Passio Christi et mors Christ’s passion and death Capitulum 226 Chapter 226 De defectibus assumptis a Christo On the defects assumed by Christ Sicut autem conveniens fuit ut Filius Dei humanam naturam assumens propter hominum salutem, in natura assumpta salutis humanae finem ostenderet per gratiae et sapientiae perfectionem, ita etiam conveniens fuit quod in humana natura assumpta a Dei Verbo conditiones aliquae existerent quae congruerent decentissimo liberationis modo generis humani. Fuit autem convenientissimus modus ut homo, qui per iniustitiam perierat, per iustitiam repararetur. Exigit autem hoc iustitiae ordo ut qui poenae alicuius peccando factus est debitor, per solutionem poenae illius liberetur. Quia vero quae per amicos facimus aut patimur, aliqualiter nos ipsi facere aut pati videmur, eo quod amor est unitiua virtus ex duobus se amantibus quodammodo faciens unum, non discordat a iustitiae ordine, si aliquis liberetur amico eius satisfaciente pro ipso. In assuming human nature for the salvation of man, the Son of God appropriately showed in the nature he assumed, by the perfection of its grace and wisdom, what was to be the goal of human salvation. No less appropriately was the human nature assumed by the Word of God characterized by certain conditions befitting the most suitable way of liberating the human race. The most suitable way was that man, who had perished through his injustice, should be restored by justice. But the order of justice requires that the one who has become liable to some punishment by sinning should be freed by paying the penalty. Since, however, what we do or suffer through our friends, we ourselves are considered in some fashion to do or to suffer, inasmuch as love is a force that in a way makes two lovers one, the order of justice is not violated if a person is set free by the satisfaction his friend offers for him. Per peccatum autem primi parentis perditio in totum humanum genus devenerat, nec alicuius hominis poena sufficere poterat ut totum humanam genus liberaret. Non enim erat condigna satisfactio et aequivalens, ut uno homine puro satisfaciente omnes homines absolverentur; similiter etiam nec sufficiebat secundum iustitiam ut angelus ex amore humani generis pro ipso satisfaceret: angelus enim non habet infinitam dignitatem, ut eius satisfactio pro infinitis et infinitorum peccatis sufficere posset. Solus autem Deus est infinitae dignitatis, qui carne assumpta pro homine sufficienter satisfacere poterat, ut supra iam diximus. Talem igitur oportuit ut humanam naturam assumeret in qua pati posset pro homine ea quae homo peccando meruit ut pateretur, ad satisfaciendum pro homine. By the sin of the first parent ruin had come upon the entire human race. No punishment undergone by any man could suffice to liberate the whole human race. No worthy satisfaction was available; no satisfaction offered by any mere man was great enough in value to free all men. Similarly, justice would not be fully met if even an angel, out of love for the human race, were to offer satisfaction for it. An angel does not possess infinite dignity, and hence any satisfaction he offered would not be capable of sufficing for indefinitely many people and their sins. God alone is of infinite dignity, and so he alone, in the flesh assumed by him, could adequately satisfy for man, as has already been noted. Therefore, it was right for him to assume a human nature so constituted that he could suffer for man in it what man himself deserved to suffer on account of his sin, and thus offer satisfaction on man’s behalf. Non autem omnis poena quam homo peccando incurrit, est ad satisfaciendum idonea. Provenit enim peccatum hominis ex hoc quod a Deo avertitur, conversus ad commutabilia bona; punitur autem homo pro peccato in utrisque: nam et privatur gratia et ceteris donis quibus Deo coniungitur, et meretur etiam pati molestiam et defectum in his propter quae a Deo aversus est. Ordo igitur satisfactionis requirit ut per poenas quas peccator in bonis commutabilibus patitur, revocetur ad Deum. However, not every punishment incurred for sin is suitable for making satisfaction. Man’s sin comes from the fact that in turning to transient goods he turns away from God. And man is punished for sin on both counts. He is deprived of grace and the other gifts by which union with God is effected, and besides this he deserves to suffer chastisement and loss with respect to the object for whose sake he turned away from God. Therefore, the order of satisfaction requires that the sinner should be led back to God by punishments suffered in relation to transient goods. Huic autem revocationi contrariae