Capitulum 9 Chapter 9 Quod Deus est simplex That God is simple Inde etiam apparet quod oportet primum movens simplex esse. Nam in omni compositione oportet esse duo quae ad invicem se habeant sicut potentia ad actum; in primo autem movente, si est omnino immobile, impossibile est esse potentiam cum actu, nam unumquodque ex hoc quod est in potentia mobile est: impossibile est igitur primum movens compositum esse. Hence it is also clear that the first mover must be simple. For any composite being must contain two factors that are related to each other as potency to act. But in the first mover, which is altogether unmoveable, all combination of potency and act is impossible, because whatever is in potency is, by that very fact, movable. Accordingly, the first mover cannot be composite. Adhuc, omni composito necesse est esse aliquid prius, nam componentia naturaliter sunt priora composito; illud igitur quod est omnium entium primum, impossibile est esse compositum. Videmus etiam in ordine eorum quae sunt, supra composita simplicia esse: nam elementa naturaliter sunt priora corporibus mixtis; inter ipsa etiam elementa primum est ignis, quod est subtilissimum; omnibus autem elementis prius est caeleste corpus, quod in maiori simplicitate constitutum est, cum ab omni contrarietate sit purum. Relinquitur igitur quod primum entium oportet omnino simplex esse. Moreover, something has to exist prior to any composite, since composing elements are naturally prior to a composite. Hence the first of all beings cannot be composite. We also observe that, in the order of things that exist, simpler things are before composite things. Thus elements are naturally prior to mixed bodies. Likewise, among the elements themselves, the first is fire, which is the simplest of all. Prior to all elements is the heavenly body, which has an even simpler construction since it is free from all contrariety. Hence the truth remains that the first of beings must be absolutely simple. Capitulum 10 Chapter 10 Quod Deus est sua essentia That God is his own essence Sequitur autem ulterius quod Deus sit sua essentia. Essentia enim uniuscuiusque rei est illud quod significat definitio eius. Hoc autem est idem cum re cuius est definitio, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet definito accidit aliquid quod est praeter definitionem ipsius: sicut homini accidit album praeter id quod est animal rationale et mortale, unde animal rationale et mortale est idem homini, sed non idem homini albo inquantum est album. In quocumque igitur non est invenire duo quorum unum est per se et aliud per accidens, oportet quod essentia eius sit omnino idem cum eo. In Deo autem, cum sit simplex, ut ostensum est, non est invenire duo quorum unum sit per se et aliud per accidens; oportet igitur quod essentia eius sit omnino idem quod ipse. The further conclusion follows that God is his own essence. The essence of anything is that which its definition signifies. This is identical with the thing of which it is the definition, except accidentally, namely, insofar as something is added to the thing defined over and above its definition. Thus whiteness is added to man, over and above the fact that he is a rational and mortal animal. Hence ‘rational and mortal animal’ is the same as man, but not the same as a white man, insofar as he is white. In any being, therefore, in which there are not found two factors, of which one is essential and the other accidental, its essence must be altogether identical with it. In God, however, since he is simple (as has been shown), there are not found two factors whereof one is essential and the other accidental. Therefore, his essence must be absolutely the same as he himself. Item, in quibuscumque essentia non est omnino idem cum re cuius est essentia, est invenire aliquid per modum potentiae et aliquid per modum actus; nam essentia formaliter se habet ad rem cuius est essentia, sicut humanitas ad hominem. In Deo autem non est invenire potentiam et actum, sed est actus purus; est igitur ipse sua essentia. Moreover, whenever an essence is not absolutely identical with the thing of which it is the essence, something is found in that thing by way of potency and something else by way of act. For an essence is formally related to the thing of which it is the essence as humanity is related to a man. In God, however, one does not find potency and act: he is pure act. Therefore, he is his essence. Capitulum 11 Chapter 11 Quod Dei essentia non est aliud quam suum esse That God’s essence is not other than his existence Ulterius autem necesse est quod Dei essentia non sit aliud quam esse ipsius. In quocumque enim aliud est essentia et aliud esse eius, oportet quod illud alio sit et alio aliquid sit; nam per esse suum de quolibet dicitur quod est, per essentiam vero suam de quolibet dicitur quid sit: unde et definitio significans essentiam demonstrat quid est res. In Deo autem non est aliud quo est et aliud quo aliquid est, cum non sit in eo compositio, ut ostensum est; non est igitur in eo aliud eius essentia et suum esse. Furthermore, God’s essence cannot be other than his existence. In any being whose essence is distinct from its existence, the being must be by one thing and be something by another thing. For in virtue of a thing’s existence we say that it is, and in virtue of its essence we say what it is. This is why a definition that signifies an essence manifests what a thing is. In God, however, there is not one thing by which he exists, and another by which he is something, since there is no composition in him, as has been shown. Therefore, God’s essence is nothing else than his