Nunc restat videre an repugnet intellectui aliquod factum nunquam non fuisse, propter quod necessarium sit non esse eius duratione praecedere, propter hoc quod dicitur ex nihilo factum esse. Sed quod hoc in nullo repugnet, ostenditur per dictum Anselmi in Monologio, 8 capitulo exponentis quomodo creatura dicatur facta ex nihilo. Tertia, inquit, interpretatio, qua dicitur aliquid esse factum de nihilo, est cum intelligimus esse quidem factum, sed non esse aliquid unde sit factum; per similem significationem dici videtur, cum homo contristatus sine causa dicitur contristatus de nihilo. Secundum igitur hunc sensum si intelligatur quod supra conclusum est, quia praeter summam essentiam cuncta quae sunt ab eadem ex nihilo facta sunt, idest non ex aliquo, nihil inconveniens sequetur. Unde patet quod secundum hanc expositionem non ponitur aliquis ordo eius quod factum est ad nihil, quasi oportuerit illud quod factum est nihil fuisse et postmodum aliquid esse.
It remains to be seen, then, whether there is a contradiction in saying that something made has always existed, on the grounds that its non-being necessarily precedes it in time, for we say that it is made out of nothing. But that there is no contradiction here is shown by Anselm in his explanation of what it means to say that a creature is made out of nothing. He says in Monologion, 8: the third sense in which we can say that something is made out of nothing is this: we understand that something is made, but that there is not something from which it is made. In a similar way, we say that someone who is sad without reason is sad about nothing. We can thus say that all things, except the Supreme Being, are made by him out of nothing in the sense that they are not made out of anything, and no absurdity results. On this understanding, therefore, no temporal priority of non-being to the thing made is posited, as there would be if there were first nothing and then later something.
Praeterea, supponatur quod ordo ad nihil in praepositione importatus remaneat affirmatus, ut sit sensus: creatura facta est ex nihilo, idest facta est post nihil, haec dictio 'post' ordinem importat absolute. Sed ordo multiplex est, scilicet durationis et naturae; si igitur ex communi et universali non sequitur proprium et particulare, non esset necessarium ut, propter hoc quod creatura dicitur esse post nihil, prius duratione fuerit nihil et postea fuerit aliquid, sed sufficit si prius natura sit nihil quam ens. Prius enim naturaliter inest unicuique quod convenit sibi in se, quam quod ex alio habetur;
Further, let us even suppose that the preposition in question imports some affirmative order of non-being to being, as if the proposition that the creature is made out of nothing meant that the creature is made after nothing. Then this expression "after" certainly implies order, but order is of two kinds: order of time and order of nature. If, therefore, the proper and the particular does not follow from the common and the universal, it will not necessarily follow that, because the creature is made after nothing, there was first nothing and then later in time something. Rather, it suffices that non-being be prior to being by nature. Now, whatever naturally pertains to something in itself is prior to what that thing only receives from another.
esse autem non habet creatura nisi ab alio, sibi autem relicta in se considerata nihil est: unde prius naturaliter est sibi nihilum quam esse. Nec oportet quod propter hoc sit simul nihil et ens, quia duratione non praecedit; non enim ponitur, si creatura semper fuit, ut in aliquo tempore nihil sit, sed ponitur quod natura eius talis esset quod esset nihil, si sibi relinqueretur: ut si dicamus aerem semper illuminatum fuisse a sole, oportebit dicere quod aer factus est lucidus a sole.
A creature does not have being, however, except from another, for, considered in itself, every creature is nothing, and thus, with respect to the creature, non-being is prior to being by nature. Nor does it follow from the creature’s always having existed that its being and non-being were ever simultaneous, as if the creature always existed but at some time nothing existed, for the priority is not one of time. Rather, the argument merely requires that the nature of the creature is such that, if the creature were left to itself, it would be nothing. For example, if we should say that the air has always been illuminated by the sun, it would nevertheless still be right to say that the air has always been made lucid by the sun.
Et quia omne quod fit ex incontingenti fit, idest ex eo quod non contingit simul esse cum eo quod dicitur fieri, oportebit dicere quod sit factus lucidus ex non lucido vel ex tenebroso; non ita quod umquam fuerit non lucidus vel tenebrosus, sed quia esset talis si eum sibi sol relinqueret. Et hoc expressius patet in stellis et orbibus quae semper illuminantur a sole.
Thus, since anything that comes to be such-and-such comes to be such-and-such from being not such-and-such, we say that the air is made lucid from being non-lucid or opaque, not because the air was once non-lucid or opaque, but because the air would be opaque if the sun did not illuminate it. This is clearly the case with the stars and those celestial bodies that are always illuminated by the sun.