sunt illae poenae quibus homo separatur a Deo; nullus igitur per hoc Deo satisfacit quod privatur gratia, vel quod ignorat Deum, vel quod habet inordinatam animam, quamvis haec sint poena peccati, sed per hoc quod in se ipso dolorem aliquem sentit et in exterioribus rebus damnum. However, the punishments by which man is separated from God stand in the way of such recall. No one offers satisfaction to God by being deprived of grace, or by being ignorant of God, or by the fact that his soul is in a state of disorder, even though such afflictions are punishment for sin; man can satisfy only by enduring some pain in himself and by undergoing loss in external goods. Non igitur Christus illos defectus assumere debuit quibus homo separatur a Deo, licet sint poena peccati, sicut privatio gratiae, ignorantia et huiusmodi. Per hoc enim minus idoneus ad satisfaciendum redderetur; quinimmo ad hoc quod esset actor humanae salutis, requirebatur ut plenitudinem gratiae et sapientiae possideret, sicut iam dictum est. Accordingly, Christ ought not to have assumed those defects which separate man from God, such as privation of grace, ignorance, and the like, although they are punishment for sin. Defects of this kind would but render him less apt for offering satisfaction. Indeed, to be the author of man’s salvation, he had to possess fullness of grace and wisdom, as we pointed out above. Sed quia homo propter peccatum in hoc punitus erat ut necessitatem moriendi haberet, et ut secundum corpus et animam esset passibilis, huiusmodi defectus Christus suscipere voluit, ut mortem pro hominibus patiendo genus humanum redimeret. Yet, since man by sinning was placed under the necessity of dying and of being subjected to suffering in body and soul, Christ wished to assume the same kind of defects, so that by undergoing death for men he might redeem the human race. Est tamen attendendum quod huiusmodi defectus, etsi sint Christo et nobis communes. Alia tamen ratione inveniuntur in ipso et in nobis. Huiusmodi enim defectus, ut dictum est, poena sunt primi peccati; quia igitur nos per vitiatam originem culpam originalem contrahimus, per consequens hos defectus dicimur contractos habere. Christus autem nullam ex sua origine maculam peccati contraxit; hos autem defectus sua voluntate accepit, unde non debet dici quod habuit hos defectus contractos, sed magis assumptos: illud enim contrahitur quod cum alio ex necessitate trahitur. Christus autem potuit assumere humanam naturam sine huiusmodi defectibus, sicut et sine culpa assumpsit: et hoc rationis ordo poscere videbatur ut qui fuit immunis a culpa, esset immunis a poena. Et sic patet quod nulla necessitate neque vitiatae originis, neque iustitiae, huiusmodi defectus fuerunt in eo: unde relinquitur quod non contracti sed voluntarie assumpti fuerunt. Defects of this kind, we should note, are common to Christ and to us. Nevertheless they are found in Christ otherwise than in us. For, as we have remarked, such defects are the punishment of the first sin. Since we contract original sin through our vitiated origin, we are in consequence said to have contracted these defects. But Christ did not contract any stain in virtue of his origin. He accepted these defects by his own free will. Hence we should not say that he contracted these defects, but rather that he assumed them; for that is contracted (contrahitur) which is necessarily drawn along with (cum trahitur) some other thing. Christ could have assumed human nature without such defects, just as he actually did assume it without the defilement of sin; and indeed the order of reason would seem to demand that he who was free from sin should also be free from punishment. Thus it is clear that defects of this sort were not in him by any necessity either of vitiated origin or of justice. Therefore, in him they were not contracted but were voluntarily assumed. Quia vero corpus nostrum praedictis defectibus subiacet in poenam peccati, nam ante peccatum ab his eramus immunes, convenienter Christus, inquantum huiusmodi defectus in sua carne assumpsit, dicitur similitudinem peccati gessisse secundum illud Apostoli Ro. VIII Deus misit Filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati; unde et ipsa Christi passibilitas vel passio ab Apostolo peccatum nominatur, cum subditur et de peccato damnavit peccatum in carne, et Ro. V: Quod mortuus est peccato, mortuus est semel. Et quod est mirabilius, hac etiam ratione dicit Apostolus Gal. III quod est factus pro nobis maledictum. Hac etiam ratione dicitur simplam nostram vetustatem assumpsisse, scilicet poenae, ut duplam nostram consumeret, scilicet culpae et poenae. Yet, since