existence. Item, ostensum est quod Deus est actus purus absque alicuius potentialitatis permixtione; oportet igitur quod eius essentia sit ultimus actus, nam omnis actus qui est citra ultimum est in potentia ad ultimum actum. Ultimus autem actus est ipsum esse. Cum enim omnis motus sit exitus de potentia in actum, oportet illud esse ultimum actum in quem tendit omnis motus; et cum motus naturalis in hoc tendat quod est naturaliter desideratum, oportet hoc esse ultimum actum quod omnia desiderant: hoc autem est esse. Oportet igitur quod essentia divina, quae est actus purus et ultimus, sit ipsum esse. Again, we have proved that God is pure act without any admixture of potentiality. Accordingly, his essence must be ultimate act; for any act that is short of the ultimate act is in potency to that ultimate act. But the ultimate act is being itself. For, since all motion is an issuing forth from potency to act, the ultimate act must be that toward which all motion tends; and since natural motion tends to what is naturally desired, the ultimate act must be that which all desire. This is being. Consequently, the divine essence, which is pure and ultimate act, must be being itself. Capitulum 12 Chapter 12 Quod Deus non est in aliquo genere That God is not in a genus Hinc autem apparet quod Deus non est in aliquo genere sicut species. Nam differentia addita generi constituit speciem, igitur cuiuslibet speciei essentia habet aliquid additum supra genus; sed ipsum esse, quod est essentia Dei, nihil in se continet quod sit alteri additum: Deus igitur non est species alicuius generis. We infer from the above that God is not contained within any genus as a species. For a specific difference added to a genus constitutes a species. Hence the essence of any species possesses something over and above its genus. But being itself, which is God’s essence, does not contain within itself anything that is added to something else. Accordingly, God is not a species of any genus. Item, cum genus contineat differentias potestate, in omni constituto ex genere et differentiis est actus permixtus potentiae. Ostensum est autem in Deo esse purum actum absque permixtione potentiae; non est igitur eius essentia constituta ex genere et differentiis, et ita non est in genere. Furthermore, since genus contains specific differences potentially, in every being composed of genus and differences, act is commingled with potency. But we have shown that God is pure act without any commingling of potency. Therefore, his essence is not composed of genus and differences; and so he is not in any genus. Capitulum 13 Chapter 13 Quod Deus non est genus That God is not a genus Ulterius autem ostendendum est quod neque possibile est Deum esse genus. Ex genere enim habetur quid est res, non autem rem esse; nam per differentias specificas constituitur res in proprio esse. Sed hoc quod Deus est, est ipsum esse; impossibile est ergo quod sit genus. Furthermore, it is to be shown that God cannot be a genus, either. What a thing is comes from its genus, but not that it is; for the thing is established in its proper existence through specific differences. But that which God is, is very existence itself. Therefore, he cannot be a genus. Item, omne genus differentiis aliquibus dividitur; ipsius autem esse non est accipere aliquas differentias, differentiae enim non participant genus nisi per accidens, inquantum species constitutae per differentias genus participant. Non potest autem esse aliqua differentia quae non participat esse, quia non ens nullius est differentia; impossibile est igitur quod Deus sit genus de multis speciebus praedicatum. Moreover, every genus is divided by some differences. But no specific differences can be found for being itself. For differences do not share in genus except indirectly, insofar as the species that are constituted by differences share in a genus. But there cannot be any difference that does not share in being, since non-being is not a specific difference of anything. Accordingly, God cannot be a genus predicated of several species. Capitulum 14 Chapter 14 Quod Deus non est aliqua species de multis praedicata That God is not a species said of many individuals Neque etiam est possibile quod sit sicut una species de multis individuis praedicata. Individua enim diversa quae conveniunt in una essentia speciei distinguuntur per aliqua quae sunt praeter essentiam speciei; sicut homines conveniunt in humanitate, sed distinguuntur ab invicem per id quod est praeter rationem humanitatis. Hoc autem in Deo non potest accidere, nam ipse Deus est sua essentia, ut ostensum est; impossibile est igitur quod Deus sit species quae de pluribus individuis praedicetur. Nor can God be, as it were, a single species predicated of many individuals. Various individuals that come together in one essence of a species are distinguished by factors that lie outside the essence of the species. For example, men are alike in their common humanity but differ from one another in virtue of something that is outside the notion of humanity. This cannot occur in God, for God himself is his essence, as has been shown. Therefore, God cannot be a species that is predicated of several individuals. Item, plura individua sub una specie contenta differunt secundum esse, et tantum conveniunt in una essentia speciei. Ubicumque igitur sunt plura individua sub una specie, oportet quod aliud sit esse et aliud essentia speciei; in Deo autem idem est esse et essentia, ut ostensum est: impossibile est igitur quod Deus sit sicut quaedam species de pluribus praedicata. Again, a number of individuals comprised under one species differ in their existence, and