De Aeternitate Mundi
On the Eternity of the World
Supposito secundum fidem Catholicam quod mundus durationis initium habuit, dubitatio mota est, utrum potuerit semper fuisse. Cuius dubitationis ut veritas explicetur, prius distinguendum est in quo cum adversariis convenimus, et quid est illud in quo ab eis differimus. Si enim intelligatur quod aliquid praeter Deum potuit semper fuisse, quasi possit esse aliquid, tamen ab eo non factum, error abominabilis est, non solum in fide, sed etiam apud philosophos, qui confitentur et probant omne quod est quocumque modo esse non posse, nisi sit causatum ab eo qui maxime et verissime esse habet. Si autem intelligatur aliquid semper fuisse, et tamen causatum fuisse a Deo secundum totum id quod in eo est, videndum est utrum hoc possit stare.
We accept, in accordance with the Catholic faith, that the world had a beginning in time. The question still arises whether the world could have always existed, and to explain the truth of this matter, we should first distinguish where we agree with our opponents from where we disagree with them. If someone holds that something besides God could have always existed, in the sense that there could be something always existing and yet not made by God, then we differ with him: such an abominable error is contrary not only to the faith but also to the teachings of the philosophers, who confess and prove that everything that in any way exists could not exist unless it be caused by him who supremely and most truly has existence. However, someone may hold that there has always existed something that nevertheless had been wholly caused by God, and thus we ought to determine whether this position is tenable.
Si autem dicatur hoc esse impossibile, vel hoc dicetur quia Deus non potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuerit; aut quia non potuit fieri, etsi Deus posset facere. In prima autem parte omnes consentiunt, in hoc scilicet quod Deus potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuerit, considerando potentiam ipsius infinitam; restat igitur videre, utrum sit possibile aliquid fieri quod semper fuerit.
Now, if it be impossible that something caused by God has always existed, it will be so either because God could not make something that has always existed or because such a thing could not be made, even by the power of God. As to the first, all parties agree that, in view of his infinite power, God could have made something that has always existed, provided that such a thing can be made. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether something that has always existed can be made.
Si autem dicatur quod hoc non potest fieri, hoc non potest intelligi nisi duobus modis, vel duas causas veritatis habere: vel propter remotionem potentiae passivae, vel propter repugnantiam intellectuum.
If such a thing cannot be made, the impossibility will arise for one of two reasons: either because of an absence of a pre-existing passive potentiality or because of some contradiction between the ideas involved.
Primo modo posset dici antequam Angelus sit factus 'non potest Angelus fieri,' quia non praeexistit ad eius esse aliqua potentia passiva, cum non sit factus ex materia praeiacente; tamen Deus poterat facere Angelum, poterat etiam facere ut Angelus fieret, quia fecit, et factus est. Sic ergo intelligendo, simpliciter concedendum est secundum fidem quod non potest creatum semper esse, quia hoc ponere esset ponere potentiam passivam semper fuisse: quod haereticum est. Tamen ex hoc non sequitur quod Deus non possit facere ut fiat aliquid semper ens.
In regard to the first, notice that before an angel is made, we may say, in a certain manner of speaking, that the angel cannot come to be, meaning that, since an angel is not made from pre-existing matter, there is no passive potentiality preceding its existence. Nevertheless, God was able to make the angel, and he was able to make it that the angel came to be, for God made the angel, and the angel was made. If a thing’s being made implied the pre-existence of a passive potentiality, then it would have to be conceded, according to faith, that something caused cannot have always existed, for if such a thing had always existed, it would follow that a passive potentiality had always existed, and this is heretical. But, as the example of the angel shows, a passive potentiality need not precede in time something God makes, and so it does not follow that God could not have made something that has always existed.