our bodies are subject to the aforesaid defects in punishment for sin—for prior to sin we were immune from them—Christ, so far as he assumed such defects in his flesh, is rightly deemed to have borne the likeness of sin, as the Apostle says in Romans 8:3: God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh. Hence Christ’s very passibility or suffering is called sin by the Apostle, when he adds that God condemned sin in the flesh, and observes in Romans 6:10: In that he died to sin, he died once. For the same reason the Apostle uses an even more astonishing expression in Galatians 3:13, saying that Christ was made a curse for us. This is also why Christ is said to have assumed our single oldness, namely, of punishment, in order to relieve us of our double burden, namely, sin and punishment. Est autem considerandum ulterius quod defectus poenales in corpore duplices inveniuntur: quidam communes omnibus, ut esuries, sitis, lassitudo post laborem, dolor, mors et huiusmodi; quidam vero non sunt omnibus communes, sed quorundam hominum proprii, sicut caecitas, lepra, febris, membrorum mutilatio et huiusmodi. Horum autem defectuum haec est differentia, quod defectus communes in nobis ab alio traducuntur, scilicet ex primo parente qui eos pro peccato incurrit; defectus autem proprii ex particularibus causis in singulis hominibus innascuntur. Christus autem ex se ipso nullam causam defectus habebat, nec ex anima quae erat gratia et sapientia plena et Verbo Dei unita, nec ex corpore quod erat optime omnipotenti virtute Spiritus Sancti compactum, sed sua voluntate quasi dispensative ad nostram salutem procurandam aliquos defectus suscepit. We should call to mind, further, that the penal defects afflicting our bodies are of two kinds. Some are common to all men, such as hunger, thirst, weariness after labor, pain, death, and the like. Others, however, are not common to all, but are peculiar to certain individuals, such as blindness, leprosy, fever, mutilation of the members, and similar ills. The difference between these defects is this: common defects are passed on to us from another, namely, our first parent, who incurred them through sin; but personal defects are produced in individual men by particular causes. But Christ had no cause of defect in himself, either in his soul, which was full of grace and wisdom and was united to the Word of God, or in his body, which was excellently organized and disposed, having been fashioned by the omnipotent power of the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, he took upon himself certain defects by the free decision of his own will, with a view to procuring our salvation. Illos igitur suscipere debuit qui ab alio derivantur ad alios, scilicet communes, non proprios, qui in singuli ex causis propriis innascuntur. Simul etiam quia principaliter venerat ad restaurandum humanam naturam, illos defectus suscipere debuit qui in tota natura inveniebantur. Accordingly, Christ fittingly took on himself those defects that are handed down from one man to others, namely, the common defects, but not the special defects that arise in individuals from particular causes. Again, since he came chiefly to restore human nature, he fittingly assumed those defects that are found universally in nature. Patet igitur secundum praedicta quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, Christus assumpsit defectus nostros indetractabiles, id est quibus detrahi non potest. Si enim defectum scientiae vel gratiae suscepisset, aut etiam lepram auel caecitatem auel aliquid huiusmodi, hoc ad derogationem dignitatis Christi pertinere videretur, et esset hominibus detrahendi occasio, quae nulla datur ex defectibus totius naturae. The doctrine thus set forth also makes it clear that, as Damascene points out, Christ assumed our irreprehensible defects, that is, those which are not open to slander. If Christ had taken to himself a deficiency in knowledge or in grace, or even such ills as leprosy or blindness, this would seem to detract from his dignity, and might provide men with an occasion for defaming him. But no such occasion is given by defects attaching to the whole of nature. Capitulum 227 Chapter 227 Quare Christus mori voluit Why Christ willed to die Manifestum est ergo secundum praedicta quod Christus aliquos defectus nostros suscepit, non ex necessitate, sed propter aliquem finem, scilicet propter nostram salutem. Omnis autem potentia et habitus sive habilitas ordinatur ad actum sicut ad finem: unde passibilitas ad satisfaciendum vel merendum non sufficit sine passione in actu. Non enim aliquis dicitur bonus vel malus ex eo quod potest talia agere, sed