Sic ergo patet quod in hoc quod dicitur aliquid esse factum a Deo et nunquam non fuisse, non est intellectus aliqua repugnantia. Si enim esset aliqua, mirum est quomodo Augustinus eam non vidit, quia hoc esset efficacissima via ad improbandum aeternitatem mundi; cum tamen ipse multis rationibus impugnet aeternitatem mundi in XI et XII De civitate Dei, hanc etiam viam omnino praetermittit.
It is thus clear that there is no contradiction in saying that something made by God has always existed. Indeed, if there were some contradiction, it would be amazing that Augustine failed to see it, for exposing such a contradiction would be a most effective way of proving that the world is not eternal, and although Augustine offers many arguments against the eternity of the world in De civitate Dei, 11-12, he never suggests that such a view involves a contradiction.
Quinimmo videtur innuere quod non sit ibi repugnantia intellectuum, unde dicit X De civitate Dei 31 capitulo, de Platonicis loquens: Id quomodo intelligant invenerunt, non esse hoc scilicet temporis sed substitutionis initium. Sic enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium, quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret; nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset. Sic, inquiunt, et mundus et dii in illo creati semper fuerunt, semper existente qui fecit; et tamen facti sunt.
On the contrary, Augustine seems to hint that there is no contradiction involved. Thus, speaking of the Platonists, he says in De civitate Dei, 10, 31: they somehow contemplate a beginning in causation rather than a beginning in time. Imagine, they say, a foot that has been in dust since eternity: a footprint has always been beneath it, and nobody would doubt that the footprint was made by the pressure of the foot. Although neither is prior in time to the other, yet one is made by the other. Likewise, they say, the world and the gods in it have always been created, just as he who made them always existed; yet, nevertheless, they were made.
Nec unquam dicit hoc non posse intelligi, sed alio modo procedit contra eos. Item dicit XI libro 4 capitulo: Qui autem a Deo quidem mundum factum fatentur, non tamen eum temporis sed suae creationis initium volunt habere, ut modo quodam vix intelligibili semper sit factus, dicunt quidem aliquid, et cetera. Causa autem quare est vix intelligibile, tacta est in prima ratione.
Nor does Augustine ever say that this cannot be understood; rather, he proceeds against the Platonists in a totally different way. He says in De civitate Dei, 11, 4: those, however, who admit that the world was made by God but nevertheless want to hold that the world had a beginning in creation but not in time, so that, in some scarcely intelligible way, it has always been made by God, think that they are defending God against a charge of casual rashness. Their position is difficult to understand, however, only for the reason given above in the first argument.
Mirum est etiam quomodo nobilissimi philosophorum hanc repugnantiam non viderunt. Dicit enim Augustinus in eodem libro capitulo 5, contra illos loquens de quibus in praecedenti auctoritate facta est mentio: Cum his agimus qui et Deum corporum et omnium naturarum quae non sunt quod ipse, creatorem nobiscum sentiunt; de quibus postea subdit: Isti philosophos ceteros nobilitate et auctoritate vicerunt. Et hoc etiam patet diligenter consideranti dictum eorum qui posuerunt mundum semper fuisse, quia nihilominus ponunt eum a Deo factum, nihil de hac repugnantia intellectuum percipientes; ergo illi qui tam subtiliter eam percipiunt soli sunt homines, et cum illis oritur sapientia.
How remarkable it would be that even the most noble of philosophers failed to see a contradiction in the idea that something made by God has always existed. Speaking against the Platonists, Augustine says in De civitate Dei, 11, 5: here we are contending with those who agree with us that God is the Creator of all bodies and all natures except himself, and then, again about the Platonists, he adds in De civitate Dei, 11, 5: these philosophers surpassed the rest in nobility and authority. Augustine said this even after diligently considering their position that the world has always existed, for they nevertheless thought that it was made by God, and they saw no contradiction between these two ideas. Therefore, those who so subtly perceive the contradiction are solitary men, and with these does wisdom arise.
Sed quia quaedam auctoritates videntur pro eis facere, ideo ostendendum est quod praestant eis debile fulcimentum. Dicit enim Damascenus I libro 8 capitulo: Non aptum natum est quod ex non ente ad esse deducitur, coaeternum esse ei quod sine principio est et semper est. Item Hugo de sancto Victore in principio libri sui De sacramentis, dicit: Ineffabilis omnipotentiae virtus non potuit aliud praeter se habere coaeternum, quo faciendo iuvaretur.
