of the soul’s powers, there proceeds only what is bodily and bodily distinct, although in the case of living beings what proceeds is joined in some way to that from which it proceeds. Sunt autem quaedam vires quarum operationes, etsi corpora non transcendant, tamen se extendunt ad species corporum sine materia eas recipiendo, sicut est in omnibus viribus animae sensitivae: est enim sensus susceptivus specierum sine materia, ut Philosophus dicit. Huiusmodi autem vires, licet quodammodo immaterialiter formas rerum suscipiant, non tamen eas suscipiunt absque organo corporali. Si qua igitur processio in huiusmodi viribus animae inveniatur, quod procedit non erit aliquod corporale, vel corporaliter distinctum aut coniunctum ei a quo procedit, sed incorporaliter et immaterialiter quodammodo, licet non omnino absque adminiculo organi corporalis. Sic enim procedunt in animalibus formationes rerum imaginatarum, quae quidem sunt in imaginatione non sicut corpus in corpore sed quodam spirituali modo: unde et ab Augustino imaginaria visio spiritualis nominatur. There are other powers whose operations, although they do not go beyond bodies, nonetheless extend to the species of bodies by receiving them without their accompanying matter. This is the case with all the powers of the sensitive soul. For sense is capable of receiving species without matter, as the Philosopher says. But such faculties, although they are receptive of the forms of things in a sort of immaterial way, do not receive them without a bodily organ. If procession takes place within these powers of the soul, that which proceeds will not be something bodily, nor will it be distinct from or joined to that faculty whence it proceeds in a bodily way, but in a certain non-bodily and immaterial way (although not entirely without the help of a bodily organ). This is how, in animals, the representations of things imagined proceed, which exist in the imagination not as a body in a body, but in a certain spiritual way. This is why Augustine calls imaginary vision spiritual. Si autem secundum operationem imaginationis procedit aliquid non per modum corporalem, multo fortius hoc accidet per operationem partis intellectivae, quae nec etiam in sui operatione indiget organo corporali, sed omnino eius operatio immaterialis est. Procedit enim verbum secundum operationem intellectus ut in ipso intellectu dicentis existens, non quasi localiter in eo contentum nec corporaliter ab eo separatum, sed in ipso quidem existens secundum potestatem naturalis operationis, ab eo vero distinctum secundum ordinem originis; et eadem ratio est de processione quae attenditur secundum operationem voluntatis, prout res amata existit in amante, ut supra dictum est. But if something proceeds in a way that is not bodily when the imagination operates, this will be the case much more in the operation of the intellectual faculty, which does not need a bodily organ in its operation, but whose operation is entirely immaterial. For in an intellectual operation a word proceeds in such a way that it exists in the very intellect of the speaker: not as locally contained there, nor as bodily separated, but as existing in it according to the power of the natural operation while distinct from it according to the order of origin. The same is true in that procession which is observed to take place in the operation of the will, so far as the beloved exists in the lover, as was said above. Licet autem vires intellectivae et sensitivae secundum propriam rationem sint nobiliores viribus animae vegetabilis, non tamen in hominibus aut in aliis animalibus secundum processionem imaginativae partis aut sensitivae procedit aliquid subsistens in natura speciei eiusdem, sed hoc solum accidit per processionem quae fit secundum operationem animae vegetabilis; et hoc ideo est quia in omnibus compositis ex materia et forma, multiplicatio individuorum in eadem specie fit secundum materiae divisionem. Unde in hominibus et aliis animalibus, cum ex forma et materia componantur, secundum corporalem divisionem quae invenitur in processione quae est secundum operationem animae vegetabilis, et non in aliis operationibus animae, multiplicantur individua in eandem speciem. In rebus vero quae non sunt ex materia et forma compositae, non potest esse nisi distinctio formalis tantum; sed si forma secundum quam attenditur distinctio sit substantia rei, oportet quod illa distinctio sit rerum subsistentium quarundam, non autem si forma illa non sit rei substantia. However, although the intellectual and sensitive powers are nobler in character than the powers of the vegetative soul, nothing