Secundo modo dicitur propter repugnantiam intellectuum aliquid non posse fieri, sicut quod non potest fieri ut affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera, quamvis Deus hoc possit facere, ut quidam dicunt, quidam vero dicunt, quod nec Deus hoc posset facere, quia hoc nihil est: tamen manifestum est quod non potest facere ut hoc fiat, quia positio qua ponitur esse, destruit se ipsam. Si tamen ponatur quod Deus huiusmodi potest facere ut fiant, positio non est haeretica, quamvis ut credo sit falsa, sicut quod praeteritum non fuerit includit in se contradictionem; unde Augustinus in libro Contra Faustum: Quisquis ita dicit: 'Si omnipotens est Deus, faciat ut ea quae facta sunt, facta non fuerint', non videt hoc se dicere 'Si omnipotens est Deus, faciat ut ea quae vera sunt, eo ipso quo vera sunt, falsa sint'. Et tamen quidam magni pie dixerunt Deum posse facere de praeterito quod non fuerit praeteritum; nec fuit reputatum haereticum.
In regard to the second, saying that something made has always existed may be thought to involve a contradiction and therefore be impossible in the way it is impossible for an affirmation and a negation to be simultaneously true. Still, some people say that God can even make self-contradictory things, while others deny this and argue that such things are actually nothing. Clearly, however, God cannot make self-contradictory things come to be, for the assumption that such a thing exists immediately implies that it does not exist. Nevertheless, the proposition that God can make self-contradictory things is not heretical, although, as I believe, it is false, just as the proposition that the past did not occur is false, for that proposition includes in itself a contradiction. For, as Augustine says in Contra Faustum (26, 5): anyone who says, "If God is omnipotent, let him make what has happened not to have happened," does not realize that he is saying, "if God is omnipotent, let him make true things false insofar as they are true." Nevertheless, certain great men have piously maintained that God can make past events not to have happened, and this was not reputed to be heretical.
Videndum est ergo utrum in his duobus repugnantia sit intellectuum, quod aliquid sit creatum a Deo et tamen semper fuerit; et quidquid de hoc verum sit, non erit haereticum dicere quod hoc potest fieri a Deo, ut aliquid creatum a Deo semper fuerit. Tamen credo quod si esset repugnantia intellectuum, esset falsum; si autem non est repugnantia intellectuum, non solum non est falsum sed etiam impossibile: aliter esset erroneum, si aliter dicatur. Cum enim ad omnipotentiam Dei pertineat ut omnem intellectum et virtutem excedat, expresse omnipotentiae Dei derogat, qui dicit aliquid posse intelligi in creaturis quod a Deo fieri non possit: nec est instantia de peccatis, quae in quantum huiusmodi nihil sunt. In hoc ergo tota consistit quaestio, utrum esse creatum a Deo secundum totam substantiam et non habere durationis principium, repugnent ad invicem, vel non.
We thus ought to determine whether there is any contradiction between these two ideas, namely, to be made by God and to have always existed. And, whatever may be the truth of this matter, it will not be heretical to say that God can make something created by him to have always existed, although I believe that if there is a contradiction involved in asserting this, the assertion will be false. However, if there is no contradiction involved, then it will be neither false nor impossible that God could have made something that has always existed, and it will be an error to say otherwise. For, if there is no contradiction, it will be expressly derogatory to the omnipotence of God, which exceeds every thought and power of ours, to say that we creatures could conceive of something that God could not make. (Sins are not an instance to the contrary, for, considered in themselves, they are nothing.) In this, therefore, the entire question consists: whether to be wholly created by God and not to have a beginning in time are contradictory terms.
Quod autem non repugnent ad invicem, sic ostenditur. Si enim repugnant, hoc non est nisi propter alterum duorum, vel propter utrumque: aut quia oportet ut causa agens praecedat duratione, aut quia oportet quod non esse praecedat duratione propter hoc quod dicitur creatum a Deo ex nihilo fieri.
That they are not contradictory can be shown as follows. If they are contradictory, this is for one or both of these two reasons: either because the agent cause must precede the effect in time, or because non-being must precede the effect in time, for we say that what God creates comes to be out of nothing.