Sic ergo patet quod in hoc quod dicitur aliquid esse factum a Deo et nunquam non fuisse, non est intellectus aliqua repugnantia. Si enim esset aliqua, mirum est quomodo Augustinus eam non vidit, quia hoc esset efficacissima via ad improbandum aeternitatem mundi; cum tamen ipse multis rationibus impugnet aeternitatem mundi in XI et XII De civitate Dei, hanc etiam viam omnino praetermittit.
It is thus clear that there is no contradiction in saying that something made by God has always existed. Indeed, if there were some contradiction, it would be amazing that Augustine failed to see it, for exposing such a contradiction would be a most effective way of proving that the world is not eternal, and although Augustine offers many arguments against the eternity of the world in De civitate Dei, 11-12, he never suggests that such a view involves a contradiction.
Quinimmo videtur innuere quod non sit ibi repugnantia intellectuum, unde dicit X De civitate Dei 31 capitulo, de Platonicis loquens: Id quomodo intelligant invenerunt, non esse hoc scilicet temporis sed substitutionis initium. Sic enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium, quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret; nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset. Sic, inquiunt, et mundus et dii in illo creati semper fuerunt, semper existente qui fecit; et tamen facti sunt.
On the contrary, Augustine seems to hint that there is no contradiction involved. Thus, speaking of the Platonists, he says in De civitate Dei, 10, 31: they somehow contemplate a beginning in causation rather than a beginning in time. Imagine, they say, a foot that has been in dust since eternity: a footprint has always been beneath it, and nobody would doubt that the footprint was made by the pressure of the foot. Although neither is prior in time to the other, yet one is made by the other. Likewise, they say, the world and the gods in it have always been created, just as he who made them always existed; yet, nevertheless, they were made.
Nec unquam dicit hoc non posse intelligi, sed alio modo procedit contra eos. Item dicit XI libro 4 capitulo: Qui autem a Deo quidem mundum factum fatentur, non tamen eum temporis sed suae creationis initium volunt habere, ut modo quodam vix intelligibili semper sit factus, dicunt quidem aliquid, et cetera. Causa autem quare est vix intelligibile, tacta est in prima ratione.
Nor does Augustine ever say that this cannot be understood; rather, he proceeds against the Platonists in a totally different way. He says in De civitate Dei, 11, 4: those, however, who admit that the world was made by God but nevertheless want to hold that the world had a beginning in creation but not in time, so that, in some scarcely intelligible way, it has always been made by God, think that they are defending God against a charge of casual rashness. Their position is difficult to understand, however, only for the reason given above in the first argument.
Mirum est etiam quomodo nobilissimi philosophorum hanc repugnantiam non viderunt. Dicit enim Augustinus in eodem libro capitulo 5, contra illos loquens de quibus in praecedenti auctoritate facta est mentio: Cum his agimus qui et Deum corporum et omnium naturarum quae non sunt quod ipse, creatorem nobiscum sentiunt; de quibus postea subdit: Isti philosophos ceteros nobilitate et auctoritate vicerunt. Et hoc etiam patet diligenter consideranti dictum eorum qui posuerunt mundum semper fuisse, quia nihilominus ponunt eum a Deo factum, nihil de hac repugnantia intellectuum percipientes; ergo illi qui tam subtiliter eam percipiunt soli sunt homines, et cum illis oritur sapientia.
How remarkable it would be that even the most noble of philosophers failed to see a contradiction in the idea that something made by God has always existed. Speaking against the Platonists, Augustine says in De civitate Dei, 11, 5: here we are contending with those who agree with us that God is the Creator of all bodies and all natures except himself, and then, again about the Platonists, he adds in De civitate Dei, 11, 5: these philosophers surpassed the rest in nobility and authority. Augustine said this even after diligently considering their position that the world has always existed, for they nevertheless thought that it was made by God, and they saw no contradiction between these two ideas. Therefore, those who so subtly perceive the contradiction are solitary men, and with these does wisdom arise.
Sed quia quaedam auctoritates videntur pro eis facere, ideo ostendendum est quod praestant eis debile fulcimentum. Dicit enim Damascenus I libro 8 capitulo: Non aptum natum est quod ex non ente ad esse deducitur, coaeternum esse ei quod sine principio est et semper est. Item Hugo de sancto Victore in principio libri sui De sacramentis, dicit: Ineffabilis omnipotentiae virtus non potuit aliud praeter se habere coaeternum, quo faciendo iuvaretur.