that subsists in the nature of the same species proceeds either in men or in other animals according to the procession of the imaginative or sensitive faculties. This occurs only in that procession which takes place through the operation of the vegetative soul. The reason for this is that in all beings composed of matter and form, the multiplication of individuals in the same species is effected by a division of matter. Hence among men and other animals, composed as they are of form and matter, individuals are multiplied in the same species by the bodily division which ensues in the procession that is proper to the operation of the vegetative soul, but that does not take place in other operations of the soul. In beings that are not composed of matter and form, there can only be formal distinction. But if the form that is the reason for the distinction is a thing’s substance, then the distinction must be between subsistent things. (Of course, this is not the case if the form in question is not the substance of the thing.) Est igitur commune in omni intellectu, ut ex dictis patet, quod oportet id quod intellectu concipitur, ab intelligente quodammodo procedere inquantum intelligens est, et sua processione quodammodo ab ipso distingui, sicut conceptio intellectus quae est intentio intellecta distinguitur ab intellectu intelligente; et similiter oportet quod affectio amantis, per quam amatum est in amante, procedat a voluntate amantis inquantum est amans. Sed hoc proprium habet intellectus divinus quod, cum intelligere eius sit esse ipsius, oportet quod conceptio intellectus, quae est intentio intellecta, sit substantia eius; et similiter est de affectione in ipso Deo amante. Relinquitur igitur quod intentio intellectus divini, quae est Verbum ipsius, non distinguitur a producente ipsum in hoc quod est esse substantiam, sed solum secundum relationem processionis unius ex alio; et similiter est de affectione amoris in Deo amante, quae ad Spiritum Sanctum pertinet. As is clear from what has been said, every intellect has this in common: what is conceived in the intellect must in some way proceed from the knower, so far as he is knowing; and it must be in some way distinguished from him by its procession, just as the conception of the intellect, which is the intellectual likeness, is distinguished from the knowing intellect. Similarly, the affection of the lover, whereby the beloved is in the lover, must proceed from the will of the lover insofar as he is loving. But the divine intellect has this unique to itself: since God’s understanding is his existence, his intellectual conception (which is the intelligible likeness) must be his substance; and the case is similar with affection in God’s loving. Consequently, the representation in the divine intellect, which is God’s Word, is not distinguished from him who produces the Word as regards substantial existence, but only according to the relation of procession of one from the other. The case is similar concerning the affection of love in God loving, which pertains to the Holy Spirit. Sic igitur patet quod nihil prohibet Verbum Dei, quod est Filius, esse unum cum Patre secundum substantiam, et tamen distingui ab eo secundum relationem processionis, ut dictum est. Unde et manifestum est quod eadem res non oritur neque procedit a se ipsa, quia Filius secundum quod a Patre procedit ab eo distinguitur; et eadem ratio est de Spiritu Sancto per comparationem ad Patrem et Filium. Thus it is plain that nothing prevents God’s Word, who is the Son, from being one with the Father in substance, and that, nevertheless, the Word is distinct from the Father according to the relation of procession, as we have said. Hence it is also evident that the same thing does not arise or proceed from itself; for the Son, as proceeding from the Father, is distinct from him. And the same observation holds true of the Holy Spirit, relative to the Father and the Son. Capitulum 53 Chapter 53 Quod relationes quibus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus distinguuntur sunt reales et non rationis tantum That the relations whereby Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinguished are real, and not merely rational Istae autem relationes quibus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus ab invicem distinguuntur sunt relationes reales et non rationis tantum. Illae enim relationes sunt rationis tantum quae non consequuntur ad aliquid quod est in rerum natura, sed ad aliquid quod est in apprehensione tantum, sicut dextrum et sinistrum in lapide non sunt relationes reales sed rationis tantum, quia non consequuntur