Primo ostendam quod non est necesse ut causa agens, scilicet Deus, praecedat duratione suum causatum si ipse voluisset.
First, we should show that it is not necessary that God, as an agent cause, precede in time that which he causes, unless, of course, he should will to do so. This can be shown in several ways.
Primo sic: nulla causa producens suum effectum subito necessario praecedit duratione suum effectum; sed Deus est causa producens effectum suum non per motum, sed subito: ergo non est necessarium quod duratione praecedat effectum suum. Prima per inductionem patet in omnibus mutationibus subitis, sicut est illuminatio et huiusmodi; nihilominus tamen potest probari per rationem sic.
First, no cause instantaneously producing its effect necessarily precedes the effect in time. God, however, is a cause that produces effects not through motion but instantaneously. Therefore, it is not necessary that he precede his effects in time. The first premise is clear by induction from all instantaneous changes, such as illumination and the like, but this premise may be proved by reason as well.
In quocumque instanti ponitur res esse, potest poni principium actionis eius, ut patet in omnibus generabilibus, quia in illo instanti in quo incipit ignis esse, calefacit; sed in operatione subita, simul, immo idem est principium et finis eius, sicut in omnibus indivisibilibus: ergo in quocumque instanti ponitur agens producens effectum suum subito, potest poni terminus actionis suae. Sed terminus actionis simul est cum ipso facto; ergo non repugnat intellectui, si ponatur causa producens effectum suum subito non praecedere duratione causatum suum. Repugnat autem in causis producentibus per motum effectus suos, quia oportet quod principium motus praecedat finem eius. Et quia homines sunt assueti considerare huiusmodi factiones quae sunt per motus, ideo non facile capiunt quod causa agens duratione effectum suum non praecedat; et inde est quod multorum inexperti ad pauca respicientes facile enuntiant.
For, at whatever instant a thing exists, at that instant it can begin to act, as is clear in the case of all things that come to be by generation: in the very instant at which there is fire, the fire heats. But in an instantaneous action, the beginning and the end of the action are simultaneous, indeed identical, as is clear in the case of all indivisible things. Hence, at whatever moment an agent instantaneously producing an effect exists, the end of its action can exist as well. The end of the action, however, is simultaneous with the thing made. Therefore, there is no contradiction if we suppose that a cause instantaneously producing an effect does not precede its effect in time. A contradiction does obtain if the cause involved is one that produces its effects through motion, for the beginning of the motion precedes in time the end of the motion. Since people are accustomed to considering the type of cause that produces effects through motion, they do not easily grasp that an agent cause may fail to precede its effect in time, and so, attending to a few things and being unfamiliar with many others, they easily fall into error.
Nec potest huic rationi obviare quod Deus est causa agens per voluntatem, quia etiam voluntas non est necessarium quod praecedat duratione effectum suum; nec agens per voluntatem, nisi per hoc quod agit ex deliberatione: quod absit ut in Deo ponamus.
Nor can the conclusion be avoided by saying that God is an agent cause that acts voluntarily, for neither the will nor the voluntary agent need precede its effect in time, unless the agent cause acts from deliberation, which we take to be absent in God.
Praeterea, causa producens totam rei substantiam non minus potest in producendo totam substantiam, quam causa producens formam in productione formae; immo multo magis, quia non producit educendo de potentia materiae, sicut est in eo qui producit formam. Sed aliquod agens quod producit solum formam potest in hoc quod forma ab eo producta sit quandocumque ipsum est, ut patet in sole illuminante; ergo multo fortius Deus, qui producit totam rei substantiam, potest facere ut causatum suum sit quandocumque ipse est.
Further, a cause that produces the whole substance of a thing is not less powerful than a cause that produces just a form. On the contrary, it is much more powerful, for it does not act by educing from the potentiality of matter, as do causes that merely produce forms. However, some causes that produce only forms are such that, whenever the cause exists, the form produced by it exists as well, as is clear in the case of illumination by the sun. Therefore, much more can God, who produces the whole substance of things, make something caused by him exist whenever he himself exists.