Still, since certain authorities seem to argue on the side of such men, we ought to show that they base themselves on a weak foundation. Damascene says in De fide irthodoxa, 1, 8: what is made out of nothing is by nature not such that it is coeternal to what has no causal principle and always exists. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor says in De sacramentis 1, 1: the ineffable omnipotent power could not have anything coeternal beyond itself that would help it in making.
Sed harum auctoritatum et similium intellectus patet per hoc quod dicit Boetius in ultimo De consolatione: Non recte quidam, cum audiunt visum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium temporis, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo Conditori conditum mundum fieri coaeternum putant. Aliud enim est per interminabilem vitam duci, quod mundo Plato tribuit, aliud interminabilis vitae totam pariter complexam esse praesentiam, quod divinae mentis esse proprium manifestum est. Unde patet quod etiam non sequitur quod quidam obiciunt, scilicet quod creatura aequaretur Deo in duratione.
But the position of these and similar authorities is made clear by Boethius, who says in De consolatione, 5, prosa 6: when some people hear that Plato thought this world neither had a beginning in time nor will ever have an end, they mistakenly conclude that the created world is coeternal with the Creator. However, to be led through the endless life Plato attributes to the world is one thing; to embrace simultaneously the whole presence of endless life is quite another, and it is this latter that is proper to the divine mind. Thus, it does not follow, as some people object, that a creature, if it had always existed, would be equal to God in duration.
Et quod per hunc modum dicatur quod nullo modo potest esse aliquid coaeternum Deo, quia scilicet nihil potest esse immutabile nisi solus Deus, patet per hoc quod dicit Augustinus in libro XII De civitate Dei capitulo 15: Tempus, quoniam mutabilitate transcurrit, aeternitati immutabili non potest esse coaeternum. Ac per hoc etiam si immortalitas Angelorum non transit in tempore, nec praeterita est quasi iam non sit, nec futura quasi nondum sit: tamen eorum motus, quibus tempora peraguntur, ex futuro in praeteritum transeunt; et ideo Creatori, in cuius motu dicendum non est vel fuisse quod iam non sit, vel futurum esse quod nondum sit, coaeterni esse non possunt. Similiter etiam dicit VIII Super Genesim: Quia omnino incommutabilis est illa natura Trinitatis, ob hoc ita aeterna est ut ei aliquid coaeternum esse non possit. Consimilia verba dicit in XI Confessionum.
For, even if some created thing always existed, it could in no way be coeternal with God, for nothing but God is immutable. As Augustine says in De civitate Dei, 12, 15, time, since it passes away by its mutability, cannot be coeternal with immutable eternity. Thus, even if the immortality of the angels does not pass away in time (it is neither past, as if it did not exist now; nor is it future, as if it did not yet exist), nevertheless, the angels’ motions, by which moments of time are carried along from the future into the past, pass away. Therefore, angels cannot be coeternal with the Creator, in whose motion there is nothing which has been that is not now, nor anything which will later be that is not already. Likewise, Augustine says in Super Genesis ad litteram, 8, 23, since the nature of the Trinity is wholly unchangeable, it is eternal in such a way that nothing can be coeternal with it, and he uses words to the same effect in Confessionum, 11, 30, as well.
Addunt etiam pro se, rationes quas etiam philosophi tetigerunt et eas solverunt, inter quas illa est difficilior quae est de infinitate animarum: quia si mundus semper fuit, necesse est modo infinitas animas esse. Sed haec ratio non est ad propositum; quia Deus mundum facere potuit sine hominibus et animabus, vel tunc homines facere quando fecit, etiam si totum mundum fecisset ab aeterno: et sic non remanerent post corpora animae infinitae. Et praeterea non est adhuc demonstratum quod Deus non possit facere ut sint infinita actu.
Those who try to prove that the world could not have always existed even adduce arguments that the philosophers have considered and solved. Chief among these is the argument from the infinity of souls: if the world had always existed, these people argue, there would necessarily now exist an infinite number of souls. But this argument is not to the point, for God could have made the world without making men or creatures with souls, or he could have made men when in fact he did make them, even if he had made the rest of the world from eternity. In either case, an infinite number of souls would not remain after the bodies had passed away. Furthermore, it has not yet been demonstrated that God cannot cause an infinite number of things to exist simultaneously.
Aliae etiam rationes sunt a quarum responsione supersedeo ad praesens: tum quia eis alibi responsum est, tum quia quaedam earum sunt adeo debiles, quod sua debilitate contrariae parti videntur probabilitatem afferre.
There are other arguments as well, but I refrain from answering them at present, either because they have been suitably answered elsewhere, or because they are so weak that their very weakness lends probability to the opposing view.