aliquam virtutem realem in lapide existentem, sed solum acceptionem apprehendentis lapidem ut sinistrum quia est alicui animali ad sinistrum; sed in animali dextrum et sinistrum sunt relationes reales, quia consequuntur virtutes quasdam in determinatis partibus animalis inventas. Cum igitur relationes praedictae, quibus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus distinguuntur, sint realiter in Deo existentes, oportet quod relationes praedictae sint relationes reales et non rationis tantum. The relations by which the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinguished from one another are real relations, and not merely rational. Those relations are purely rational which do not follow from anything found in the nature of things, but follow from intellectual apprehension alone. Thus right and left in a stone are not real relations, but only rational relations; they do not follow from any real disposition present in the stone, but only from the perception of one who apprehends the stone as left because it is to the left of some animal. On the other hand, left and right in an animal are real relations, because they follow on certain dispositions found in definite parts of the animal. Accordingly, since the relations whereby the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished really exist in God, the aforesaid relations must be real relations, and are not merely relations of reason. Capitulum 54 Chapter 54 Quod huiusmodi relationes non sunt accidentaliter inhaerentes That such relations do not inhere accidentally Non est etiam possibile quod sint accidentaliter inhaerentes, tum quia operationes ad quas consequuntur dictae relationes sunt ipsa Dei substantia, tum etiam quia supra ostensum est quod in Deo nullum accidens esse potest. Unde si relationes praedictae realiter sint in Deo, oportet quod non sint accidentaliter inhaerentes sed subsistentes. Quomodo autem id quod est in aliis rebus accidens in Deo substantialiter esse possit, ex praemissis manifestum est. These relations cannot inhere in God accidentally, both because the operations on which the relations follow are the very substance of God, and also because, as was shown above, there can be no accident in God. Hence, if the relations are really in God, they cannot be accidentally inherent, but must be subsistent. How it is that what is an accident in other things can exist substantially in God, is clear from what has been previously set forth. Capitulum 55 Chapter 55 Quod per praedictas relationes in Deo personalis distinctio constituitur That the personal distinction is constituted through the aforesaid relations in God Quia ergo in divinis distinctio est per relationes quae non sunt accidentes sed subsistentes, rerum autem subsistentium in natura quacumque intellectuali est distinctio personalis, necesse est quod per praedictas relationes in Deo personalis distinctio constituatur. Pater igitur et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt tres personae, et similiter tres hypostases, quia ‘hypostasis’ significat aliquid subsistens completum. Since distinction in the Godhead is by relations that are not accidental, but subsistent, and since among beings subsisting in an intellectual nature there is personal distinction, it necessarily follows that personal distinction in God is constituted by the aforesaid relations. Therefore, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, and similarly three hypostases, since ‘hypostasis’ means something that is subsistent and complete. Capitulum 56 Chapter 56 Quod impossibile est plures personas esse in divinis quam tres That it is impossible for there to be more than three persons in God Plures autem personas tribus esse in divinis impossibile est, cum non sit possibile divinas personas multiplicari per substantiae divisionem, sed solum per alicuius processionis relationem, nec cuiuscumque processionis, sed talis quae non terminetur ad aliquod extrinsecum: nam si terminaretur ad aliquod extrinsecum, non haberet naturam divinam, et sic non posset esse persona aut hypostasis divina. Processio autem in Deo ad exterius non terminata non potest accipi nisi aut secundum operationem intellectus, prout procedit Verbum, aut secundum operationem voluntatis, prout procedit amor, ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur potest esse aliqua persona divina procedens nisi vel ut Verbum quod dicimus Filium, vel ut amor quod dicimus Spiritum. There cannot be more than three persons in God, for the divine persons cannot be multiplied by a division of their substance, but solely by the relation of some procession; and