Praeterea, si aliqua causa sit, qua posita in aliquo instanti non possit poni effectus eius ab ea procedens in eodem instanti, hoc non est nisi quia causae deest aliquid de complemento; causa enim completa et causatum sunt simul. Sed Deo nunquam defuit aliquid de complemento; ergo causatum eius potest poni semper eo posito, et ita non est necessarium quod duratione praecedat.
Further, if, when a cause exists, its effect does not immediately exist as well, this can only be because something complementary to that cause is lacking: the complete cause and the thing caused are simultaneous. God, however, never lacks any kind of complementary cause in order to produce an effect. Therefore, at any instant at which God exists, so too can his effects, and thus God need not precede his effects in time.
Praeterea, voluntas volentis nihil diminuit de virtute eius, et praecipue in Deo. Sed omnes solventes ad rationes Aristotelis quibus probatur res semper fuisse a Deo, per hoc quod idem semper facit idem, dicunt quod hoc sequeretur si non esset agens per voluntatem; ergo etsi ponatur agens per voluntatem, nihilominus sequitur quod potest facere ut causatum ab eo nunquam non sit. Et ita patet quod non repugnat intellectui quod dicitur agens non praecedere effectum suum duratione, quia in illis quae repugnant intellectui, Deus non potest facere ut illud sit.
Further, the will of the voluntary agent in no way diminishes the agent’s power, and this is especially true with God. But all those who try to answer the arguments of Aristotle (who held that something caused by God has always existed, since like always makes like) say that the conclusion would follow if God were not a voluntary agent. Therefore, allowing that God is a voluntary agent, it still follows that he can make something caused by him to have always existed. Thus, although God cannot make contradictories true, we have shown that there is no contradiction in saying that an agent cause does not precede its effect in time.
Nunc restat videre an repugnet intellectui aliquod factum nunquam non fuisse, propter quod necessarium sit non esse eius duratione praecedere, propter hoc quod dicitur ex nihilo factum esse. Sed quod hoc in nullo repugnet, ostenditur per dictum Anselmi in Monologio, 8 capitulo exponentis quomodo creatura dicatur facta ex nihilo. Tertia, inquit, interpretatio, qua dicitur aliquid esse factum de nihilo, est cum intelligimus esse quidem factum, sed non esse aliquid unde sit factum; per similem significationem dici videtur, cum homo contristatus sine causa dicitur contristatus de nihilo. Secundum igitur hunc sensum si intelligatur quod supra conclusum est, quia praeter summam essentiam cuncta quae sunt ab eadem ex nihilo facta sunt, idest non ex aliquo, nihil inconveniens sequetur. Unde patet quod secundum hanc expositionem non ponitur aliquis ordo eius quod factum est ad nihil, quasi oportuerit illud quod factum est nihil fuisse et postmodum aliquid esse.
It remains to be seen, then, whether there is a contradiction in saying that something made has always existed, on the grounds that its non-being necessarily precedes it in time, for we say that it is made out of nothing. But that there is no contradiction here is shown by Anselm in his explanation of what it means to say that a creature is made out of nothing. He says in Monologion, 8: the third sense in which we can say that something is made out of nothing is this: we understand that something is made, but that there is not something from which it is made. In a similar way, we say that someone who is sad without reason is sad about nothing. We can thus say that all things, except the Supreme Being, are made by him out of nothing in the sense that they are not made out of anything, and no absurdity results. On this understanding, therefore, no temporal priority of non-being to the thing made is posited, as there would be if there were first nothing and then later something.