ex eo quod agit, nec laus et vituperium potentiae debetur, sed actui; unde et Christus non solum passibilitatem nostram suscepit ut nos salvaret, sed etiam ut pro peccatis nostris satisfaceret voluit pati. Passus est autem pro nobis ea quae ut nos pateremur ex peccato primi parentis meruimus, quorum praecipuum est mors, ad quam omnes aliae passiones humanae ordinantur sicut ad ultimum: Stipendia enim peccati mors est, ut Apostolus dicit Ro. V. Evidently, therefore, as we see from this discussion, Christ took some of our defects on himself not out of necessity, but for a definite purpose, namely, for our salvation. But every potency and every habit or capacity are ordained toward act as their end. Hence capacity to suffer is not enough for satisfaction or merit apart from actual suffering. A person is called good or evil not because he is able to perform good or evil actions, but because he performs them; praise and blame are duly rendered not for power to act but for acting. To save us, consequently, Christ was not content merely to make our passibility his portion, but he willed actually to suffer that he might satisfy for our sins. He endured for us those sufferings which we deserved to suffer in consequence of the sin of our first parent. Of these the chief is death, to which all other human sufferings are ordered as to their final term. For the wages of sin is death, as the Apostle says in Romans 6:23. Unde et Christus pro peccatis nostris voluit mortem pati ut, dum poenam nobis debitam ipse sine culpa susciperet, nos a reatu mortis liberaret, sicut aliquis a debito poenae liberatur, alio pro eo poenam sustinente. Accordingly, Christ willed to submit to death for our sins so that, in taking on himself without any fault of his own the punishment due to us, he might free us from the death to which we had been sentenced, in the way that anyone would be freed from a debt of penalty if another person undertook to pay the penalty for him. Mori etiam voluit ut non solum mors eius esset nobis satisfactionis remedium, sed etiam salutis sacramentum, ut ad similitudinem mortis eius nos carnali vitae moriamur in spiritualem vitam translati, secundum illud I Pe. III Christus semel pro peccatis nostris mortuus est, iustus pro iniustis, ut nos offerret Deo, mortificatos quidem carne, vivificatos autem spiritu. Another reason why he wished to die was that his death might be for us not only a remedy of satisfaction but also a sacrament of salvation, so that we, transferred to a spiritual life, might die to our carnal life, in the likeness of his death. This is in accord with 1 Peter 3:18: For Christ also died for sins once for all, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh but made alive in the spirit. Mori etiam voluit ut nobis mors eius esset perfectae virtutis exemplum. Quantum ad caritatem quidem, quia maiorem caritatem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis, ut dicitur Io. XV; tanto enim quisque magis amare ostenditur, quanto plura et graviora pro amico pati non refugit: omnium autem humanorum malorum gravius est mors, per quam tollitur vita humana, unde nullum maius signum dilectionis esse potest quam quod homo pro amico se morti exponat. Christ also wished to die that his death might be an example of perfect virtue for us. He gave an example of charity, for greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends (John 15:13). The more numerous and grievous are the sufferings a person does not refuse to bear for his friend, the more strikingly his love is shown forth. But of all human ills the most grievous is death, by which human life is snuffed out. Hence no greater proof of love is possible than that a man should expose himself to death for a friend. Quantum ad fortitudinem vero, quae propter adversa a iustitia non recedit, quia maxime ad fortitudinem pertinere videtur ut etiam nec timore mortis aliquis a virtute recedat, unde dicit Apostolus Hebr. II de Christi passione loquens Ut per mortem destrueret eum qui habebat mortis imperium, et liberaret eos qui per totam vitam timore mortis obnoxii erant servituti. Dum enim pro veritate mori non recusavit, exclusit timorem moriendi, propter quem homines servituti peccati plerumque subduntur. By his death Christ also gave an example of fortitude, which does not abandon justice in the face of adversity; refusal to give up the practice of virtue even under fear of death seems to pertain most emphatically to fortitude. Thus the Apostle says in Hebrews 2:14–15, with reference to Christ’s Passion: That through death he might destroy him who has the power of death, that is, the devil, and deliver all those