not by any sort of procession, but only by such as does not have its term in something outside of God. If the relation had something external as its term, this would not possess the divine nature, and so could not be a divine person or hypostasis. But procession in God that does not terminate outside of God must be either according to the operation of the intellect, whereby the Word proceeds, or according to the operation of the will, whereby love proceeds, as is clear from the things said. Therefore, no divine person can proceed unless he proceeds as the Word, whom we call the Son, or as love, whom we call the Holy Spirit. Rursus, cum Deus omnia uno intuitu per suum intellectum comprehendat, et similiter uno actu voluntatis omnia diligat, impossibile est in Deo esse plura verba aut plures amores; si igitur Filius procedit ut Verbum, vel Spiritus Sanctus procedit ut amor, impossibile est in Deo esse plures Filios aut plures Spiritus Sanctos. Moreover, since God comprehends everything in his intellect by a single gaze, and similarly loves everything by a single act of his will, there cannot be several words or several loves in God. If, then, the Son proceeds as Word, and if the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, there cannot be several Sons or several Holy Spirits in God. Item, perfectum est extra quod nihil est; quod igitur extra se aliquid sui generis patitur non est simpliciter perfectum, propter quod et ea quae sunt simpliciter in suis naturis perfecta numero non multiplicantur, sicut Deus, sol et luna, et alia huiusmodi. Oportet autem tam Filium quam Spiritum Sanctum esse simpliciter perfectos, cum uterque eorum sit Deus, ut ostensum est; impossibile est igitur esse plures Filios aut plures Spiritus Sanctos. Again, the perfect is that beyond which there is nothing. Hence a being that tolerates anything of its own kind outside itself is not absolutely perfect. This is why things that are simply perfect in their natures are not numerically multiplied, such as God, the sun, the moon, and so on. But both the Son and the Holy Spirit must be simply perfect, since each of them is God, as we have shown. Therefore, several Sons or several Holy Spirits are impossible. Praeterea, illud per quod aliquid subsistens est hoc ab aliis distinctum, impossibile est quod numero multiplicetur, eo quod individuum de pluribus praedicari non potest; sed filiatione Filius est haec persona divina in se subsistens et ab aliis distincta, sicut per principia individuantia Socrates est haec persona humana. Sicut igitur principia individuantia quibus Socrates est hic homo non possunt convenire nisi uni, ita etiam filiatio in divinis non potest nisi uni convenire; et simile est de relatione Patris et Spiritus Sancti: impossibile est igitur in divinis esse plures Patres aut plures Filios aut plures Spiritus Sanctos. Besides, that by which a subsistent thing is this particular thing (distinct from other things) cannot be numerically multiplied, because an individual cannot be predicated of many. But it is by sonship that the Son is this divine person, subsisting in himself and distinct from the other divine persons, just as Socrates is constituted as this human person by individuating principles. Accordingly, as the individuating principles whereby Socrates is this man cannot pertain to more than one man, so sonship in the Godhead cannot pertain to more than one divine person. And it is similar with the relation of the Father and the Holy Spirit. Hence there cannot be several Fathers in God or several Sons or several Holy Spirits. Adhuc, ea quae sunt unum secundum formam non multiplicantur numero nisi per materiam, sicut multiplicatur albedo per hoc quod est in pluribus subiectis; in divinis autem non est materia, quidquid igitur est unum specie et forma in divinis impossibile est multiplicari secundum numerum: huiusmodi autem sunt paternitas et filiatio et Spiritus Sancti processio, impossibile est igitur in divinis esse plures patres aut filios vel spiritus sanctos. Further, things that are one according to form are not numerically multiplied except through matter; thus whiteness is multiplied by existing in many subjects. But there is no matter in God. Consequently, whatever is one in species and form in the Godhead cannot be numerically multiplied. Such are paternity and filiation and the procession of the Holy Spirit. And thus there cannot be several Fathers or Sons or Holy Spirits in God. Capitulum 57 Chapter 57 De proprietatibus seu notionibus in divinis et quot sunt numero in Patre Of the properties or notions in God, and how many are enumerated in the Father