Praeterea, supponatur quod ordo ad nihil in praepositione importatus remaneat affirmatus, ut sit sensus: creatura facta est ex nihilo, idest facta est post nihil, haec dictio 'post' ordinem importat absolute. Sed ordo multiplex est, scilicet durationis et naturae; si igitur ex communi et universali non sequitur proprium et particulare, non esset necessarium ut, propter hoc quod creatura dicitur esse post nihil, prius duratione fuerit nihil et postea fuerit aliquid, sed sufficit si prius natura sit nihil quam ens. Prius enim naturaliter inest unicuique quod convenit sibi in se, quam quod ex alio habetur;
Further, let us even suppose that the preposition in question imports some affirmative order of non-being to being, as if the proposition that the creature is made out of nothing meant that the creature is made after nothing. Then this expression "after" certainly implies order, but order is of two kinds: order of time and order of nature. If, therefore, the proper and the particular does not follow from the common and the universal, it will not necessarily follow that, because the creature is made after nothing, there was first nothing and then later in time something. Rather, it suffices that non-being be prior to being by nature. Now, whatever naturally pertains to something in itself is prior to what that thing only receives from another.
esse autem non habet creatura nisi ab alio, sibi autem relicta in se considerata nihil est: unde prius naturaliter est sibi nihilum quam esse. Nec oportet quod propter hoc sit simul nihil et ens, quia duratione non praecedit; non enim ponitur, si creatura semper fuit, ut in aliquo tempore nihil sit, sed ponitur quod natura eius talis esset quod esset nihil, si sibi relinqueretur: ut si dicamus aerem semper illuminatum fuisse a sole, oportebit dicere quod aer factus est lucidus a sole.
A creature does not have being, however, except from another, for, considered in itself, every creature is nothing, and thus, with respect to the creature, non-being is prior to being by nature. Nor does it follow from the creature’s always having existed that its being and non-being were ever simultaneous, as if the creature always existed but at some time nothing existed, for the priority is not one of time. Rather, the argument merely requires that the nature of the creature is such that, if the creature were left to itself, it would be nothing. For example, if we should say that the air has always been illuminated by the sun, it would nevertheless still be right to say that the air has always been made lucid by the sun.
Et quia omne quod fit ex incontingenti fit, idest ex eo quod non contingit simul esse cum eo quod dicitur fieri, oportebit dicere quod sit factus lucidus ex non lucido vel ex tenebroso; non ita quod umquam fuerit non lucidus vel tenebrosus, sed quia esset talis si eum sibi sol relinqueret. Et hoc expressius patet in stellis et orbibus quae semper illuminantur a sole.
Thus, since anything that comes to be such-and-such comes to be such-and-such from being not such-and-such, we say that the air is made lucid from being non-lucid or opaque, not because the air was once non-lucid or opaque, but because the air would be opaque if the sun did not illuminate it. This is clearly the case with the stars and those celestial bodies that are always illuminated by the sun.
Sic ergo patet quod in hoc quod dicitur aliquid esse factum a Deo et nunquam non fuisse, non est intellectus aliqua repugnantia. Si enim esset aliqua, mirum est quomodo Augustinus eam non vidit, quia hoc esset efficacissima via ad improbandum aeternitatem mundi; cum tamen ipse multis rationibus impugnet aeternitatem mundi in XI et XII De civitate Dei, hanc etiam viam omnino praetermittit.
It is thus clear that there is no contradiction in saying that something made by God has always existed. Indeed, if there were some contradiction, it would be amazing that Augustine failed to see it, for exposing such a contradiction would be a most effective way of proving that the world is not eternal, and although Augustine offers many arguments against the eternity of the world in De civitate Dei, 11-12, he never suggests that such a view involves a contradiction.
Quinimmo videtur innuere quod non sit ibi repugnantia intellectuum, unde dicit X De civitate Dei 31 capitulo, de Platonicis loquens: Id quomodo intelligant invenerunt, non esse hoc scilicet temporis sed substitutionis initium. Sic enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium, quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret; nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset. Sic, inquiunt, et mundus et dii in illo creati semper fuerunt, semper existente qui fecit; et tamen facti sunt.