who through fear of death were subject to lifelong bondage. In not refusing to die for truth, Christ overcame the fear of dying, which is the reason men for the most part are subject to the slavery of sin. Quantum ad patientiam vero, quae in adversis tristitiam hominem absorbere non sinit, quia quanto sunt maiora adversa, tanto magis in his relucet patientiae virtus unde in maximo malorum quod est mors, perfectae patientiae datur exemplum, si absque mentis turbatione sustineatur, quod de Christo propheta praedixit dicens Ys. LIII tamquam agnus coram tondente se obmutescet, et non aperiet os suum. Further, he gave an example of patience, a virtue that prevents sorrow from overwhelming man in time of adversity; the greater the trials, the more splendidly does the virtue of patience shine forth in them. Therefore, an example of perfect patience is afforded in the greatest of evils, which is death, if it is borne without mental turbulence. Such tranquility the prophet foretold of Christ: He shall be like a lamb that before its shearers is dumb, and shall not open his mouth (Isa 53:7). Quantum ad obedientiam vero, quia tanto laudabilior est obedientia quanto in difficilioribus quis obedit; omnium autem difficillimum est mors: unde ad perfectam obedientiam Christi commendandam dicit Apostolus Phil. II quod factus est obediens Patri usque ad mortem. Lastly, our Lord gave an example of obedience, for the more difficult are the precepts one obeys, the more praiseworthy is the obedience. But the most difficult of all the objects of obedience is death. Hence, to commend the perfect obedience of Christ, the Apostle says, in Philippians 2:8, that he was obedient to the Father even unto death. Capitulum 228 Chapter 228 De morte crucis On the death of the cross Ex eisdem etiam causis apparet quare mortem crucis voluit pati. Primo quidem quia hoc convenit quantum ad remedium satisfactionis convenienter enim homo punitur per ea in quibus peccavit; in quo enim peccat quis, per hoc et torquetur, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Peccatum autem hominis primum fuit per hoc quod pomum arboris ligni scientiae boni et mali contra praeceptum decerpsit; loco cuius Christus se ligno affigi permisit, ut exsolveret quae non rapuit, sicut de eo Psalmus dicit. The same reasons reveal why Christ willed to suffer the death of the cross. In the first place, such a death was suitable as a salutary means of satisfaction. Man is fittingly punished in the things wherein he has sinned, as is said in Wisdom 11:16: One is punished by the very things by which he sins. But the first sin of man was the fact that he ate the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, contrary to God’s command. In his stead Christ permitted himself to be fastened to a tree, so that he might pay for what he did not carry off, as Psalm 68 [67]:5 says of him. Convenit etiam quantum ad sacramentum. Voluit enim Christus ostendere sua morte, ut sic moreremur vitae carnali quod spiritus noster in superna elevaretur; unde et ipse dicebat Io. XII Ego si exaltatus fuero a terra, omnia traham ad me ipsum. Death on the cross was also appropriate as a sacrament. Christ wished to make clear by his death that we ought so to die in our carnal life that our spirit might be raised to higher things. Hence he himself says, in John 12:32: I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all men to myself. Convenit etiam quantum ad exemplum perfectae virtutis. Homines enim quandoque non minus refugiunt vituperabile genus mortis quam mortis acerbitatem; unde ad perfectionem virtutis pertinere videtur ut propter bonum virtutis aliquis vetiam vituperabilem mortem non refugiat pati. Unde Apostolus ad commendandam perfectam obedientiam Christi, cum dixisset de eo quod factus est obediens usque ad mortem, subdidit mortem autem crucis: quae quidem mors turpissima videbatur, secundum illud Sap. II Morte turpissima condemnemus eum. This kind of death was likewise fitting as an example of perfect virtue. Sometimes men shrink no less from a disgraceful kind of death than from the painfulness of death. Accordingly, the perfection of virtue seems to require that a person should not refuse to suffer even a disgraceful death for the good of virtue. Therefore, to commend the perfect obedience of Christ, the Apostle, after saying of him that he was obedient unto death, added: even to the death of the cross (Phil 2:8). This sort of death was looked on as the most ignominious of all, in the words of Wisdom 2:20: Let us condemn him to a shameful death. Capitulum 229 Chapter 229 De morte Christi On the death of Christ Cum autem in Christo conveneriant