Still, since certain authorities seem to argue on the side of such men, we ought to show that they base themselves on a weak foundation. Damascene says in De fide irthodoxa, 1, 8: what is made out of nothing is by nature not such that it is coeternal to what has no causal principle and always exists. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor says in De sacramentis 1, 1: the ineffable omnipotent power could not have anything coeternal beyond itself that would help it in making.
Sed harum auctoritatum et similium intellectus patet per hoc quod dicit Boetius in ultimo De consolatione: Non recte quidam, cum audiunt visum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium temporis, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo Conditori conditum mundum fieri coaeternum putant. Aliud enim est per interminabilem vitam duci, quod mundo Plato tribuit, aliud interminabilis vitae totam pariter complexam esse praesentiam, quod divinae mentis esse proprium manifestum est. Unde patet quod etiam non sequitur quod quidam obiciunt, scilicet quod creatura aequaretur Deo in duratione.
But the position of these and similar authorities is made clear by Boethius, who says in De consolatione, 5, prosa 6: when some people hear that Plato thought this world neither had a beginning in time nor will ever have an end, they mistakenly conclude that the created world is coeternal with the Creator. However, to be led through the endless life Plato attributes to the world is one thing; to embrace simultaneously the whole presence of endless life is quite another, and it is this latter that is proper to the divine mind. Thus, it does not follow, as some people object, that a creature, if it had always existed, would be equal to God in duration.
Et quod per hunc modum dicatur quod nullo modo potest esse aliquid coaeternum Deo, quia scilicet nihil potest esse immutabile nisi solus Deus, patet per hoc quod dicit Augustinus in libro XII De civitate Dei capitulo 15: Tempus, quoniam mutabilitate transcurrit, aeternitati immutabili non potest esse coaeternum. Ac per hoc etiam si immortalitas Angelorum non transit in tempore, nec praeterita est quasi iam non sit, nec futura quasi nondum sit: tamen eorum motus, quibus tempora peraguntur, ex futuro in praeteritum transeunt; et ideo Creatori, in cuius motu dicendum non est vel fuisse quod iam non sit, vel futurum esse quod nondum sit, coaeterni esse non possunt. Similiter etiam dicit VIII Super Genesim: Quia omnino incommutabilis est illa natura Trinitatis, ob hoc ita aeterna est ut ei aliquid coaeternum esse non possit. Consimilia verba dicit in XI Confessionum.
For, even if some created thing always existed, it could in no way be coeternal with God, for nothing but God is immutable. As Augustine says in De civitate Dei, 12, 15, time, since it passes away by its mutability, cannot be coeternal with immutable eternity. Thus, even if the immortality of the angels does not pass away in time (it is neither past, as if it did not exist now; nor is it future, as if it did not yet exist), nevertheless, the angels’ motions, by which moments of time are carried along from the future into the past, pass away. Therefore, angels cannot be coeternal with the Creator, in whose motion there is nothing which has been that is not now, nor anything which will later be that is not already. Likewise, Augustine says in Super Genesis ad litteram, 8, 23, since the nature of the Trinity is wholly unchangeable, it is eternal in such a way that nothing can be coeternal with it, and he uses words to the same effect in Confessionum, 11, 30, as well.
Addunt etiam pro se, rationes quas etiam philosophi tetigerunt et eas solverunt, inter quas illa est difficilior quae est de infinitate animarum: quia si mundus semper fuit, necesse est modo infinitas animas esse. Sed haec ratio non est ad propositum; quia Deus mundum facere potuit sine hominibus et animabus, vel tunc homines facere quando fecit, etiam si totum mundum fecisset ab aeterno: et sic non remanerent post corpora animae infinitae. Et praeterea non est adhuc demonstratum quod Deus non possit facere ut sint infinita actu.
Those who try to prove that the world could not have always existed even adduce arguments that the philosophers have considered and solved. Chief among these is the argument from the infinity of souls: if the world had always existed, these people argue, there would necessarily now exist an infinite number of souls. But this argument is not to the point, for God could have made the world without making men or creatures with souls, or he could have made men when in fact he did make them, even if he had made the rest of the world from eternity. In either case, an infinite number of souls would not remain after the bodies had passed away. Furthermore, it has not yet been demonstrated that God cannot cause an infinite number of things to exist simultaneously.
Aliae etiam rationes sunt a quarum responsione supersedeo ad praesens: tum quia eis alibi responsum est, tum quia quaedam earum sunt adeo debiles, quod sua debilitate contrariae parti videntur probabilitatem afferre.
There are other arguments as well, but I refrain from answering them at present, either because they have been suitably answered elsewhere, or because they are so weak that their very weakness lends probability to the opposing view.