yet are alike in their one essence. Accordingly, whenever a number of individuals are under one species, their existence must be different from the essence of the species. But in God existence and essence are identical, as has been demonstrated. Therefore, God cannot be a sort of species predicated of many individuals. Capitulum 15 Chapter 15 Quod necesse est Deum esse unum That it is necessary for God to be one Hinc etiam apparet quod necesse est unum solum Deum esse. Nam si sint multi dii, aut aequivoce aut univoce dicentur dii. Si aequivoce, hoc non est ad propositum: nihil enim prohibet quod nos appellamus lapidem, alios appellare Deum. Si autem univoce, oportet quod conveniant vel in genere vel in specie; ostensum est autem quod Deus neque potest esse genus, neque species plura sub se continens: impossibile est igitur esse plures deos. Hence the conclusion is also evident that there can only be one God. If there were many gods, they would be called gods either equivocally or univocally. If they are called gods equivocally, this is not relevant to our topic: there is nothing to prevent other peoples from applying the name ‘god’ to what we call a stone. If they are called gods univocally, they must agree either in genus or in species. But we have just shown that God can be neither a genus nor a species comprising many individuals under itself. Accordingly, a multiplicity of gods is impossible. Item, illud quo essentia communis individuatur, impossibile est pluribus convenire: unde licet possint esse plures homines, impossibile tamen est hunc hominem esse nisi unum tantum. Si igitur essentia per se ipsam individuetur et non per aliquid aliud, impossibile est quod pluribus conveniat; sed essentia divina per se ipsam individuatur, quia in Deo non est aliud essentia et quod est, cum ostensum sit quod Deus sit sua essentia: impossibile est ergo quod sit Deus nisi unus tantum. Again, that whereby a common essence is individuated cannot pertain to many. Although there can be many men, it is impossible for this particular man to be more than one only. So if an essence is individuated by itself, and not by something else, it cannot pertain to many. But the divine essence is individuated by itself, since God’s essence is not distinct from his existence; for we have shown that God is his essence. Hence God cannot be more than one only. Item, duplex est modus quo aliqua forma potest multiplicari: unus per differentias, sicut forma generalis, ut color in diversas species coloris; alius per subiecta, sicut albedo. Omnis ergo forma quae non potest multiplicari per differentias, si non sit forma in subiecto existens, impossibile est quod multiplicetur; sicut albedo si subsisteret sine substantia, non esset nisi una tantum. Essentia autem divina est ipsum esse, cuius non est accipere differentias, ut ostensum est; cum igitur ipsum esse divinum sit quasi forma per se subsistens, eo quod Deus est suum esse, impossibile est quod essentia divina sit nisi una tantum. Impossibile est igitur esse plures deos. Again, a form can be multiplied in two ways: first, by specific differences, as in the case of a generic form; this is how color is differentiated into the various species of color. Second, by the subjects in which it inheres, as whiteness is multiplied. Therefore, any form incapable of being multiplied by specific differences, if it is a form that does not exist in a subject, cannot be multiplied at all. Thus whiteness, if it were to subsist without a subject, would not be more than one. But the divine essence is being itself, which does not admit of specific differences, as we have shown. Since, therefore, the divine existence is like a form subsisting by itself (for God is his existence), the divine essence cannot be more than one. Accordingly, a plurality of gods is impossible. Capitulum 16 Chapter 16 Quod impossibile est Deum esse corpus That it is impossible for God to be a body Patet autem ulterius quod impossibile est ipsum Deum esse corpus. Nam in omni corpore compositio aliqua invenitur, omne enim corpus est partes habens; id igitur quod est omnino simplex, corpus esse non potest. It is evident, further, that God himself cannot be a body. For in every body some composition is found, since every body has parts. Hence that which is absolutely simple cannot be a body. Item, nullum corpus invenitur movere nisi per hoc quod ipsum movetur, ut per omnia inducenti apparet; si ergo primum movens est omnino immobile, impossibile est ipsum esse corpus. Moreover, we find that a body only moves something else by being moved itself, as is clear to one who considers all the cases. So if the first mover is absolutely immovable, he cannot be a body. Capitulum 17 Chapter 17 Quod impossibile est Deum esse formam corporis That it is impossible for him to be the form of a body Neque etiam est possibile ipsum esse formam corporis aut aliquam virtutem in corpore. Cum enim omne corpus mobile inveniatur, oportet corpore moto, ea quae sunt in corpore moveri, saltem per accidens; primum autem movens non potest nec per se nec per accidens moveri, cum oporteat ipsum esse omnino immobile, ut ostensum est: impossibile est igitur quod sit forma vel virtus in corpore. Nor is it possible for God to be the form of a body or any kind of power existing in a body. For, since all bodies are found to be mobile, whatever is present in a body must be moved, at least incidentally, if the body itself is moved. The first mover, however, cannot be moved either of itself or incidentally, for it must be absolutely immobile, as has been shown. Therefore, it is impossible that God be a form or a power in a body.