On the contrary, Augustine seems to hint that there is no contradiction involved. Thus, speaking of the Platonists, he says in De civitate Dei, 10, 31: they somehow contemplate a beginning in causation rather than a beginning in time. Imagine, they say, a foot that has been in dust since eternity: a footprint has always been beneath it, and nobody would doubt that the footprint was made by the pressure of the foot. Although neither is prior in time to the other, yet one is made by the other. Likewise, they say, the world and the gods in it have always been created, just as he who made them always existed; yet, nevertheless, they were made.
Nec unquam dicit hoc non posse intelligi, sed alio modo procedit contra eos. Item dicit XI libro 4 capitulo: Qui autem a Deo quidem mundum factum fatentur, non tamen eum temporis sed suae creationis initium volunt habere, ut modo quodam vix intelligibili semper sit factus, dicunt quidem aliquid, et cetera. Causa autem quare est vix intelligibile, tacta est in prima ratione.
Nor does Augustine ever say that this cannot be understood; rather, he proceeds against the Platonists in a totally different way. He says in De civitate Dei, 11, 4: those, however, who admit that the world was made by God but nevertheless want to hold that the world had a beginning in creation but not in time, so that, in some scarcely intelligible way, it has always been made by God, think that they are defending God against a charge of casual rashness. Their position is difficult to understand, however, only for the reason given above in the first argument.
Mirum est etiam quomodo nobilissimi philosophorum hanc repugnantiam non viderunt. Dicit enim Augustinus in eodem libro capitulo 5, contra illos loquens de quibus in praecedenti auctoritate facta est mentio: Cum his agimus qui et Deum corporum et omnium naturarum quae non sunt quod ipse, creatorem nobiscum sentiunt; de quibus postea subdit: Isti philosophos ceteros nobilitate et auctoritate vicerunt. Et hoc etiam patet diligenter consideranti dictum eorum qui posuerunt mundum semper fuisse, quia nihilominus ponunt eum a Deo factum, nihil de hac repugnantia intellectuum percipientes; ergo illi qui tam subtiliter eam percipiunt soli sunt homines, et cum illis oritur sapientia.
How remarkable it would be that even the most noble of philosophers failed to see a contradiction in the idea that something made by God has always existed. Speaking against the Platonists, Augustine says in De civitate Dei, 11, 5: here we are contending with those who agree with us that God is the Creator of all bodies and all natures except himself, and then, again about the Platonists, he adds in De civitate Dei, 11, 5: these philosophers surpassed the rest in nobility and authority. Augustine said this even after diligently considering their position that the world has always existed, for they nevertheless thought that it was made by God, and they saw no contradiction between these two ideas. Therefore, those who so subtly perceive the contradiction are solitary men, and with these does wisdom arise.
Sed quia quaedam auctoritates videntur pro eis facere, ideo ostendendum est quod praestant eis debile fulcimentum. Dicit enim Damascenus I libro 8 capitulo: Non aptum natum est quod ex non ente ad esse deducitur, coaeternum esse ei quod sine principio est et semper est. Item Hugo de sancto Victore in principio libri sui De sacramentis, dicit: Ineffabilis omnipotentiae virtus non potuit aliud praeter se habere coaeternum, quo faciendo iuvaretur.
Still, since certain authorities seem to argue on the side of such men, we ought to show that they base themselves on a weak foundation. Damascene says in De fide irthodoxa, 1, 8: what is made out of nothing is by nature not such that it is coeternal to what has no causal principle and always exists. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor says in De sacramentis 1, 1: the ineffable omnipotent power could not have anything coeternal beyond itself that would help it in making.
Sed harum auctoritatum et similium intellectus patet per hoc quod dicit Boetius in ultimo De consolatione: Non recte quidam, cum audiunt visum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium temporis, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo Conditori conditum mundum fieri coaeternum putant. Aliud enim est per interminabilem vitam duci, quod mundo Plato tribuit, aliud interminabilis vitae totam pariter complexam esse praesentiam, quod divinae mentis esse proprium manifestum est. Unde patet quod etiam non sequitur quod quidam obiciunt, scilicet quod creatura aequaretur Deo in duratione.