in unam personam tres substantiae, scilicet corpus, anima et divinitas Verbi, quarum duae, scilicet anima et corpus, unitae sunt in unam naturam, in morte quidem Christi separata est unio corporis et animae: Aliter enim corpus vere mortuum non fuisset, mors enim corporis nihil est aliud quam separatio animae ab ipso. In Christ three substances, the body, the soul, and the divinity of the Word, are joined together in one person. Two of these, the soul and the body, are united to form one nature. Accordingly, at the death of Christ the union between body and soul was dissolved. Otherwise the body would not have been truly dead, since death of the body is nothing else than the separation of the soul from it. Neutrum tamen separatum est a Dei Verbo quantum ad unionem personae. Ex unione autem animae et corporis resultat humanitas: unde separata anima a corpore Christi per mortem, in triduo mortis homo dici non potuit. Dictum est autem supra quod propter unionem in persona humanae naturae ad Dei Verbum, quidquid dicitur de homine Christo potest convenienter de Dei Filio praedicari; unde cum in morte manserit unio personalis Filii Dei tam ad animam quam ad corpus Christi, quidquid de utroque eorum dicitur, poterat de Dei Filio praedicari. Unde et in Symbolo dicitur de Filio Dei quod sepultus est, propter hoc quod corpus sibi unitum iacuit in sepulcro, et quod descendit ad inferos, anima descendente. But neither soul nor body was separated from the Word of God, as far as union with the person is concerned. Human nature results from the union of soul and body; hence Christ could not be said to be a man during the three days of his death, when his soul remained separated from his body by death. However, as was shown above, on account of the union of the human nature with the Word of God in one person, whatever is said of the man Christ can rightly be predicated also of the Son of God. Consequently, since the personal union of the Son of God both with the soul and with the body of Christ remained in death, whatever is said of either of them could be predicated of the Son of God. Hence the Creed asserts that the Son of God was buried, for the reason that the body united to him lay in the tomb, and likewise that he descended into hell, because his soul descended. Est etiam considerandum quod masculinum genus designat personam, neutrum vero naturam: unde in Trinitate dicimus quod Filius est alius a Patre, non aliud. Secundum hoc ergo in triduo mortis Christus fuit totus in sepulcro, totus in inferno, totus in caelo, propter personam quae unita erat et carni in sepulcro iacenti, et animae infernum exspolianti, et subsistebat in natura divina in caelo regnante; sed non potest dici quod totum fuerit in sepulcro aut in inferno, quia non tota humana natura, sed pars in sepulcro aut in inferno fuit. We should also recall that the masculine gender designates a person, and that the neuter gender designates nature. Thus in speaking of the Trinity we say that the Son is another person (alius) than the Father, but not that he is another thing (aliud). Accordingly, during the three days of his death Christ was whole in the sepulcher, whole in hell, and whole in heaven, because of his person which remained united to his flesh reposing in the tomb and to his soul which was emptying hell, and which continued to subsist in the divine nature reigning in heaven. But we cannot say that the whole of Christ was in the sepulcher or in hell, because only a part of the human nature and not the whole of it was in the sepulcher or in hell. Capitulum 230 Chapter 230 Quod mors Christi fuit voluntaria That the death of Christ was voluntary Fuit igitur mors Christi nostrae morti conformis quantum ad id quod est de ratione mortis, quod est animam a corpore separari; sed quantum ad aliquid mors Christi a nostra morte differens fuit. Nos enim morimur quasi morti subiecti ex necessitate vel naturae, vel alicuius violentiae nobis illatae; Christus autem mortuus est non necessitate, sed potestate et propria voluntate: unde ipse dicebat Io. X Potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam, et iterum sumendi eam. Christ’s death was like our death as regards the essence of death, which consists in the separation of the soul from the body. But in another respect the death of Christ was different from ours. We die because we are subject to death by a necessary law of nature, or in consequence of some violence done to us. But Christ did not die because of any necessity. He gave up his life by his power and his own will, as he himself attested: I have power to lay my life down, and I have power to take it again (John 10:18).