But the position of these and similar authorities is made clear by Boethius, who says in De consolatione, 5, prosa 6: when some people hear that Plato thought this world neither had a beginning in time nor will ever have an end, they mistakenly conclude that the created world is coeternal with the Creator. However, to be led through the endless life Plato attributes to the world is one thing; to embrace simultaneously the whole presence of endless life is quite another, and it is this latter that is proper to the divine mind. Thus, it does not follow, as some people object, that a creature, if it had always existed, would be equal to God in duration.
Et quod per hunc modum dicatur quod nullo modo potest esse aliquid coaeternum Deo, quia scilicet nihil potest esse immutabile nisi solus Deus, patet per hoc quod dicit Augustinus in libro XII De civitate Dei capitulo 15: Tempus, quoniam mutabilitate transcurrit, aeternitati immutabili non potest esse coaeternum. Ac per hoc etiam si immortalitas Angelorum non transit in tempore, nec praeterita est quasi iam non sit, nec futura quasi nondum sit: tamen eorum motus, quibus tempora peraguntur, ex futuro in praeteritum transeunt; et ideo Creatori, in cuius motu dicendum non est vel fuisse quod iam non sit, vel futurum esse quod nondum sit, coaeterni esse non possunt. Similiter etiam dicit VIII Super Genesim: Quia omnino incommutabilis est illa natura Trinitatis, ob hoc ita aeterna est ut ei aliquid coaeternum esse non possit. Consimilia verba dicit in XI Confessionum.
For, even if some created thing always existed, it could in no way be coeternal with God, for nothing but God is immutable. As Augustine says in De civitate Dei, 12, 15, time, since it passes away by its mutability, cannot be coeternal with immutable eternity. Thus, even if the immortality of the angels does not pass away in time (it is neither past, as if it did not exist now; nor is it future, as if it did not yet exist), nevertheless, the angels’ motions, by which moments of time are carried along from the future into the past, pass away. Therefore, angels cannot be coeternal with the Creator, in whose motion there is nothing which has been that is not now, nor anything which will later be that is not already. Likewise, Augustine says in Super Genesis ad litteram, 8, 23, since the nature of the Trinity is wholly unchangeable, it is eternal in such a way that nothing can be coeternal with it, and he uses words to the same effect in Confessionum, 11, 30, as well.
Addunt etiam pro se, rationes quas etiam philosophi tetigerunt et eas solverunt, inter quas illa est difficilior quae est de infinitate animarum: quia si mundus semper fuit, necesse est modo infinitas animas esse. Sed haec ratio non est ad propositum; quia Deus mundum facere potuit sine hominibus et animabus, vel tunc homines facere quando fecit, etiam si totum mundum fecisset ab aeterno: et sic non remanerent post corpora animae infinitae. Et praeterea non est adhuc demonstratum quod Deus non possit facere ut sint infinita actu.
Those who try to prove that the world could not have always existed even adduce arguments that the philosophers have considered and solved. Chief among these is the argument from the infinity of souls: if the world had always existed, these people argue, there would necessarily now exist an infinite number of souls. But this argument is not to the point, for God could have made the world without making men or creatures with souls, or he could have made men when in fact he did make them, even if he had made the rest of the world from eternity. In either case, an infinite number of souls would not remain after the bodies had passed away. Furthermore, it has not yet been demonstrated that God cannot cause an infinite number of things to exist simultaneously.
Aliae etiam rationes sunt a quarum responsione supersedeo ad praesens: tum quia eis alibi responsum est, tum quia quaedam earum sunt adeo debiles, quod sua debilitate contrariae parti videntur probabilitatem afferre.
There are other arguments as well, but I refrain from answering them at present, either because they have been suitably answered elsewhere, or because they are so weak that their very weakness lends probability to the opposing view.